Timothy Pawl’s Model of the Incarnation: A Comprehensive Analysis of the Two Natures of Christ

Introduction: The Challenge of the Incarnation

The doctrine of the Incarnation stands at the very heart of Christian faith. It declares something that seems almost impossible to believe: that Jesus Christ, the man who walked the dusty roads of Palestine two thousand years ago, was both fully God and fully human at the same time. This teaching isn’t just a side note in Christianity—it’s the foundation stone upon which everything else rests. As Timothy Pawl explains in his book “The Incarnation” (Elements in the Philosophy of Religion), “The doctrine of the Incarnation is the teaching that Jesus Christ, the human crucified under Pontius Pilate, was truly God, one person of the Blessed Trinity” (Chapter 1: Introduction).

But here’s where things get complicated. How can one person be both God, with all the amazing qualities that come with being divine, and human, with all the limitations that we experience every day? God is supposed to be all-knowing, all-powerful, and present everywhere at once. Humans, on the other hand, have limited knowledge, get tired, and can only be in one place at a time. This puzzle is what Pawl calls “the Fundamental Philosophical Problem of Christology” (Chapter 7: The Fundamental Philosophical Problem).

Over the centuries, many brilliant minds have tried to solve this puzzle. Some have suggested that Jesus gave up his divine powers when he became human (this is called Kenoticism). Others have proposed that he had two separate consciousnesses—one divine and one human. Still others, like Oliver Crisp and the defenders of Kryptic models, have offered different solutions. But according to Pawl, each of these approaches has serious problems.

This is where Timothy Pawl’s model comes in. As a philosopher at the University of St. Thomas, Pawl has developed what he believes is a better way to understand the Incarnation—one that stays true to traditional Christian teaching while also making philosophical sense. His approach is sophisticated yet careful, drawing on centuries of theological wisdom while engaging with modern philosophical tools.

In this comprehensive report, we will explore Pawl’s model in great detail. We’ll see how he builds his case step by step, starting with the basic building blocks and working up to a complete picture of how one person can be both God and human. We’ll also compare his approach with other models, particularly looking at where he differs from scholars like Oliver Crisp and those who defend Kryptic models of the Incarnation. Finally, we’ll examine a crucial issue that often gets overlooked: how physicalism (the belief that humans are purely physical beings without souls) actually undermines the true doctrine of the Incarnation.

Part I: The Foundation of Pawl’s Model

Understanding Conciliar Christology

Before diving into Pawl’s specific model, we need to understand what he’s trying to defend. Pawl isn’t making up new ideas about Jesus; instead, he’s defending what Christians have traditionally believed for nearly two thousand years. This traditional teaching is called “Conciliar Christology” because it was carefully worked out in a series of church councils during the early centuries of Christianity.

Pawl begins his book by laying out exactly what these councils taught. In Chapter 1: “Introduction”, he explains that his goal is to defend the coherence of this traditional teaching against philosophical objections. The councils that met in places like Nicaea (325 AD), Constantinople (381 AD), Ephesus (431 AD), and Chalcedon (451 AD) weren’t just making things up—they were trying to be faithful to what the Bible teaches while also being philosophically careful.

According to these councils, several things must be true about Jesus Christ. First, he is truly God—not just godlike or especially close to God, but actually God himself, the Second Person of the Trinity. As Pawl notes in his discussion of “The Divinity of Christ” (Chapter 3), this means Jesus has all the essential attributes of divinity: he is eternal, unchanging, all-knowing, all-powerful, and present everywhere.

Second, Jesus is truly human—not just appearing to be human or partly human, but completely and fully human like us in every way except sin. In Chapter 4: “The Humanity of Christ”, Pawl explains that this means Jesus had a real human body and a real human soul. He could feel pain, get hungry, experience emotions, and even die.

Third, these two natures exist in one person. There aren’t two people (a divine Jesus and a human Jesus)—there’s just one Jesus who is both divine and human. This unity is called the “hypostatic union,” which Pawl discusses extensively in Chapter 5: “The Hypostatic Union”.

The Fundamental Problem

Now we come to the heart of the philosophical challenge. If Jesus has both a divine nature and a human nature, it seems like he would have contradictory properties. How can the same person be both omniscient (all-knowing) and limited in knowledge? How can he be both omnipotent (all-powerful) and weak? How can he be both omnipresent (present everywhere) and located in one specific place?

Pawl presents this problem formally in Chapter 7: “The Fundamental Philosophical Problem”. The problem can be stated like this: According to traditional Christian teaching, Christ has incompatible properties. For example, he is both passible (able to suffer) as a human and impassible (unable to suffer) as God. But nothing can have incompatible properties at the same time. Therefore, the traditional teaching seems to be incoherent.

This is a serious challenge. If the Incarnation involves a logical contradiction, then it’s not just mysterious—it’s impossible. And if it’s impossible, then Christianity’s central claim is false. So the stakes couldn’t be higher.

Key Terminology in Pawl’s System

To understand Pawl’s solution, we need to get clear on some technical terms he uses. Don’t worry—while these terms might sound complicated at first, they’re actually pretty straightforward once you understand what they mean.

Person and Nature: In everyday language, we often use “person” and “human” interchangeably. But in theology, they mean different things. A “person” is an individual rational being—a “who.” A “nature” is what kind of thing something is—a “what.” You and I are each one person with one human nature. But Jesus is one person with two natures (divine and human).

Concrete vs. Abstract Natures: This is a crucial distinction in Pawl’s model. An abstract nature is like a checklist of properties—for example, “human nature” understood as the list of qualities that make something human (rational, embodied, mortal, etc.). A concrete nature, on the other hand, is an actual individual instance—not the idea of humanity, but an actual human being with flesh and blood.

Pawl argues strongly that when the councils talked about Christ’s human nature, they meant a concrete nature. As he explains in Chapter 2, Section II.b: “Nature”, “The concrete nature view states that natures are fundamentally concrete particulars: on this view, Christ’s human nature was fundamentally a concrete particular.” This isn’t just a minor technical point—it’s essential to Pawl’s entire model.

The Hypostatic Union: This term refers to the union of the divine and human natures in the one person of Christ. “Hypostasis” is just another word for “person” in this context. The hypostatic union is mysterious and unique—it’s not like any other kind of union we’re familiar with. It’s not like the union of body and soul in a regular human being, and it’s not like two things being glued together. It’s a special kind of union that preserves both natures completely while uniting them in one person.

Supposit: This is a technical term for an individual substance—basically, a complete individual thing that exists on its own. Normally, every human nature is its own supposit (its own individual thing). But Christ’s human nature is special—it doesn’t exist on its own but exists in the person of the Word (the Second Person of the Trinity).

Part II: Pawl’s Compositional Model Explained

The Basic Structure

Now we’re ready to dive into Pawl’s actual model. His approach is what philosophers call a “compositional” model because it understands Christ as composed of parts—though not in the way we normally think of parts.

In his foundational work “In Defense of Conciliar Christology” (Chapter 2, Section IV), Pawl lays out what he calls the “Bare Bones Model.” Think of this like the framework of a house before all the details are added. The basic idea is this: Christ is one divine person who has taken on an additional concrete human nature.

Here’s where Pawl’s model gets really interesting. He argues that we should think of Christ as having a “three-part Christology.” This doesn’t mean Christ is divided into three pieces, but rather that we can distinguish three metaphysical components: (1) the divine nature, (2) a human body, and (3) a human soul.

Pawl explains in Chapter 2, Section IV.e: “The Hypostatic Union”: “This model is what is sometimes called a ‘three-part Christology.’ Two-part Christologies state that Christ is composed of two ‘parts’, the Word and a human body. Three-part Christologies say that Christ has three ‘parts’: the Word, and a human nature comprising a body-and-soul composite, distinct from the Word.”

It’s crucial to understand that when Pawl talks about “parts,” he’s not thinking of parts like the parts of a machine. As he carefully notes, we shouldn’t think of these as mereological parts (parts in the strict philosophical sense). Instead, he’s using “parts” in a looser, more figurative sense to help us understand the distinctions within Christ while maintaining his unity.

How Properties Work in Pawl’s Model

One of the most sophisticated aspects of Pawl’s model is how he handles the attribution of properties to Christ. This is where his philosophical training really shines through.

According to Pawl, when we say something like “Christ is omniscient” or “Christ is hungry,” we need to understand what makes these statements true. His answer draws on a philosophical theory called “truthmaker theory.” A truthmaker is whatever in reality makes a statement true. For example, what makes “The ball is red” true is the ball actually being red.

In Chapter 3: “The Theory Enfleshed”, Pawl explains that different types of predications (statements about Christ) have different types of truthmakers:

Essential Predications: When we say something essential about Christ (like “Christ is divine”), the truthmaker is his divine nature itself. The divine nature makes it true that Christ is eternal, omnipotent, omniscient, etc.

Accidental Predications: When we say something accidental about Christ (like “Christ is sitting”), the truthmaker is his human nature along with certain accidental properties. His human body can sit, stand, walk, etc.

Here’s where Pawl introduces a crucial principle that he calls “Typical Dependence” (Chapter 2, Section IV.d): “If some truth, t, would depend upon some things, the xs (e.g., a concrete nature; property-role fulfillers), were the xs in a typical case of nature possession, then t would depend upon the xs were the xs in an atypical case of nature possession.”

What does this mean in plain English? Basically, if having a human body normally makes it true that a person can be hungry, then Christ’s having a human body makes it true that Christ can be hungry—even though his case is atypical because he’s also divine. The human nature does the same “work” in Christ that it does in us, and the divine nature continues doing its divine work.

The Communication of Idioms

One of the most important doctrines Pawl must explain is the “communication of idioms” (also called the “communication of properties”). This is the teaching that properties of both natures can be truly predicated of the one person of Christ.

As Pawl explains in detail in Chapter 1, Section VI: “Concerning the Predications True of Christ”, this doctrine means we can say things like “God died on the cross” (because the person who died had a divine nature) and “This man created the world” (because the person who is human also has a divine nature).

But—and this is crucial—the properties don’t transfer between the natures themselves. The human nature doesn’t become omniscient, and the divine nature doesn’t become mortal. Instead, both sets of properties belong to the one person through his two natures. Pawl illustrates this with helpful diagrams in his book, showing how properties “flow” to the person without mixing between the natures.

Think of it like this: Imagine you’re both a student and an athlete. As a student, you have the property of “taking exams.” As an athlete, you have the property of “running races.” Both properties belong to you, the one person, but they come from different aspects of your life. Your athletic abilities don’t make you better at exams, and your studying doesn’t make you run faster. Similarly, Christ’s divine properties and human properties both belong to him but come from different natures.

Solving the Fundamental Problem

Now we can see how Pawl solves the fundamental problem we discussed earlier. Remember, the problem was that Christ seems to have contradictory properties—he’s both passible and impassible, both omniscient and limited in knowledge, etc.

Pawl’s solution, developed extensively in Chapter 7: “The Fundamental Philosophical Problem”, is to deny that these properties are truly incompatible when properly understood. He offers several strategies, but his preferred solution is what he calls the “qua” strategy (where “qua” means “in virtue of” or “as”).

The key insight is this: Christ is impassible qua divine (in virtue of his divine nature) and passible qua human (in virtue of his human nature). These aren’t contradictory because they’re true in different respects. It’s like saying someone is tall qua basketball player but short qua professional athlete in general—there’s no contradiction because the comparisons are being made in different respects.

But Pawl goes beyond just using “qua” clauses. He provides a robust metaphysical foundation for understanding how these qualifications work. In his extended discussion in “In Defense of Conciliar Christology” (Chapter 6: “Denying ‘In the Same Way'”), he explores different ways of understanding qua-clauses:

1. Modifying the assertion: “Christ-is-impassible-qua-divine” is a different assertion than “Christ is impassible.”

2. Modifying the subject: “Christ-qua-divine is impassible” refers to Christ considered under a certain aspect.

3. Modifying the copula: “Christ is-divinely impassible” uses a special kind of “is.”

4. Modifying the predicate: “Christ is impassible-qua-divine” involves a special kind of impassibility.

Pawl carefully examines each option and shows that while each has its merits and problems, together they provide resources for solving the fundamental problem without falling into contradiction.

Part III: Comparing Pawl’s Model with Alternative Approaches

The Kryptic Model (Divine Preconscious Model)

One significant alternative to Pawl’s approach is what’s known as the Kryptic Model, particularly as developed in Andrew Ter Ern Loke’s work on the Divine Preconscious Model (DPM). This model takes a very different approach to solving the problem of the Incarnation.

According to the Kryptic Model described in “A Kryptic Model of the Incarnation” (Chapter 4), the Logos (the Second Person of the Trinity) had a divine mind before the Incarnation. At the Incarnation, this divine consciousness acquired a human aspect while retaining access to divine knowledge through what Loke calls the “divine preconscious.”

The key idea is that Jesus had one consciousness with two aspects—divine and human. The divine knowledge and powers were still there but hidden in the preconscious, like how you still know your phone number even when you’re not actively thinking about it. This is why it’s called “Kryptic”—from the Greek word for “hidden.”

Where does Pawl’s model differ from the Kryptic approach? First, Pawl doesn’t require any special theory about consciousness or the preconscious. His model works with standard metaphysical categories of person, nature, and properties. Second, Pawl maintains that Christ has both a divine will and a human will (called Dyothelitism), while some versions of the Kryptic model struggle to maintain two distinct wills.

The Kryptic model has its strengths. It provides an intuitive explanation for how Jesus could be genuinely limited in his human experience while still being divine. When Jesus says, “But about that day or hour no one knows, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father” (Mark 13:32), the Kryptic model can explain this as the human conscious aspect not accessing the divine preconscious knowledge.

However, Pawl would argue that his model handles this just as well without needing a complex theory of consciousness. In his model, Christ knows all things through his divine nature but has limited knowledge through his human nature. When Christ speaks of not knowing something, he’s speaking according to his human nature.

Oliver Crisp’s Compositional Model

Oliver Crisp, a prominent philosophical theologian, has developed his own compositional model of the Incarnation, detailed in his books “Divinity and Humanity: The Incarnation Reconsidered” and other works. Like Pawl, Crisp defends a “parts Christology,” but there are important differences.

Crisp’s model, as explained in “Divinity and Humanity” (Chapter 2), distinguishes between different ways of understanding Christ’s human nature:

1. Abstract vs. Concrete Nature: Like Pawl, Crisp recognizes the distinction between abstract and concrete natures. However, Crisp is more open to abstract nature views than Pawl is.

2. Two-part vs. Three-part Christology: Crisp explores both options, while Pawl firmly commits to a three-part Christology.

3. The Anhypostatos-Enhypostatos Distinction: Both Crisp and Pawl affirm that Christ’s human nature is anhypostatic (not a person on its own) and enhypostatic (existing in the person of the Word).

Where Crisp and Pawl most notably differ is in their treatment of the metaphysical details. Crisp tends to be more exploratory, considering various options and their implications. Pawl, on the other hand, develops a more systematic and detailed metaphysical framework, particularly with his truthmaker theory and his principle of Typical Dependence.

Crisp also places more emphasis on the notion of “perichoresis” (mutual indwelling) in explaining the relationship between the two natures. He suggests that the divine nature “penetrates” the human nature in a unique way, sustaining and upholding it. Pawl, while not rejecting this idea, doesn’t make it central to his model.

Kenotic Models

Another major alternative to Pawl’s approach is Kenotic Christology. “Kenosis” comes from the Greek word for “emptying,” based on Philippians 2:7, which says Christ “emptied himself” in becoming human.

There are different versions of Kenotic theory:

Ontological Kenoticism: This view says that the Son actually gave up certain divine attributes (like omniscience or omnipotence) when he became incarnate. He literally became less than fully divine during his earthly life.

Functional Kenoticism: This view says that the Son retained all divine attributes but chose not to exercise some of them during his earthly life. It’s like Superman pretending to be Clark Kent—he still has his powers but doesn’t use them.

Pawl strongly rejects Ontological Kenoticism. As he argues, if the Son gave up essential divine attributes, he would cease to be divine. But the whole point of the Incarnation is that Jesus is fully divine and fully human, not formerly divine and now human.

Regarding Functional Kenoticism, Pawl’s model could be seen as compatible with it in some ways. After all, his model allows that Christ might not always exercise all his divine powers through his human nature. But Pawl would insist that Christ never ceases to exercise his divine powers through his divine nature—he continues to sustain the universe even while sleeping in the boat during the storm.

Two Minds/Two Consciousnesses Models

Some philosophers, like Richard Swinburne and Thomas Morris, have proposed that Christ had two minds or two consciousnesses—one divine and one human. This would be like having two streams of consciousness running in parallel in the same person.

Pawl discusses this option but doesn’t commit to it. His model is compatible with Christ having two consciousnesses, but it doesn’t require it. The key for Pawl is that Christ has two natures with their respective properties and operations, whether or not this involves two distinct consciousnesses.

The advantage of the two-minds view is that it clearly preserves both divine omniscience and human limited knowledge. The disadvantage is that it threatens the unity of Christ’s person—how can one person have two separate streams of consciousness without being two persons?

Different from the Kryptic model’s single consciousness with two aspects, the two-minds view posits genuinely distinct consciousnesses. This raises difficult questions: How do these minds relate to each other? Does the human mind know about the divine mind? Can they communicate?

Part IV: The Challenge of Physicalism to the Incarnation

What is Physicalism?

Now we come to a crucial issue that has serious implications for understanding the Incarnation: physicalism. Physicalism is the philosophical view that human beings are purely physical entities. According to physicalists, we don’t have immaterial souls—we’re just complex arrangements of matter. Our thoughts, feelings, and consciousness are all just brain states or functions of our physical bodies.

This view has become increasingly popular in philosophy and science. Many scientists and philosophers argue that neuroscience shows our mental life is entirely dependent on our brains. When the brain is damaged, our mental abilities are affected. When the brain dies, they say, the person ceases to exist entirely.

But as Pawl and others have argued, physicalism creates massive problems for the doctrine of the Incarnation. Let’s explore why this is such a serious issue.

How Physicalism Undermines Christ’s True Humanity

According to Pawl’s model, Christ’s human nature is a composite of body and soul, just like our human natures. This follows the traditional Christian understanding that humans are not just physical bodies but also have immaterial souls. As Pawl explains in Chapter 2, Section IV.a, “A concrete human nature is a composite of soul and body, again, understood however one understands the conciliar statements to have used those terms.”

But if physicalism is true, there are no souls. Humans would be just physical bodies with complex brains. This creates several problems for the Incarnation:

Problem 1: The Councils Explicitly Affirm Christ Had a Human Soul

The church councils were very clear that Christ had a human soul. The Council of Chalcedon declared that Christ is “complete in humanity… truly human, with a rational soul and a body” (quoted in Pawl, Chapter 1). If physicalism is true and humans don’t have souls, then either:

1. Christ didn’t really become like us (because he had a soul and we don’t), or

2. Christ didn’t have a soul (contradicting the councils), or

3. The councils were just wrong about human nature.

None of these options are acceptable for orthodox Christianity.

Problem 2: The Problem of Divine-Physical Union

If humans are purely physical, then in the Incarnation, the divine nature would have to unite directly with a physical body. But how can an immaterial, infinite, eternal divine nature unite with mere matter?

This problem is explored in the Kryptic model discussion. As Merricks notes (cited in “A Kryptic Model of the Incarnation,” Chapter 4.6), if the Logos becomes a purely physical entity at the Incarnation, “it would seem to be metaphysically impossible for him to possess divine properties such as having the knowledge of all truths, having the power of omnipotence, etc. as there seems to be a metaphysical limit as to how much information and power a physical body can hold.”

Think about it: How much information can a physical brain hold? Even the most powerful computer has limits. But God’s knowledge is infinite. No physical system, no matter how complex, can contain infinite information. So if Christ’s humanity was purely physical, he couldn’t truly be divine.

How Physicalism Denies the Incarnation Would Survive Death

Here’s where physicalism becomes really problematic for the Incarnation. According to Christian teaching, when Christ died, the union between his divine and human natures continued. Pawl discusses this in detail in “In Defense of Extended Conciliar Christology” (Chapter 10: “The Interim State”).

The traditional teaching says that when Christ died:

1. His soul separated from his body

2. His soul descended to the realm of the dead

3. His body remained in the tomb

4. The divine nature remained united to both the separated soul and body

5. On the third day, soul and body were reunited in the resurrection

But if physicalism is true, when Christ’s body died, Christ would have ceased to exist entirely (since on physicalism, we are just our bodies). The Incarnation would have ended at his death. There would be no continuing union, no descent to the dead, no maintaining of the hypostatic union during the three days in the tomb.

As Pawl explains in his discussion of what he calls the “Interim State,” the councils taught that “the Word remained united to both the body and soul, though the body and soul were not united to one another” during the time between Christ’s death and resurrection. This makes no sense on physicalism because there would be no soul to remain united to.

Physicalism and the Resurrection

The resurrection also becomes problematic on physicalism. If we are just our physical bodies, then resurrection would mean either:

1. Reconstitution: God gathers the same physical particles and reassembles them. But bodies decompose and their particles get recycled into other things. The same carbon atoms that were in one person’s body might later be in another person’s body. Who gets those atoms in the resurrection?

2. Recreation: God creates a new body that’s similar to the old one. But then is it really the same person? If God created a perfect copy of you, would that copy be you or just someone very similar to you?

With a soul, these problems are solved. The soul provides continuity of identity. Even if the body is destroyed, the person continues to exist in their soul, and can be reunited with a body (whether the same matter or new matter) in the resurrection.

Why Dualism is Necessary for the Incarnation

Given these problems, Pawl and other defenders of orthodox Christology argue that some form of dualism (the view that humans have both bodies and souls) is necessary for a coherent doctrine of the Incarnation.

This doesn’t mean we have to accept Cartesian dualism (the view that soul and body are completely separate substances that somehow interact). There are other forms of dualism that might work:

Thomistic Dualism: Following Thomas Aquinas, the soul is the form of the body. The soul and body are deeply united, but the soul can exist without the body (though in an incomplete state).

Emergent Dualism: The soul emerges from the body but becomes a distinct reality that can survive bodily death.

Substance Dualism: The soul and body are distinct substances that are united in the human person.

Pawl’s model seems most compatible with Thomistic dualism, given his use of hylomorphic concepts (form and matter). In Chapter 3, Section II: “Hylomorphism”, he explains how the soul serves as the substantial form of the body, making it a human body rather than just a collection of particles.

Responding to Physicalist Objections

Physicalists often argue that dualism is unscientific or that neuroscience has disproven the existence of souls. How might Pawl respond?

First, Pawl could point out that science studies the physical world. It’s not surprising that when we look at the brain, we see physical processes. But this doesn’t prove that there’s nothing more than physical processes. Science is methodologically limited to studying physical things—it can neither prove nor disprove the existence of non-physical souls.

Second, the fact that brain damage affects mental function doesn’t prove physicalism. Dualists can agree that the soul depends on the brain for its earthly operations. Think of it like a pianist and a piano—damage to the piano affects the music, but that doesn’t mean the pianist doesn’t exist separately from the piano.

Third, there are positive reasons to believe in souls:

1. Unity of Consciousness: We experience ourselves as unified subjects, not as collections of particles.

2. Personal Identity: We remain the same person over time despite complete turnover of our physical matter.

3. Intentionality: Our thoughts are about things in a way that purely physical states arguably cannot be.

4. Moral Responsibility: We hold people responsible for their actions in a way that makes more sense if they’re more than just physical processes.

The Stakes of the Physicalism Debate

This isn’t just an abstract philosophical debate. If physicalism is true, then the Incarnation as traditionally understood is false. This would mean:

1. The creeds and councils were wrong about Christ having a human soul

2. Christ’s death would have ended the Incarnation

3. The resurrection becomes philosophically problematic

4. The continuing incarnation of the risen Christ is impossible

5. Our own hope of resurrection is undermined

As Pawl notes, defending the coherence of the Incarnation requires defending certain metaphysical views about human nature. The Incarnation isn’t just a religious doctrine that floats free from philosophical considerations—it makes specific claims about the nature of persons, souls, and bodies that have philosophical implications.

Part V: The Activities of Christ in Pawl’s Model

Christ’s Knowledge: Divine Omniscience and Human Learning

One of the most challenging aspects of the Incarnation is understanding how Christ’s knowledge works. The Gospels present us with what seems like a paradox: Jesus knows people’s thoughts, knows distant events, and speaks with divine authority. Yet he also grows in wisdom (Luke 2:52), asks genuine questions, and says there are things he doesn’t know (Mark 13:32).

Pawl addresses this challenge in Chapter 6: “The Activities of Christ”, particularly in his discussion of Christ’s knowing. His model provides a clear framework: Christ knows all things through his divine nature but has limited knowledge through his human nature.

Think of it this way: Imagine you’re simultaneously watching a movie on TV while reading a book. Through your eyes focused on the book, you have access to that information. Through your peripheral vision and hearing, you have access to the movie. You’re one person with two different sources of information. Similarly, Christ is one person with two “sources” of knowledge—divine and human.

But this raises questions:

Question 1: If Christ has divine omniscience, how can he genuinely not know something?

Pawl’s answer is that Christ can speak from his human nature. When Jesus says, “Who touched me?” in a crowd, he might be expressing his human experience of not knowing, even while divinely knowing the answer. It’s not deception—it’s speaking from one aspect of his reality.

Question 2: Doesn’t having access to divine omniscience mean his human nature isn’t truly like ours?

Pawl would respond that Christ’s human nature, considered in itself, is exactly like ours. It’s the person who has access to divine knowledge, not the human nature itself. The human nature remains limited, even though the person who has that nature also has unlimited knowledge through his divine nature.

Christ’s Will: Divine Determination and Human Choice

Another complex issue is Christ’s willing. The church councils affirmed that Christ has two wills—a divine will and a human will (this doctrine is called Dyothelitism). But how do two wills work in one person?

Pawl explores this in detail, noting that the councils insisted both wills are complete and functional. The divine will is omnipotent and always wills what is good. The human will is like ours—it can be tempted, can struggle, and must choose between options.

We see this most clearly in the Garden of Gethsemane, where Jesus prays, “Not my will, but yours be done” (Luke 22:42). Pawl’s model can explain this: Christ’s human will naturally shrinks from suffering and death (as any human will would), but it freely submits to what the divine will knows is best.

But this raises the question of Christ’s impeccability (inability to sin):

Pawl discusses various solutions to this problem. His model allows that Christ’s human will is genuinely free and could, considered in itself, choose to sin. But the person who has that human will is divine and therefore cannot sin. It’s like a situation where someone could physically do something but is prevented by their character—except in Christ’s case, it’s prevented by his divine nature.

The temptations are real because Christ’s human nature genuinely experiences them. He feels hunger, fatigue, fear, and all the pressures that might lead someone to sin. The fact that he won’t ultimately sin doesn’t make the experience less real or the resistance less praiseworthy.

Christ’s Power: Miracles and Limitations

The Gospels show Jesus performing amazing miracles—calming storms, multiplying food, raising the dead. Yet they also show him getting tired, needing to eat, and being unable to do many miracles in his hometown because of their lack of faith.

How does Pawl’s model explain this? Through his divine nature, Christ has omnipotence—unlimited power. Through his human nature, he has normal human powers and limitations. The miracles are performed through divine power, but Christ often chooses to experience human limitations.

This isn’t pretending or play-acting. When Christ is tired, he’s genuinely tired in his human nature. When he’s hungry, he’s genuinely hungry. The divine nature doesn’t eliminate these human experiences—it allows the human nature to be genuinely human.

Christ’s Emotional Life

One aspect that deserves special attention is Christ’s emotional life. The Gospels show Jesus experiencing a full range of emotions: joy, sorrow, anger, compassion, and even anxiety in the Garden of Gethsemane.

Some theological traditions have struggled with this, especially those influenced by Greek philosophy’s idea that God is “impassible” (unable to suffer or feel emotions). But Pawl’s model handles this well: Christ truly experiences emotions in his human nature while remaining impassible in his divine nature.

When Jesus weeps at Lazarus’s tomb, these are real tears of real sorrow. When he feels compassion for the crowds, it’s genuine human emotion. This isn’t God pretending to feel—it’s God truly experiencing human emotion through the human nature he has taken on.

Death and Resurrection

Perhaps the most challenging aspect of Christ’s activities is his death and resurrection. How can God die? And what happens to the Incarnation during the three days when Christ’s body lies in the tomb?

Pawl provides a detailed analysis of this in his extended work. According to his model:

1. Death: Christ truly dies in his human nature. His human soul separates from his human body, which is what death is. But the divine nature cannot die and remains united to both the separated soul and body.

2. The Interim State: During the three days, the hypostatic union continues, but in a unique way. The divine person remains united to the human soul (which descends to the realm of the dead) and to the human body (which lies in the tomb).

3. Resurrection: The soul and body are reunited, but now in a glorified state. The human nature is transformed but remains truly human.

This account preserves both the reality of Christ’s death (he didn’t just appear to die) and the continuation of the Incarnation (the union wasn’t broken by death).

Part VI: Philosophical Objections and Pawl’s Responses

The Incoherence Objection

The most serious objection to the Incarnation is that it’s simply incoherent—like claiming something is a square circle. Critics argue that the properties of divinity and humanity are logically incompatible.

Pawl takes this objection very seriously. In fact, much of his book is devoted to showing that the Incarnation, while mysterious, is not incoherent. His strategy involves several moves:

First Move: Distinguish Contradiction from Mystery

A contradiction would be saying “Christ is omniscient” and “Christ is not omniscient” in the same sense at the same time. But the doctrine actually says, “Christ is omniscient according to his divine nature” and “Christ is limited in knowledge according to his human nature.” These statements can both be true because they’re qualified differently.

Second Move: Develop Precise Metaphysical Categories

Rather than working with vague notions, Pawl develops precise definitions of person, nature, hypostasis, etc. This precision helps avoid apparent contradictions that arise from ambiguous terms.

Third Move: Show Parallel Cases

Pawl sometimes points to analogous cases where something seems contradictory but isn’t. For example, water can be both liquid (at room temperature) and solid (when frozen), though not in the same respect at the same time.

The Multiple Incarnations Objection

If Pawl’s model works, could the same divine person become incarnate multiple times? Could all three persons of the Trinity become incarnate in the same human nature? These might seem like absurd consequences.

Surprisingly, Pawl argues that his model does allow for multiple incarnations, and he doesn’t see this as a problem. In fact, he develops this position extensively in “In Defense of Extended Conciliar Christology”, particularly in his discussion of “Thomistic Multiple Incarnations.”

According to Pawl, there’s no logical impossibility in the Son becoming incarnate in multiple human natures simultaneously, or even in all three persons of the Trinity becoming incarnate. While this might seem strange, Pawl argues that strangeness isn’t the same as impossibility.

However, Pawl is careful to note that just because something is logically possible doesn’t mean it has happened or will happen. Christian revelation tells us about one Incarnation—the Son becoming incarnate as Jesus Christ. Whether other incarnations are possible is a matter of theological speculation.

The Divine Suffering Objection

Classical theism holds that God is impassible—unable to suffer. But Christians also claim that God the Son suffered and died on the cross. How can both be true?

Pawl’s model handles this through the distinction of natures. The divine nature remains impassible—it cannot suffer or change. But the person of the Son truly suffers in and through his human nature. When we say “God suffered,” we mean the person who is God suffered in his human nature, not that the divine nature itself suffered.

Some critics find this unsatisfying. They argue that if the person really suffers, and the person is divine, then divinity suffers. Pawl responds by maintaining that suffering is undergone by the person through the human nature specifically. The divine nature provides no capacity for suffering, so while the person who is divine suffers, he doesn’t suffer divinely.

The Omnipresence Problem

Here’s another puzzle: God is omnipresent (present everywhere), but Jesus was located in specific places. He was in Bethlehem, then Nazareth, then Jerusalem. How can someone be both omnipresent and located in one place?

Again, Pawl’s two-nature solution applies. Christ is omnipresent through his divine nature—the divine nature doesn’t become localized. But he is present in a specific location through his human nature. His human body, like ours, can only be in one place at a time.

This is sometimes called the “extra Calvinisticum”—the idea that the Son exists fully outside (extra) the human nature even while united to it. The divine nature isn’t contained or limited by the human nature.

The Consciousness Problem

If Christ has two natures with their respective intellectual capacities, does he have two consciousnesses? And if so, how is he one person rather than two?

As we’ve seen, different models handle this differently. Pawl’s model doesn’t require taking a position on whether Christ has one or two consciousnesses. What matters is that Christ is one person with two natures, however consciousness relates to those natures.

If Christ does have two consciousnesses, Pawl would say they belong to one person in virtue of the hypostatic union. Just as your various mental faculties (memory, imagination, reason) all belong to one person (you), so Christ’s divine and human consciousnesses (if he has two) would belong to one person.

The Worship Problem

Christians worship Jesus Christ. But worship should only be given to God. If Jesus has a human nature, and human nature isn’t divine, are Christians wrong to worship Jesus?

Pawl’s model provides a clear answer: We worship the person of Christ, who is divine. We don’t worship the human nature separately from the divine person. When Thomas says to Jesus, “My Lord and my God!” (John 20:28), he’s recognizing that this person before him is God, even though he has a human nature.

The human nature is worthy of special honor because it belongs to a divine person, but it’s the person who is worshiped, not the nature considered in abstraction from the person.

Part VII: Implications and Applications

Implications for Christian Theology

Pawl’s model has significant implications for various areas of Christian theology:

1. Soteriology (Doctrine of Salvation): If Pawl is right, then our salvation depends on the real union of divine and human in Christ. It’s because Christ is truly divine that his sacrifice has infinite value. It’s because he’s truly human that he can represent us and die in our place.

2. Anthropology (Doctrine of Humanity): Pawl’s model requires that humans have souls, not just bodies. This has implications for how we understand ourselves, death, and the afterlife. We’re not just physical machines but body-soul composites made in God’s image.

3. Sacramental Theology: If the Incarnation involves the divine taking on physical reality, this affirms the importance of physical elements in spiritual life. The sacraments (baptism, communion) involve physical elements conveying spiritual grace.

4. Ethics: The Incarnation affirms the value and dignity of human nature. If human nature is good enough for God to take on, it deserves respect and care. This grounds human dignity and rights.

Implications for Philosophy

Pawl’s work also has implications for philosophy more broadly:

1. Metaphysics: The Incarnation requires robust metaphysical commitments about persons, natures, properties, and substances. It shows that these aren’t just abstract philosophical concepts but have real theological and practical importance.

2. Philosophy of Mind: The Incarnation provides reasons to reject physicalism and affirm some form of dualism. It suggests that consciousness and intentionality cannot be reduced to physical processes.

3. Philosophy of Language: Pawl’s analysis of qua-clauses and predication shows the importance of precision in philosophical and theological language. How we speak about complex realities matters.

4. Modal Logic: The discussion of what’s possible and impossible in the Incarnation involves sophisticated modal reasoning about necessity, possibility, and impossibility.

Practical Applications for Christian Life

While Pawl’s work is highly philosophical, it has practical implications for Christian faith and life:

1. Prayer: If Christ has both divine and human natures, we can approach him knowing he understands our human experiences while having divine power to help us.

2. Suffering: Christ’s genuine human suffering means he truly understands our pain and struggles. The Incarnation isn’t God observing human suffering from outside but entering into it.

3. Worship: Understanding the Incarnation helps us worship Christ appropriately—as truly God and truly human, not as a demigod or superhuman.

4. Ethics: Christ’s perfect human life provides a model for human behavior. Because he’s truly human, his example is relevant and achievable (with divine grace).

5. Hope: The continuing Incarnation (Christ remains incarnate after the resurrection) gives hope for our own resurrection and eternal life.

The Broader Significance of Pawl’s Project

Why does all this philosophical detail matter? Why spend so much effort on these technical distinctions?

First, truth matters. If Christianity is true, we should be able to show that its central claims are at least coherent, even if mysterious. Pawl’s work helps demonstrate that the Incarnation, while beyond full comprehension, isn’t nonsensical.

Second, precision prevents heresy. Many christological heresies arose from imprecise thinking or language. By being careful about terms and distinctions, we can avoid errors that distort the Gospel.

Third, engaging with objections strengthens faith. Rather than avoiding difficult questions, Pawl faces them head-on. This shows that Christian faith can withstand philosophical scrutiny.

Fourth, the Incarnation connects to everything else in Christianity. Get the Incarnation wrong, and everything else—salvation, ethics, worship, hope—goes wrong too. Pawl’s careful work helps preserve the integrity of the whole Christian system.

Part VIII: Critical Evaluation and Future Directions

Strengths of Pawl’s Model

Having examined Pawl’s model in detail, we can identify several significant strengths:

1. Philosophical Rigor: Pawl brings serious philosophical tools to bear on theological questions. He doesn’t hide behind mystery or faith when logical analysis is needed.

2. Fidelity to Tradition: Unlike some modern approaches that revise or reinterpret traditional doctrine, Pawl genuinely tries to defend what the councils actually taught.

3. Comprehensive Scope: Pawl addresses not just one or two problems but provides a comprehensive model that handles multiple challenges to the Incarnation.

4. Clarity of Expression: Despite dealing with complex topics, Pawl writes clearly and provides helpful examples and analogies.

5. Engagement with Alternatives: Pawl doesn’t just present his own view but seriously engages with alternatives, showing why he thinks his model is superior.

Potential Weaknesses and Challenges

However, Pawl’s model also faces some challenges:

1. The Qua-Strategy: While Pawl’s use of qua-clauses solves logical problems, some might feel it doesn’t fully capture the mystery and paradox of the Incarnation. Is saying “Christ is omniscient-qua-divine” really sufficient?

2. Consciousness Questions: Pawl doesn’t fully resolve questions about Christ’s consciousness. While he shows his model is compatible with various views, some might want a more definitive answer.

3. Biblical Exegesis: Pawl focuses on philosophical and conciliar texts more than biblical exegesis. Some might want more direct engagement with how his model handles specific biblical passages.

4. Experiential Aspects: The model is highly abstract and metaphysical. Some might wonder how it relates to the experiential, lived reality of Christ’s life.

5. The Truthmaker Framework: Pawl’s model depends heavily on truthmaker theory, which itself is controversial in philosophy. If truthmaker theory is wrong, does his model collapse?

Comparing Pawl’s Success with Other Models

How does Pawl’s model compare overall with the alternatives we’ve examined?

Each model has its strengths. Kenotic models best explain the biblical portrayal of Christ’s limitations. The Two Minds view clearly preserves both omniscience and limited knowledge. The Kryptic model provides an intuitive picture of how divine and human can unite.

But Pawl’s model stands out for its philosophical coherence and fidelity to conciliar teaching. While it may be more complex than some alternatives, this complexity allows it to handle a wider range of objections successfully.

Future Directions for Research

Pawl’s work opens up several avenues for future research:

1. Consciousness Studies: How exactly does consciousness relate to nature and person? Could insights from philosophy of mind and cognitive science shed light on this?

2. Biblical Studies: How does Pawl’s model handle specific difficult passages in the Gospels? More detailed exegetical work would be valuable.

3. Comparative Religion: How does Pawl’s model of Incarnation compare with concepts of divine embodiment in other religions?

4. Practical Theology: What are the implications of Pawl’s model for preaching, pastoral care, and spiritual formation?

5. Modal Metaphysics: Pawl’s discussion of possible worlds and multiple incarnations raises interesting questions in modal metaphysics.

6. Philosophy of Action: How do Christ’s two wills relate in making decisions? This connects to broader questions about free will and action theory.

Conclusion: The Significance of Pawl’s Achievement

As we conclude this extensive examination of Timothy Pawl’s model of the Incarnation, it’s worth stepping back to appreciate what he has accomplished. The Incarnation has been called the central mystery of Christian faith—a doctrine that pushes human reason to its limits. For two thousand years, critics have argued that it’s incoherent, impossible, or meaningless. And for two thousand years, Christian thinkers have worked to show that while the Incarnation surpasses human understanding, it doesn’t contradict it.

Pawl stands in this long tradition, but he brings to it the tools of contemporary analytic philosophy. His work shows that the ancient doctrine can withstand modern philosophical scrutiny. He demonstrates that one can be intellectually rigorous while remaining faithful to traditional Christian teaching.

The Core Achievement

At its heart, Pawl’s model successfully shows that the Incarnation is not logically contradictory. This might seem like a modest achievement, but it’s actually quite significant. If the Incarnation were logically contradictory—like a square circle—then it would be necessarily false. By showing that it’s logically coherent, Pawl keeps open the possibility that it’s true.

But Pawl does more than just defend against objections. He provides a positive model that helps us understand how the Incarnation might work metaphysically. His careful distinctions between person and nature, his use of truthmaker theory, and his principle of Typical Dependence all contribute to a robust philosophical framework for understanding the Incarnation.

The Importance of the Anti-Physicalism Argument

One of the most significant aspects of Pawl’s work, which we’ve explored in detail, is how it shows that physicalism is incompatible with the Incarnation. This isn’t just a side issue—it’s crucial for maintaining orthodox Christology.

If humans are purely physical beings without souls, then:

• Christ couldn’t have had a human soul (contradicting the councils)
• The divine nature would have to unite directly with matter (metaphysically problematic)
• Christ’s death would end the Incarnation (contradicting the continuing union)
• The resurrection becomes philosophically incoherent

By showing these problems, Pawl demonstrates that defending the Incarnation requires defending certain views about human nature. Christian theology cannot remain neutral on philosophical questions about mind and body.

Lessons for Theological Method

Pawl’s work also provides important lessons for how to do theology:

1. Take Objections Seriously: Rather than dismissing philosophical objections as irrelevant to faith, Pawl engages them carefully and thoroughly.

2. Be Precise: Vague language leads to confusion and error. Careful definitions and distinctions are essential for good theology.

3. Respect Mystery Without Hiding Behind It: Pawl acknowledges that the Incarnation is mysterious, but he doesn’t use mystery as an excuse to avoid hard questions.

4. Build on Tradition: Rather than starting from scratch, Pawl builds on centuries of theological reflection, showing respect for the wisdom of the past while using contemporary tools.

5. Integrate Philosophy and Theology: Pawl shows that philosophy and theology need not be enemies. Good philosophy can serve theological truth.

Remaining Questions

While Pawl’s model is impressive, some questions remain:

1. The Experience of Christ: How did it feel to be the incarnate Son? What was Christ’s subjective experience like? Pawl’s model, being primarily metaphysical, doesn’t fully address these phenomenological questions.

2. The Mechanism of Union: While Pawl explains what the hypostatic union accomplishes, the exact mechanism remains mysterious. How exactly does a divine person assume a human nature?

3. The relationship Between Natures: How do the two natures relate to each other in the concrete life of Christ? When Jesus makes a decision, how do the two wills interact?

4. Development in Christ: How do we understand Christ’s growth and development? If he has divine omniscience, in what sense does he “grow in wisdom”?

These questions don’t undermine Pawl’s model but rather point to areas where further work is needed.

The Broader Significance

The Incarnation is not just a doctrine to be defended but a reality to be lived. If God became human in Jesus Christ, this changes everything:

It changes how we view God: God is not distant and uninvolved but entered into human experience. God knows what it’s like to be human from the inside.

It changes how we view humanity: Human nature is capable of union with the divine. We are not worthless specks but beings made for communion with God.

It changes how we view the physical world: Matter is not evil or irrelevant to spiritual life. God took on flesh, affirming the goodness of creation.

It changes how we view suffering: God doesn’t observe our suffering from afar but has experienced it himself. The cross shows God entering into the depths of human pain.

It changes how we view hope: If death couldn’t break the union of divine and human in Christ, nothing can separate us from God’s love.

Final Reflections

Timothy Pawl’s model of the Incarnation represents a significant achievement in philosophical theology. By bringing together traditional theological commitments with contemporary philosophical rigor, he has shown that the central mystery of Christian faith can withstand intellectual scrutiny.

His work reminds us that faith and reason need not be opposed. The same God who reveals himself in Christ also created the human mind with its capacity for logic and understanding. While we cannot fully comprehend the Incarnation, we can understand enough to see that it’s not nonsensical or contradictory.

Most importantly, Pawl’s work serves the church’s mission of proclaiming Christ. In a world where Christianity is often dismissed as intellectually untenable, Pawl shows that the faith once delivered to the saints remains rationally defensible. The Word who became flesh is also the Logos—the divine reason through whom all things were made.

The mystery of the Incarnation remains a mystery. But thanks to work like Pawl’s, we can see more clearly that it’s a mystery worth believing in—a mystery that illuminates rather than obscures, that expands reason rather than destroying it, that brings together what seems impossible to unite: the infinite and the finite, the eternal and the temporal, the divine and the human, in the one person of Jesus Christ.

As we continue to reflect on this great doctrine, may we, like Pawl, bring our best thinking to bear on the deepest truths of faith. For in the end, all truth is God’s truth, and the one who is the Truth itself became flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth. This is the mystery Pawl has helped us understand a little better—not to eliminate its mystery but to show its coherence, beauty, and transformative power for human thought and life.

“The Word became flesh and dwelt among us, and we have seen his glory, glory as of the only Son from the Father, full of grace and truth.” – John 1:14

In defending the logical coherence of these ancient words, Timothy Pawl has performed a valuable service for Christian theology and philosophy. His model may not answer every question, but it demonstrates that the Incarnation—the heartbeat of Christian faith—remains intellectually viable in the modern world. And for that, both the academy and the church can be grateful.

Bibliography and Further Reading

Primary Sources by Timothy Pawl

Books:

• Pawl, Timothy. 2020. The Incarnation. Elements in the Philosophy of Religion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Pawl, Timothy. 2016. In Defense of Conciliar Christology: A Philosophical Essay. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Pawl, Timothy. 2019. In Defense of Extended Conciliar Christology: A Philosophical Essay. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Key Articles:

• Pawl, Timothy. 2014. “A Solution to the Fundamental Philosophical Problem of Christology.” Journal of Analytic Theology 2: 61-85.
• Pawl, Timothy. 2015. “Conciliar Christology and the Problem of Incompatible Predications.” Scientia et Fides 3(2): 85-106.
• Pawl, Timothy. 2016. “Temporary Intrinsics and Christological Predication.” In Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Volume 7.
• Pawl, Timothy. 2019. “Explosive Theology: A Reply to Jc Beall’s ‘Christ – A Contradiction.'” Journal of Analytic Theology 7: 440-451.

Other Models Discussed

On the Kryptic Model:

• Loke, Andrew Ter Ern. 2014. A Kryptic Model of the Incarnation. London: Routledge.
• Various articles on Divine Subconscious and Divine Preconscious Models

On Crisp’s Model:

• Crisp, Oliver. 2007. Divinity and Humanity: The Incarnation Reconsidered. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Crisp, Oliver. 2009. God Incarnate: Explorations in Christology. London: T&T Clark.
• Crisp, Oliver. 2011. “Compositional Christology without Nestorianism.” In The Metaphysics of the Incarnation.

On Physicalism and the Incarnation:

• Merricks, Trenton. 2007. “The Word Made Flesh: Dualism, Physicalism and the Incarnation.” In Persons: Human and Divine.
• Various works on philosophy of mind and theological anthropology

Historical and Theological Background

• Tanner, Norman P. 1990. Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils. 2 Volumes. Georgetown University Press.
• Cross, Richard. 2002. The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Various patristic and medieval sources on Christology

This report has attempted to present Timothy Pawl’s model of the Incarnation in a comprehensive yet accessible way, showing both its philosophical sophistication and its theological significance. The debate over the coherence of the Incarnation continues, but Pawl’s contribution marks a significant advance in demonstrating that traditional Christian doctrine can withstand rigorous philosophical examination while remaining faithful to the mystery at the heart of the faith.