I. Introduction: The Mystery of the God-Man
For over two thousand years, Christians have celebrated and wrestled with one of the most profound mysteries of the faith: the Incarnation of Jesus Christ. This doctrine teaches that the eternal Son of God, the Second Person of the Trinity, took on human nature while remaining fully divine. The church has long confessed that Jesus Christ is one person with two complete natures—divine and human. This teaching stands at the very heart of Christianity, for without it, there could be no salvation. If Christ were not fully God, He could not save us from our sins. If He were not fully human, He could not represent us before God or serve as our substitute.
Yet this central doctrine has also been one of the most challenging to understand and explain. How can one person possess both divine and human natures? How can the same individual be both omniscient (all-knowing) and limited in knowledge, both omnipotent (all-powerful) and weak, both omnipresent (present everywhere) and located in one place? These questions have occupied the greatest theological minds throughout church history.
In recent years, two significant models have emerged that attempt to provide coherent explanations of the Incarnation while remaining faithful to Scripture and the historic creeds of the church. Oliver Crisp, in his book “Divinity and Humanity: The Incarnation Reconsidered,” presents a model based on the concept of perichoresis—a divine interpenetration between Christ’s two natures. Andrew Loke, in his work “A Kryptic Model of the Incarnation,” offers what he calls the Divine Preconscious Model, where Christ’s divine properties were “hidden” in His preconscious mind during His earthly ministry.
This report will provide a thorough examination of both models, focusing particularly on how each explains the relationship between Christ’s two natures and what it means for Him to be fully God and fully human. We will explore how these models differ in their approaches, examine their strengths and weaknesses, and consider how both models demonstrate that physicalism—the view that humans are purely physical beings without souls—fundamentally denies the true humanity of Christ and makes the Incarnation impossible.
II. Oliver Crisp’s Perichoretic Model
A. The Concept of Perichoresis
Oliver Crisp begins his exploration of the Incarnation in Chapter 1 of “Divinity and Humanity” with an examination of perichoresis, a Greek term that means “interpenetration” or “mutual indwelling.” This concept has been used in Christian theology in two distinct ways: to describe the relationship between the three persons of the Trinity (person-perichoresis) and to describe the relationship between Christ’s two natures (nature-perichoresis).
Crisp carefully distinguishes between these two applications. In the Trinity, perichoresis refers to how the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit interpenetrate one another while remaining distinct persons. In the Incarnation, it refers to how the divine and human natures of Christ relate to one another in the one person of Jesus Christ. As Crisp explains in Chapter 1, “Problems with perichoresis,” the concept was first used by the Church Fathers to make sense of the hypostatic union (the union of two natures in one person), and only later applied to the Trinity.
According to Crisp’s research, the term was first used by Gregory of Nazianzus in the fourth century and later developed by Maximus the Confessor. However, it was John of Damascus in the seventh century who introduced the notion of interpenetration in a technical fashion. Crisp notes that John of Damascus made a crucial contribution by suggesting an asymmetrical penetration—the divine nature penetrates the human nature, but not vice versa.
“The divine nature of Christ penetrates the human nature of Christ in virtue of divine omnipresence. This penetration is asymmetrical: the relation originates in the divine and moves in the direction of the human nature only. There is no sense in which the human nature penetrates the divine nature of Christ either in origination or reciprocation.” (Crisp, Divinity and Humanity, Chapter 1)
B. The Human Nature of Christ in Crisp’s Model
In Chapter 2, “The human nature of Christ,” Crisp addresses one of the most important questions in Christology: What exactly is Christ’s human nature, and how does it relate to our human nature? Crisp argues for what he calls a concrete-nature view, meaning that Christ’s human nature is not an abstract concept or set of properties, but a real, concrete reality consisting of a human body and a human soul.
This is significant because it means that Christ truly experienced human life as we do. He had a real human body that could hunger, thirst, and feel pain. He had a real human soul with human emotions, thoughts, and experiences. Crisp emphasizes that this human nature was complete—nothing essential to humanity was missing from Christ’s human nature.
However, Crisp makes an important distinction. While Christ’s human nature was complete, it was not independent. It did not exist as a separate person but was assumed by the divine Person of the Son. This leads to what theologians call the anhypostasia-enhypostasia distinction, which Crisp explores in Chapter 3.
C. The Anhypostasia-Enhypostasia Distinction
Chapter 3 of Crisp’s work, “The anhypostasia-enhypostasia distinction,” deals with one of the most technical but crucial aspects of Incarnational theology. Anhypostasia means that Christ’s human nature has no independent personal existence of its own—it is not a human person separate from the divine Person. Enhypostasia means that the human nature finds its personal existence in the divine Person of the Son.
This distinction is vital for avoiding the heresy of Nestorianism, which taught that Christ was two persons (one divine and one human) rather than one person with two natures. Crisp explains that the human nature of Christ never existed independently but was always united to the divine Person from the moment of conception in Mary’s womb. The human nature has its subsistence (its mode of existence) in and through the divine Person of the Word.
This means that when we see Jesus performing human actions—eating, sleeping, learning—these are genuine human experiences, but they belong to the one divine Person who has assumed human nature. There is no separate human “I” in Christ competing with or alongside the divine “I.” There is only one “I,” one subject of experience, who experiences reality through both divine and human natures.
D. The Question of Christ’s Fallen or Unfallen Human Nature
In Chapter 4, “Did Christ have a fallen human nature?” Crisp tackles a controversial question that has divided theologians. Some argue that for Christ to truly represent fallen humanity and be tempted as we are, He must have assumed fallen human nature—human nature affected by sin, though without actually sinning Himself. Others maintain that Christ assumed unfallen human nature, like Adam before the Fall.
Crisp provides a careful argument against the view that Christ had fallen human nature. He points out several problems with this position. First, Scripture consistently presents Christ as sinless and without any taint of sin (Hebrews 4:15, 1 Peter 2:22). Second, if Christ assumed fallen human nature, it’s difficult to explain how He could avoid the guilt and corruption that comes with such nature. Third, fallen human nature is not essential to being truly human—Adam and Eve were fully human before the Fall.
Instead, Crisp argues that Christ assumed unfallen human nature but experienced the effects of living in a fallen world. He experienced hunger, thirst, pain, and death—not because His nature was fallen, but because He voluntarily entered into the conditions of fallen existence. This allowed Him to be tempted and to suffer as we do, while maintaining the purity necessary to be our perfect sacrifice.
E. Divine Kenosis and the Limits of Christ’s Earthly Ministry
Chapter 5, “Divine kenosis,” addresses one of the most debated aspects of the Incarnation: the concept of kenosis or “self-emptying” based on Philippians 2:7, which says Christ “emptied himself” (or “made himself nothing” in some translations). What did Christ give up or limit in becoming human?
Crisp examines various kenotic theories and their problems. Some theologians have argued that Christ literally gave up certain divine attributes like omniscience or omnipotence during His earthly life. This would explain passages where Jesus appears limited in knowledge (Mark 13:32) or power (Mark 6:5). However, Crisp points out serious problems with this view. If Christ ceased to possess essential divine attributes, in what sense was He still God? Divine attributes are not like clothes that can be taken off and put back on—they are essential to what it means to be God.
Instead, Crisp favors what might be called a functional kenosis. Christ retained all divine attributes but voluntarily chose not to exercise them independently during His earthly ministry. The divine nature continued to possess all divine attributes, but these were exercised in and through the limitations of human nature. This is where Crisp’s concept of asymmetrical perichoresis becomes crucial—the divine nature penetrates and sustains the human nature without overwhelming or eliminating its genuine human limitations.
F. The Communicatio Idiomatum in Crisp’s Model
A crucial aspect of Crisp’s model is his treatment of the communicatio idiomatum or “communication of attributes.” This doctrine explains how properties of each nature can be predicated of the one Person of Christ. For example, we can say “God died on the cross” (a human experience attributed to the divine Person) or “The man Jesus created the world” (a divine action attributed to the one who is also human).
Crisp distinguishes between different versions of this doctrine. He rejects the “strong” version that suggests a real transfer of properties between the natures (which would lead to confusion and mixture). Instead, he advocates for a “weak” version where the properties of each nature are attributed to the Person of Christ without being transferred between the natures themselves.
“The communication of attributes involves the attribution of the properties of each of the natures of Christ to the theanthropic person of Christ, such that the person of Christ is treated as having divine and human attributes at one and the same time, yet without predicating attributes of one nature that properly belong to the other nature in the hypostatic union, without transference of properties between the natures and without confusing or commingling the two natures of Christ or the generation of a tertium quid [third kind of thing].” (Crisp, Divinity and Humanity, Chapter 1)
III. Andrew Loke’s Kryptic Model
A. The Divine Preconscious Model: An Overview
Andrew Loke presents a significantly different approach to understanding the Incarnation in his book “A Kryptic Model of the Incarnation.” The term “kryptic” comes from the Greek word krypsis, meaning “hiding” or “concealment.” Loke’s central thesis is that during the Incarnation, Christ’s divine properties were not abandoned or ceased to function, but were rather concealed within what he calls the “divine preconscious.”
In Chapter 1, “Veiled in Flesh the Godhead See?” Loke introduces his model as a solution to what he sees as insurmountable problems in other Christological models. He identifies three main competing models and their respective difficulties. The Two Consciousnesses Model faces the problem of implying two persons in Christ (Nestorianism). The Ontological Kenotic Model suggests Christ ceased to be divine during the Incarnation. Previous Divine Subconscious Models risked creating a Monophysite mixture of natures. Loke’s Divine Preconscious Model (DPM) aims to avoid all these problems.
The key innovation of Loke’s model is the postulation of a single consciousness in Christ with access to both human and divine aspects. The divine properties exist in the divine preconscious, while the human properties exist in the human conscious and preconscious. This allows Christ to be genuinely limited in His human experience while retaining all divine attributes in His divine nature.
B. Problems with Omniscience, Omnipotence, and Omnipresence
In Chapter 2, “Problems Concerning Omniscience, Omnipotence and Omnipresence,” Loke carefully outlines the logical challenges facing any model of the Incarnation. How can the same person be both omniscient (knowing all things) and limited in knowledge (not knowing the day or hour of His return, Mark 13:32)? How can He be both omnipotent (all-powerful) and unable to do mighty works in Nazareth because of unbelief (Mark 6:5-6)? How can He be omnipresent (present everywhere) and yet located bodily in specific places?
Loke argues that these apparent contradictions have led many to reject the coherence of the Incarnation altogether. He examines how being divine seems to necessarily entail having these “omni-” properties, while the New Testament clearly portrays Jesus as having human limitations. The challenge is to explain how one person can possess both sets of properties without contradiction.
The problem is particularly acute when we consider Jesus’ own statements about His limitations. When Jesus says He doesn’t know something, He’s not merely choosing not to reveal it—He genuinely doesn’t know it in His human consciousness. Yet if He’s God, He must know all things. Loke argues that previous solutions to this problem have been inadequate, leading to his development of the Divine Preconscious Model.
C. Critique of Existing Models
Chapter 3, “The Need for a New Solution,” provides Loke’s detailed critique of existing Christological models. He examines three main approaches that have been widely discussed in recent literature.
First, the Two Consciousnesses Model proposes that Christ had both a divine consciousness (knowing all things) and a human consciousness (limited in knowledge) operating simultaneously. Loke argues this model faces a fatal flaw: if Christ has two self-consciousnesses, He would be aware of Himself being both aware and unaware of the same information simultaneously. This seems to imply two persons, not one.
“The Logos would be aware of himself being consciously aware of the day of his coming, and aware of himself being consciously unaware of the day of his coming at the same time. He would have self-consciousness SC1: ‘I am aware of myself being consciously aware of the day of my coming,’ and simultaneously self-consciousness SC2: ‘I am aware of myself being consciously unaware of the day of my coming.'” (Loke, A Kryptic Model, Chapter 3)
Second, the Standard Ontological Kenotic Model suggests that the Son literally gave up certain divine attributes during the Incarnation. Loke points out that this faces a serious theological problem: if God is defined as the greatest possible being, and greatness is tied to attributes like omniscience and omnipotence, then giving up these attributes means ceasing to be God. This contradicts the fundamental Christian claim that Jesus Christ is truly God.
Third, earlier Divine Subconscious Models, such as that proposed by William Sanday in 1910, suggested that divine attributes were present in Christ’s subconscious mind. While Loke finds this approach promising, he identifies problems with how it was originally formulated, particularly the risk of creating a Monophysite mixture where the divine and human natures blend together improperly.
D. The Divine Preconscious Model Explained
In Chapter 4, “A New Kryptic Christology: The Divine Preconscious Model,” Loke presents his solution in detail. He begins with careful definitions of key terms. The conscious is our immediate awareness. The preconscious contains information that is not currently in awareness but can be readily accessed (like your phone number when someone asks for it). The unconscious contains information that cannot be voluntarily accessed.
Loke proposes that at the Incarnation, the Logos acquired a human preconscious and human conscious while retaining His divine preconscious. The divine preconscious contained all divine knowledge and powers, but during His earthly ministry, Christ voluntarily restricted His conscious access to this divine preconscious. This restriction was not absolute—at times, the divine preconscious would influence His human consciousness, allowing Him to know things beyond normal human knowledge (like Nathanael’s location before meeting him, John 1:48) or perform miracles.
This model maintains that Christ had only one consciousness—thus preserving the unity of His person—while explaining how He could be genuinely limited in His human experience. The divine nature with its attributes was truly present but “hidden” (kryptic) in the divine preconscious. Christ could have accessed this divine preconscious at any time but chose not to do so as part of His incarnate mission.
E. Resolving the Paradoxes
Chapter 5, “Addressing the Problems Concerning Omniscience, Omnipotence and Omnipresence,” demonstrates how the Divine Preconscious Model resolves the apparent contradictions. Regarding omniscience, Loke argues that Christ possessed all knowledge in His divine preconscious but had limited access to it in His conscious experience. This is analogous to how we might know something but not have it in our immediate awareness.
For omnipotence, Christ possessed all divine power in His divine nature but exercised it through the limitations of His human nature. When He couldn’t do mighty works in Nazareth, it wasn’t because He lacked the power, but because He had chosen to exercise His power in accordance with human faith and response.
Concerning omnipresence, Loke argues that the divine nature remained omnipresent while the human nature was localized. Christ experienced spatial location through His human nature while His divine nature continued to be present everywhere, sustaining the universe.
F. Defending Against Objections
In Chapter 6, “Addressing the Difficulties Facing the New Kryptic Christology,” Loke anticipates and responds to various objections. One major concern is whether this model truly preserves the full humanity of Christ. If Christ had a divine preconscious that other humans lack, was He truly human like us?
Loke responds that Christ was fully human in His conscious experience and human nature. The divine preconscious was not part of His human nature but part of His divine nature. In His human consciousness and experience, He lived a fully human life with genuine human limitations, making Him able to sympathize with our weaknesses (Hebrews 4:15).
Another objection concerns whether this model falls into Apollinarianism (the heresy that Christ had a human body but not a human soul or mind). Loke strongly denies this, emphasizing that Christ had a complete human nature including a human conscious and preconscious. The divine preconscious was additional to, not a replacement for, any aspect of human nature.
IV. Key Differences Between the Two Models
A. The Mechanism of Unity
One of the most significant differences between Crisp’s and Loke’s models lies in how they explain the unity of Christ’s person. Crisp employs the concept of perichoresis—an interpenetration where the divine nature penetrates and sustains the human nature. This creates an asymmetrical relationship where the divine nature exercises a unique influence on the human nature without mixing with it or transferring properties to it.
Loke, on the other hand, achieves unity through a single consciousness that has access to both human and divine aspects. Rather than two natures interpenetrating, Loke proposes one conscious subject with different levels of mental content—human conscious, human preconscious, and divine preconscious. This avoids any suggestion of two centers of consciousness that might imply two persons.
The practical difference is significant. In Crisp’s model, the two natures remain more distinct, with the divine nature actively sustaining and penetrating the human nature. In Loke’s model, the distinction is maintained at the level of preconscious content, with a more integrated conscious experience.
B. Handling Divine Attributes During the Incarnation
Crisp and Loke differ markedly in their explanation of how Christ’s divine attributes functioned during His earthly ministry. Crisp maintains that all divine attributes remained fully functional in the divine nature, but their exercise was channeled through the human nature. The divine omniscience was always actively knowing all things, but Christ chose to operate through the limitations of human knowledge in His earthly experience.
Loke proposes that divine attributes were genuinely concealed in the divine preconscious. While still possessed by Christ, these attributes were not actively exercised in His conscious experience except when He chose to access them. This is not a giving up of divine attributes (as in kenotic theories) but a voluntary restriction of conscious access to them.
This difference has implications for understanding Gospel passages. When Jesus says He doesn’t know the day or hour (Mark 13:32), Crisp would say the divine nature knows but the human nature doesn’t, and Christ is speaking from His human experience. Loke would say Christ’s consciousness genuinely doesn’t know because the knowledge, while present in the divine preconscious, is not being accessed.
C. The Question of Two Wills
The question of whether Christ had one will (monothelitism) or two wills (dyothelitism) represents another area of difference. Crisp clearly affirms dyothelitism—Christ had both a divine will and a human will. This was affirmed by the Sixth Ecumenical Council and is essential for Christ to be fully human, since will is a property of nature, not person. The two wills operated in harmony, with the human will always choosing to follow the divine will.
Loke’s position is more nuanced. While he affirms that Christ had complete divine and human natures, his model of a single consciousness raises questions about how two wills would operate. Loke addresses this by distinguishing between the faculty of will (which belongs to nature) and the exercise of willing (which belongs to the person). Christ had two faculties of willing but one person exercising them through His single consciousness.
This difference reflects deeper philosophical commitments about the relationship between consciousness, will, and personhood. Crisp maintains stronger distinctions between the operations of the two natures, while Loke emphasizes the unity of conscious experience.
D. The Role of the Human Soul
Both theologians affirm that Christ had a human soul, but they understand its role differently. In Crisp’s model, the human soul is part of the concrete human nature that the divine Person assumes. This soul has its own faculties of thought, will, and emotion, though these are all exercised by the one divine Person who has assumed this nature.
In Loke’s model, the human soul provides the human conscious and preconscious aspects of Christ’s mental life. It’s not a separate center of consciousness but contributes the human dimension to the single consciousness of Christ. The human soul makes Christ truly human in His psychological experience while the divine preconscious preserves His divine identity.
E. Explaining Biblical Passages
The two models lead to different interpretations of key biblical passages about Christ’s limitations and growth. When Luke 2:52 says Jesus “grew in wisdom and stature,” Crisp would emphasize that this was genuine human growth in the human nature, while the divine nature remained unchanged. The one Person experienced real human development through His human nature.
Loke would explain this as growth in Christ’s conscious awareness and human preconscious, while the divine preconscious remained unchanged. The growth was real and affected Christ’s actual conscious experience, not just His human nature considered abstractly.
Similarly, when Jesus experiences temptation (Hebrews 4:15), Crisp sees this as the human nature genuinely experiencing temptation while the divine nature remains unable to sin. Loke would say Christ’s consciousness genuinely experienced temptation as any human would, while the divine preconscious contained the power to resist all sin.
V. Philosophical and Theological Foundations
A. The Nature of Personhood
Both models must address the fundamental question: What is a person? This is crucial because orthodox Christology insists that Christ is one person, not two. Crisp follows the classical definition where a person is an individual subsistence of a rational nature. In Christ, there is only one subsistence—the divine Person of the Son—who subsists in two natures.
Loke emphasizes consciousness and self-awareness in defining personhood. A person is a subject with traits such as moral agency, rationality, self-consciousness, and the ability to relate to other persons. Christ is one person because He has one center of consciousness and self-awareness, even though He has access to both human and divine resources.
These different emphases reflect broader philosophical debates about personal identity. Is a person primarily a metaphysical reality (a subsistent individual) or a psychological reality (a center of consciousness)? Both theologians would affirm both aspects, but their models emphasize different dimensions.
B. The Abstract vs. Concrete Nature Debate
A technical but important issue both theologians address is whether natures are abstract or concrete. An abstract nature would be a set of properties (like “humanity” as the collection of properties that make something human). A concrete nature would be an actual instantiation of those properties (this particular human body and soul).
Both Crisp and Loke affirm that Christ assumed a concrete human nature, not just an abstract set of properties. This means Christ took on a real human body and soul, not just human characteristics. This is important for maintaining that Christ’s incarnation was a real event in history, not just a metaphor or appearance.
The concrete nature view also helps explain how Christ could have genuine human experiences. He didn’t just possess human properties in some abstract sense; He had a real human body that could suffer and a real human soul that could experience emotion.
C. Substance Dualism vs. Physicalism
Both models assume substance dualism—the view that humans consist of both material (body) and immaterial (soul) components. This is crucial for their Christologies because it allows for the union of the immaterial divine nature with a complete human nature (body and soul).
They reject physicalism—the view that humans are purely physical beings—for several reasons. First, physicalism cannot account for the divine nature, which is clearly immaterial. Second, if humans are purely physical, then at death, when the body ceases to function, the person ceases to exist. This would mean the Incarnation ended when Christ’s body died on the cross, which contradicts the Christian teaching about Christ’s continued existence and His descent to the dead.
Loke particularly emphasizes that physicalism faces a “metaphysical limit” problem. A purely physical entity cannot possess infinite knowledge or power—there are limits to how much information or energy a physical system can contain. Thus, a physicalist Christology cannot maintain that Christ possessed divine attributes.
VI. The Question of Christ’s Knowledge
A. The Problem of Mark 13:32
One of the most challenging passages for Christology is Mark 13:32, where Jesus says, “But about that day or hour no one knows, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father.” This seems to directly contradict the claim that Christ is omniscient.
Crisp addresses this through his two-nature framework. The divine nature knows all things, including the day and hour. But Christ speaks here from His human nature, which genuinely doesn’t know. This isn’t deception—Christ is honestly reporting His human experience. The communication of idioms allows us to attribute the experiences of either nature to the one Person.
Loke’s explanation differs significantly. In his model, Christ’s consciousness genuinely doesn’t know because this information, while present in the divine preconscious, is not being accessed. Christ could have accessed it but chose not to as part of His incarnate limitations. This makes Christ’s statement straightforwardly true of His conscious experience without requiring a nature-specific qualification.
B. Christ’s Supernatural Knowledge
Yet the Gospels also record instances where Jesus demonstrated supernatural knowledge. He knew Nathanael before meeting him (John 1:48), knew the thoughts of His opponents (Matthew 9:4), and knew that Lazarus had died without being told (John 11:14). How do our two models explain this?
Crisp would say that at times the divine nature’s omniscience was exercised through the human nature, allowing Christ to know things beyond normal human capacity. This represents a special operation of the divine nature, not a general overwhelming of human limitations.
Loke proposes that occasionally the divine preconscious would release information into Christ’s consciousness. This could happen in response to the Father’s will or the needs of Christ’s mission. The information would then be genuinely present in Christ’s conscious awareness, allowing Him to speak and act on it.
C. Growth in Knowledge
Luke 2:52 tells us that Jesus “increased in wisdom and in stature and in favor with God and man.” This growth in wisdom implies a genuine increase in knowledge and understanding. How can an omniscient Person grow in knowledge?
Crisp maintains that the growth occurred in the human nature. The divine nature remained unchanged and omniscient, but the human nature genuinely developed and learned. Through His human nature, the one Person of Christ experienced real intellectual and spiritual growth.
Loke explains this as growth in Christ’s conscious understanding and the organization of His human preconscious. As Christ matured, His human faculties developed naturally, allowing Him to process and understand more complex ideas. The divine preconscious remained unchanged, but Christ’s conscious access to and integration of knowledge genuinely grew.
VII. The Question of Christ’s Power
A. Miracles and Divine Power
The Gospels record Jesus performing numerous miracles—healing the sick, raising the dead, controlling nature. These demonstrate divine power, yet Jesus also experienced human weakness and limitation. How do our models explain this combination?
Crisp sees miracles as the divine nature acting through the human nature. The divine omnipotence was always present, but it was exercised in and through Christ’s human actions and words. When Jesus touched a leper to heal him, it was a truly human touch empowered by divine power.
Loke proposes that Christ’s divine preconscious contained omnipotent power, which could be accessed and exercised through His human actions. When performing a miracle, Christ would draw upon this divine power, channeling it through His human nature. The power remained divine, but its exercise was mediated through human actions.
B. The Limitation at Nazareth
Mark 6:5-6 presents a striking limitation: “He could not do any miracles there, except lay his hands on a few sick people and heal them. He was amazed at their lack of faith.” How could the omnipotent God be unable to perform miracles?
Crisp explains this as a voluntary limitation. Christ chose to exercise His divine power in response to faith. This wasn’t an absolute inability but a self-imposed restriction based on His mission and the nature of His ministry. The divine nature retained omnipotence but exercised it according to divine wisdom.
Loke would say that Christ chose not to access His divine preconscious power in the absence of faith. This was part of His incarnate mission—to work within the constraints of human response and relationship. The power was available but deliberately not utilized.
C. Physical Weakness and Suffering
Jesus experienced hunger (Matthew 4:2), thirst (John 19:28), fatigue (John 4:6), and ultimately death. These experiences of weakness seem incompatible with divine omnipotence. How can the all-powerful God suffer physical weakness?
Both theologians emphasize that these were genuine human experiences. Crisp maintains that the human nature truly experienced these limitations while the divine nature remained impassible (unable to suffer). The one Person experienced suffering through the human nature without the divine nature being changed or diminished.
Loke agrees that Christ genuinely experienced human weakness in His consciousness. The divine preconscious retained divine attributes, but Christ’s conscious experience was truly limited and vulnerable. This allowed Him to genuinely sympathize with human weakness while maintaining divine power.
VIII. The Unity and Distinction of Natures
A. Maintaining Distinction Without Separation
The Council of Chalcedon (451 AD) declared that Christ’s two natures exist “without confusion, without change, without division, without separation.” Both models must show how they maintain these four qualifications.
Crisp’s perichoretic model maintains distinction through asymmetry. The divine nature penetrates the human nature but not vice versa. The natures remain distinct because there is no mixture or transfer of properties between them. They are united in the one Person but retain their distinct properties and operations.
Loke maintains distinction by locating divine and human properties in different aspects of Christ’s mental life. The divine preconscious remains distinct from the human conscious and preconscious. There is no mixture because these remain separate, though accessible to the one consciousness.
B. The Communication of Idioms
The communication of idioms (communicatio idiomatum) is the principle that allows us to attribute properties of either nature to the one Person. We can say “God died on the cross” (attributing a human experience to the divine Person) or “The man Jesus created the world” (attributing a divine action to the one who is also human).
Crisp carefully distinguishes between different versions of this doctrine. He rejects any real transfer of properties between the natures, instead affirming that properties of each nature are attributed to the Person without mixing the natures themselves. This preserves both the integrity of each nature and the unity of the Person.
Loke’s model handles this somewhat differently. Since there is one consciousness, the communication of idioms reflects the fact that the one conscious subject has access to both divine and human resources. When we attribute divine or human properties to Christ, we’re describing what the one Person experiences or does through different aspects of His being.
C. Avoiding Heretical Extremes
Both models must navigate between various Christological heresies. Nestorianism divides Christ into two persons. Monophysitism blends the natures into one mixed nature. Apollinarianism denies that Christ had a human soul. Docetism claims Christ only appeared to be human.
Crisp avoids Nestorianism by insisting on one divine Person who assumes human nature, not a human person. He avoids Monophysitism by maintaining the distinction of natures through asymmetrical perichoresis. He clearly affirms Christ had a human soul and genuine human experiences.
Loke avoids Nestorianism through his single consciousness model—there cannot be two persons if there is only one center of consciousness. He avoids Monophysitism by keeping divine and human aspects distinct in the preconscious. He strongly affirms Christ’s complete humanity, including a human soul and genuine human experiences.
IX. The Problem of Physicalism
A. What Physicalism Claims
Physicalism is the view that human beings are entirely physical entities. According to this view, what we call the “mind” or “soul” is really just the brain and its activities. There is no immaterial component to human nature—we are sophisticated biological machines, nothing more.
Some Christian thinkers have been attracted to physicalism because it seems to align with modern neuroscience and avoids philosophical problems about how an immaterial soul interacts with a physical body. They argue that the Bible’s language about soul and spirit can be understood as referring to different aspects of our physical lives rather than an immaterial component.
However, both Crisp and Loke argue forcefully that physicalism is incompatible with orthodox Christology. If humans are purely physical, then Christ in His human nature was purely physical. But this creates insurmountable problems for understanding the Incarnation.
B. The Metaphysical Limit Problem
Loke emphasizes what he calls the “metaphysical limit” problem for physicalist Christology. Physical systems have inherent limitations. A physical brain, no matter how sophisticated, can only contain a finite amount of information. It can only process information at finite speeds. It can only exert finite amounts of energy.
But divine attributes are infinite. God knows all true propositions—an infinite amount of information. God has unlimited power. God is present everywhere. These infinite attributes cannot be contained in or exercised by a finite physical system. As Loke argues:
“If the Logos becomes a purely physical entity at the Incarnation, then it would seem to be metaphysically impossible for him to possess divine properties such as having the knowledge of all truths, having the power of omnipotence, etc. as there seems to be a metaphysical limit as to how much information and power a physical body can hold.” (Loke, A Kryptic Model, Chapter 4)
C. The Death Problem
Perhaps the most serious problem for physicalist Christology concerns Christ’s death. If humans are purely physical, then when the body dies, the person ceases to exist. There is no soul to survive bodily death. This would mean that when Christ died on the cross, He ceased to exist.
But this contradicts fundamental Christian teaching. The creeds speak of Christ descending to the dead between His death and resurrection. 1 Peter 3:19 speaks of Christ preaching to “the spirits in prison.” Luke 23:43 records Jesus telling the thief, “Today you will be with me in paradise.” These passages assume Christ’s continued existence after bodily death.
Moreover, if Christ ceased to exist at death, then the Incarnation ended at the crucifixion and began again at the resurrection. This would mean Christ was not continuously incarnate, which seems to undermine the permanence of the Incarnation. It would also raise questions about whether the resurrected Christ is the same person as the pre-crucifixion Christ.
D. The Divine Nature Problem
Physicalism also cannot account for the divine nature itself. God is clearly not a physical being—”God is spirit” (John 4:24). The divine nature is immaterial, eternal, and transcendent. If Christ is to be truly God, He must possess this immaterial divine nature.
But if humans are purely physical, how can a purely physical being be united with an immaterial divine nature? The physicalist might argue that only Christ’s human nature is physical while His divine nature remains immaterial. But this creates an awkward asymmetry—Christ would be partly physical and partly immaterial, undermining the physicalist claim that persons are purely physical.
Furthermore, if the human person is purely physical, and the divine nature is immaterial, how are they united in one person? The physicalist cannot appeal to an immaterial soul as the point of union, since they deny souls exist.
E. The Image of God Problem
Scripture teaches that humans are made in the image of God (Genesis 1:27). Historically, theologians have understood this to include our rational, moral, and spiritual capacities—aspects that seem to transcend purely physical processes. If humans are purely physical, in what sense are we like the immaterial God?
This problem becomes acute in Christology. Christ is the perfect image of God (Colossians 1:15), not just in His divine nature but also as the perfect human. If humans are purely physical, then Christ’s humanity would be purely physical. But how can purely physical humanity be the image of the immaterial God?
Both Crisp and Loke maintain that the image of God requires an immaterial aspect to human nature. We image God in our capacity for reason, relationship, morality, and worship—capacities that, while expressed through our bodies, transcend merely physical processes.
X. Theological Implications
A. Implications for Salvation
The differences between these models have implications for understanding salvation. In Crisp’s model, the divine nature’s penetration of human nature in Christ provides a paradigm for how divine grace penetrates and transforms human nature in salvation. Just as Christ’s human nature was sustained and perfected by divine penetration, so our human nature is renewed by divine grace.
Loke’s model suggests that salvation involves a transformation of consciousness. Just as Christ voluntarily limited His conscious access to divine resources, so sin involves a kind of spiritual unconsciousness. Salvation awakens us to spiritual realities and gives us access to divine resources through the Holy Spirit.
Both models affirm that Christ had to be fully human to save humans. As Gregory of Nazianzus famously said, “What is not assumed is not healed.” Christ assumed complete human nature—body and soul—so that complete human nature could be redeemed.
B. Implications for Christian Living
These models also affect how we understand Christ as our example. Crisp’s model emphasizes that Christ lived a perfect human life through the resources available to humanity when properly related to God. His divine nature didn’t overwhelm His humanity but worked through it. This suggests we too can live godly lives through divine grace working through our humanity.
Loke’s model emphasizes Christ’s voluntary limitations. Christ had access to divine resources but chose to live within human limitations. This provides a model of humility and voluntary self-limitation in service to others. It also suggests that spiritual growth involves learning to access the spiritual resources God makes available to us.
C. Implications for Worship
Both models affirm that Christ is worthy of worship as truly God and truly human. In Crisp’s model, we worship the one divine Person who has permanently assumed human nature. The human nature doesn’t diminish His deity but reveals God’s love and humility.
In Loke’s model, we worship the one who voluntarily veiled His divine glory for our salvation. The hiddenness of His divine attributes during His earthly ministry magnifies the sacrifice He made for us.
Both models help us understand how the man Jesus whom the disciples knew is also the eternal God worthy of worship. They preserve both the genuine humanity that makes Christ accessible to us and the true deity that makes Him worthy of our worship.
XI. Evaluating the Models
A. Strengths of Crisp’s Model
Crisp’s perichoretic model has several strengths. First, it maintains clear distinctions between the two natures while explaining their union. The concept of asymmetrical penetration provides a concrete way to understand how the natures relate without mixing.
Second, it aligns well with the historical tradition, particularly the Chalcedonian Definition and the theology of John of Damascus. Crisp shows careful engagement with patristic sources and demonstrates how his model develops traditional concepts.
Third, it clearly affirms dyothelitism, in accordance with the Sixth Ecumenical Council. This preserves the complete humanity of Christ, including a human will that genuinely chooses (though always in harmony with the divine will).
Fourth, it provides a robust framework for the communication of idioms without falling into the problems of property transfer between natures. This allows for biblical language about Christ while maintaining theological precision.
B. Potential Challenges for Crisp’s Model
However, Crisp’s model faces some challenges. The concept of perichoresis, while traditional, remains somewhat mysterious. What exactly does it mean for one nature to “penetrate” another? The analogy of soul and body helps but doesn’t fully explain the unique case of divine-human union.
The model also requires careful qualification when explaining biblical passages. When Jesus says He doesn’t know something, we must specify He speaks from His human nature. This can seem like a technical distinction that ordinary believers might find confusing.
Some critics worry that maintaining such strong distinction between the natures risks dividing Christ. If the divine nature knows while the human nature doesn’t know, are we really talking about one person or two parallel experiences?
C. Strengths of Loke’s Model
Loke’s Divine Preconscious Model offers innovative solutions to perennial problems. Its greatest strength is explaining the unity of Christ’s person through a single consciousness. This immediately addresses worries about Nestorianism—there cannot be two persons if there is only one center of consciousness.
The model provides an elegant explanation for Christ’s limitations and growth. Christ genuinely didn’t know certain things in His consciousness, genuinely grew in wisdom, genuinely experienced temptation—all while retaining divine attributes in the divine preconscious.
It also offers a psychologically plausible account of the Incarnation. The distinction between conscious and preconscious is familiar from human experience. We all have knowledge that isn’t currently conscious but can be accessed. This makes the model intuitive and relatable.
The model handles biblical passages about Christ’s limitations straightforwardly. When Jesus says He doesn’t know something, He’s simply reporting His conscious state. No complex qualifications about speaking from one nature or another are needed.
D. Potential Challenges for Loke’s Model
Loke’s model is relatively new and hasn’t been tested by centuries of theological reflection. Some may worry that it departs too far from traditional formulations, even if it aims to preserve traditional doctrine.
The concept of a divine preconscious is innovative but also speculative. What exactly is divine preconsciousness? How does it relate to the classical understanding of divine simplicity, where God has no parts or divisions?
Some might worry that restricting divine attributes to the preconscious diminishes Christ’s deity during the Incarnation. If omniscience is hidden in the preconscious, is Christ fully exercising deity in His earthly life?
The model’s emphasis on consciousness might also seem to reduce personhood to psychology. Classical Christology emphasizes metaphysical categories (nature, person, subsistence) rather than psychological ones (consciousness, preconscious).
XII. Contemporary Relevance and Application
A. Responding to Modern Challenges
Both models help respond to contemporary challenges to the Incarnation. Modern critics often claim the Incarnation is logically incoherent—that one person cannot have apparently contradictory properties. These models show how careful philosophical and theological analysis can resolve apparent contradictions.
They also address the challenge of religious pluralism. If Jesus was limited in knowledge, how can Christians claim He is uniquely God incarnate? Both models show how Christ can be genuinely limited in His human experience while remaining truly divine, supporting Christian claims about His unique status.
B. Dialogue with Science
These models also contribute to dialogue between theology and science. Both reject physicalism while remaining open to scientific insights about the body-mind relationship. They show how Christian theology can maintain traditional doctrines while engaging contemporary neuroscience and psychology.
Loke’s model, in particular, draws on psychological concepts that resonate with contemporary understanding of consciousness. This doesn’t reduce theology to psychology but shows how theological concepts can be expressed in contemporary terms.
C. Practical Ministry Applications
Understanding these models helps pastors and teachers explain the Incarnation more clearly. When congregants struggle with how Jesus could be both God and man, these models provide frameworks for explanation.
They also inform pastoral care. Understanding Christ’s genuine human experience—explained differently but affirmed by both models—helps us appreciate how Christ truly sympathizes with human weakness and struggle. This is not a God who merely observes human suffering from a distance but one who genuinely experienced it.
D. Spiritual Formation
These models also contribute to spiritual formation. Crisp’s emphasis on divine penetration suggests that spiritual growth involves allowing divine grace to penetrate and transform every aspect of our humanity. Loke’s emphasis on consciousness suggests that spiritual growth involves expanding our conscious awareness of spiritual realities.
Both models emphasize Christ’s voluntary humility in the Incarnation. This provides a model for Christian discipleship—voluntary self-limitation in service to God and others.
XIII. The Witness of Scripture
A. Old Testament Anticipations
While the Old Testament doesn’t explicitly teach the Incarnation, both theologians recognize anticipations of this doctrine. The theophanies (appearances of God) in the Old Testament suggest that God can manifest Himself in created form without ceasing to be God. The Angel of the Lord who speaks as God (Genesis 16:7-13, Exodus 3:2-6) particularly anticipates the Incarnation.
The concept of divine Wisdom personified (Proverbs 8, Wisdom of Solomon 7) provides conceptual preparation for understanding how God’s Word could become incarnate. The Messianic prophecies, especially Isaiah 9:6 calling the coming child “Mighty God,” point toward a divine-human figure.
B. The Gospels’ Portrayal
The Gospels present Jesus as both divine and human without attempting to explain how this is possible. He receives worship (Matthew 14:33, John 20:28) yet grows tired (John 4:6). He forgives sins (Mark 2:5-7) yet doesn’t know certain things (Mark 13:32). He raises the dead (John 11:43-44) yet weeps (John 11:35).
Both models help us understand this paradoxical presentation. They show how the Gospel writers’ seemingly contradictory descriptions actually reflect the deep truth of the Incarnation—one person experiencing reality through two natures.
C. Pauline Christology
Paul provides some of the highest Christology in the New Testament. Philippians 2:6-11 speaks of Christ “being in very nature God” yet “taking the very nature of a servant.” Colossians 1:15-20 presents Christ as the image of God and creator of all things who reconciled all things through His blood.
Both models help interpret these passages. Crisp’s model explains how Christ could empty Himself without ceasing to be God—through taking human nature and allowing it to condition His earthly experience. Loke’s model explains this as voluntary limitation of conscious access to divine prerogatives.
D. Johannine Insights
John’s Gospel particularly emphasizes both Christ’s deity (“the Word was God” – John 1:1) and humanity (“the Word became flesh” – John 1:14). John presents Jesus as consciously aware of His divine identity (John 8:58) yet genuinely human in experience.
The “I Am” statements in John suggest divine self-consciousness, while passages like John 11:35 (Jesus wept) and John 19:28 (I thirst) demonstrate genuine human experience. Both models provide frameworks for holding these together without contradiction.
XIV. Historical Development and Context
A. Early Church Struggles
The early church struggled to articulate how Jesus could be both God and man. Various heresies emerged from emphasizing one aspect over another. The Ebionites denied Christ’s deity. The Docetists denied His true humanity. The Arians made Him a created being. The Apollinarians denied He had a human mind.
The councils of Nicaea (325), Constantinople (381), Ephesus (431), and Chalcedon (451) progressively clarified orthodox Christology. Both Crisp and Loke work within this conciliar framework, showing how their models uphold and explain traditional doctrine.
B. Medieval Developments
Medieval theologians like Anselm, Aquinas, and Duns Scotus further developed Christological reflection. Scotus’s suggestion that Christ’s divine knowledge might be in what we would now call the subconscious anticipates aspects of Loke’s model. Aquinas’s careful distinctions between person and nature inform Crisp’s approach.
The medieval period also saw debates about whether Christ could have sinned (the impeccability debate) and whether He assumed fallen or unfallen human nature. Both contemporary models contribute to these ongoing discussions.
C. Reformation Contributions
The Reformation brought renewed focus on Christ’s work but also continued reflection on His person. Lutheran and Reformed theologians debated the communication of attributes, with Lutherans affirming a stronger version than the Reformed. Crisp’s position aligns more with the Reformed tradition of maintaining clear distinction between the natures.
The Reformers also emphasized Christ’s full humanity as essential for His role as mediator and substitute. Both contemporary models strongly affirm this Protestant emphasis on Christ’s genuine human experience.
D. Modern Challenges and Responses
The Enlightenment brought new challenges to Christology. Historical criticism questioned the Gospel accounts. Philosophical critiques claimed the Incarnation was logically impossible. Liberal theology often reduced Jesus to a moral teacher.
Both Crisp and Loke represent a robust orthodox response to these challenges. They use philosophical tools to defend traditional doctrine rather than abandon it. They show that careful thinking can vindicate rather than undermine classical Christology.
XV. Conclusion: The Enduring Mystery and Practical Truth
A. Agreement on Essentials
Despite their different approaches, Crisp and Loke agree on the essential elements of orthodox Christology. Both affirm that Jesus Christ is one person with two complete natures—fully God and fully man. Both reject any compromise of either nature. Both maintain that the Incarnation is permanent—the Son remains incarnate forever.
Both models reject physicalism as incompatible with the Incarnation. They recognize that if humans are merely physical, then Christ could not be truly God incarnate. The immaterial aspect of human nature is necessary for the union of divine and human in Christ.
Both theologians work within the boundaries of Scripture and the ecumenical councils. Their innovations are attempts to better explain and defend traditional doctrine, not to revise it. They show that orthodox Christology remains intellectually viable in the contemporary world.
B. Complementary Insights
In many ways, these models are complementary rather than contradictory. Crisp’s emphasis on the metaphysical structure of the Incarnation (two natures, one person) provides crucial foundations. Loke’s emphasis on the psychological dimension (consciousness, preconscious) offers additional explanatory power.
Crisp’s model may be more helpful for understanding the objective reality of the Incarnation—what actually happened when the Word became flesh. Loke’s model may be more helpful for understanding the subjective experience—what it was like for Christ to live as incarnate God.
Both models contribute to a fuller understanding of this central Christian mystery. Like viewing a diamond from different angles, each perspective reveals aspects of the truth while no single view exhausts the reality.
C. The Physicalism Challenge
Both models powerfully demonstrate why physicalism fails as a Christian anthropology. If humans are purely physical, the Incarnation becomes impossible. Christ cannot be truly God if He is purely physical in His humanity. He cannot continue to exist between death and resurrection if He has no immaterial aspect.
This has important implications for contemporary Christianity. Some Christians have been tempted to adopt physicalism to appear more scientifically respectable. But as both Crisp and Loke show, this would require abandoning the Incarnation, the heart of Christian faith.
The Incarnation requires that humans have an immaterial aspect—call it soul, spirit, or mind. This doesn’t conflict with genuine science, which can study the physical aspect of humanity without denying the spiritual. But it does conflict with physicalist philosophy that reduces humans to merely material beings.
D. Practical Importance
These Christological questions are not merely academic. They affect core Christian beliefs and practices. If Christ is not fully God, our worship of Him is idolatry. If He is not fully human, He cannot be our mediator and example.
Understanding how Christ can be both God and man strengthens faith and worship. It helps believers appreciate the magnitude of God’s love in the Incarnation. It provides comfort in knowing that Christ truly understands human experience while possessing divine power to save.
These models also inform Christian ethics and discipleship. Christ’s voluntary self-limitation models humility and service. His perfect human obedience shows what humanity was meant to be. His divine power assures us that following Him is not in vain.
E. The Continuing Mystery
While both models provide valuable insights, the Incarnation remains ultimately mysterious. We can understand more than if we had no explanation, but we cannot fully comprehend how infinite God became finite man while remaining God.
This is not a failure of theology but a recognition of its limits. God transcends human understanding, and His acts—especially the Incarnation—surpass our comprehension. As Loke notes in his conclusion, the goal is not to eliminate mystery but to show that the Incarnation is coherent and possible, even if not fully comprehensible.
Both theologians would agree with the ancient maxim: theology is faith seeking understanding, not faith achieving complete understanding. We see through a glass darkly, but what we see is real and true and transformative.
F. The Living Christ
Ultimately, both models point us to the living Christ who is not merely a theological puzzle but a living Person. He is the one who walked the roads of Palestine, died on Calvary’s cross, rose from the dead, and reigns at the Father’s right hand. He is fully God, worthy of our worship. He is fully human, able to sympathize with our weaknesses.
This is the Christ proclaimed by Scripture, confessed by the church, and experienced by believers. The models of Crisp and Loke help us better understand and articulate this faith. They show that the central Christian claim—that God became man for our salvation—remains coherent, powerful, and true.
In a world that often reduces Jesus to merely a teacher or example, these robust Christological models call us back to the full biblical and creedal faith. They remind us that Christianity stands or falls with the Incarnation. If Christ is not truly God and truly man, Christianity is false. But if He is—and both models show this is coherent and possible—then He is indeed the way, the truth, and the life.
G. Final Reflections
The comparison of these two models reveals the richness of orthodox Christology. Within the boundaries of biblical and creedal faith, there is room for different explanations and emphases. This diversity is not weakness but strength, showing that orthodox doctrine can be expressed in various ways while maintaining core truths.
For students of theology, these models demonstrate the importance of careful philosophical and theological thinking. The Incarnation is not a simple doctrine that can be stated in a sentence and left unexamined. It requires deep reflection, careful distinction, and humble recognition of mystery.
For pastors and teachers, these models provide resources for explaining and defending the faith. When skeptics claim the Incarnation is impossible or incoherent, these models show otherwise. When believers struggle to understand how Jesus can be both God and man, these models offer helpful frameworks.
For all Christians, these models deepen appreciation for what God has done in Christ. The Incarnation is not just a doctrine to be believed but a reality to be wondered at, celebrated, and lived out. In becoming human while remaining God, Christ has united heaven and earth, divine and human, in His own person. This union is our salvation and our hope.
As we continue to reflect on these profound truths, may we, like Crisp and Loke, use our minds in service of faith, always remembering that the goal is not merely understanding but worship, not merely knowledge but love, not merely theology but doxology. For in the end, the Incarnation is not a problem to be solved but a gift to be received, a mystery to be adored, and a truth that transforms everything.
© 2025, Matthew. All rights reserved.
