Chapter 8
His Inner Life, Emotions, Suffering, and Death
In the previous chapter, we saw that the Bible consistently portrays Jesus as having a complete human nature — one that includes not just a physical body but also an immaterial soul. We looked at the big picture. Now it is time to zoom in. In this chapter, we are going to walk through the most important Gospel passages that reveal the inner life of Jesus Christ — His emotions, His grief, His anguish, His spiritual commitments, and the moment of His death. What we will find, I believe, is powerful and deeply moving: the Gospels paint a portrait of a Savior who possesses a rich, genuine, deeply human inner life that simply cannot be reduced to physical brain activity.
Here is the thesis I want to defend: The Gospels portray Jesus as having a rich inner life — with genuine human emotions, a soul that grieves, a spirit that He commits to the Father at death, and a human will that submits to the divine will — that cannot be reduced to mere physical brain activity and that demands a genuine human soul.
Why does this matter so much? Because if Jesus does not have a human soul, then every time the Gospels describe His inner life — every reference to His grief, His anguish, His spiritual struggle — we have to reduce all of it to nothing more than electrochemical activity in a first-century Palestinian brain. The agony of Gethsemane becomes a neurochemical event. The committing of His spirit to the Father becomes a meaningless gesture. The weeping at the tomb of Lazarus becomes a reflexive biological response. Is that really what the Gospel writers intended to convey? I don't think so. And I think the evidence will bear that out.
We will examine seven key Gospel passages in depth. For each one, I will provide the full text of the passage (in the ESV), a careful analysis of the original Greek, a look at what scholars have said, and then a comparison between what the passage means on a dualist reading (where Jesus has a genuine soul) and what it gets reduced to on a physicalist reading (where Jesus is nothing more than a physical organism). Along the way, we will also connect these passages to Andrew Ter Ern Loke's kryptic model of the Incarnation — the model I believe best explains how the eternal Son of God could genuinely experience human life from the inside.1
But before we dive into the passages, I want to set the stage with a crucial insight from Michael Wilkinson — an insight that I think changes everything about how we should approach this question.
Most of the time, when people think about human nature, they start with themselves. They ask: "What am I? Am I a body? A soul? Both?" And then they take their answer and apply it to Jesus. So if someone concludes that human beings are purely physical organisms — no soul, no spirit, just matter — they apply that view to Christ and say, "Well, Jesus must have been a purely physical organism, too."
Michael Wilkinson, in his groundbreaking book Crowned with Glory and Honor, argues that this approach has things exactly backward. Instead of starting with a philosophical anthropology and applying it to Christ, we should start with Christ and derive our anthropology from Him.2 After all, Jesus is what Wilkinson calls "the man par excellence" — the paradigm human being, the second Adam, the firstborn among many brothers (Romans 8:29). If we want to know what a human being truly is, we should look at the human being — the one human being whose nature has been defined with precision by the ecumenical councils of the church.
And what did those councils say about Christ's human nature? The Council of Chalcedon (451) declared that Christ possesses a human nature consisting of a "rational soul and body."3 The Second Council of Constantinople (553) explicitly condemned the heresy of Apollinarianism — the denial that Christ has a human rational soul.4 The church insisted, with unmistakable clarity, that a complete human nature includes both a body and a soul.
Wilkinson's Key Insight: "Jesus as the man par excellence must govern how we define the creation of man par ordinaire." In other words, Christ's human nature — as defined by the councils — should norm our understanding of human nature in general. If Christ's human nature includes a body and a soul, then human nature includes a body and a soul. Any anthropology that denies the human soul is not just philosophically problematic — it is Christologically inadequate.
This is a powerful move. Wilkinson calls it "Chalcedonian anthropology," and it reverses the usual direction of influence.5 Instead of importing a philosophical theory about human nature into Christology, we let Christology tell us what human nature is. And if Christ — the definitive human being — has a soul, then we have a soul too.
As Wilkinson puts it in his six concluding theses: "Because the man Jesus Christ is the revelation of human being, he is ontologically definitive for our human being."6 The person-nature ontology of Christ — a divine person subsisting in both a divine nature and a human nature composed of body and soul — provides the pattern for our own constitution as persons who subsist in a human nature composed of body and soul.7
With Wilkinson's framework in mind, let us now turn to the Gospel texts themselves and see how they portray the inner life of Jesus — a life that points unmistakably to the reality of His human soul.
We begin with what is arguably the most intense and intimate moment of Jesus' earthly life before the cross itself: the agony in the Garden of Gethsemane. Here is the text:
"Then he said to them, 'My soul is very sorrowful, even to death; remain here, and watch with me.'" — Matthew 26:38 (ESV; cf. Mark 14:34)
Let's pay careful attention to what Jesus says here. He does not say, "I am feeling sad." He does not say, "My body is in distress." He says, "My soul is very sorrowful." The Greek word translated "soul" is psychē (ψυχή) — the standard word for the soul, the inner self, the immaterial center of a person's life.8 Jesus explicitly identifies His soul — His psychē — as the subject of His suffering. It is not His body that is sorrowful. It is His soul.
The word translated "very sorrowful" is perilypos (περίλυπος), a compound word meaning "deeply grieved" or "surrounded by grief on every side." The prefix peri- (around, on every side) intensifies the word lypos (grief), creating the sense that Jesus' soul was engulfed by sorrow — overwhelmed from every direction.9 And then comes the phrase heōs thanatou (ἕως θανάτου), meaning "to the point of death" or "even unto death." The grief was so intense that it brought Jesus to the very edge of death. This language echoes the anguish of the psalmist in Psalm 42:5-6, 11 and Psalm 43:5, where the psalmist asks, "Why are you cast down, O my nephesh?"10
What is happening here? Jesus is laying bare the anguish of His human soul. He is opening a window into the deepest interior of His human experience and revealing something staggering: the Son of God, in His human nature, is experiencing grief so profound that it threatens to destroy Him. This is not an act. This is not a theological illustration. This is a genuine human being — the God-man — experiencing the full weight of human anguish in His psychē, His soul.
The great New Testament scholar D. A. Carson notes that the language in this passage conveys the sense of Jesus being "completely surrounded by sorrow," an anguish that is total and all-encompassing.11 R. T. France observes that the language points to a depth of inner emotional agony that goes beyond mere physical suffering — it is a suffering of the whole inner person.12
The Dualist Reading: Jesus has a genuine human soul — a psychē — and that soul is the seat of His deepest anguish. The grief of Gethsemane is a genuine experience of the human soul, in which the inner person confronts the prospect of bearing the sins of the world and experiences sorrow so deep it approaches the boundary of death. This is profoundly meaningful: the Son of God entered into the deepest dimension of human suffering — soul-suffering — in order to redeem us body and soul.
The Physicalist Reduction: On physicalism, Jesus has no soul. His psychē is just a way of referring to his biological life or his brain activity. So when Jesus says "My soul is very sorrowful, even to death," what He really means — on this view — is something like: "My brain is producing neurochemicals associated with extreme distress." The most profound moment of pre-crucifixion agony in all of redemptive history becomes a description of brain chemistry.
Can we really accept that reduction? Is that what the Gospel writer is trying to communicate? I don't think so. Matthew and Mark present Jesus as a person with a genuine inner life — a soul that suffers, that grieves, that is overwhelmed. The word psychē is not a metaphor for brain states. It is the biblical word for the soul — the same word used throughout the Old and New Testaments for the immaterial dimension of human persons.13
We should also notice the context in which Jesus makes this statement. He has just eaten the Passover meal with His disciples. He has washed their feet. He has predicted His betrayal and Peter's denial. And now, in the quiet darkness of a garden on the Mount of Olives, He opens the deepest chambers of His inner life to His closest friends. "My soul is very sorrowful, even to death." This is not a casual remark. It is a confession of the most intense kind — an invitation to witness the suffering of His innermost being. The fact that Jesus chooses the word psychē — soul — rather than some more generic expression tells us something important about how He understands His own experience. He is not merely "feeling bad." His soul is in agony.
It is also significant that Jesus asks His disciples to "remain here, and watch with me" (Matthew 26:38). He is not asking them to watch His body. He is asking them to share in His experience — to keep vigil alongside His suffering soul. The request for companionship in this moment reveals the genuinely human dimension of His anguish. A brain experiencing neurochemical distress does not ask for companionship. A soul in agony does. Jesus' request only makes sense if He has a genuine inner life — an inner person who craves fellowship in the darkest hour.
Mark's account adds that Jesus "began to be greatly distressed and troubled" (Mark 14:33, ESV). The Greek words here are ekthambeisthai (ἐκθαμβεῖσθαι, to be greatly amazed or alarmed) and adēmonein (ἀδημονεῖν, to be in anguish or deeply distressed). The first word suggests something like horrified astonishment — Jesus was seized with a kind of dread that alarmed even Him. The second word conveys a deep, settled distress — a heaviness of spirit that goes beyond momentary fear. Together, these verbs paint a picture of a human soul confronting something terrible — something that evokes horror, dread, and crushing sorrow all at once. These are not descriptions of brain chemistry. They are descriptions of the deepest experiences a human soul can undergo.
It is worth noting that Luke's account of Gethsemane adds another striking detail: "And being in agony he prayed more earnestly; and his sweat became like great drops of blood falling down to the ground" (Luke 22:44, ESV). The Greek word for "agony" is agōnia (ἀγωνία), which suggests an intense inner struggle or contest.14 The struggle is not merely physical — it is spiritual and volitional. Jesus is wrestling with the horror of what lies ahead, and the intensity of this inner struggle is so extreme that it produces physical symptoms. This is a case where the soul's anguish overflows into the body, not the other way around. On physicalism, there is no soul to be in agony — there are only neurons firing. But the Gospel text presents the agony as an experience of the whole person, centered in the soul.
We come now to the moment of Jesus' death — the climax of all redemptive history. Luke records Jesus' final words:
"Then Jesus, calling out with a loud voice, said, 'Father, into your hands I commit my spirit!' And having said this he breathed his last." — Luke 23:46 (ESV)
Matthew's account adds a different but complementary detail: "And Jesus cried out again with a loud voice and yielded up his spirit" (Matthew 27:50, ESV). The verb Matthew uses is aphēken (ἀφῆκεν), from aphiēmi, meaning "to release" or "to send away." Jesus actively released His spirit — He was not simply killed; He voluntarily gave up His spirit.15
In Luke's account, the word translated "spirit" is pneuma (πνεῦμα) — the other major biblical term for the immaterial dimension of a person. And the verb translated "commit" is paratithemai (παρατίθημαι), which means "to entrust," "to place into the care of," or "to commit into safekeeping."16 This is a word used for entrusting something valuable to someone for safekeeping — like depositing treasure in a bank or placing a child into the arms of a guardian.
Stop and think about what this implies. Jesus is entrusting His pneuma — His spirit — to the Father. This act of committing presupposes several things:
(1) The spirit is a real entity — something that can be entrusted.
(2) The spirit can be separated from the body — otherwise, why commit it elsewhere?
(3) The spirit continues to exist after the body dies — otherwise, what is being committed?
(4) The spirit can be received by God — the Father's "hands" are its destination.
On dualism, all four of these implications make perfect sense. Jesus has a human spirit (pneuma) — an immaterial soul — that survives the death of the body. At the moment of death, the soul separates from the body. Jesus, in an act of trust and surrender, entrusts His soul to the Father's care. The soul goes to paradise (as Jesus told the thief on the cross: "Today you will be with me in paradise," Luke 23:43), while the body remains in the tomb. The hypostatic union — the union of the divine nature and the human nature in the one Person of the Son — is not broken. The Son remains united to both the soul and the body, even in their temporary separation.17
Key Point: Jesus is quoting Psalm 31:5 — "Into your hand I commit my spirit" — a psalm of trust in which the psalmist entrusts his ruach (רוּחַ, spirit) to God. By using these words at the moment of death, Jesus identifies Himself with the long biblical tradition of trusting one's spirit to God at the point of death. This only makes sense if there is a spirit to entrust.
Now consider what this passage means on physicalism. If there is no immaterial spirit, if Jesus is nothing more than a physical organism, then there is nothing to commit. The person Jesus is about to cease functioning. His brain is about to shut down. His body is about to die. On physicalism, "Father, into your hands I commit my spirit" reduces to something like, "Father, I am about to stop existing as a conscious organism." The act of committing becomes a meaningless gesture — there is nothing being entrusted to anyone. The Father's "hands" receive nothing, because there is nothing to receive.18
That is a devastatingly inadequate reading of this text. Luke presents Jesus' death not as the extinction of a physical organism, but as the departure of a spirit from a body — a departure made in trust and surrender, into the waiting care of the Father. As John W. Cooper argues in his classic study, the New Testament consistently portrays death as the separation of the soul or spirit from the body, and the Gospels' depiction of Jesus' death is the supreme example of this portrayal.19
We should also consider the connection between Luke 23:46 and Luke 23:43, where Jesus tells the penitent thief, "Truly, I say to you, today you will be with me in paradise" (ESV). If Jesus has no spirit or soul that survives death, then this promise is empty. On physicalism, there is no "Jesus" in paradise that afternoon — His body is in the tomb, and His person has ceased to exist. But Jesus clearly promises conscious, personal presence: "you will be with me." The "me" who will be in paradise that day is the same "me" who is hanging on the cross — the Person of the Son, united to a human soul that survives the death of the body. The promise to the thief presupposes that Jesus — in some real sense — will continue to exist after His body dies. And that presupposes a soul.
The early church recognized the theological significance of this moment. Stephen, the first Christian martyr, echoed Jesus' words when he said, "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit" (Acts 7:59, ESV). Stephen clearly believed that his spirit would survive the death of his body and be received by the risen Lord. He was following the pattern established by Jesus Himself at Calvary. If Jesus' own act of committing His spirit was merely a metaphor — if there was no spirit to commit — then Stephen was building his dying hope on an illusion. But the consistent witness of the New Testament is that the spirit is real, it survives death, and it is received by God.
The Gospel of John records a remarkable statement by Jesus about His own death and resurrection:
"For this reason the Father loves me, because I lay down my life that I may take it up again. No one takes it from me, but I lay it down of my own accord. I have authority to lay it down, and I have authority to take it up again. This charge I have received from my Father." — John 10:17-18 (ESV)
The word translated "life" here is, once again, psychē (ψυχή). Jesus says He lays down His psychē — His soul, His life — and then takes it up again. The language of "laying down" and "taking up" implies a continuous subject — someone who does the laying down and then does the taking up. But on physicalism, the subject ceases to exist at death. If Jesus is nothing more than a physical organism, then when He dies, there is no one left to "take up" the life again. The organism has ceased functioning. The brain has shut down. The person is gone.20
On dualism, by contrast, the passage makes perfect sense. Jesus — the Person of the Son, united to a human soul and a human body — voluntarily lays down His psychē. At death, the soul separates from the body. But the soul does not cease to exist. The Son remains united to the soul, and the soul remains active during the period between death and resurrection (the triduum mortis — the "three days of death").21 Then, at the resurrection, the soul is reunited with the body — the glorified body — and Jesus "takes up" His life again. There is a continuous subject throughout: the Son of God, united to a human soul, who never ceases to exist.
Notice also the language of authority: "I have authority to lay it down, and I have authority to take it up again." This presupposes a genuine agent — a Person with real power over His own life and death. On physicalism, this authority is difficult to account for. Can a physical organism have authority over its own cessation and reconstitution? What kind of authority does a brain exercise over its own death and re-creation? On dualism, Christ's authority flows from the fact that He is a divine Person who possesses a human nature (body and soul). He can lay down the soul's union with the body, and He can restore it — because He, as the divine Son, has authority over life and death itself.22
There is another important detail in this passage that is easy to miss. Jesus says, "This charge I have received from my Father." The act of laying down His life and taking it up again is not arbitrary — it is a mission entrusted to Him by the Father. The word "charge" translates entolē (ἐντολή), which means "command" or "commission." The Son has received a commission from the Father that involves a voluntary death and a voluntary resumption of life. This commission presupposes a continuous agent who can receive a command, carry it out through death, and complete it through resurrection. On physicalism, the agent is extinguished at death. How can a non-existent person complete a commission? On dualism, the Son — united to a human soul that survives death — carries the commission through death and into resurrection without any interruption of His personal existence.
We should also observe that the word psychē in this passage functions as more than a mere synonym for "life" in the biological sense. Jesus is not simply saying, "I will cease to be a living organism and then resume being a living organism." He is saying something far more profound: He is willingly surrendering His soul — the animating principle of His human existence — and then reassuming it. The laying down and taking up of the psychē is an act that only makes full sense if the psychē is a real thing — a genuine entity that can be released from the body and then reunited with it. If psychē means nothing more than "biological life," then "taking it up again" implies a re-creation of biological function from scratch — which raises the devastating personal identity problem that we will address in Chapter 24. But if psychē refers to the soul, then the continuity of Christ's personal identity through death and resurrection is preserved by the soul's unbroken existence.
Some of the most moving passages in the Gospels are those that reveal the emotional life of Jesus. These are not incidental details. They are windows into the human soul of the Son of God — and they pose a serious challenge to any physicalist account of Christ's human nature.
"When Jesus saw her weeping, and the Jews who had come with her also weeping, he was deeply moved in his spirit and greatly troubled. And he said, 'Where have you laid him?' They said to him, 'Lord, come and see.' Jesus wept." — John 11:33-35 (ESV)
This short passage is packed with emotional and theological significance. Let's look at the Greek carefully.
The phrase "deeply moved in his spirit" translates the Greek enebrimēsato tō pneumati (ἐνεβριμήσατο τῷ πνεύματι). The verb embrimaomai (ἐμβριμάομαι) is a strong word — it originally referred to the snorting of a horse, and it conveys intense inner agitation, a stirring of the deepest emotions.23 Some scholars translate it as "deeply moved," others as "indignant" or "stirred with strong emotion." The point is that something profound is happening in the depths of Jesus' inner being — in His pneuma, His spirit.
The next phrase, "greatly troubled," translates etaraxen heauton (ἐτάραξεν ἑαυτόν) — literally, "He troubled Himself." The verb tarassō (ταράσσω) means "to stir up" or "to agitate," like stirring up water in a pool. And the reflexive pronoun heauton (himself) indicates that this was something Jesus did to Himself — He allowed Himself to be moved, to enter into this emotional experience fully and voluntarily.24
Then come the two most powerful words in the passage — perhaps two of the most powerful words in all of Scripture: "Jesus wept" (edakrysen ho Iēsous, ἐδάκρυσεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς). The verb dakryō (δακρύω) means "to shed tears" — quiet weeping, tears streaming down the face. This is the Son of God, the Maker of heaven and earth, weeping at the tomb of His friend. His human soul is moved to tears.
What is happening here? On the dualist reading, Jesus' spirit — His pneuma — is the seat of His deepest emotional response. His grief is not merely a physical reaction — not just tear ducts activating and stress hormones releasing. His grief is an experience of the soul, an eruption of sorrow from the deepest interior of His human person. The spirit is stirred. The soul is troubled. And the tears flow from a heart that genuinely loves and genuinely grieves.
On the physicalist reading, there is no spirit to be deeply moved. There is no soul to be troubled. The weeping is a neurochemical process — neurons firing, hormones releasing, tear ducts activating. Jesus' grief is a biological reflex, nothing more. Is that really what John is trying to tell us?
I want to connect this to a point I have developed at greater length in my companion book, The Heart of God: Does God Feel? A Biblical and Theological Case for the Emotional Life of God. In that work, I argue that God has genuine emotional responses to His creatures — that divine passibility, properly qualified, is a biblical truth. Christ's emotions at Lazarus's tomb are genuine expressions of His human soul, and they also reflect, at a deeper level, the divine nature's genuine emotional engagement with the suffering of creation.25 The tears of Jesus are not just human tears — they are the tears of God incarnate, shed through a genuine human soul. Physicalism strips this moment of its theological depth by reducing it to a purely biological event.
"Now is my soul troubled. And what shall I say? 'Father, save me from this hour'? But for this purpose I have come to this hour." — John 12:27 (ESV)
Here Jesus uses the word psychē (ψυχή) again — "my soul." The verb "troubled" is tetaraktai (τετάρακται), a perfect passive form of tarassō, meaning "has been stirred up" or "is in a state of agitation." Jesus' psychē — His soul — is the subject of this inner turmoil. And once again, the physicalist must reduce this to brain chemistry. "My brain is in a state of neurochemical disturbance" — is that what Jesus is saying? Of course not. He is identifying His soul as the locus of His anguish, just as He did in Gethsemane.26
"After saying these things, Jesus was troubled in his spirit, and testified, 'Truly, truly, I say to you, one of you will betray me.'" — John 13:21 (ESV)
The phrase "troubled in his spirit" is etarachthē tō pneumati (ἐταράχθη τῷ πνεύματι). Once more, the spirit (pneuma) is the seat of Jesus' inner disturbance. The betrayal by Judas did not merely cause Jesus physical discomfort or mental anxiety in the way a stressful situation might cause a headache. It troubled His spirit — the deepest interior of His human person. The emotional response is located not in the brain but in the pneuma — the spirit, the inner person, the soul.27
Taken together, John 11:33, 12:27, and 13:21 paint a consistent and compelling picture. Jesus has a rich, genuine inner life. His emotions are located in His psychē and His pneuma — His soul and His spirit. These are not merely different words for "brain activity." They are the biblical vocabulary for the immaterial dimension of the human person — and John uses them deliberately and consistently to describe the inner life of Christ.
It is worth pausing to appreciate the sheer range of emotional experience that the Gospels attribute to Jesus. We see sorrow (Matt. 26:38), indignation and deep inner stirring (John 11:33), distress (John 12:27), grief at betrayal (John 13:21), compassion for the crowds (Matt. 9:36; 14:14), love for His friends (John 11:5; 13:1), joy in the Spirit (Luke 10:21), righteous anger at the desecration of the temple (John 2:13-17), and frustration at unbelief (Mark 9:19). This is not the profile of a biological machine responding to stimuli. This is the portrait of a person with a soul — a person whose inner life is as deep and varied and real as any human being's, because it is a genuinely human inner life, lived through a genuine human soul. If we reduce all of this to neural processing, we have not explained anything. We have explained it away.
There is also the important observation that the Fourth Gospel, which is widely recognized as the most theologically developed of the four Gospels, is also the Gospel that most consistently attributes emotional depth to Jesus by locating it in His pneuma and psychē. John, who begins his Gospel with the highest Christological declaration in the New Testament — "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God" (John 1:1) — is also the evangelist who most vividly portrays the inner life of Christ's human soul. This is no accident. For John, the high Christology and the deep humanity go together. The Word who was God is also the man who wept, who was troubled in spirit, whose soul was in anguish. The Incarnation means that the divine Person truly entered into human experience — and human experience, as John portrays it, is an experience of the soul, not merely of the body.
"And Jesus increased in wisdom and in stature and in favor with God and man." — Luke 2:52 (ESV)
This short verse is deeply significant for understanding Christ's human nature. The verb "increased" is proekopten (προέκοπτεν), from prokoptō, which means "to advance" or "to make progress." The imperfect tense indicates an ongoing, gradual process — Jesus was continually growing, developing, advancing in wisdom over time.28
The word "wisdom" is sophia (σοφία), and "stature" is hēlikia (ἡλικία), which can mean either physical height or age. The point is that Jesus experienced genuine human growth — both physical and intellectual. He did not emerge from the womb speaking in complete sentences or reciting the Torah from memory. He grew up. He learned. He developed. He was a genuine human child who became a genuine human man.
But wait — how can the eternal Son of God, who is omniscient, "increase in wisdom"? Doesn't omniscience mean that He already knows everything? This is where Andrew Ter Ern Loke's kryptic model of the Incarnation is so helpful.
Loke's Kryptic Model and Luke 2:52: On Loke's Divine Preconscious Model, the Son retained His divine omniscience throughout the Incarnation, but this knowledge was held at a "preconscious" level — present but not constantly flooding His waking human awareness. Jesus grew in wisdom by assimilating knowledge into His human conscious experience and His human preconscious through normal human means — learning from His parents, from the Scriptures, from His experience of the world. Even though He had knowledge of all truths in the divine preconscious, He chose to acquire knowledge through genuinely human processes, so as to share in our experience of growing and learning.
Loke explains that Jesus "grew in wisdom by assimilating knowledge into his human conscious and part B of his preconscious," where "part B" refers to the human preconscious — the ordinary storehouse of human memory and experience. The divine preconscious (part A) contained omniscient knowledge, but Jesus chose not to access it in His waking consciousness, instead learning as humans learn.29 When He was an infant, He did not consciously know the skills of carpentry — He had to learn them as any human child would. This was not pretense. It was genuine human experience, lived from within a genuinely human soul.
Now, this growth in wisdom presupposes a human soul. On the kryptic model, the divine knowledge exists at the level of the divine preconscious, while the human soul's conscious experience genuinely grows in knowledge over time. The growth is real. The learning is real. The development of wisdom is a genuine process of the human soul — not merely of a developing brain.30
On physicalism, by contrast, Luke 2:52 describes nothing more than brain development. Neural connections are forming. Synapses are strengthening. The cerebral cortex is maturing. Jesus' "increase in wisdom" is just what happens when a child's brain grows. There is no soul that is learning, no inner person that is developing. It is all matter in motion.
But this raises a question for the physicalist: if Jesus is the eternal Son of God, and His human nature is purely physical, what exactly is the relationship between the divine Person and the developing brain? Is the Second Person of the Trinity united to a set of neurons? Does God the Son "grow" as the brain grows? On dualism, the answer is clear: the divine Person is united to a human nature consisting of body and soul. The body grows physically (in "stature"), and the soul grows in its conscious experience of wisdom. The soul is the bridge between the divine Person and the human experience — it is the locus of conscious growth, learning, and development. Without a soul, the connection between the eternal Son and a developing human brain becomes deeply mysterious.
"But concerning that day or that hour, no one knows, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father." — Mark 13:32 (ESV)
This verse has puzzled Christians for centuries. How can the Son of God — who is omniscient — not know the day and hour of His return? Doesn't His ignorance imply that He is not fully God? The kryptic model provides a clear answer, and that answer depends on the reality of Christ's human soul.
On Loke's model, the word oiden (οἶδεν), translated "knows," can also be rendered "is consciously aware of."31 The Son's omniscience was held in the divine preconscious — it was present but not accessed in His waking human conscious experience. In His human consciousness — the experience of His human soul — Jesus genuinely did not know the day or hour. This was not a kenotic surrender of omniscience (as if God could cease being omniscient and still be God). Rather, it was a kryptic concealment — the divine knowledge was present at the preconscious level but not accessed by the human conscious mind.32
The full treatment of how the kryptic model explains this verse will be given in Chapter 17. For our purposes here, the key point is this: Mark 13:32 presupposes a genuine human cognitive limitation — Christ's human soul did not know the day or hour. The text assumes that Jesus has a human mind, a human conscious experience, that is genuinely limited in its knowledge. This human mind is not a brain — it is a faculty of the human soul, the immaterial center of Christ's human conscious life. On physicalism, the "human mind" is just a brain, and the limitation is just a neurological limitation. But the theological significance of the verse depends on there being a genuine subject — a human soul — whose conscious experience is truly limited, even while the divine nature retains full omniscience.
"Father, if you are willing, remove this cup from me. Nevertheless, not my will, but yours, be done." — Luke 22:42 (ESV)
This verse will receive its full treatment in Chapter 14, where we will examine the doctrine of dyothelitism — the orthodox teaching that Christ has two wills, a divine will and a human will — in detail. But even a brief look at this passage is important for our purposes here, because it reveals something profound about Christ's human soul.
When Jesus says "my will" and "yours," He is distinguishing between two wills. "My will" refers to His human will — the will of His human soul, which recoils from the horror of the cross. "Yours" refers to the divine will — the will of God the Father (and, indeed, the will of the divine nature shared by all three Persons of the Trinity). The human will does not ultimately resist the divine will — it freely submits: "not my will, but yours, be done."33
The Third Council of Constantinople (681) defined the orthodox position: Christ has two natural wills — a divine will and a human will — and these two wills are not opposed to each other. The human will follows and submits to the divine will without being eliminated or overridden.34
But here is the critical question for our chapter: what is a human will? Where is it located? On dualism, the human will is a faculty of the human soul — it is the soul's capacity for choosing, desiring, and deciding. It is an immaterial power of an immaterial substance. On physicalism, the "human will" is a brain state — a configuration of neurons, a pattern of electrochemical activity. Can a brain state submit to a divine will? Can a pattern of neural firing freely choose to align itself with the will of God? The very idea seems incoherent. A brain state is a physical event determined by prior physical causes — it does not "submit" to anything. It just happens.35
Dyothelitism — the doctrine of two wills — requires a human soul. If Christ has a human will that genuinely chooses, deliberates, and freely submits to the divine will, then that human will must be grounded in something more than a physical brain. It must be grounded in a genuine human soul with a genuine capacity for free choice.
We have now surveyed seven key Gospel passages that reveal the inner life of Jesus Christ. It is time to step back and ask: what happens to all of this on physicalism?
If Christ has no soul — if His human nature is nothing more than a physical body, a biological organism — then every single one of the passages we have examined must be radically reinterpreted:
"My soul is very sorrowful, even to death" becomes "My brain is producing neurochemicals associated with extreme distress."
"Father, into your hands I commit my spirit" becomes "Father, I am about to cease functioning as a conscious organism."
"I lay down my life that I may take it up again" becomes a claim made by a subject who will cease to exist and somehow be reconstituted — but by whom? There is no continuous subject to do the "taking up."
"He was deeply moved in his spirit" becomes "His autonomic nervous system produced a stress response."
"Now is my soul troubled" becomes "My neural circuits are in a state of elevated agitation."
"Jesus was troubled in his spirit" becomes "Jesus experienced physiological arousal."
"Jesus increased in wisdom" becomes "Jesus' brain developed more neural connections."
The Core Problem: Physicalism trivializes the most profound moments of redemptive history. It takes the deepest expressions of the Son of God's genuine human experience — His grief, His anguish, His love, His trust, His surrender — and reduces them all to electrochemical events in a first-century Palestinian brain. The agony of Gethsemane becomes a neurochemical event. The committing of His spirit becomes a meaningless gesture. The weeping at Lazarus's tomb becomes a reflexive biological response. Is this really what the Gospel writers intended to convey? I am convinced the answer is no.
The Gospel writers never describe Jesus' inner life in neurological terms. They never say, "And His amygdala was activated," or "And His cortisol levels increased." They use the same soul-and-spirit vocabulary — psychē and pneuma — that is used throughout the Bible to describe the immaterial dimension of human persons. They use this vocabulary consistently, deliberately, and without any hint that it is merely metaphorical. When Jesus says "my soul," He means His soul. When He commits His spirit to the Father, He means His spirit. These are not figures of speech. They are descriptions of reality.36
As Joshua Farris rightly argues in his survey of theological anthropology, the Christological implications of one's view of human nature are enormous. If we deny the soul, we do not just lose a philosophical abstraction — we lose the theological depth of Christ's human experience. We lose the inner life of the Savior. We lose the anguish of Gethsemane, the trust of Calvary, the tears of Bethany — not the events themselves, but their meaning. On physicalism, these moments have no more significance than any other neurological event in any other human brain. On dualism, they are the experiences of the human soul of the Son of God — and they mean everything for our salvation.37
One of the most striking features of the Gospel evidence is its consistency. All four Gospel writers — Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John — present Jesus as having a genuine inner life that is described in soul-and-spirit language. This is not a feature unique to one Gospel or one theological tradition within early Christianity. It is a shared conviction of the entire Gospel witness.
Matthew and Mark describe the anguish of Gethsemane with the word psychē. Luke records the committing of the pneuma. John describes the deep stirring of the pneuma at Lazarus's tomb, the troubling of the psychē in anticipation of the cross, and the disturbance of the pneuma at Judas's betrayal. All four Gospels refer to Jesus' dead body using the word sōma (σῶμα, body) — a word that, in context, distinguishes the body from the spirit that has departed it.38
This consistency matters because it shows that the earliest Christian communities understood Jesus as a person with a genuine inner life — a life of the soul, not just a life of the body. The Gospel writers were not importing Greek philosophy into their narrative. They were using the natural vocabulary of first-century Judaism — psychē and pneuma, the Greek equivalents of the Hebrew nephesh (נֶפֶשׁ) and ruach (רוּחַ) — to describe what they had seen, heard, and come to believe about Jesus.39
Cooper's careful study of biblical anthropology demonstrates that this vocabulary carries dualist implications throughout both Testaments. While the Bible is certainly holistic — it treats the person as an integrated whole of body and soul — it is also dualist in the sense that body and soul are distinguishable and separable at death.40 The Gospels' portrayal of Jesus operates within this same framework. Jesus is a unified whole — body and soul, functioning together — until the moment of death, when the soul departs the body and is entrusted to the Father.
In the interest of fairness, I want to consider the main arguments that physicalists offer in response to the evidence we have surveyed. There are three major objections, and I believe all three fail.
Some physicalists argue that the word psychē does not really mean "soul" in the metaphysical sense. It simply means "life" or "self" or "person." When Jesus says "My psychē is sorrowful," He is just saying "I am sorrowful" — using psychē as a way of referring to Himself as a whole person, not to an immaterial substance.
This objection has a grain of truth. The word psychē does have a range of meanings in Greek, and it can sometimes function as a way of saying "self" or "life."41 But this observation does not help the physicalist as much as they think. Here is why.
Even if psychē sometimes means "life" or "self," the question is: what kind of "self" is being described? When Jesus says "My psychē is sorrowful," He is identifying the subject of His suffering — and that subject is described as His psychē, not His sōma (body) or His sarx (flesh). The fact that Jesus locates His anguish in His psychē rather than His body is itself significant. It points to an inner dimension of the person that is distinct from the physical body.
Moreover, in the context of Jesus' death, psychē and pneuma clearly function as terms for something that departs the body. "Father, into your hands I commit my pneuma" — this is language of separation and departure. The pneuma goes somewhere; the body remains. If pneuma just means "breath" (as some physicalists suggest), then Jesus is saying, "Father, into your hands I commit my breath" — which is nonsensical. You do not entrust breath to God's care. You entrust a person, a soul, a spirit — something that continues to exist and needs care and protection.42
Additionally, we must consider the broader pattern of New Testament usage. In Matthew 10:28, Jesus says, "Do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul (psychē). Rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell" (ESV). Here, psychē clearly refers to something distinct from the body — something that survives the killing of the body. It is impossible to make sense of this verse if psychē means merely "life" in the biological sense, because biological life obviously can be killed by those who kill the body. Jesus' point depends on the soul being something different from and separable from the body. (The full exegesis of Matthew 10:28 is given in Chapter 3; the point here is simply that the physicalist cannot consistently reduce psychē to "life" or "self" across the board.) When Jesus says "my psychē is sorrowful," He is using the same word that He uses in Matthew 10:28 to refer to the immaterial dimension of human persons — the dimension that survives the death of the body.
A second physicalist objection goes like this: the Gospel writers are using the everyday language of their time. They are describing human experience as it appears from the inside — phenomenologically — without making metaphysical claims about the existence of an immaterial substance. Just as we say "the sun rises" without committing to geocentrism, the Gospel writers say "my soul is troubled" without committing to substance dualism.
This objection is more sophisticated, but it still fails. The reason is that the Gospel writers' use of psychē and pneuma is not merely descriptive of experience — it is embedded in a theological framework that makes separability claims. When Jesus commits His pneuma to the Father at death, the text is making a claim about what happens at the moment of death: something departs the body and goes to God. This is not phenomenological language — it is ontological language. It is making a claim about what exists and what happens.43
Furthermore, as we argued in Chapters 3 and 4, the biblical writers across both Testaments consistently use soul-and-spirit language in contexts that imply the separability of the soul from the body at death — and the continued conscious existence of the soul after death. This is not merely a way of talking; it is a way of understanding reality. And it is a way of understanding reality that the church has affirmed for two thousand years.
A third objection — perhaps the most common one in popular-level discussions — claims that dualism is a Greek philosophical idea that was imported into Christianity by Plato-influenced church fathers. The "real" biblical view, according to this objection, is holistic monism: the person is a unified whole, not a composite of body and soul.
This objection rests on a false dichotomy. As Cooper has demonstrated at length, the biblical view is both holistic and dualist. It is holistic in the sense that the person is a unified whole during earthly life — body and soul functioning together as an integrated unit. But it is dualist in the sense that body and soul are distinguishable and separable at death, with the soul continuing to exist in a conscious intermediate state until the resurrection.44
The claim that dualism is a "Greek import" has been repeatedly refuted by careful biblical scholarship. The Old Testament's use of nephesh and ruach already contains the seeds of a dualist understanding, as we saw in Chapter 3. The intertestamental Jewish literature — including much of it that shows no discernible Greek philosophical influence — affirms the survival of the soul after death. And the New Testament, including the words of Jesus Himself, consistently presents death as the separation of the soul from the body.45
The Gospel passages we have examined in this chapter are part of this larger biblical picture. When Jesus speaks of His psychē and His pneuma, He is not importing Greek philosophy. He is using the natural vocabulary of first-century Judaism to describe the reality of His human inner life — a life of the soul, lived in genuine communion with the Father.
We cannot leave this chapter without touching on the famous principle articulated by Gregory of Nazianzus in the fourth century: "What is not assumed is not healed" (to gar aproslepton, atherapeuton).46 Gregory was arguing against Apollinarius, who denied that Christ had a human rational soul (nous). Gregory's point was devastatingly simple: if the Son of God did not assume a human soul, then the human soul is not redeemed. If Christ's human nature lacks a soul, then the most important dimension of our humanity — the soul, the seat of sin, moral failure, and alienation from God — remains untouched by the Incarnation.
The full treatment of Apollinarianism will be given in Chapter 12. But the principle is directly relevant here, because it connects the Gospel evidence for Christ's human soul to the soteriological purpose of the Incarnation. Why does it matter that Jesus had a genuine inner life — a soul that grieved, a spirit that was troubled, a will that chose obedience? Because if He did not, then the deepest dimension of our human brokenness has not been entered, engaged, and healed by God.
Think about it this way. The human soul is the primary locus of sin, of moral failure, of alienation from God, of spiritual death. It is in the soul that we rebel against God, that we choose self over love, that we turn away from the light. If Christ did not assume a human soul — if His human nature was purely physical — then He entered into the body's suffering but not the soul's. His atonement would address our physical brokenness but leave our deepest spiritual wound untouched. It would be like treating a cancer patient's broken arm while ignoring the cancer.47
Physicalism, by denying the existence of the human soul altogether, makes this problem inescapable. If there is no soul, then there is nothing for Christ to assume beyond a body. And if there is nothing beyond a body for Christ to assume, then what Gregory feared has come to pass: the deepest dimension of human nature remains unredeemed.
It is important to see that this is not merely an abstract theological point. It has direct pastoral implications. When a believer is struggling with sin — not with a physical ailment but with pride, lust, bitterness, despair — where does the struggle take place? In the soul. In the inner person. In the heart, as the Bible describes it. If Christ did not assume a human soul, then He never entered into that dimension of our struggle. He never experienced the soul's battle against temptation from the inside. He never carried the soul's burden of grief, shame, or anguish. And if He never experienced those things, how can He truly be our sympathetic High Priest? Hebrews 4:15 tells us that we have a High Priest who "in every respect has been tempted as we are, yet without sin." That temptation takes place in the soul — in the inner life of desire, will, and choice. If Jesus has no soul, then He was not truly tempted "in every respect." He was only tempted at the level of neural activity — and that is not what temptation is.
The Gospel passages we have examined in this chapter put flesh on Gregory's principle. They show us a Jesus who entered into the full depth of human inner experience. His soul grieved. His spirit was troubled. His will wrestled with obedience. His heart broke at the sight of death. These are not merely events in a brain — they are experiences of a soul. And because the Son of God assumed that soul, our souls can be healed.
Throughout this chapter, I have referred to Loke's kryptic model of the Incarnation at several points. Let me draw the threads together and show why this model provides the best framework for making sense of the Gospel evidence.
The kryptic model holds that the eternal Son retained all His divine attributes during the Incarnation but concealed them at a preconscious level. His divine knowledge, power, and presence were all "there" — but they were not flooding His waking human consciousness. Instead, Jesus experienced a single, genuinely human stream of consciousness — the conscious experience of His human soul — while the divine attributes operated "behind the scenes," available when the Father willed their use (as in miracles, prophecy, and supernatural knowledge).48
This model makes excellent sense of the Gospel data we have surveyed:
In Gethsemane, Jesus' human soul — His psychē — genuinely experienced sorrow "even to death." The divine knowledge of the resurrection was present at the preconscious level, but in His waking human experience, Jesus confronted the horror of the cross with the full weight of human anguish. He was not pretending. He was genuinely suffering in His human soul.
At the cross, Jesus committed His pneuma to the Father — an act of genuine trust from a genuine human soul. The divine preconscious "knew" that the Father would receive and preserve His spirit, but in His conscious human experience, Jesus exercised the same faith that every dying believer is called to exercise.
In His growth in wisdom (Luke 2:52), Jesus' human soul genuinely learned and developed, even though the divine preconscious contained omniscient knowledge. This was not pretense — it was the genuine experience of a human soul that chose to learn as humans learn.
In His limited knowledge (Mark 13:32), Jesus' human conscious experience genuinely did not include knowledge of the day and hour. The divine preconscious held this knowledge, but the human soul — the conscious "operating system" of Jesus' earthly life — genuinely did not access it.
In every case, the kryptic model requires a human soul. Without a soul, there is no "human conscious experience" distinct from the divine preconscious. Without a soul, there is no inner life to speak of — only a brain. And a brain cannot be the subject of Gethsemane's anguish, the agent of Calvary's trust, or the seat of genuine growth and learning. The kryptic model works because Christ has a human soul — and the Gospel evidence confirms that He does.49
We have walked through the most important Gospel passages that reveal the inner life of Jesus Christ, and the evidence is overwhelming. The Gospels consistently and deliberately portray Jesus as having a genuine human soul — a psychē that grieves, a pneuma that is stirred and committed to the Father, a will that chooses and submits, an intellect that grows in wisdom. This inner life is not reducible to brain activity. It is the life of a genuine human soul — the soul of the Son of God incarnate.
Physicalism cannot do justice to this evidence. It must reduce every reference to Christ's soul or spirit to a description of brain states. It must trivialize the agony of Gethsemane, the trust of Calvary, and the tears of Bethany by treating them as nothing more than neurochemical events. It must strip the most profound moments of redemptive history of their theological depth and spiritual significance.
Substance dualism, by contrast, takes the Gospel evidence at face value. Jesus has a soul. That soul is the seat of His anguish, His love, His trust, and His obedience. That soul survived the death of the body and was entrusted to the Father. That soul — united to the divine nature of the eternal Son — is the bridge between God and humanity, the inner sanctuary where the deepest work of redemption takes place.
As Wilkinson has reminded us, Christ is the paradigm human being — the man par excellence. If He has a soul, then we have a soul. And if physicalism cannot account for His soul, then physicalism cannot account for ours either. The Gospels do not merely suggest that Jesus has an inner life. They insist on it. And that insistence has profound implications — for our understanding of the Incarnation, for our understanding of human nature, and for our understanding of salvation itself.
I want to close with a personal reflection. As I have studied these Gospel texts — reading them slowly, carefully, in the original Greek — I have been struck again and again by their depth, their honesty, and their power. The Gospel writers are not giving us theological abstractions. They are giving us a portrait of a real Person — a Person who genuinely suffered, genuinely loved, genuinely struggled, and genuinely trusted. And in every case, the inner life of that Person — the life of His soul — is at the center of the picture. Take away the soul, and you lose the picture. You are left with a biological organism going through neurochemical processes. You are left with a brain, not a Savior.
But the Gospels will not let us get away with that reduction. They press us, again and again, to see Jesus as He is: the eternal Son of God, united to a genuine human nature — body and soul — experiencing the full range of human life from the inside. His soul grieved in Gethsemane. His spirit was committed to the Father on Calvary. His inner person was moved to tears at the tomb of Lazarus. His psychē was troubled by the prospect of the cross. His will chose obedience in the face of unimaginable suffering. This is the Jesus of the Gospels — not a mere body, but a complete human being, body and soul, united to the eternal God. And because He assumed our full human nature — body and soul — He is able to save us completely, in body and soul, now and forever.
In the next chapter, we will turn from the Gospels to the Epistles and see how Paul, the author of Hebrews, and the other apostolic writers confirm and deepen this same picture of Christ's complete human nature — body and soul.
1 Andrew Ter Ern Loke, A Kryptic Model of the Incarnation, Routledge New Critical Thinking in Religion, Theology, and Biblical Studies (London: Routledge, 2014), chap. 4, "A New Kryptic Christology: The Divine Preconscious Model." ↩
2 Michael A. Wilkinson, Crowned with Glory and Honor: A Chalcedonian Anthropology, Studies in Historical and Systematic Theology (Bellingham, WA: Lexham Academic, 2024), 30. ↩
3 The Chalcedonian Definition (451) declares that Christ is "acknowledged in two natures... the distinction of natures being in no way annulled by the union, but rather the characteristics of each nature being preserved and coming together to form one person and one subsistence." The phrase "rational soul and body" (ek psychēs logikēs kai sōmatos) appears in the Definition's description of Christ's human nature. See Timothy Pawl, In Defense of Conciliar Christology, Oxford Studies in Analytic Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), chap. 1, "The Content of Conciliar Christology." ↩
4 The Second Council of Constantinople (553) anathematized those who denied that Christ possesses a human rational soul. See the discussion in Chapter 13 of this volume. ↩
5 Wilkinson, Crowned with Glory and Honor, 281. ↩
6 Wilkinson, Crowned with Glory and Honor, 334. ↩
7 Wilkinson, Crowned with Glory and Honor, 281–83. ↩
8 The word psychē (ψυχή) is used over 100 times in the New Testament. Its range of meaning includes "soul," "life," "self," and "person," but in contexts involving inner experience and especially in contexts involving death and separation from the body, it carries the clear sense of the immaterial dimension of the person. See John W. Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-Dualism Debate (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), 99. ↩
9 Walter Bauer, Frederick W. Danker, William F. Arndt, and F. Wilbur Gingrich, A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), s.v. "περίλυπος." ↩
10 The LXX of Psalm 42:5 uses the phrase hina ti perilypos ei, psychē mou ("Why are you cast down, O my soul?"), echoing the same vocabulary. ↩
11 D. A. Carson, The Gospel According to John, Pillar New Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1991), 538–40. Carson's discussion of Jesus' emotional life in John's Gospel emphasizes the genuine human depth of these experiences. ↩
12 R. T. France, The Gospel of Matthew, New International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2007), 1003–5. ↩
13 For a comprehensive treatment of the biblical use of psychē and its Hebrew equivalent nephesh, see the discussion in Chapter 3 of this volume and Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, 33–70. ↩
14 BDAG, s.v. "ἀγωνία." The word is rare in the New Testament, appearing only here in Luke 22:44. ↩
15 BDAG, s.v. "ἀφίημι." The verb in Matthew 27:50 (aphēken to pneuma) suggests a voluntary act — Jesus "released" or "sent away" His spirit. This is consistent with John 10:17-18, where Jesus claims authority to lay down His life. ↩
16 BDAG, s.v. "παρατίθημι." The word is used in the middle voice here, emphasizing the personal nature of the act: Jesus is entrusting something precious — His own spirit — into the Father's safekeeping. ↩
17 The continuity of the hypostatic union during the triduum mortis is treated in depth in Chapter 21 of this volume. On dualism, the Son remained united to both the body (in the tomb) and the soul (in paradise/the realm of the dead), preserving the Incarnation through death. ↩
18 This is the central problem that physicalism faces with respect to Christ's death, as argued more fully in Chapters 20–22. See also R. Keith Loftin and Joshua R. Farris, eds., Christian Physicalism? Philosophical Theological Criticisms (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2018), chap. 9, "Physicalism and the Death of Christ." ↩
19 Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, 99–100. Cooper demonstrates that the New Testament consistently uses sōma for the dead body and pneuma or psychē for the departed spirit/soul, indicating a separation at death. ↩
20 The personal identity problem for physicalist accounts of the resurrection is treated in detail in Chapter 24 of this volume. ↩
21 On the triduum mortis and what happened to Christ between death and resurrection, see Chapter 21 (the Holy Saturday argument) and Chapter 23 (the descent to the dead). ↩
22 Leon Morris, The Gospel According to John, rev. ed., New International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1995), 458–60. ↩
23 BDAG, s.v. "ἐμβριμάομαι." The word appears five times in the New Testament, three times in connection with Jesus (Matt. 9:30; Mark 1:43; John 11:33, 38). In John 11:33, the context clearly indicates deep inner emotional agitation, not merely physical disturbance. ↩
24 Carson, Gospel According to John, 415–16. Carson notes the unusual reflexive construction, suggesting that Jesus voluntarily allowed Himself to enter into this emotional state — He was not overwhelmed against His will but chose to be moved. ↩
25 See the author's companion volume, The Heart of God: Does God Feel? A Biblical and Theological Case for the Emotional Life of God, especially the chapters on Christ's emotions as expressions of both His human soul and the divine nature's genuine emotional engagement with creation. ↩
26 Carson, Gospel According to John, 441. ↩
27 Carson, Gospel According to John, 470. ↩
28 I. Howard Marshall, The Gospel of Luke, New International Greek Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1978), 128–29. ↩
29 Loke, Kryptic Model, chap. 5, "Addressing the Problems Concerning Omniscience, Omnipotence and Omnipresence." Loke explains that Jesus "grew in wisdom by assimilating knowledge into his human conscious and part B of his preconscious (part B of his preconscious being the human preconscious which he was willing to direct his attention to)." ↩
30 Loke, Kryptic Model, chap. 4, "A New Kryptic Christology: The Divine Preconscious Model." ↩
31 Loke, Kryptic Model, chap. 5, "Addressing the Problems Concerning Omniscience, Omnipotence and Omnipresence." Loke notes that the Greek word oiden in Mark 13:32 can be rendered "is consciously aware of" rather than simply "knows." ↩
32 The full treatment of the kryptic model's explanation of Mark 13:32 is given in Chapter 17 of this volume. ↩
33 The full exegesis of Luke 22:42 and the doctrine of dyothelitism is given in Chapter 14 of this volume. ↩
34 Pawl, In Defense of Conciliar Christology, chap. 3, "The Third Council of Constantinople." See also the discussion in Chapter 13 of this volume. ↩
35 Joshua R. Farris, An Introduction to Theological Anthropology: Humans, Both Creaturely and Divine (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2020), 145–47. Farris discusses the implications of physicalism for human agency and free will, arguing that physicalism undermines genuine moral agency. ↩
36 Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, 99–102. ↩
37 Farris, Introduction to Theological Anthropology, 203–5. Farris argues that the Christological implications of denying the soul are severe, affecting not only our understanding of Christ's person but also our soteriology. ↩
38 All four Gospels use sōma to refer to the dead body of Jesus (Matt. 27:58-59; Mark 15:43-45; Luke 23:52-55; John 19:38-40). The consistent use of sōma for the dead body, alongside the language of the pneuma departing, implies a body-spirit separation at death. ↩
39 For the relationship between the Greek psychē/pneuma and the Hebrew nephesh/ruach, see the full discussion in Chapter 3 of this volume and Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, 33–54. ↩
40 Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, xv–xvi. Cooper argues that the Bible teaches "a functional holism (body and soul are deeply integrated) that is ontologically dualist (the soul is a distinct substance that survives death)." ↩
41 BDAG, s.v. "ψυχή." The lexicon lists several meanings including "life," "soul," "self," and "person." ↩
42 For a detailed response to the claim that pneuma means merely "breath" in death contexts, see Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, 99–100, and the discussion in Chapter 3 of this volume. ↩
43 Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, xxv–xxvi. Cooper addresses the objection that biblical anthropological language is merely phenomenological and argues that the separability claims embedded in the texts carry genuine ontological import. ↩
44 Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, 92. Cooper's analysis of the intertestamental literature shows that the combination of holistic anthropology and dualist eschatology was well established in pre-Christian Judaism. ↩
45 Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, xv–xvi. See also the full treatment in Chapter 3 of this volume. ↩
46 Gregory of Nazianzus, Epistle 101.32 (to Cledonius). The principle to gar aproslepton, atherapeuton (τὸ γὰρ ἀπρόσληπτον, ἀθεράπευτον) — "what is not assumed is not healed" — became one of the most important soteriological principles in Christian theology. See the full treatment in Chapter 12 of this volume. ↩
47 The soteriological implications of denying Christ's human soul are developed more fully in Chapter 12 (on Apollinarianism) and Chapter 20 (on the problem stated). ↩
48 Loke, Kryptic Model, chap. 4, "A New Kryptic Christology: The Divine Preconscious Model." See the full treatment of the kryptic model in Chapter 17 of this volume. ↩
49 Oliver D. Crisp, Divinity and Humanity: The Incarnation Reconsidered, Current Issues in Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), chap. 2, "The Human Nature of Christ." Crisp's defense of the concrete nature view — that Christ's human nature is a concrete particular composed of a human body and soul — supports the claim that the kryptic model requires a genuine human soul, not merely a physical body. ↩
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