Appendix B
One of the great gifts of the analytic theology movement over the last forty years has been a flood of careful, philosophically rigorous proposals about how the Incarnation works. The Council of Chalcedon in 451 told us what we must affirm — one Person in two natures, without confusion, change, division, or separation — but the council did not tell us how to picture this in our minds. Modern theologians and philosophers of religion have stepped into that gap and offered competing models. Some of these models are compatible with one another. Some are not. And some, as I argue throughout this book, are simply incompatible with the conciliar tradition that gives the doctrine of the Incarnation its shape.1
This appendix gathers the five most influential modern models in one place and compares them side by side. My aim is not to settle every question in a chart — that is what the body of the book is for. My aim is to give you a quick reference so that, when a writer or preacher uses one of these terms, you can immediately picture what they mean and how it differs from the alternatives. Think of this appendix as the map you keep open on your phone while reading the rest of the book.
Five models are compared: kenotic Christology (associated with Thomasius, Gore, Davis, and Feenstra), the two-minds view (Thomas Morris), the kryptic or "Divine Preconscious" model (Andrew Ter Ern Loke — my own preferred view), conciliar Christology (Timothy Pawl), and compositional Christology (Brian Leftow). Each is described in chapters 15–19. Here we boil each model down to its essentials and lay them next to each other so the differences — and the surprising agreements — leap off the page.
How to read these charts. The questions across the top are the load-bearing questions for any model of the Incarnation. They are the questions that the early councils wrestled with, and they are the questions that physicalism causes the most trouble for. If a model gets even one of these questions wrong, the whole doctrine of the Incarnation can collapse. Pay special attention to the rows on "What happens at death?" and "Does the model require a soul?" — these are the two questions where the failure of physicalism becomes most visible.
Before reading the charts, here is the briefest possible summary of each model. Think of these as the pre-game introductions before the players take the field.
Kenotic Christology. When the Son became human, He emptied Himself of certain divine attributes (omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence) — either giving them up entirely (classical 19th-century kenoticism) or voluntarily not exercising them while still possessing them (functional kenoticism).2
Two-Minds View. Christ has two minds — a divine mind that knows everything and a human mind that knows only what a first-century Jewish man could know. The human mind is a "proper part" of the divine mind, like a small spotlight inside a much larger floodlight.3
Kryptic Model (Divine Preconscious). Christ retained every divine attribute fully, but those attributes were concealed (krypsis, κρύψις) at a "preconscious" level — present but not flooding His ordinary human awareness. Christ had one stream of conscious experience (a genuinely human one), with the divine omniscience available "behind the scenes" when the Father willed it.4
Conciliar Christology. Whatever the seven ecumenical councils affirmed about Christ is logically coherent — and Pawl shows this rigorously using analytic philosophy and the "qua" strategy (Christ is omniscient qua divine and limited qua human, with no contradiction). Pawl is more interested in showing that the councils can be defended than in giving a specific picture of how the natures relate.5
Compositional Christology. The person of Christ is a whole made up of parts: the divine Word, a human body, and (on the orthodox version) a human soul. The Incarnation is a kind of mereological union — God assumed parts that, together with Himself, compose the one Person Jesus Christ.6
Because we have five models and eight major questions to compare, we have split the chart into two halves for readability. The first chart focuses on the metaphysics of each model — what happens to the divine nature, how many consciousnesses and wills there are, and what the human nature looks like. The second chart focuses on the theological consequences — fidelity to the councils, what happens at death, the necessity of the soul, and my own assessment.
Chart 1 — The Metaphysics of Each Model
| Model | Divine Attributes (Omniscience, Omnipotence, Omnipresence) | How Many Consciousnesses? | How Many Wills? | Christ's Human Nature |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kenotic (Thomasius, Gore, Davis, Feenstra) | Surrendered or "laid aside" at the Incarnation — either lost entirely (classical) or retained but not exercised (functional). | Typically one (a limited, human consciousness). | Often functionally one. Some kenoticists affirm two wills, but the model leans monothelite in practice. | Typically body + soul, but the focus of the model is on the divine side, not the human side. |
| Two-Minds (Morris) | Fully retained — the divine mind remains omniscient throughout the Incarnation. | Two simultaneous consciousnesses — divine mind and human mind, with asymmetric access. | Two (dyothelite). | Body + soul. The human mind is a faculty of the human soul; physicalism would not give Morris's model what it needs. |
| Kryptic / Divine Preconscious (Loke) | Fully retained but concealed (krypsis) at a preconscious level. Available when the Father wills (miracles, prophecy). | One — a single, genuinely human stream of conscious experience. | Two (dyothelite, per Constantinople III). | Body + rational soul (concrete-nature view). The soul is the seat of the conscious human experience. |
| Conciliar (Pawl) | Fully retained. Apparent contradictions resolved by the "qua" strategy — properties are relativized to the nature in question. | Underdetermined. Pawl's defense is compatible with either one or two consciousnesses; he aims to defend coherence, not picture the experience. | Two (dyothelite — defends the Constantinople III definition). | Body + rational soul (concrete-nature view, explicitly). |
| Compositional (Leftow) | Fully retained. The Word does not lose anything; He gains a human body and soul as parts of His incarnate person. | Generally one (Leftow leans toward a one-mind view), though dyothelitism remains compatible. | Two on most orthodox versions (dyothelite). Some early compositional views were monothelite. | Body + soul as parts that, together with the Word, compose the person of Christ. Strongly concrete-nature. |
Chart 2 — The Theological Consequences
| Model | Compatible with the Ecumenical Councils? | What Happens at Death (Triduum Mortis)? | Does the Model Require a Human Soul? | Author's Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kenotic | Strained at best. Chalcedon says the divine nature is "without change" (atreptōs); kenosis is precisely a change to the divine nature.7 | If a soul is affirmed, the union can be maintained. Most kenoticists do affirm a soul, but the model itself does not strictly require one. | Not in principle, though most defenders affirm one. | Rejected. Divine attributes are essential properties; a being who lacks omniscience is not God. Creates a Trinity problem (does the Father remain omniscient while the Son does not?). |
| Two-Minds | Compatible, with care. Faces a "two subjects" worry that critics say flirts with Nestorianism. | Hypostatic union maintained — the human soul (with its human mind) survives bodily death and remains united to the Word. | Yes. The "human mind" needs an immaterial bearer; a brain alone cannot sustain a "mind" with the kind of cognitive content Morris envisions. | Strong, but flawed. The "two subjects" worry is real. If there are two streams of consciousness, in what sense is there only one Person? |
| Kryptic / Divine Preconscious | Fully compatible. Preserves Chalcedon's "without change" and Constantinople III's two wills. Avoids Nestorian and Apollinarian tendencies. | Hypostatic union maintained. Christ's human soul survives death; the divine Person remains united to both the body in the tomb and the conscious soul. The Incarnation is not interrupted. | Yes — absolutely. The "preconscious" needs a metaphysical substrate. The soul is the seat of human consciousness; the brain alone cannot house infinite divine information. | Best model available. Preserves full deity, genuine humanity, single conscious experience, conciliar fidelity, and a coherent account of Holy Saturday. The author's preferred view. |
| Conciliar | Most rigorously conciliar. Pawl's whole project is to defend the conciliar definitions philosophically. | Hypostatic union maintained — Pawl's defense includes Christ's continued unity during the triduum, which presupposes a soul.8 | Yes. Pawl defends the conciliar formula ek psychēs logikēs kai sōmatos ("from a rational soul and a body"). | Highly recommended. Pawl's coherence defense is compatible with the kryptic model. Loke fills in how; Pawl shows that it can be true. Complementary, not competing. |
| Compositional | Compatible when paired with a soul and dyothelitism. Leftow's later work moves in this direction. | Hypostatic union maintained — the soul, as a part of the composite, remains united to the Word during the triduum. | Yes. The composite includes a soul as one of its parts. Without a soul, the "human nature" part of the composition collapses to a corpse. | Useful, partly compatible with Loke. The compositional framework is illuminating for thinking about the unity of Christ's person, but raises its own questions about whether the union produces a "third thing." The author leans toward Loke. |
The pattern that emerges. Notice what every orthodox model has in common across the second chart: every one of them either explicitly requires a human soul (two-minds, kryptic, conciliar, compositional) or works only when supplemented by one (kenoticism). Without a soul, the Incarnation has no metaphysical place to go between Friday afternoon and Sunday morning. This is the heart of the book's argument: the Incarnation does not "leave room" for physicalism. Every serious model of how the Incarnation works presupposes that Christ has an immaterial human soul.
Several patterns are worth lingering over.
First, every orthodox model retains the divine attributes. Kenotic Christology is the only one in our list that surrenders or suspends them, and that is precisely why it has had a rocky reception in the broader tradition. The other four models — two-minds, kryptic, conciliar, and compositional — all insist that the Son did not become less God by becoming man. He gained a human nature; He did not lose a divine attribute. Whatever else we say about the Incarnation, the Son who walked the dusty roads of Galilee was at every moment fully God, holding the universe in being.9
Second, the real disagreements among orthodox models are about consciousness and explanation, not about the divine attributes. Two-minds says there are two streams of consciousness; kryptic says one. Conciliar says we can defend coherence without picking; compositional emphasizes the part-whole structure of Christ's person. These are real differences, but they are not the kind of differences that make one model orthodox and another heretical. They are different ways of filling out the same conciliar picture.
Third — and this is the point the book is built around — every model that is broadly compatible with the councils requires a human soul. Look at the third column of Chart 2. Two-minds requires a soul as the bearer of the human mind. The kryptic model requires a soul to host the conscious human experience that the divine attributes are concealed from. Conciliar Christology requires a soul because the councils themselves explicitly affirm one. Compositional Christology requires a soul because the soul is one of the parts of the composite.
This is why physicalism is not a small adjustment to Christology. It is not the kind of thing a theologian can simply add as a footnote to an otherwise traditional doctrine of Christ. Physicalism removes the soul, and removing the soul causes every major model of the Incarnation to fall apart. Wilkinson makes a similar point from a different angle in Crowned with Glory and Honor: our doctrine of Christ should shape our doctrine of humanity, not the other way around.10 If Christ's full humanity required a rational soul (as the councils insist), then human nature in general includes a rational soul. The Incarnation tells us what we are.
A note for readers wrestling with conditional immortality. Many readers come to this book having been convinced — rightly, I think — that the New Testament does not teach eternal conscious torment. They have then been told that conditional immortality requires Christian physicalism, since (the argument goes) if there is no immortal soul, there is no platform for endless torment. This is a non sequitur. As I argue in chapter 33, conditional immortality and substance dualism are perfectly compatible. The soul that survives bodily death is contingently immortal — sustained in being by God, not eternal in its own right. One can hold to a conscious intermediate state, a final judgment, and the ultimate annihilation of the impenitent without committing to physicalism. The Incarnation, as this chart makes plain, demands that we keep the soul.
Charts always oversimplify. Every cell in the tables above could be expanded into a chapter, and several of them are. If you find yourself wanting more detail on, say, why the kenotic model struggles with Chalcedon's "without change," see chapter 15. If you want to understand the "two subjects" worry that haunts Morris's view, see chapter 16. If you want the full case for the kryptic model — and especially for why it absolutely requires a human soul — see chapter 17. If you want to see Pawl's coherence defense laid out carefully, see chapter 18. And if you want to see how the question of Christ's death without a soul collapses every one of these models into incoherence, see chapter 21 on the triduum mortis.
The chart is the map. The book is the territory. Use them together.
1 The five models compared here are not the only options on the market — one could include, for example, Robin Le Poidevin's "metaphysics of incarnation" proposals, Stephen Davis's particular version of kenoticism, or Thomas H. McCall's analytic-theological adjustments — but these five represent the most influential and widely discussed positions in contemporary analytic Christology. ↩
2 Oliver D. Crisp, Divinity and Humanity: The Incarnation Reconsidered, Current Issues in Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), chap. 5, "Divine Kenosis," provides a careful, sympathetic-but-critical taxonomy of kenotic models. ↩
3 The classic statement is Thomas V. Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986). For a fair summary, see also Crisp, Divinity and Humanity, chap. 6. ↩
4 Andrew Ter Ern Loke, A Kryptic Model of the Incarnation, Routledge New Critical Thinking in Religion, Theology, and Biblical Studies (London: Routledge, 2014), chap. 4, "A New Kryptic Christology: The Divine Preconscious Model." ↩
5 Timothy Pawl, In Defense of Conciliar Christology, Oxford Studies in Analytic Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), chap. 1, "The Content of Conciliar Christology," and chap. 5, "The Fundamental Problem and Replies." ↩
6 The compositional approach is most fully developed by Brian Leftow in his essay "A Timeless God Incarnate," discussed at length in Crisp, Divinity and Humanity, chap. 2, "The 'Fittingness' of the Virginal Conception of Christ" and chap. 3, "The Anhypostasia-Enhypostasia Distinction." ↩
7 The Chalcedonian Definition (451) describes the union of natures as occurring "without confusion, without change, without division, without separation" (asynchytōs, atreptōs, adiairetōs, achōristōs). The phrase "without change" (atreptōs) is the precise word that kenotic Christology has the most difficulty with. See Pawl, In Defense of Conciliar Christology, chap. 1, "The Content of Conciliar Christology." ↩
8 Pawl does not develop a full account of the triduum mortis in In Defense of Conciliar Christology, but his commitment to the conciliar definition (which includes a rational soul) and to the unbroken hypostatic union entails that the soul carries the union through Holy Saturday. See further the discussion in chapter 21 of this book. ↩
9 John W. Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-Dualism Debate (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), 5–9, makes a closely related point about the way Christological commitments constrain anthropological options — though Cooper is primarily concerned with the intermediate state of believers rather than with Christ Himself. ↩
10 Michael A. Wilkinson, Crowned with Glory and Honor: A Chalcedonian Anthropology, Studies in Historical and Systematic Theology (Bellingham, WA: Lexham Academic, 2024), 23–28. Wilkinson's central thesis — that Christology should ground anthropology — is one of the most important moves in recent theological anthropology and is closely allied with the argument of this book. See also Joshua R. Farris, An Introduction to Theological Anthropology: Humans, Both Creaturely and Divine (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2020), 145–52, on the relationship between substance dualism and Christological orthodoxy. ↩