We have now spent several chapters examining objections to substitutionary atonement from exegetical, theological, moral, and Eastern Orthodox perspectives (see Chapters 32–34). In this chapter, we turn to a different kind of critique — one that comes not primarily from the halls of academic theology or from rival confessional traditions, but from people who have experienced real suffering and who worry that the doctrine of the cross, as it has sometimes been taught, may actually make that suffering worse. These are the objections raised by feminist theologians, liberation theologians, advocates of nonviolent theology, and cultural critics who see in traditional atonement teaching a dangerous celebration of violence, a justification of abuse, and an unhealthy fixation on individual guilt at the expense of systemic injustice.
I want to say right at the outset: these objections deserve to be heard. They are not trivial. They are not merely the complaints of people who find the cross "offensive" in a superficial sense. Many of these critics are writing out of genuine pastoral concern — concern for abused women who have been told to "bear their cross" and submit to violent husbands, concern for oppressed communities who have been handed a gospel of passive acceptance rather than prophetic liberation, concern for thoughtful seekers who are scandalized not by the true gospel but by distorted caricatures of it. We owe it to these voices to listen carefully, to acknowledge where their criticisms land, and to distinguish between legitimate concerns about how the doctrine has been misused and the question of whether the doctrine itself is true.
My thesis in this chapter is straightforward: contemporary objections to substitutionary atonement from feminist, liberationist, and nonviolent perspectives raise important pastoral and ethical concerns that we must take seriously, but they ultimately fail to overturn the doctrine when it is rightly understood within a Trinitarian framework of divine love and self-sacrifice. The problem, in most cases, is not with substitutionary atonement itself but with distorted versions of it — versions that pit the Father against the Son, that glorify suffering for its own sake, or that reduce salvation to a purely individual transaction. When we correct the distortions and recover the full biblical picture, we find that the cross is not the enemy of the vulnerable but their greatest ally. The cross does not sanction violence; it absorbs and defeats it. The cross does not ignore systemic evil; it exposes and conquers it. And the cross does not encourage passive submission to abuse; it reveals God's own identification with victims and His fierce opposition to every form of oppression.
We dealt with this accusation at length in Chapter 20 ("The Love of the Trinity in the Atonement — Against 'Cosmic Child Abuse'"), where I argued that the charge fundamentally misunderstands the Trinitarian nature of the cross. Here I do not intend to repeat that full argument, but rather to examine why this particular accusation has gained such cultural traction in recent years and what that tells us about both the failures of popular preaching and the deeper issues at stake.
The phrase "cosmic child abuse" was made famous by Steve Chalke and Alan Mann in their 2003 book The Lost Message of Jesus. Chalke wrote that penal substitutionary atonement, as commonly presented, amounts to "a form of cosmic child abuse — a vengeful Father, punishing his Son for an offence he has not even committed."1 The phrase hit like a thunderbolt. It was provocative, memorable, and — for many people — deeply resonant. It captured something that a lot of Christians had felt but had not been able to articulate: a discomfort with sermons and hymns that seemed to depict God the Father as an angry deity taking out His rage on an innocent Jesus.
As Simon Gathercole has noted, however, criticisms like Chalke's are often "extremely shallow" — amounting to little more than people saying, "I don't like this doctrine."2 Gathercole identifies three key problems with the accusation. First, it "neglect[s] the obvious fact that the death of Christ is not that of a third party but is the 'self-substitution of God.'"3 Outside of a context of high Christology and Trinitarian theology, substitution might be vulnerable to the charge of abuse. But no serious theologian advocating substitution denies the deity of Christ. The cross is not something the Father does to the Son as though to a helpless outsider; it is something the Triune God does within His own being. Second, Jesus offers Himself as a sacrifice in line with His own will. Paul states that "the Son of God loved me and gave himself for me" (Galatians 2:20, ESV). Christ is not a passive victim but an active agent. Third, Gathercole observes that while it is easy to caricature atonement theories as cruel and violent, "this is not how millions of Christians over the centuries have experienced such teaching."4 The lived experience of countless believers testifies that the cross — rightly understood — brings not terror but comfort, not cruelty but hope.
David Allen is even more forceful, calling Chalke's accusation "blasphemous" and arguing that it "fails to acknowledge the trinitarian framework of the cross and undermines the sovereignty of God over the cross (Acts 2:23) as well as the reality of redemptive suffering as expressed in Isaiah 52:13–53:12."5 Allen approvingly cites Bruce McCormack's penetrating response: "What happens in the outpouring of the wrath of God by the Father upon Jesus Christ is that the human experience of the 'penalty of death' that humans have merited through their sinfulness is taken into the very life of God himself."6 The Triune God pours out the consequences of sin upon Himself, through the human nature that the Son has made His own. This is not violence done by one individual to another; it is God's own costly self-giving. McCormack's conclusion is worth pausing over: "A well-ordered penal substitution theory (one that gets its ontological presuppositions right) does not portray this event in terms of a violent action of God (conceived of as one individual) against the Son (conceived of as a second distinct individual). Therefore, the event in question is inimitable in the absolute degree. It justifies nothing on the plane of human-to-human relations, and the moral charge against penal substitution cannot finally be sustained."7
Key Point: The "cosmic child abuse" charge is based on a serious theological error — the assumption that the Father and Son are two separate individuals with conflicting wills. In reality, the cross is the unified act of the Triune God. The Father does not punish an unwilling victim; the Son goes willingly, and the entire Godhead acts together in self-giving love. As John Stott memorably put it, the cross is not a punishment imposed from outside but God's own "self-satisfaction through divine self-substitution."
But here is the uncomfortable truth we must face: the "cosmic child abuse" accusation resonates because some popular presentations of penal substitutionary atonement have depicted the cross in ways that sound abusive. When preachers describe God as "pouring out His fury" on Jesus, when they speak of the Father "turning His back in disgust" on the Son, when they use language that makes it sound as though the cross was an act of divine rage directed at an innocent bystander — they are giving ammunition to critics like Chalke, and they are, frankly, distorting the gospel.
Philippe de la Trinité, writing from a Roman Catholic perspective, devoted an entire chapter of his book What Is Redemption? to cataloguing such distortions, which he calls "distorting mirrors." He documents how even respected preachers and theologians have fallen into the error of depicting "an enraged God" who "wreaks vengeance on his Son for quantities of sins of which he is innocent, finally driving him to the feeling of his own abandonment and quasi-damnation."8 Philippe insists that "Christ never suffered at his Father's hands" and that the corrective is found in St. Thomas Aquinas's measured, careful theology of vicarious satisfaction rooted in love: "Christ's Passion was a promotion, an exaltation, not an oppression."9
This cultural resonance has only intensified in the age of the #MeToo movement. Our society is newly — and rightly — sensitized to patterns of abuse, manipulation, and coercion. When people hear a sermon that makes it sound like God demanded the torture and death of His own child to satisfy His anger, they understandably recoil. The solution, however, is not to abandon substitutionary atonement. The solution is to correct the caricature. As I. Howard Marshall wisely put it, the way to answer criticism of penal substitution "is not by denying the biblical perception of the significance of the death of Jesus, but by understanding it correctly."10
What does a correct understanding look like? It looks like what John Stott described in his magisterial treatment of "The Self-Substitution of God." Stott argues that "the righteous, loving Father humbled himself to become in and through his only Son flesh, sin and a curse for us, in order to redeem us without compromising his own character."11 The cross is not the Father doing something terrible to the Son. It is the Father giving the Son (John 3:16), the Son giving Himself (Galatians 2:20), and the Spirit empowering this self-offering (Hebrews 9:14) — all in one unified act of holy love. "The concept of substitution may be said, then, to lie at the heart of both sin and salvation," Stott writes. "For the essence of sin is man substituting himself for God, while the essence of salvation is God substituting himself for man."12 That is profoundly beautiful — and it is about as far from "child abuse" as one can imagine.
It is worth pausing here to note something that Chalke's critics have not always emphasized enough. The accusation of "cosmic child abuse" depends on thinking of the Father and the Son as two completely separate individuals — like a human parent and a human child. But this is precisely what the doctrine of the Trinity denies. The Father and the Son are distinct persons within one divine Being. They share a single divine nature, a single divine will (in the sense that the divine will is one), and a single divine love. When the Son goes to the cross, the Father is not standing on the sidelines inflicting punishment on someone else. The Father is in Christ, reconciling the world to Himself (2 Corinthians 5:19). The entire Godhead is involved. This is why Stott's phrase "self-substitution" is so important. It is not the Father substituting the Son in our place, as though sending someone else to suffer on His behalf. It is God substituting Himself — the Triune God, in the person of the Son, taking upon Himself the consequences that our sin deserved.
Rutledge reinforces this point by reminding us that "the language of 'the crucified God' is not confined to Jürgen Moltmann; it is as old as Ignatius of Antioch ('the blood of God') and as new as Jon Sobrino ('God was on Jesus' cross')." She adds: "The critics of the God-language are wrong on this point; the tradition taken as a whole is solidly behind the idea that the cross of Christ is an event undertaken by the Three Persons united."34 Once we grasp this Trinitarian reality, the "child abuse" metaphor simply collapses. It is a category mistake. It applies a model drawn from human family dysfunction — an abusive parent and a helpless child — to a relationship that is fundamentally unlike any human relationship: the eternal, co-equal, perfectly loving communion of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.
Anselm himself, writing almost a thousand years ago, anticipated this very objection. Rutledge shows that in Cur Deus Homo, Anselm has his interlocutor Boso raise exactly the concern that modern critics press: "How will it ever be made out a just or reasonable thing that God should treat ... in such a manner ... his beloved Son in whom he was well pleased?" And again: "It is a strange thing if God so delights in, or requires, the blood of the innocent, that he neither chooses, nor is able, to spare the guilty without the sacrifice of the innocent" (Cur Deus Homo 1.8, 1.10).35 Anselm responds by insisting that the Son goes to His death "in full knowledge" of what He is doing, that the Father "did not compel him to suffer death, or even allow him to be slain against his will, but of his own accord he endured death for the salvation of men" (1.8). And in a crucial passage, Anselm writes: "The Son had agreed with the Father and the Holy Spirit that there was no other way to reveal to the world the height of his omnipotence than by his death" (1.9).40 The cross proceeds from a Trinitarian consensus — not from an authoritarian Father imposing His will on a helpless Son.
Beginning in the late 1980s, a number of feminist theologians launched a powerful critique of substitutionary atonement. The most influential early statement came from Joanne Carlson Brown and Rebecca Parker in their 1989 essay "For God So Loved the World?" published in the volume Christianity, Patriarchy, and Abuse: A Feminist Critique. Brown and Parker argued that traditional atonement theology — particularly the idea that God required the suffering and death of His Son — sanctions and even sacralizes suffering. In their reading, the cross sends the message that suffering is redemptive, that innocent victims should accept their pain, and that God Himself models a pattern of demanding the suffering of the vulnerable for the benefit of others.13
Rita Nakashima Brock and Rebecca Parker extended this critique in their 2001 book Proverbs of Ashes: Violence, Redemptive Suffering, and the Search for What Saves Us. Drawing on their own experiences as survivors and as pastoral counselors, Brock and Parker contended that the doctrine of redemptive suffering has done incalculable harm to women. They told stories of women who stayed in abusive marriages because their pastors told them to "be like Jesus" and endure suffering patiently. They argued that the cross, when used as a model for Christian living, can become a tool for keeping the oppressed in their place.14
As Fleming Rutledge notes, these feminist theologians "maintained that the narrative of substitution glorifies passive suffering and has done untold damage to women over the centuries."15 The phrase "divine child abuse," which Chalke later popularized in a broader context, actually originated in this feminist discussion. The concern was deeply personal and pastoral: if the God we worship demands suffering, then suffering becomes sacred, and those who inflict it can claim they are doing God's work.
Pastoral Note: Before offering any response to the feminist critique, we must acknowledge this: the misuse of the cross to justify abuse is real and deplorable. It has happened. Pastors have told abused women to "bear their cross." Churches have counseled victims to stay in dangerous situations. If the only message of the cross is "innocent suffering is God's will," then the feminist critics are right to be alarmed. Any theology of the atonement that fails to address this pastoral reality is inadequate.
How should we respond? I believe we need to say several things at once, and we need to say them carefully.
First, we must take the concern seriously. The abuse of a doctrine does not invalidate the doctrine, but it does obligate us to address the abuse. If substitutionary atonement has been taught in ways that encourage victims to accept abuse, then those ways of teaching it were wrong. We must be honest about this failure. We must repent of careless preaching that has caused harm. And we must commit to teaching the atonement in ways that protect the vulnerable rather than endangering them.
Second, we must distinguish between misuse and proper use. The fact that a truth can be distorted does not make it untrue. Practically any good thing can be misused. The doctrine of God's sovereignty has been misused to justify fatalism. The doctrine of grace has been misused to justify moral laxity. The doctrine of submission has been misused to justify tyranny. In each case, the proper response is not to abandon the doctrine but to recover its true meaning. The same is true of substitutionary atonement. The problem is not with the doctrine itself but with specific distortions of it — distortions that we ourselves must reject.
Third, the cross is actually the most powerful critique of abuse that exists. This is the point that the feminist critique, ironically, misses. The cross does not sanction the suffering of the innocent; it exposes it. At the cross, God identifies Himself not with the powerful abuser but with the innocent victim. Jesus was unjustly accused, falsely condemned, beaten, mocked, and killed by the combined forces of religious and political power. The cross reveals the ugliness of violence done to the innocent. It unmasks the mechanisms of scapegoating and oppression. Far from endorsing abuse, the cross stands as history's most devastating indictment of it.
Rutledge makes this point powerfully. She observes that it is not atonement doctrine that has stood behind the suffering of women at the hands of patriarchal society. Rather, "other scriptural passages lie behind the idea that women's lot is to endure without complaint" — passages about household codes and the curse of Eve. "Numerous passages of this nature surely have had more to do with the subjugation and suffering of women, slaves, and children than theories of atonement."16 The substitutionary model of the atonement has been unfairly singled out. If blame is to be assigned, it belongs to the misinterpretation of entirely different texts.
Rutledge also notes that the feminist critique of substitution "has already had its day, so widespread has been the reaction — including reaction from other women theologians."17 The feminist objection served as a valuable corrective — it made all of us more careful in how we speak about the Father and the Son at the cross, and it rightly insisted that we must "never again read certain statements in the tradition in the same way."18 But as an argument against the doctrine itself, it does not hold.
Fourth, and most importantly, Christ's suffering is unique and unrepeatable. This is a crucial theological point that the feminist critique often overlooks. The New Testament does not present the cross as a universal pattern that all people must replicate. Christ's substitutionary death is once for all (Romans 6:10; Hebrews 7:27; 9:12; 10:10). It cannot be repeated, and no one else is called to do what Jesus did. When Paul speaks of sharing in Christ's sufferings (Philippians 3:10) or filling up what is lacking in Christ's afflictions (Colossians 1:24), he is not saying that believers must replicate the atoning work of the cross. He is speaking of the suffering that comes from faithful witness to the gospel in a hostile world — a very different thing from passively accepting abuse.
The cross does not say, "Suffering is good; accept it." The cross says, "Suffering inflicted on the innocent is evil — and God Himself has entered into the heart of that evil to defeat it from the inside." The cross is not a recipe for passive victimhood. It is the most radical act of divine love and power ever undertaken, and its effect is liberation — liberation from sin, liberation from death, and liberation from every power that oppresses and destroys.
No pastor should ever tell an abused woman to "bear her cross" by remaining in a dangerous situation. That is not what the cross means. The cross means that God sees her suffering, that God is on her side, and that God has acted decisively to defeat the powers of evil that oppress her. A proper theology of the atonement should lead to the protection of the vulnerable, not their continued exploitation.
It is also worth noting — and this is a point that is not made often enough — that the feminist critics sometimes conflate two very different things: the doctrine of substitutionary atonement and the broader cultural practice of telling women to suffer silently. The latter is a real problem, but it draws on a wide range of cultural and religious sources, many of which have nothing to do with atonement theology at all. Patriarchal assumptions about the "proper role" of women, misreadings of household codes in the New Testament, cultural norms that prize female submission, and centuries of legal structures that denied women autonomy — all of these have contributed to the abuse of women far more directly than any theory about why Jesus died. Singling out substitutionary atonement as the primary cause of this problem misdiagnoses the disease and therefore prescribes the wrong cure. The cure is not to abandon the doctrine but to challenge the patriarchal assumptions and cultural practices that have distorted it.
Furthermore, we should note that many women throughout the history of the church have found deep comfort, empowerment, and liberation in the doctrine of substitutionary atonement. Gathercole's point is relevant here: "The vehemence of reactions against substitutionary and forensic models over the centuries has often obscured recognition of their sheer effectiveness in a wide variety of contexts and over many centuries."42 Women such as Fanny Crosby, who wrote some of the most beloved hymns about the cross; Catherine Booth, co-founder of the Salvation Army, who preached the substitutionary death of Christ with power; and countless unnamed women in churches around the world who have found in the cross their deepest source of hope and strength — these voices must also be heard. The feminist critique speaks for some women's experience, but it does not speak for all. And the testimony of those who have been empowered by the cross deserves the same respectful hearing as the testimony of those who have been hurt by its misuse.
Summary of Response to the Feminist Critique: (a) The misuse of the cross to justify abuse is real and deplorable — and we must repent of it. (b) But the misuse of a doctrine does not invalidate the doctrine. (c) The cross is actually the most powerful critique of abuse that exists — it exposes the evil of violence done to the innocent and reveals God's identification with victims. (d) Christ's suffering is unique and unrepeatable — it is not a template for passive acceptance of abuse. (e) A right understanding of the cross should empower the church to protect the vulnerable.
J. Denny Weaver, writing from a Mennonite pacifist perspective, has offered one of the most thorough attempts to construct an atonement theology without any element of divine violence. In The Nonviolent Atonement (2001; 2nd edition 2011), Weaver argues that penal substitutionary atonement makes God complicit in violence. If God required the death of His Son — if the cross was in any sense an act of divine punishment — then God is a violent God, and a violent God cannot be the foundation for a nonviolent ethic. Weaver proposes instead what he calls "narrative Christus Victor," a model in which Christ conquers the powers of evil through His life, death, and resurrection without any element of satisfaction, punishment, or divinely willed suffering.19
The appeal of Weaver's proposal is obvious, especially for Christians committed to nonviolence and pacifism. If God Himself is violent, how can we preach peace? If the central act of salvation is an act of punishment, how can we oppose punitive systems of justice? Weaver's concerns are deeply felt and earnestly argued. He surveys a wide range of feminist, womanist, and liberationist critiques of traditional atonement theories and synthesizes them into a comprehensive alternative vision.20
Despite its appeal, I believe the nonviolent atonement proposal has serious problems — problems that ultimately make it untenable as a reading of the biblical evidence.
First, the cross involves voluntary self-sacrifice, not imposed violence. Weaver's argument depends on the assumption that substitutionary atonement depicts God as doing something violent to Jesus against His will. But as we have already seen, this is not what the doctrine teaches. The Son goes willingly. "No one takes my life from me," Jesus says, "but I lay it down of my own accord" (John 10:18, ESV). The cross is not violence imposed from above; it is love offered from within. There is an enormous moral difference between a parent forcing a child to endure harm and a person voluntarily giving his life for others. The cross belongs firmly in the second category. We recognize this distinction in everyday life: a soldier who throws himself on a grenade to save his comrades is not a "victim of violence" in the same sense as someone who is attacked against their will. The soldier's act is supremely courageous, supremely loving, and supremely voluntary — even though it results in his death. The same is true, in an infinitely greater way, of Christ's death on the cross.
Second, the New Testament itself interprets Jesus' death in substitutionary and judicial terms — and this is not a later theological invention. As we have argued throughout this book (see especially Chapters 6–12), the substitutionary interpretation of the cross is woven into the earliest strata of the New Testament. Paul's statement that "Christ died for our sins in accordance with the Scriptures" (1 Corinthians 15:3, ESV) is a pre-Pauline creed that goes back to the earliest church. Isaiah 53, which speaks of the Servant bearing our iniquities and being crushed for our transgressions, is presupposed by the New Testament authors at every turn. The sacrificial system of the Old Testament, with its sin offerings and guilt offerings and Day of Atonement rituals, provides the theological grammar that the New Testament uses to explain the cross (see Chapters 4–5). To strip all of this away in the name of nonviolence is not to recover the true gospel; it is to impose a modern philosophical commitment onto ancient texts that say something very different.
Third, a theology that cannot affirm the New Testament's own interpretation of the cross has a problem much deeper than atonement theory. If Isaiah 53 says the Lord "laid on him the iniquity of us all" (53:6), and if this cannot be true because it makes God violent, then we are saying the Bible is wrong. If Paul says God "made him to be sin who knew no sin" (2 Corinthians 5:21), and this is unacceptable, then Paul was wrong. This is a much bigger issue than atonement models. It raises the question of whether Scripture is authoritative for our theology or whether our prior ethical commitments get to override what Scripture says. I am deeply sympathetic to the commitment to nonviolence as a Christian ethical stance. But I do not believe that ethical commitment gives us license to rewrite the Bible's own account of what God did at the cross.
Fourth, as several scholars have pointed out, there is really no such thing as a non-violent atonement theory. Allen cites Ben Pugh's observation that "it could be said that there is no such thing as a non-violent atonement theory. Every theory of the atonement, even non-violent ones, involves God in redemptive violence."21 Even the Christus Victor model — Weaver's preferred framework — depicts a cosmic battle in which Christ defeats the powers of evil. How is this not violence? If Christ "disarmed the rulers and authorities and put them to open shame, triumphing over them" (Colossians 2:15, ESV), is that not an act of power and conquest? As Rutledge notes, "the Christus Victor motif provides just as much if not more fuel for aggression than does the substitution motif, given the violence ever ready to erupt in human nature; the concept of Christ as a conquering hero lends itself all too easily to a Crusader mentality."22 Constantine's motto In hoc signo vinces ("In this sign you shall conquer") has had a far bloodier history than any sermon on penal substitution.
Rutledge offers an additional insight that I find compelling. She observes that the New Testament actually pays very little attention to the physical violence of crucifixion itself. "Instead, it focuses on shame (Hebrews 12:2), contempt and mockery (Luke 23:11), scandal and foolishness (1 Corinthians 1–2), Jesus' blamelessness (Luke 23:13–25, 39), and his dereliction or Godforsakenness (Matthew 27:46; Mark 15:34; 2 Corinthians 5:21) — anything and everything but the physical details."23 The modern fixation on "the violence of the cross" actually imports a framework that is foreign to the New Testament's own emphasis. The New Testament's primary concern is not the physical pain of crucifixion but its theological meaning — what it accomplished in the relationship between God and humanity.
Key Point: The nonviolent atonement proposal rightly protests distortions that depict God as a violent abuser. But it goes too far by eliminating the substitutionary and judicial dimensions that the New Testament itself affirms. The cross involves voluntary self-sacrifice within the life of the Triune God, not imposed violence. And even the Christus Victor model, which Weaver prefers, involves divine power overcoming evil — which is itself a form of "violence" against the powers of darkness.
A related objection comes from William Hess, who in Crushing the Great Serpent argues that the Western emphasis on the violence of the cross is actually a distortion introduced over the course of church history as Christianity lost touch with the original meaning of sacrifice. Hess contends that ancient sacrifices were not primarily about violence or punishment but about dedication, relationship, and celebration. Over time, especially during the Reformation, the concept of sacrifice "mutate[d] into a display of violence," and the cross came to be seen primarily through the lens of "horror, torture, death, and violence" rather than liberation and victory.24
There is a kernel of truth here. I agree with Hess that we should not reduce sacrifice to violence, and I agree that some post-Reformation treatments have focused too narrowly on the punitive dimension of the cross at the expense of its broader meaning (see Chapter 17 on the Reformation and Chapter 22 on the variety of atonement models). But Hess overstates his case. As we argued in Chapters 4–6, the Old Testament sacrificial system does include genuinely substitutionary elements — the laying on of hands, the bearing of sin, the guilt offering (asham) — that cannot be reduced to relational dedication or joyful celebration. Isaiah 53:10 explicitly describes the Servant's death as a guilt offering. Leviticus 17:11 connects blood atonement with the giving of life. These are not pagan imports; they are integral to the biblical text. Hess's argument that substitutionary atonement is essentially a pagan idea imported into Christianity does not survive careful engagement with the Old Testament evidence.25
Liberation theology, which emerged primarily in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s (with figures like Gustavo Gutiérrez, Leonardo Boff, and Jon Sobrino), raised a different kind of objection to traditional Western atonement theology. The concern is not primarily about violence or suffering but about scope. Liberation theologians worry that penal substitutionary atonement focuses too narrowly on individual guilt and the individual's relationship with God, while ignoring the structural, systemic, and corporate dimensions of sin. If salvation is reduced to "my sins are forgiven because Jesus took my punishment," then the gospel has nothing to say about poverty, racism, political oppression, economic exploitation, and the myriad forms of systemic injustice that grind millions of people into misery every day.
This is a serious concern. If our theology of the atonement addresses only the vertical dimension (my relationship with God) and ignores the horizontal dimension (my relationship with my neighbor and with unjust social structures), then we have an incomplete gospel. Any gospel that tells the poor to be content with their lot because their sins are forgiven, while doing nothing to challenge the systems that keep them poor, is not the full gospel of Jesus Christ. The prophets of Israel thundered against injustice (Amos 5:21–24; Isaiah 1:10–17; Micah 6:8). Jesus Himself came preaching good news to the poor, liberty to captives, and freedom for the oppressed (Luke 4:18–19). A theology that has no room for these realities is deficient.
I believe, however, that the liberation critique is aimed at a straw man — or at least at a shrunken version of substitutionary atonement that does not represent the full biblical picture. Here is why.
First, penal substitutionary atonement does address individual guilt, and rightly so — because personal sin is real. Liberation theology is right that sin has corporate and structural dimensions, but it would be a grave mistake to lose sight of the personal dimension. Every human being stands before God as a moral agent who has sinned (Romans 3:23). Every human being needs forgiveness, reconciliation, and a restored relationship with the Creator. The gospel addresses this need. It would be strange to criticize a doctrine for doing what it is supposed to do — addressing the reality of personal guilt before God. The individual dimension of salvation is not a bug in the system; it is a feature. We should not apologize for affirming it.
Second, the atonement has corporate and cosmic dimensions that go far beyond individual forgiveness. This is where the multi-faceted model I have been advocating throughout this book comes into its own. As argued in Chapters 21 and 24, the atonement includes a Christus Victor dimension in which Christ defeats the powers and principalities — the systemic, structural forces of evil that oppress humanity. Paul's vision in Colossians 2:15 is not merely individual; it is cosmic. Christ has "disarmed the rulers and authorities" — including, by implication, unjust political systems, economic exploitation, racial oppression, and every form of structural evil. The atonement also includes a dimension of reconciliation (2 Corinthians 5:18–20) that is not merely vertical (God and the individual) but horizontal (reconciliation between estranged human communities — as in Ephesians 2:14–16, where the cross breaks down the dividing wall between Jew and Gentile).
Third, the multi-faceted model this book proposes includes both the individual/forensic dimension (substitutionary atonement) and the corporate/cosmic dimension (Christus Victor, reconciliation, new creation). These are not competing alternatives; they are complementary facets of one great reality (see Chapter 24). Substitutionary atonement addresses personal guilt before God. Christus Victor addresses the powers and structures of evil. Reconciliation addresses the broken relationships between human communities. New creation (2 Corinthians 5:17) addresses the renewal of all things. When all of these facets are held together, the result is a gospel that speaks to both the individual sinner and the systemic structures of injustice — a gospel that addresses both the vertical and the horizontal, both the personal and the political.
The great South African theologian Desmond Tutu understood this instinctively. He was deeply committed to both personal salvation and social justice, and he saw no tension between the two. The cross was, for him, both the place where individual sinners find forgiveness and the place where the powers of apartheid and racial injustice were judged and defeated. That is the fullness of the gospel, and it is what the multi-faceted model of the atonement is designed to capture.
We should also note that there is a subtle danger in the liberation critique that must be addressed. If we remove the individual/forensic dimension of the atonement entirely and reduce the cross to a political event — a symbol of solidarity with the oppressed, or a demonstration of resistance against unjust power — we lose something essential. We lose the reality that each individual person is guilty before God and in need of forgiveness. Liberation from unjust social structures is a genuine biblical concern, but it is not the only concern. A person can be freed from political oppression and still be enslaved to sin. A person can live in a perfectly just society (if such a thing were possible) and still need the cross. The deepest human problem is not merely structural injustice — it is the broken relationship between the human heart and God. Substitutionary atonement addresses that deepest problem. Christus Victor and reconciliation address the wider dimensions of evil. Both are needed. Neither alone is sufficient.
Jon Sobrino, one of the most influential liberation theologians, has argued that Christology must begin "from below" — from the perspective of the crucified and the poor.38 I am sympathetic to this impulse. The God who went to the cross does indeed identify with the poor, the marginalized, and the oppressed. But I would gently push back on the assumption that beginning "from below" requires us to minimize the substitutionary dimension. The poor need more than solidarity. They need forgiveness. They need reconciliation with God. They need the assurance that their sins — not just the sins committed against them, but their own sins — have been dealt with at the cross. A gospel that addresses only systemic oppression but not personal guilt is as incomplete as a gospel that addresses only personal guilt but not systemic oppression. The full gospel includes both.
Finally, I want to note that substitutionary atonement, far from undermining the concern for justice, actually provides its deepest foundation. Why is injustice wrong? Because it violates the character of a holy and just God. Why should we care about the poor and the oppressed? Because God cares about them — so much so that He gave His own Son for them. Why should the church be the most passionate advocate for justice in the world? Because we worship a God who took the ultimate step of self-giving love to set things right. The cross reveals, as nothing else does, the infinite value that God places on every human life. A church that truly understands the cross will never be content with a gospel that ignores the poor. It will never tolerate injustice in its midst. And it will never reduce salvation to a merely individual, privatized experience. The cross demands more — and it provides the power to deliver more.
Key Point: The liberation theology critique is right that the gospel has social and structural dimensions. But the solution is not to abandon substitutionary atonement in favor of a purely political reading of the cross. The solution is to affirm the full, multi-faceted biblical witness: substitutionary atonement addresses personal guilt, Christus Victor addresses systemic evil, reconciliation addresses broken relationships, and new creation addresses the renewal of all things. Together, they give us a gospel that speaks to the whole of human need.
Underlying all of the objections we have examined in this chapter — the "cosmic child abuse" accusation, the feminist critique, the nonviolent atonement proposal, and the liberation theology concern — is a deeper question: What kind of God do we worship? Is God violent or nonviolent? Is God retributive or restorative? Is God angry or loving? These are the real questions that drive much of the contemporary debate about the atonement.
As I argued in Chapter 3, the answer to these questions is not either/or but both/and — though with careful qualification. God is love (1 John 4:8). God is holy (Isaiah 6:3). God is just (Psalm 89:14). God's wrath is real (Romans 1:18) — but it is not irrational anger or vindictive rage. It is the settled, holy opposition of God's perfect nature to everything that is evil. God's wrath is the obverse of His love: precisely because God loves what is good, He opposes what is evil. Love without justice would be sentimental and impotent; justice without love would be cold and tyrannical. In God, love and justice meet perfectly — and the cross is the place where that meeting occurs (Psalm 85:10).
The contemporary objections we have examined tend to assume that if God is loving, He cannot also exercise judgment. But this assumption is foreign to the biblical witness. The God of the Bible is consistently portrayed as both loving and just, both merciful and holy, both gracious and opposed to evil. The cross does not resolve this "tension" by choosing one side over the other. It resolves it by revealing a God who satisfies His own justice through His own self-sacrifice — who bears in His own being the cost of dealing with human sin so that sinners can be forgiven without compromising His holy character.
Philippe de la Trinité captures this beautifully. He insists that there is no "retributive justice" at work at the cross in the sense of an angry God exacting vengeance. Instead, there is "vicarious satisfaction" rooted in "the preeminence of mercy." Christ is the "victim of love" — not a victim of the Father's wrath but a victim of His own boundless, self-giving love for humanity, acting in perfect union with the Father and the Spirit.26 The Father does not stand over against the Son at the cross. There is "no abandonment, no antagonism, no wrath on the side of the Father."27 And yet — and this is crucial — the judicial consequences of human sin are genuinely dealt with. The guilt is genuinely removed. The broken relationship is genuinely restored. This is not accomplished through divine rage but through divine love — a love so deep that it absorbs the consequences of human sin within the life of God Himself.
Rutledge makes a complementary point. She insists that "any model requiring us to split the Father from the Son violates the fundamental Trinitarian theology of God and must be renounced." She adds: "The event of the cross is the enactment in history of an eternal decision within the being of God. God is not changed by the historical event but has always been going out from God's self in love."28 The cross does not change God. It reveals who God has always been — a God of self-giving, other-oriented, sacrificial love.
I want to close this chapter by making a point that is often missed in these debates. The critics we have examined — feminists, liberationists, nonviolent theologians — are concerned, rightly, with the well-being of victims, the marginalized, the oppressed. Their hearts are in the right place even when, in my judgment, their theology goes astray. But here is the irony: the cross, rightly understood, is the church's most powerful resource for the very causes these critics champion.
The cross reveals God's identification with victims. Jesus was Himself a victim — of unjust accusation, of political manipulation, of mob violence, of state execution. When victims look at the cross, they see a God who knows what it is like to suffer at the hands of the powerful. This is not a God who sanctions their suffering; it is a God who shares it, who enters into it, and who ultimately overcomes it through resurrection. The cross is the most anti-abuse statement in the history of the world, because it says: God is on the side of the innocent sufferer, not the oppressor.
The cross is also the definitive victory over systemic evil. Colossians 2:15 declares that Christ "disarmed the rulers and authorities" — the archai (ἀρχαί) and exousiai (ἐξουσίαι) — "putting them to open shame." These "powers" are not merely spiritual demons in a narrow sense; they include all the structures and systems that oppress humanity. As Walter Wink and others have argued, the "powers" in Paul's thought include political institutions, economic systems, cultural ideologies, and religious establishments insofar as they have become instruments of evil.29 The cross defeats all of them. A church armed with this theology should be the most formidable force for justice in the world.
Paradoxically, the cross is also the most powerful argument for nonviolence — but not in the way Weaver suggests. The cross does not teach that God is nonviolent in some absolute philosophical sense. It teaches something more profound: that God conquers evil not by retaliating in kind but by absorbing its worst effects within His own being and transforming them through resurrection. This is the pattern that Christians are called to follow — not in the unique atoning sense (that work is Christ's alone) but in the ethical sense. We overcome evil with good (Romans 12:21). We turn the other cheek (Matthew 5:39). We love our enemies (Matthew 5:44). We do this not because we deny that evil deserves judgment, but because we trust that the Judge of all the earth will do right (Genesis 18:25) and because we have seen in the cross that God's way of dealing with evil is more powerful than any human retaliation.
This distinction is crucial. Some proponents of nonviolent atonement seem to argue that if God is not violent, then evil does not deserve judgment and there is no real penalty for sin. But this does not follow. The biblical witness is clear that sin carries real consequences — death, separation from God, enslavement to corruption. These consequences are not arbitrary punishments imposed by a vindictive deity; they are the natural and judicial outcomes of rebellion against the source of all life, truth, and goodness. The cross deals with these consequences — not by pretending they do not exist, and not by having God ignore them, but by having God absorb them within His own life. That is substitution. That is the heart of the gospel. And it is fully consistent with a God of love who takes evil more seriously, not less seriously, than any of us do.
Rutledge makes this point with striking force, citing the theologian Miroslav Volf, who argues that one cannot maintain a commitment to nonviolence in the face of great evil unless one believes in a God who will ultimately judge that evil. "One could certainly not speak of a God of violence," Volf writes. "This is the thought behind the image of the suffering Lamb of God." The future of the world to come "is ruled by the one who on the cross took violence upon himself."30 In other words, it is precisely because God has dealt with evil at the cross — absorbing its violence and defeating it through resurrection — that we are freed to practice nonviolence in the present. We do not need to take vengeance, because vengeance belongs to the Lord (Romans 12:19). We do not need to impose justice by force, because justice has already been accomplished at Calvary and will be fully revealed when Christ returns.
Finally, the cross is the foundation for the dignity and liberation of women — and indeed of all marginalized people. At the cross, God declares that every human life has infinite value — so much value that God Himself was willing to die for it. The God who went to the cross for sinners does not endorse their abuse; He condemns it in the strongest possible terms. A church that truly understands the cross will be the fiercest defender of the abused, the most tireless advocate for the marginalized, and the most relentless opponent of every form of injustice. If the church has sometimes failed in these callings — and it has — the fault lies not with the cross but with the church's failure to live up to the cross.
Key Point: The cross, rightly understood, is not the enemy of victims, women, the marginalized, or the oppressed. It is their greatest advocate. God identifies with victims at the cross. God defeats systemic evil at the cross. God models costly, self-giving love at the cross. And God calls the church to follow the pattern of the cross — not in passive acceptance of abuse, but in active, sacrificial love that opposes evil and upholds the dignity of every human being.
Before concluding, I want to address one more issue that runs beneath these contemporary objections. Why have they gained such traction in our cultural moment? What makes them feel so compelling to so many thoughtful people?
Stephen Holmes has offered a perceptive analysis of this question. He notes that the "cultural plausibility" of penal substitution has weakened for several reasons: shifting views on retributive justice, "the prevailing instinctive political liberalism among cultural elites," and the reality that many people in Western society "simply do not view themselves as sinners in need of salvation."31 When the very concept of sin is questioned, the idea that a penalty for sin must be paid seems not just unnecessary but offensive. When retributive justice is viewed as inherently barbaric, any atonement theory involving judicial punishment seems morally repugnant.
I think Holmes is right about the diagnosis. But the proper response is not to surrender the doctrine to the cultural zeitgeist. Holmes himself argues that "penal substitution remains of value because it reveals something about the inescapability of guilt and so about our need for atonement."32 The fact that our culture has difficulty with the concepts of sin, guilt, and judgment does not mean those concepts are wrong. It may mean that our culture needs to hear them more clearly, not less. The cross has always been scandalous. Paul himself acknowledged that the cross is "a stumbling block to Jews and folly to Gentiles" (1 Corinthians 1:23, ESV). The temptation to smooth out the scandal — to make the cross more palatable to contemporary sensibilities — is not new. Every generation faces it. And every generation must resist it, because the scandal of the cross is inseparable from its saving power.
At the same time, I fully agree that the church has a responsibility to present the cross clearly and accurately. If the reason people reject substitutionary atonement is that they have heard a distorted version of it — one that pits the Father against the Son, glorifies suffering for its own sake, or sanctions abuse — then the church's first task is to correct the distortion. We must preach the cross as what it truly is: the unified, self-giving act of the Triune God, motivated by love, addressing the reality of human sin, and achieving the reconciliation of all things. When the cross is presented in this light, many of the contemporary objections lose their force — not because they are silenced but because their legitimate concerns are addressed within the doctrine itself.
We have examined four major contemporary objections to substitutionary atonement in this chapter: the "cosmic child abuse" accusation, the feminist critique, the nonviolent atonement proposal, and the liberation theology concern. In each case, we have found that the objection contains a genuine insight that must be heard — a real concern about how the doctrine has been misused, misrepresented, or narrowly applied. But in each case, we have also found that the objection fails to overturn the doctrine when it is rightly understood.
The "cosmic child abuse" accusation misunderstands the Trinitarian nature of the cross. The feminist critique rightly protests the misuse of the cross to justify abuse but wrongly concludes that the doctrine itself is the problem. The nonviolent atonement proposal rightly insists on the self-giving character of divine love but wrongly eliminates the substitutionary and judicial dimensions that the New Testament itself affirms. The liberation theology concern rightly insists on the corporate and systemic dimensions of salvation but wrongly suggests that the individual/forensic dimension must be abandoned.
The answer to all of these concerns is not a smaller cross but a bigger one. Not less atonement theology but more — more Trinitarian, more multi-faceted, more attentive to both the individual and the corporate, more honest about both the love and the justice of God. The cross, rightly understood, is not the enemy of the vulnerable but their champion. It is not the sanctioning of violence but its defeat. It is not the justification of abuse but its most devastating exposure. And it is not merely an answer to individual guilt but a victory over every power — personal, structural, systemic, and cosmic — that stands between God and the world He loves.
The cross is not the problem. The cross is the answer. But we must make sure we are preaching the real cross — not a distorted version that gives ammunition to its critics and harm to its hearers. When we do that — when we preach the cross as the self-substitution of the Triune God, acting in unified love to bear the consequences of human sin and defeat the powers of evil — we will find that the cross speaks with power not only to those who already believe but to those who are asking the hard questions that this chapter has explored.
As Stott so memorably put it: "The concept of substitution may be said to lie at the heart of both sin and salvation. For the essence of sin is man substituting himself for God, while the essence of salvation is God substituting himself for man."33 That truth — rightly understood, faithfully proclaimed, and humbly lived — can stand up to any objection. It has done so for two thousand years. It will continue to do so.
1 Steve Chalke and Alan Mann, The Lost Message of Jesus (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2003), 182–83. ↩
2 Simon Gathercole, Defending Substitution: An Essay on Atonement in Paul (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2015), 24. ↩
3 Gathercole, Defending Substitution, 24–25. Gathercole here draws on Stott's language of "the self-substitution of God." ↩
4 Gathercole, Defending Substitution, 25. Gathercole cites Simeon Zahl on the experiential effectiveness of substitutionary teaching across centuries and contexts. ↩
5 David L. Allen, The Atonement: A Biblical, Theological, and Historical Study of the Cross of Christ (Nashville: B&H Academic, 2019), 201. ↩
6 Bruce McCormack, cited in Allen, The Atonement, 201. ↩
7 McCormack, cited in Allen, The Atonement, 201–2. ↩
8 Philippe de la Trinité, What Is Redemption? How Christ's Suffering Saves Us (Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Road, 2021), 6–7. ↩
9 Philippe de la Trinité, What Is Redemption?, 5. The quotation from Aquinas serves as the epigraph for Philippe's chapter on "Distorting Mirrors." ↩
10 I. Howard Marshall, Aspects of the Atonement: Cross and Resurrection in the Reconciling of God and Humanity (Colorado Springs: Paternoster, 2007), 67. Cited in Allen, The Atonement, 204. ↩
11 John R. W. Stott, The Cross of Christ (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2006), 159. ↩
12 Stott, The Cross of Christ, 159. ↩
13 Joanne Carlson Brown and Rebecca Parker, "For God So Loved the World?" in Christianity, Patriarchy, and Abuse: A Feminist Critique, ed. Joanne Carlson Brown and Carole R. Bohn (New York: Pilgrim Press, 1989), 1–30. ↩
14 Rita Nakashima Brock and Rebecca Ann Parker, Proverbs of Ashes: Violence, Redemptive Suffering, and the Search for What Saves Us (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001). ↩
15 Fleming Rutledge, The Crucifixion: Understanding the Death of Jesus Christ (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015), 494. ↩
16 Rutledge, The Crucifixion, 494–95. Rutledge identifies the "household rules" passages (Eph. 5:21–33; Col. 3:18–4:1; 1 Pet. 3:1–7) and the example passage (1 Pet. 2:21) as more likely culprits than substitutionary atonement doctrine. ↩
17 Rutledge, The Crucifixion, 494. ↩
18 Rutledge, The Crucifixion, 495. ↩
19 J. Denny Weaver, The Nonviolent Atonement, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011). Weaver's "narrative Christus Victor" model attempts to tell the story of Christ's victory over evil without positing any divine violence or satisfaction. ↩
20 Rutledge, The Crucifixion, 494. Rutledge notes that "J. Denny Weaver does a good job of surveying the discussion in The Nonviolent Atonement." ↩
21 Ben Pugh, cited in Allen, The Atonement, 201. ↩
22 Rutledge, The Crucifixion, 498–99. ↩
23 Rutledge, The Crucifixion, 498. ↩
24 William L. Hess, Crushing the Great Serpent: Did God Punish Jesus? (2024), chap. 14, "Pagan Substitutionary Atonement." ↩
25 For the detailed exegetical argument regarding the substitutionary significance of the Old Testament sacrificial system, see Chapters 4–6 of this volume. See also Allen, The Atonement, 45–98, and Gathercole, Defending Substitution, 69–95, on the relationship between "Christ died for our sins" (1 Cor. 15:3) and Isaiah 53. ↩
26 Philippe de la Trinité, What Is Redemption?, 67–95. Philippe's Chapter III, "Vicarious Satisfaction: The Preeminence of Mercy," develops the positive case for understanding Christ as the "victim of love" who acts in complete union with the Father. ↩
27 Philippe de la Trinité, What Is Redemption?, 88. ↩
28 Rutledge, The Crucifixion, 499–500. ↩
29 See Walter Wink, Naming the Powers: The Language of Power in the New Testament (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), and the subsequent volumes in his Powers trilogy. For a balanced evangelical engagement with Wink's proposal, see Clinton E. Arnold, Powers of Darkness: Principalities and Powers in Paul's Letters (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1992). ↩
30 Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and Reconciliation (Nashville: Abingdon, 1996), 303–4. Cited in Rutledge, The Crucifixion, 504. ↩
31 Stephen R. Holmes, "Penal Substitution," in T&T Clark Companion to Atonement, ed. Adam J. Johnson (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2017), 295. Cited in Allen, The Atonement, 204. ↩
32 Holmes, "Penal Substitution," 295. Cited in Allen, The Atonement, 204. ↩
33 Stott, The Cross of Christ, 159. ↩
34 For the argument that the New Testament's own interpretation of Christ's death is substitutionary and penal, see Chapters 6–12 of this volume. Gathercole, Defending Substitution, demonstrates that the pre-Pauline formula "Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures" (1 Cor. 15:3) is fundamentally substitutionary in character. ↩
35 See the full treatment of Anselm's anticipation of the feminist critique in Rutledge, The Crucifixion, 161–63. Rutledge shows that Anselm himself raised the objection that it would seem unjust for God to condemn the innocent to free the guilty (Cur Deus Homo 1.8) and responded by emphasizing the voluntary, Trinitarian character of the Son's self-offering. ↩
36 Hans Boersma, Violence, Hospitality, and the Cross: Reappropriating the Atonement Tradition (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004). Boersma argues that all theological traditions, including those committed to nonviolence, must reckon with some element of divine "violence" or coercion in the atonement. His nuanced treatment is an important contribution to this discussion. ↩
37 Gustavo Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation, trans. Caridad Inda and John Eagleson, rev. ed. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1988). ↩
38 Jon Sobrino, Christ the Liberator: A View from the Victims, trans. Paul Burns (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2001). Sobrino argues that Christology must begin "from below" — from the perspective of the crucified and the poor. While sympathetic to liberation theology's pastoral concerns, I believe Sobrino underestimates the substitutionary dimension of the cross in favor of an exemplary/solidarity model. ↩
39 For the Christus Victor dimension of the atonement and its relevance to systemic evil, see Chapter 21 of this volume. For the integration of substitutionary and Christus Victor themes, see Chapter 24. ↩
40 Rutledge, The Crucifixion, 162–63. Rutledge emphasizes Anselm's own words: "The Son had agreed with the Father and the Holy Spirit that there was no other way to reveal to the world the height of his omnipotence than by his death" (Cur Deus Homo 1.9). She comments: "In that last, deceptively simple sentence there is a world of glad tidings and Nicene truth." ↩
41 For a thorough philosophical defense of the coherence of substitutionary atonement against the charge of injustice, see Chapter 25 of this volume. See also William Lane Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ: An Exegetical, Historical, and Philosophical Exploration (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2020), 147–208. ↩
42 Leon Morris, The Apostolic Preaching of the Cross, 3rd ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965). Morris's classic treatment remains an indispensable resource for demonstrating the substitutionary and propitiatory character of New Testament atonement language. ↩
43 Joel B. Green and Mark D. Baker, Recovering the Scandal of the Cross: Atonement in New Testament and Contemporary Contexts, 2nd ed. (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2011). Green and Baker argue for contextualizing atonement imagery and express reservations about the primacy of penal substitution, but their work is valuable for its sensitivity to cross-cultural concerns. ↩
44 Joshua M. McNall, The Mosaic of Atonement: An Integrated Approach to Christ's Work (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Academic, 2019). McNall's "kaleidoscopic" approach to atonement theory is broadly sympathetic to the multi-faceted model advocated in this volume. ↩
45 Darby Kathleen Ray, Deceiving the Devil: Atonement, Abuse, and Ransom (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 1998). Ray writes from a feminist perspective and proposes a "revised ransom" model as an alternative to penal substitution. ↩
46 Jeremy Treat, The Crucified King: Atonement and Kingdom in Biblical and Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2014). Treat argues persuasively that penal substitution and Christus Victor are not competing models but complementary dimensions: "The cross is a victory (Christus Victor) by means of penal substitution." Cited in Allen, The Atonement, 203. ↩
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