In the previous chapter, we dealt at length with one of the most common objections to postmortem opportunity: the claim that it undermines evangelism and the urgency of the Great Commission. We saw that this objection, while understandable, does not hold up under close examination (see Chapter 26). But the evangelism objection is not the only card in the critic's hand. There are several other theological objections that have been raised against the idea that God continues to offer salvation after physical death. Some of these are ancient, going back as far as Augustine. Others are more recent, arising from modern evangelical theology. All of them deserve a careful, fair hearing—and a thorough response.
In this chapter, I want to walk through the remaining major theological objections to postmortem opportunity, one by one. My goal is to present each objection as fairly and strongly as I can—to "steel-man" the opposition, as they say—before offering what I believe are compelling biblical and theological responses. Here is the thesis I will defend: the remaining major theological objections to postmortem opportunity—including claims about the impossibility of postmortem repentance, the sufficiency of this life, the finality of death, and the danger of presumption—can all be answered from Scripture and sound theological reasoning.
I want to be clear about something at the outset. I take these objections seriously. The scholars who raise them are thoughtful, sincere Christians who care deeply about biblical fidelity. I disagree with their conclusions, but I respect their concerns. My aim is not to dismiss their worries but to show that a belief in postmortem opportunity can answer every one of them without abandoning any core commitment of orthodox Christianity.
Before we dive in, it may be helpful to set the stage. The objections we will examine in this chapter come from a wide range of theological traditions—Reformed, Arminian, Catholic, and broadly evangelical. Some of them go all the way back to the fifth century and the towering influence of Augustine, whose opposition to postmortem hope shaped Western Christianity for more than a millennium. Others are more recent, reflecting the concerns of contemporary systematic theologians. What they all share is a conviction that postmortem opportunity, however attractive it may seem pastorally, runs into serious theological problems. My goal in this chapter is to show that it does not. Each of these objections, when examined carefully, turns out to be far less decisive than its proponents believe.
I should also note what this chapter will not do. We have already addressed the scriptural objections to postmortem opportunity in Chapters 18–19, the historical objections in Chapters 24–25, and the evangelism objection in Chapter 26. This chapter focuses exclusively on the theological objections—arguments that arise not from specific Bible verses or historical precedents but from broader doctrinal reasoning about the nature of God, humanity, death, and the afterlife.
Let us take them one at a time.
This is perhaps the most foundational objection of all. If repentance after death is simply impossible—if death permanently and irrevocably fixes a person's spiritual condition—then every other argument for postmortem opportunity is beside the point. No amount of biblical evidence or theological reasoning would matter if the dead literally cannot change their minds. So we need to address this claim head-on.
As James Beilby observes, there are several different reasons people have given for believing that postmortem repentance is impossible.1 Let us examine each one.
The first reason is the claim that the Bible explicitly teaches that repentance after death is impossible. The problem with this claim, as I have argued at length in earlier chapters (see Chapters 18–19), is that the scriptural evidence for it is surprisingly thin. As Beilby notes, "if we approach Scripture with an open mind on the subject, it is exceedingly difficult to see how Scripture makes that argument."2 The key texts that are usually cited—Hebrews 9:27, Luke 16:19–31, and 2 Corinthians 5:10—simply do not teach what opponents claim they teach when examined in their proper context. Hebrews 9:27 tells us that people die and then face judgment, but it says nothing about the impossibility of repentance between death and judgment (see Chapter 18 for detailed exegesis). Luke 16 is a parable about the reversal of fortunes, not a doctrinal treatise on the mechanics of the afterlife (see Chapter 18). And 2 Corinthians 5:10 speaks about judgment for things done "in the body," but it does not say that no further opportunity exists beyond this life (see Chapter 18). In short, the scriptural case for the impossibility of postmortem repentance has been overstated—dramatically so.
A second reason is the appeal to church tradition. The Roman Catholic Catechism, for instance, states that death ends the time open to accepting or rejecting divine grace.3 Many Protestants hold a similar view, often citing the consensus of post-Augustinian tradition as evidence. But as Beilby rightly points out, this appeal to tradition "will be persuasive only to those within the Roman Catholic Church, and even faithful Roman Catholics might want to know why the Church teaches that repentance after death is impossible."4 Moreover, as we explored in Chapters 24–25, the historical objection to postmortem opportunity is not as strong as many assume. Significant segments of the early church—including major figures like Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Gregory of Nyssa—believed that God's redemptive work continued after death.5 Of the six known theological schools in the first five centuries, four taught some form of universal restoration, which necessarily involves postmortem repentance.6 So tradition actually cuts both ways on this question.
The third reason is the most philosophically sophisticated, and it deserves the most careful attention. This is the argument, rooted in the theology of Thomas Aquinas, that the soul becomes fixed and unchangeable once it is separated from the body at death. In his Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas argues that the soul is in a "mutable state" only while united to the body. Once separated from the body in death, it enters "a state of rest in the end acquired," and its will becomes "immovable regarding a desire for the ultimate end."7
This is a serious argument, and we need to understand it clearly. Aquinas held a view of human nature called hylomorphism (from the Greek words hylē [ὕλη], meaning "matter," and morphē [μορφή], meaning "form"). On this view, a human person is a union of soul and body—the soul is the "form" of the body. The soul can exist without the body after death, but in an incomplete, diminished state. And in this separated state, Aquinas argued, the soul cannot change its fundamental orientation. It is locked in whatever direction it was facing at the moment of death.
But as the philosopher Jerry Walls has pointed out, this argument carries very little weight for those who do not share Aquinas's particular view of the soul-body relationship. Walls observes that Aquinas's argument "will carry very little weight with dualists who believe that the soul is the essential self ... [and] retains its basic powers even without the body."8 If the soul is a complete substance in its own right—as substance dualists like J.P. Moreland, Richard Swinburne, and Charles Taliaferro maintain (see Chapters 6–7)—then there is no reason to think that separation from the body would destroy its capacity for thought, choice, and repentance. The soul does not need the body in order to think, will, or respond to God.
Key Point: Aquinas's argument that repentance is impossible after death depends on his particular view of the soul-body relationship (hylomorphism). Substance dualists, who hold that the soul is the essential self and retains its powers apart from the body, have no reason to accept this conclusion. And even materialists who believe in bodily resurrection at the final judgment must grant that the resurrected person has the capacity to respond to God.
Furthermore, even if we set aside the dualism-versus-hylomorphism debate entirely, we must reckon with a simple biblical fact: Scripture teaches that all people will be raised and will stand before God at the final judgment (John 5:28–29; Revelation 20:12–13). Whether we are dualists, hylomorphists, or even physicalists, the resurrection gives every person a complete existence—body and soul reunited—in which they face God. At that point, even on Aquinas's own terms, the objection disappears. The resurrected person has everything Aquinas says is needed for the soul to change: a body. As Beilby notes, "the defender of Postmortem Opportunity has many options for thinking about the nature of human constitution."9
Additionally, as we explored in Chapter 10, Ladislaus Boros's "final decision hypothesis" suggests that the very moment of death may be a uniquely clarifying experience in which the whole person—body and soul together—makes a definitive choice for or against God.10 Boros draws on Thomistic metaphysics to argue that death, far from fixing the soul in its pre-death condition, actually opens up the soul to its deepest and most lucid act of self-determination. This is not a rejection of Aquinas but a creative extension of his thought—one that several Catholic theologians, including Karl Rahner, have found compelling.11
Beilby also offers a fascinating alternative for those who are deeply committed to the idea that postmortem repentance is impossible in the afterlife but who still want to affirm a postmortem opportunity. He raises the concept of "hypertime"—the idea that multiple moments of experience can be contained within a single moment of clock time. If hypertime is real, it is possible that the moment of death encompasses, from the dying person's perspective, years of opportunities to encounter God and respond.12 This may sound speculative, and Beilby acknowledges that it is. But it is worth noting that many people who have near-death experiences report exactly this kind of time distortion—an experience of vast duration compressed into what, from the outside, appears to be mere seconds or minutes (see Chapter 5).
Finally, I want to add a point that I believe is often overlooked. The claim that God withdraws the grace necessary for repentance after death is, frankly, in deep tension with what Scripture teaches about God's character. If God genuinely "desires all people to be saved and to come to a knowledge of the truth" (1 Timothy 2:4, ESV), and if there are billions who die without ever having a genuine encounter with the gospel, then why on earth would God withdraw His grace at the very moment when these people most need it? As Beilby puts it, this is "incongruous with the clear teaching of Scripture that God desires all people to be saved."13 The burden of proof, I submit, rests squarely on those who claim God stops pursuing the lost at death—not on those who claim He continues.
This objection goes something like this: "God has designed this earthly life to be the arena in which we make our eternal decision. Everything we need to respond to God is available here and now. The gospel has been preached, general revelation is accessible to all, and the Holy Spirit is at work in the world. This life is sufficient for God's salvific purposes. There is no need for a postmortem opportunity."
I understand why some find this persuasive. It sounds pious. It sounds like a strong affirmation of God's sovereignty and wisdom. But I believe it is flatly contradicted by the evidence.
Consider the facts. Tens of billions of people have lived and died on this earth without ever hearing the name of Jesus Christ.14 This includes hundreds of millions who lived before Christ came, in regions completely cut off from the revelation given to Israel. It includes countless infants who died before they could understand anything at all. It includes people like Beilby's case study "George"—a person living in ninth-century BCE Upper Mongolia who had no access whatsoever to special revelation.15 It includes "Kunta Kinte," a person who heard a version of the "gospel" presented to him by people who enslaved, tortured, and brutalized him in the name of Christ.16 Can we really look at these situations and say with a straight face, "This life was sufficient for God's purposes"?
Think About It: The claim that "this life is sufficient" works only if you assume restrictivism (only those who explicitly hear and accept Christ in this life are saved) or inclusivism (God can save through Christ even those who never hear His name). But restrictivism leaves billions of people condemned for a decision they never had the opportunity to make—which is impossible to reconcile with a God who "desires all people to be saved" (1 Timothy 2:4). And inclusivism, while more generous, still relies on implicit faith in general revelation—which the postmortem opportunity thesis argues is not enough. People deserve a genuine, personal encounter with the living Christ.
Here is the core problem with this objection: it assumes what it needs to prove. It assumes that God's purposes are limited to what happens in this earthly life. But why would we assume that? Scripture tells us that God is the God of the living and the dead (Romans 14:9). It tells us that Jesus holds the keys of death and Hades (Revelation 1:18). It tells us that Christ "went and proclaimed to the spirits in prison" (1 Peter 3:19, ESV—see Chapters 11–12 for full exegesis). It tells us that "the gospel was preached even to those who are dead" (1 Peter 4:6, ESV). It tells us that at the name of Jesus, "every knee should bow, in heaven and on earth and under the earth" (Philippians 2:10, ESV). Again and again, Scripture portrays God's redemptive work as spanning the totality of existence—not just the brief window of earthly life.
As Stephen Jonathan argues in Grace beyond the Grave, the question we must ask is whether human death puts an end to any possibility of repentance once we integrate two important facts: (1) the persistence of God in pursuing His will to save, and (2) the reality that although human beings may be bounded by death, God is not. Indeed, in Christ, God has shown His sovereignty over death itself.17 If God's purposes span all of reality—if He is the Lord of both the living and the dead—then it is entirely reasonable to believe that His salvific work does not stop at the grave.
Moreover, to say that "this life is sufficient" is to make a claim that is manifestly untrue for a six-month-old baby who dies of a congenital defect. It is untrue for a woman raised in an abusive cult who was taught to fear the name of Jesus. It is untrue for an indigenous tribesman who lived his entire life without contact with any Christian community. We can cling to the abstract theological claim that "this life is sufficient," or we can look honestly at the real world and acknowledge that for billions of real human beings, it plainly was not. I believe honesty requires the latter.
Consider, too, the pastoral dimension of this question. Stephen Jonathan, himself a Pentecostal pastor of more than twenty-five years, writes with deep sensitivity about the funerals he has conducted for people whose faith was, at best, uncertain. He speaks of the "conspiracy of silence" that surrounds the death of loved ones who did not profess Christ—the awkward evasion that many pastors resort to when asked by grieving families about the eternal destiny of the deceased.40 The claim that "this life is sufficient" offers no comfort in such moments. It simply tells the grieving family that their loved one is lost forever, and there is nothing to be done. Is that really the message of the God who "is patient with you, not wanting anyone to perish, but everyone to come to repentance" (2 Peter 3:9, ESV)?
I do not think so. I think the testimony of Scripture, from beginning to end, is that God is a relentless pursuer of the lost—a shepherd who leaves the ninety-nine to find the one (Luke 15:4), a woman who lights a lamp and sweeps the house until she finds the lost coin (Luke 15:8), a father who watches the road for the returning prodigal and runs to embrace him (Luke 15:20). The claim that this pursuit stops at the moment of death—that the Shepherd gives up on the lost sheep the instant it dies—is, I believe, fundamentally at odds with the character of the God revealed in Jesus Christ.
Some critics worry that affirming a postmortem opportunity amounts to admitting that God's plan for this world didn't work. If God has to "clean up" after death what He couldn't accomplish during earthly life, doesn't that suggest that His purposes were thwarted? Doesn't it make the afterlife look like a backup plan?
This objection rests on a misunderstanding—a rather significant one. It assumes that postmortem opportunity is something God resorts to reluctantly because His preferred plan failed. But that is not at all what I am arguing. I am arguing that postmortem opportunity is part of God's plan—not a backup plan, not a Plan B, but an integral element of a comprehensive divine strategy that spans all of created reality.
Think about it this way. God's plan includes the creation of the physical universe. It includes the calling of Israel. It includes the incarnation, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. It includes the outpouring of the Holy Spirit and the formation of the church. It includes the Great Commission and the worldwide spread of the gospel. And it includes—I believe—the continued pursuit of the lost after death, the final judgment as a moment of decisive encounter, and the ultimate restoration of all things under the lordship of Christ. All of these are part of one grand, unified plan. None of them represent a "failure" of the others.
An analogy may be helpful. Suppose a loving father plans a surprise birthday party for his child. The plan includes sending out invitations a month in advance, decorating the house, preparing the food, and then welcoming the guests. Now, the father knows that some guests will RSVP early, some will RSVP late, and some won't respond to the written invitation at all—so he plans to call them personally the day before the party to make sure they know they are welcome. Would we say that the phone calls represent a "failure" of the written invitations? Of course not. They are all part of one plan, designed to ensure that everyone who is wanted at the party has a genuine opportunity to come.
In the same way, God's postmortem pursuit of the lost is not a sign that His earthly plan failed. It is a sign that His plan is bigger than we imagined. His purposes are not limited to seventy or eighty years of earthly existence. They stretch from before the foundation of the world to the final consummation of all things. Postmortem opportunity is simply the recognition that the God who is Lord over both the living and the dead (Romans 14:9) exercises His lordship over both domains.
We might also consider how God's plan in Scripture has always involved multiple stages and unfolding phases. The promise to Abraham was not fulfilled in Abraham's lifetime—it unfolded over centuries. The prophecies of the Messiah were not understood all at once—they were revealed progressively across the Old and New Testaments. The kingdom of God itself was inaugurated at Christ's first coming but will not be consummated until His second coming. In every case, the fact that God's plan includes future stages does not mean the earlier stages "failed." It means God's purposes are comprehensive, spanning multiple eras of history. Why should we think it is any different with individual salvation? If God's plan for human history unfolds across multiple stages, it is perfectly reasonable to believe that His plan for individual persons does the same—beginning in this life, continuing through death and the intermediate state, and reaching its climax at the final judgment.
Beilby makes a similar point by noting that the division of human existence into "premortem" and "postmortem" is exhaustive—there is no third category.18 If someone does not hear the gospel before death, then the only remaining option is for them to hear it after death. To deny this is not to protect God's sovereignty; it is to limit it.
This is an objection with both ancient and modern roots. The worry goes like this: if people know (or believe) that God will offer a chance at salvation after death, they will use this as an excuse to sin freely in this life, assuming they can always repent later. "Why live a holy life now," the argument goes, "if you can put off the decision until after you die?"
I want to be very honest about something. This is a real pastoral concern, and I do not dismiss it. The last thing I want is for anyone to use the doctrine of postmortem opportunity as a license to sin. But I also think this objection fails for several important reasons.
First, this is essentially the same objection that the apostle Paul faced in Romans 6:1 regarding the doctrine of grace: "What shall we say then? Are we to continue in sin that grace may abound?" (ESV). Paul's emphatic answer was, "By no means! How can we who died to sin still live in it?" (Romans 6:2, ESV). Paul did not respond by weakening his doctrine of grace. He did not say, "Well, maybe grace isn't quite as free and lavish as I just said." He doubled down. He insisted that grace is absolutely free, absolutely abundant, and absolutely undeserved—and that the proper response to grace is not presumption but gratitude, love, and holy living.
Key Parallel: Every generous doctrine of God's grace faces the charge of encouraging presumption. If the doctrine of grace itself did not need to be weakened to avoid presumption, then neither does the doctrine of postmortem opportunity. The solution to presumption is not less grace, but a deeper understanding of what grace means.
If the boundless, scandalous grace of the gospel itself does not need to be limited to prevent presumption, then neither does the extension of that grace beyond the grave. The answer to the abuse of grace is never the withdrawal of grace. It is a deeper understanding of the God who gives it.
Second, the idea that someone could strategically "wait" to repent after death reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of how sin and character formation work. As Beilby observes, "choices create dispositions to choose in similar ways in the future, repetitively acting on dispositions creates habits, and habits create our character."19 This is what theologians and philosophers call the "solidification of character." The more a person deliberately rejects God, postpones repentance, and indulges in sin, the harder it becomes for them to turn around. A lifetime of deliberate rebellion against God does not make postmortem repentance more likely. It makes it less likely. The person who thinks, "I'll enjoy my sin now and repent later," is actually making it progressively harder for themselves to repent at all.
This is one of the reasons I believe this life matters so deeply—a point I will return to below. The decisions we make now shape who we are becoming. A life of responding to God's promptings, of growing in love and holiness, of following Christ even when it is difficult—this kind of life is forming a character that will respond joyfully when confronted with God's full presence. A life of deliberate rejection is doing the opposite.
Third, as Jerry Walls cleverly points out, if the possibility of postmortem repentance trivializes this life, then "the same might be said for deathbed repentance."20 After all, if a person can put off their decision until the last moments of life and still be saved, doesn't that also encourage presumption? Yet virtually every Christian tradition affirms the possibility of genuine deathbed conversion. The thief on the cross was saved in the last moments of his life (Luke 23:43). If deathbed conversion does not destroy the motivation for holy living, then postmortem opportunity does not either.
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the presumption objection misunderstands what postmortem opportunity actually claims. Beilby makes a crucial distinction here. The postmortem opportunity is designed primarily for those who never had a genuine chance to hear and respond to the gospel—the unevangelized and the pseudoevangelized. It is not a blanket promise that everyone gets a comfortable second chance after a life of deliberate rebellion. Someone who knows the gospel, understands it, and deliberately rejects it in favor of sin is not in the same category as someone who never heard it at all.21
Now, I go further than Beilby here. I believe God offers the postmortem encounter to all the unsaved, not just the unevangelized—because that is who God is, a God of relentless, unfailing love. But even on my broader view, the presumption objection still fails. Why? Because anyone who is aware of the postmortem opportunity is, by definition, someone who has heard the gospel. And anyone who has heard the gospel and strategically plans to reject it now and repent later has already profoundly misunderstood what salvation is. As Beilby puts it, "the choice to postpone commitment in this life reveals that what is desired is not relationship with God, but the eternal benefits that come with being a Christian. And that is simply not the Christian message of salvation."22 Salvation is not a fire insurance policy. It is a relationship with the living God. And relationships cannot be put on hold.
This is an intriguing objection, and it may be the one with the oldest pedigree. Augustine himself raised it in City of God as an argument against Origen's teaching on postmortem hope.23 The logic goes like this: if it is possible for someone to change their fundamental spiritual orientation after death (from unbelief to faith), then what prevents someone from going in the opposite direction—from faith to unbelief? If the dead can repent and enter heaven, can the redeemed in heaven apostatize and fall into sin?
This is a clever argument, and I want to give it the attention it deserves. But I believe it fails, for reasons that are both philosophically sound and deeply biblical.
The first thing to understand is that the theory of postmortem opportunity does not require that it be possible to sin in heaven. As Beilby explains, affirming that the unevangelized have a postmortem opportunity "merely invalidates one of the possible answers as to why sin in heaven is impossible—namely, the claim that it is impossible to change one's fundamental spiritual dispositions in the postmortem state. But there are other reasons to assert that it is impossible to sin in heaven."24
In other words, the opponent's logic assumes that there is only one possible reason why sin in heaven is impossible: namely, that the dead cannot change. If we take away that reason (by affirming that the unevangelized can repent), then—the objection claims—we have no way to explain why the saved cannot apostatize. But this is a false dilemma. There are other, better reasons why sin in heaven is impossible.
Beilby identifies two broad approaches to explaining why the redeemed in heaven do not sin. The first locates the explanation in God—He simply prevents them from sinning. The second locates the explanation in the humans themselves—something about their transformation makes them unable and unwilling to sin.25
Beilby (and I agree with him) prefers the second approach, for two good reasons. First, if humans are able to sin in heaven and God simply overrides their will to prevent it, this seems like a strange kind of "perfection." As Beilby puts it, "final sanctification, on this account, is simply God doing something in heaven that he did not do in this life—namely, stop us from sinning."26 Second, if God could simply override human free will to prevent sin, why did He not do so from the very beginning, in the Garden of Eden? The fact that God allowed the possibility of sin in the first place suggests that His solution to sin involves the genuine transformation of human character, not the mere suppression of free will.
The Key Insight: The redeemed in heaven cannot sin, not because God overrides their will, but because their character has been fully formed through the process of salvation—justification, sanctification, and glorification. They have freely chosen God, and their character has been perfected through that choice. They do not want to sin, and their freely formed character makes sinning psychologically impossible for them. This is the "traditional view of heaven" as Timothy Pawl and Kevin Timpe describe it: the redeemed have both free will and the inability to sin.
Pawl and Timpe offer a helpful explanation of how this works. They argue that "one can be free in heaven but unable to sin in virtue of having a moral character that one has previously freely formed."27 In other words, when we freely choose God over a lifetime (or, in some cases, through a postmortem encounter), we are building a character that is oriented toward God. At some point, that character becomes so deeply set that choosing against God is no longer a real psychological possibility—not because freedom has been removed, but because it has been fully exercised. Just as a person who has cultivated a deep love of honesty over many decades would find it psychologically impossible to commit a brazen act of fraud, so the person whose character has been fully formed by grace finds it impossible to sin.
But here is the crucial question for the defender of postmortem opportunity: if death is not what fixes a person's character, what does? Beilby's answer is compelling: it is not death itself that solidifies character, but the judgment and the beatific vision—the face-to-face encounter with God in all His glory.28 When the redeemed finally see Christ "as he is" (1 John 3:2), and when they see God "face to face" rather than "in a mirror dimly" (1 Corinthians 13:12), this vision of God's glory will complete their transformation. The process of sanctification that began in this life (or, for some, in the postmortem encounter) reaches its fulfillment in the unmediated experience of God's presence.
R. Zachary Manis's "divine presence model" is helpful here (see Chapters 23 and 23A for full treatment). Manis argues that the process of sanctification involves the gradual removal of the spiritual "veil" that obscures our perception of God—a veil caused by sin.29 As this veil is removed through the work of the Holy Spirit, the believer's ability to love God and neighbor is "gradually perfected."30 The ultimate completion of this process—glorification—is the point at which the veil is fully removed and the person sees God as He truly is. It is this experience, not the bare fact of physical death, that permanently and irrevocably orients the soul toward God.
This means that the dynamics are genuinely different for the unevangelized receiving a postmortem opportunity and for the redeemed already in God's presence. The unevangelized person in Hades has not yet had their decisive encounter with God. Their character is not yet fixed. They are in a state of openness and possibility. But once a person—whether they accepted Christ in this life or through a postmortem encounter—has been fully sanctified and glorified through the beatific vision, their character is fixed. Not because God overrides their will, but because their will has been freely and fully aligned with God's. There is no reason for them to sin, no inclination toward sin, and no possibility that they would choose sin—because to do so would be to choose against everything they have freely become.
So the objection dissolves. Postmortem opportunity does not "open the door to sin in heaven" because the door to sin in heaven was never held shut by the impossibility of postmortem change. It is held shut by the power of glorification—the full transformation of human character in the presence of God's glory.
This is perhaps the objection that carries the most emotional weight in evangelical circles. Many Christians worry that affirming postmortem opportunity is the first step on a slippery slope that leads inevitably to universalism—the belief that all people will eventually be saved. "If God offers a chance after death," the argument goes, "why wouldn't He keep offering forever until everyone says yes? And if He keeps offering forever, isn't that just universalism?"
I understand this concern, and I want to address it directly and honestly. As Beilby observes, "it is difficult to overstate the importance of the fear of Universalism" in suppressing postmortem hope throughout church history.31 The fear that postmortem opportunity leads inevitably to universalism was one of the key reasons why the Western church, following Augustine, moved away from the postmortem hope that many in the early church had affirmed. Even today, many evangelicals treat the mere mention of postmortem salvation as tantamount to universalism.
But the slippery slope argument fails for a simple and decisive reason: the author's view includes a final deadline.
On the view I have defended throughout this book, God offers genuine, meaningful encounters with Himself to all the unsaved at three possible junctures: during the dying process, during the intermediate state (in Hades), and at or during the final judgment—the Great White Throne Judgment described in Revelation 20. This last encounter is the final and most decisive one. It is, I believe, the last opportunity for the unsaved to accept Christ. After the final judgment, the verdict is irrevocable. Those who persist in rejecting Christ, even after the fullest possible revelation of His love, will face the second death—destruction in the Lake of Fire (see Chapter 31 for the full integrated framework).
This is emphatically not universalism. Universalism claims that all people will eventually be saved—that God's grace will, in the end, overcome every resistance. My view claims that all people will be given a genuine opportunity to be saved, but that some may—and likely will—persist in rejecting God even after the fullest possible revelation of His love. The postmortem opportunity is real, but so is the possibility of final refusal. God offers; humans may decline. And after the judgment, the decline is permanent.
The Critical Distinction: Universalism says all will be saved. Postmortem opportunity says all will be given a genuine chance to be saved. These are not the same thing. Postmortem opportunity is compatible with the belief that some will reject God permanently—a belief that I hold and that I believe Scripture supports (see Chapter 30).
The fear of a slippery slope assumes that if you grant postmortem opportunity, there is no principled place to draw the line short of universalism. But this is simply not true. There are clear theological reasons to affirm both postmortem opportunity and a final, irrevocable judgment:
First, Scripture teaches both God's universal salvific will and the reality of final judgment. God "desires all people to be saved" (1 Timothy 2:4), but Jesus also speaks of a time when "the door is shut" (Luke 13:25) and when the separation of sheep and goats is final (Matthew 25:31–46). Postmortem opportunity affirms both of these truths. It affirms the universal salvific will by insisting that God genuinely pursues every lost person. And it affirms the finality of judgment by insisting that there comes a point—the Great White Throne—after which no further opportunity is given.
Second, free will provides a principled stopping point. God does not override human freedom. He pursues, He invites, He reveals, He loves—but He does not coerce. If a person, confronted with the full, unshielded presence of God's love at the final judgment, still chooses to reject Him, God will honor that choice. As I argued in Chapter 23, drawing on the Eastern Orthodox tradition and the divine presence model, the Lake of Fire is the experience of God's unfiltered presence by those who have made themselves incapable of receiving His love. For those who repent, the fire purifies. For those who refuse to repent, even after full knowledge of who God is and how much He loves them, the fire consumes. It is not God hatefully destroying them; it is the natural consequence of encountering infinite holiness while clinging to rebellion (see Chapters 23–23C).
Third, the idea that postmortem opportunity inevitably leads to universalism confuses opportunity with outcome. Giving someone a genuine opportunity to respond does not guarantee that they will respond positively. We know this from everyday experience. Millions of people in this life have heard the gospel clearly, have been loved by faithful Christians, have felt the drawing of the Holy Spirit—and have still walked away. If people can reject God in this life, why would we assume they cannot reject Him after death? The postmortem encounter may be more vivid, more personal, and more unmistakable than any earthly encounter—but it is still an encounter with a God who respects human freedom.
Beilby helpfully observes that there is a "definite correlation between postmortem repentance and Universalism"—in the sense that universalism requires postmortem repentance, since obviously not everyone is saved in this life.32 But correlation is not causation. The fact that universalism needs postmortem repentance does not mean that postmortem repentance leads to universalism. Postmortem opportunity is a necessary condition for universalism, but it is not a sufficient condition. One can affirm postmortem opportunity while also affirming that some will reject God finally—just as one can affirm the universal offer of grace in this life while also affirming that many reject it.
In fact, as I argue in Chapter 30, the postmortem opportunity thesis is compatible with all three major views of hell: eternal conscious torment, conditional immortality, and universal reconciliation. Each of these views can incorporate the belief that God offers salvation after death. The question of what happens to those who ultimately reject that offer is a separate question from whether the offer is made. And my answer to that separate question is clear: those who finally refuse God after the fullest possible encounter with His love will be destroyed. This is conditional immortality, not universalism.
Beyond the six major objections addressed above, there are several additional concerns that critics have raised. Let me address these more briefly.
This is one of the most persistent objections, and it is fueled by a simple but critical misunderstanding. As Beilby states emphatically: "Let me say unequivocally that if the theory of Postmortem Opportunity amounts to offering a second chance to those that have had a viable first chance, then it should end up on the scrap heap of theological theories."33 And I agree completely.
The key word is first. For the unevangelized, the pseudoevangelized, infants, and many others, the postmortem opportunity is not a second chance at all. It is a first chance—the first genuine, unobstructed, fully informed encounter with the living God. Donald Bloesch puts it well: postmortem opportunity affirms "the universality of a first chance, an opportunity for salvation for those who have never heard the gospel in its fullness."34
Now, as I have stated throughout this book, I believe the postmortem encounter extends to all the unsaved, not just the unevangelized. Does this mean I am offering a "second chance" to those who heard and rejected the gospel in this life? Not exactly. Even those who heard the gospel in this life may not have truly understood it—their exposure may have been distorted by abusive churches, hypocritical Christians, cultural barriers, or their own woundedness. The postmortem encounter is God's way of ensuring that every person gets a genuine encounter with the real Jesus—not a caricature, not a distortion, not a cultural imposition, but the living Christ Himself. Whether we call this a "first chance" or a "clarified chance" or a "definitive chance," it is not the cheap, flippant "second chance" that critics fear.
I find it helpful to think about it in terms of the distinction between hearing about God and encountering God. A person can hear about God in Sunday school, read about God in a book, or listen to a sermon about God—and still never have a genuine, personal, life-transforming encounter with the living Christ. Many people who grew up in Christian homes and attended church regularly would tell you that they "knew about" God for years before they truly "knew" Him. The postmortem opportunity I am describing is not a second chance to hear about God. It is, for many, the first real chance to encounter Him—to stand face to face with the One who made them, who loves them, who died for them. This is qualitatively different from anything they experienced in this life.
The early church father Cyprian's objection to postmortem repentance is instructive here. As Beilby notes, Cyprian argued that those who had lapsed during the Decian persecution (250–251) should be restored before they die, because "there is no confession among the dead." But Cyprian's concern was not about the unevangelized at all. He was worried about Christians who had already professed faith and then denied it under pressure—a very different situation from that of someone who never heard the gospel in the first place.42 Many of the early church objections to "postmortem repentance" were actually objections to the idea of a second chance for apostates, not objections to the idea that the unevangelized might receive their first genuine encounter with Christ after death. We need to be careful not to conflate these two very different concerns.
Jonathan Kvanvig raises an interesting logical point about second chances: "If a second chance is deserved, then it is hard to see why the same considerations would not justify a third chance if the second chance were passed on, thereby launching an infinite sequence of delays of consignment to hell."35 This is actually an argument for the view I am defending. The concept of sequential "chances" does not quite capture what is happening in the postmortem encounter. It is not a series of test retakes. It is a comprehensive, relational encounter with God that may unfold over an extended period of divine time—during the dying process, in the intermediate state, and at the final judgment—but that culminates in a definitive, irrevocable moment of decision at the Great White Throne.
Some critics appeal to passages like Matthew 7:13–14 ("small is the gate and narrow the road that leads to life, and only a few find it," ESV) and Matthew 22:14 ("many are called, but few are chosen," ESV) to argue that postmortem opportunity would result in too many people being saved, contradicting Jesus' teaching that the saved are few.
This objection rests on a faulty assumption. As Beilby notes, "the assumption that if people are given a Postmortem Opportunity to hear and respond to the gospel, then many of those people will be saved" is not necessarily true.36 Postmortem opportunity does not guarantee a positive response. If people can reject God in this life—after hearing the gospel, experiencing His love through the community of believers, and feeling the conviction of the Holy Spirit—then they can certainly reject Him in a postmortem encounter as well. The postmortem opportunity is a genuine offer, not an irresistible force.
Moreover, these "few will be saved" passages are notoriously difficult to interpret and are addressed in various ways by scholars. Many understand them as warnings about the difficulty of discipleship and the danger of complacency, not as statistical predictions about the final number of the saved. Jesus may be saying that the path of following Him in this life is demanding and few choose it—not that the ultimate number of the redeemed will be small. Others point out that Jesus was speaking to a specific audience in a specific historical context, warning them about the cost of following Him in the face of Roman oppression and Jewish religious establishment. In any case, these passages say nothing about postmortem opportunity one way or the other. They do not address the question of what happens to those who never had the chance to walk through either the narrow or the wide gate.
Some opponents concede that Scripture does not rule out postmortem opportunity, but argue that since Scripture does not explicitly teach it, we should not affirm it. This is a more modest objection than the others, and it deserves a thoughtful response.
First, I would point out that there is more scriptural support for postmortem opportunity than many realize. The passages about Christ's descent to the dead and His preaching to spirits in prison (1 Peter 3:18–4:6; Ephesians 4:8–10; see Chapters 11–13) provide at least indirect—and arguably direct—biblical evidence for the claim that God's salvific work extends beyond the grave.
Second, as Beilby observes, "the best way to think about the necessity of theology being based on Scripture is that specific theological beliefs cannot contradict what Scripture clearly teaches and should be based on reasonable inferences from what Scripture does teach."37 Postmortem opportunity does not contradict any clear teaching of Scripture. And it is a reasonable inference from what Scripture does clearly teach: that God loves all people (John 3:16), that He desires all to be saved (1 Timothy 2:4; 2 Peter 3:9), that Christ died for all (2 Corinthians 5:14–15; 1 John 2:2), that He holds the keys of death and Hades (Revelation 1:18), and that He is Lord of both the living and the dead (Romans 14:9). If all of these things are true, then postmortem opportunity is not a speculative novelty but a natural and compelling conclusion.
Third, many doctrines that are universally affirmed in the church are not "explicitly taught" in a single proof text. The doctrine of the Trinity, for instance, is nowhere stated in a single verse of Scripture. It is a theological conclusion drawn from the totality of biblical evidence. The same is true for many other doctrines—the hypostatic union, the communicatio idiomatum, the doctrine of progressive revelation. If we required every doctrine to be stated in a single, unambiguous proof text, we would lose much of the theological richness of the Christian tradition. Postmortem opportunity is a systematic theological conclusion drawn from the biblical evidence about God's character, Christ's work, and the scope of redemption.
I would also note that several doctrines that are widely held by those who oppose postmortem opportunity are themselves not "explicitly taught" in Scripture. The doctrine that death permanently and irrevocably seals one's eternal destiny, for instance, is an inference—not a direct quotation from any Bible verse. The idea that general revelation is "sufficient to condemn but insufficient to save" is a theological conclusion, not a biblical proof text. The concept of an "age of accountability" for children—a doctrine that provides great comfort to grieving parents—is nowhere stated in Scripture. If opponents of postmortem opportunity are willing to accept these inferred doctrines, they should not dismiss postmortem opportunity merely because it, too, is inferred rather than explicitly stated.
Some critics worry that the concept of the "pseudoevangelized" is too vague. If someone heard a distorted gospel, does that count as having been evangelized? What if they heard a mostly accurate gospel but were put off by the hypocrisy of the messenger? What if they attended church faithfully for years but were spiritually abused by a pastor? What if they grew up in a nominally Christian culture where the gospel was reduced to a set of moral rules with no mention of grace? Where exactly is the line between "genuinely evangelized" and "pseudoevangelized"?
This is a legitimate question, but I do not think it undermines the case for postmortem opportunity. In fact, I think it strengthens it. The very difficulty of drawing this line is one of the strongest arguments for believing that God will sort it out Himself. We cannot peer into another person's heart and determine whether they had a "genuine" opportunity to respond to the gospel. We cannot weigh the extent to which their exposure to Christianity was distorted by abuse, cultural imperialism, bad theology, or personal trauma. But God can. And I believe He does—not by consigning billions of ambiguous cases to eternal destruction, but by giving each person a personal, face-to-face encounter with the real Jesus, unclouded by the failures of His human representatives.
This is one of the things I find most beautiful about the postmortem opportunity thesis. It does not ask us to play God by determining who had a "good enough" chance. It trusts God to give every person the chance they need—a genuine, personal, unmistakable encounter with His love.
A closely related objection to the presumption concern is the worry that affirming postmortem opportunity devalues this earthly life. If the decisive moment of salvation can come after death, does anything we do in this life really matter?
Absolutely it does. Let me count the ways.
First, the decisions we make in this life shape our character, and character determines how we will respond when we encounter God. A lifetime of responding to God's promptings, of loving our neighbors, of growing in faithfulness—all of this builds a character that will respond joyfully to the postmortem encounter. A lifetime of selfishness, hatred, and rebellion builds a character that may find God's love unbearable. This life is not irrelevant; it is formative.
Second, as N.T. Wright has eloquently argued, what we do in this life has eternal significance because it participates in God's ongoing work of renewing all things. Our acts of love, justice, creativity, and mercy are not just passing distractions from the "real" business of getting souls into heaven. They are, as Wright says, "part of what we may call building for God's kingdom."38 And this is true whether or not anyone receives a postmortem opportunity.
Third, the experience of knowing Christ in this life is itself an immeasurable good—not merely a means to the end of escaping hell. To know God, to walk with Him, to experience His love and presence and guidance in the midst of everyday life—this is precious beyond description. It is not something to be postponed or devalued. The person who accepts Christ in this life and walks with Him for decades has something that the person who comes to faith only at the final judgment does not have: a lifetime of relationship with God. This is reason enough to share the gospel now, to respond to the gospel now, and to encourage others to do the same. As Paul wrote, "For to me, to live is Christ" (Philippians 1:21, ESV)—not "to me, to live is to wait for the afterlife." The Christian life is not merely a holding pattern until we reach our eternal destination. It is a rich, meaningful, transformative journey with the living God that begins the moment we say yes to Him.
Fourth, the Great Commission itself is not merely about securing people's eternal destiny. It is about making disciples—teaching people to follow Christ, to live in His love, to embody His kingdom here and now. Even if every person who died unevangelized were guaranteed a postmortem encounter with Christ (which is what I believe), the task of discipleship would remain urgent and essential. The world needs Christians who are salt and light (Matthew 5:13–16), who feed the hungry and clothe the naked (Matthew 25:35–36), who work for justice and reconciliation (Micah 6:8). These tasks cannot wait for the afterlife. They must be done now, in this world, by people who have been transformed by the love of Christ.
Fifth, Beilby makes the important point that even if our evangelistic efforts are imperfect, they matter because God has commanded them. We do missions because God has asked us to. Our obedience is not contingent on our assessment of whether God could do a better job without us. He could. But He has invited us to participate in His work, and that invitation is itself a gift.39 Gabriel Fackre, himself an advocate of posthumous salvation, captures this beautifully when he insists that eschatological evangelization does not "cut the nerve of mission." The answer, Fackre says, is "a resounding 'No!'"40 The knowledge that God will pursue the lost even beyond death does not diminish our calling to pursue them now. It amplifies it, because it tells us that we serve a God whose love is so vast and so persistent that nothing—not even death—can stop it.
We have now walked through the major theological objections to the doctrine of postmortem opportunity—and I hope you have seen that none of them is as devastating as it might first appear.
Let me briefly summarize what we have found. The claim that repentance after death is impossible depends on a particular philosophical view of the soul that is neither biblically required nor universally held. Substance dualists have strong reasons to reject it, and even hylomorphists must reckon with the fact of bodily resurrection at the final judgment. The claim that this life is sufficient for God's salvific purposes ignores the billions who never had a genuine opportunity to hear the gospel—infants, the unevangelized, the pseudoevangelized, and countless others. The claim that postmortem opportunity implies God's plan failed rests on a misunderstanding of what postmortem opportunity claims—it is part of God's comprehensive plan, not a correction of it. The claim that it leads to presumption is the same objection Paul faced regarding grace in Romans 6, and the same answer applies: the proper response to grace is gratitude and holiness, not licentiousness. The claim that it opens the door to sin in heaven conflates the pre-judgment state of openness with the post-glorification state of perfection—two fundamentally different conditions. And the claim that it leads inevitably to universalism ignores the clear distinction between offering an opportunity and guaranteeing an outcome, and it ignores the decisive endpoint provided by the Great White Throne Judgment.
We also addressed several additional concerns: the "second chance" objection (which dissolves once we recognize that for the unevangelized, it is a first chance, not a second); the "only a few will be saved" passages (which do not speak to the question of postmortem opportunity); the objection that the doctrine is not explicitly taught in Scripture (which applies equally to many other widely held doctrines); the difficulty of defining the "pseudoevangelized" (which actually strengthens the case for letting God sort it out); and the worry that postmortem opportunity devalues this life (which we showed is unfounded—this life remains deeply significant for character formation, discipleship, and the building of God's kingdom).
At the end of the day, every one of these objections shares a common thread: they assume that the boundaries of God's redemptive work must be drawn more narrowly than what God's own character, as revealed in Scripture, seems to require. They assume that death is a wall God cannot or will not cross. They assume that the God who "desires all people to be saved" will nevertheless withhold the opportunity for salvation from billions. They assume that the God who is "not wanting anyone to perish, but everyone to come to repentance" (2 Peter 3:9, ESV) will stop pursuing the lost at the moment they need Him most.
I do not find these assumptions convincing. I find them deeply at odds with the God revealed in Jesus Christ—the God who leaves the ninety-nine to find the one, who searches the house until the lost coin is found, who runs to embrace the returning prodigal (Luke 15). I believe that the God who pursues us with such relentless love in this life does not suddenly stop at the grave. His love is stronger than death (Song of Solomon 8:6). His mercy endures forever (Psalm 136). And His purposes for His creation will not be thwarted by the limitations of human life.
As Robin Parry has asked with transparent honesty, "What if I am wrong?" about his own theological conclusions.45 That is a question every theologian should ask. So let me pose it to myself. What if I am wrong about postmortem opportunity? What damage would my error cause? Would it lead people to dishonor God? I do not think so. The worst that could be said is that I have attributed to God more love, more mercy, and more persistence than He actually shows. And while I do not believe I am wrong, I confess I would rather err on the side of a God who is more loving than I imagined than on the side of a God who is less. As Jonathan puts it in his own concluding reflections, belief in posthumous salvation "is not only no threat to orthodoxy, but it is contested that it provides a more compelling understanding of the nature of God's attributes, in that his love and his justice are complementary, rather than conflicting."46
None of this is to say that the objections we have examined are trivial. They are not. They represent genuine concerns from thoughtful Christians who care about faithfulness to Scripture and the integrity of the gospel. I have tried to take each one seriously and respond to it with both rigor and respect. But I am persuaded—after careful study of Scripture, theology, philosophy, and church history—that the doctrine of postmortem opportunity can withstand every objection that has been raised against it. It is not only defensible. It is, I believe, the most faithful and compelling account of how a perfectly loving, perfectly just, and perfectly sovereign God deals with the billions of human beings who die without ever knowing Him.
In the next chapter, we will turn to the relationship between inclusivism and postmortem opportunity, and we will see how these two "wider hope" positions can be combined into a single, comprehensive framework that does justice to both the breadth of God's love and the necessity of a personal encounter with Jesus Christ (see Chapter 28).
1 James K. Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity: A Biblical and Theological Assessment of Salvation After Death (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2021), 234. ↩
2 Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 234. ↩
3 Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: United States Catholic Conference, 2000), §1021. The Catechism states: "Death puts an end to human life as the time open to either accepting or rejecting the divine grace manifested in Christ." ↩
4 Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 235. ↩
5 See the detailed survey in Chapters 24–25 of this volume. See also David Burnfield, Patristic Universalism: An Alternative to the Traditional View of Divine Judgment, 2nd ed. (2016), chap. 9, "Universalism Is a Recent Theological Concept." ↩
6 Burnfield, Patristic Universalism, chap. 9, "Historical Support of the Early Church." George T. Knight is cited by Burnfield as noting that of the six known theological schools in the first five centuries, four taught universalism, one taught conditional immortality, and one taught eternal torment. ↩
7 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, IV.90, as cited in Jerry L. Walls, Hell: The Logic of Damnation (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 88–89. See also Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 236. ↩
8 Jerry L. Walls, Hell: The Logic of Damnation (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 89, as cited in Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 236. ↩
9 Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 236. ↩
10 Ladislaus Boros, The Mystery of Death (New York: Herder & Herder, 1965), chap. 2, "The Moment of Death as the Point of Full Personal Self-Realization." See Chapter 10 of this volume for a full treatment. ↩
11 Karl Rahner, On the Theology of Death (New York: Herder & Herder, 1961), especially his discussion of the soul's "pancosmic" relationship to materiality in death. See also Boros, Mystery of Death, chap. 3, "The Philosophical Analysis of Death." ↩
12 Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 237. Beilby's discussion of hypertime is explicitly speculative, but he presents it as a way of accommodating those who believe postmortem repentance in the afterlife proper is impossible while still affirming a postmortem opportunity at the moment of death. ↩
13 Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 235. ↩
14 Beilby estimates that there have been "tens of billions of people (and maybe a lot more) who have never heard the gospel of Jesus Christ." See Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 5. ↩
15 Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 4. ↩
16 Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 8–10. "Kunta Kinte" is Beilby's case study of a person whose exposure to "Christianity" was through those who enslaved, tortured, and brutalized him. ↩
17 Stephen Jonathan, Grace beyond the Grave: Is Salvation Possible in the Afterlife? A Biblical, Theological, and Pastoral Evaluation (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2014), Foreword by Nigel G. Wright. ↩
18 Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 97. ↩
19 Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 230. ↩
20 Jerry L. Walls, Hell: The Logic of Damnation (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), as cited in Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 222–23. ↩
21 Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 222. Beilby notes that someone who is aware of the postmortem opportunity would, by definition, also be aware of the gospel and thus not be a candidate for a postmortem opportunity (on his version of the theory). ↩
22 Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 223. ↩
23 Augustine, City of God, 21.17. As Beilby notes, Augustine objected to Origen's postmortem hope by arguing that it deprived the saints of any "fearless assurance of eternal blessedness." See Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 238. ↩
24 Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 238. ↩
25 Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 238–39. ↩
26 Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 239. ↩
27 Timothy Pawl and Kevin Timpe, "Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven," Faith and Philosophy 26, no. 4 (October 2009): 398–419, as cited in Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 239. ↩
28 Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 240. Beilby argues that it is "judgment and the apprehension of God's fundamental nature—what is often called the 'beatific vision'" that solidifies character, not death itself. ↩
29 R. Zachary Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God: An Essay on the Problem of Hell (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 348–49. Manis draws on 2 Corinthians 3:14–16 and the image of the "veil" on the heart. ↩
30 Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, 292. Manis writes that the love of God "is formed in oneself, transforming one's spiritual condition, gradually, through a lifelong (and perhaps also postmortem) process of sanctification." ↩
31 Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 199. ↩
32 Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 199. ↩
33 Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 218. ↩
34 Donald Bloesch, "Fate of the Unbelieving Dead," in Essentials of Evangelical Theology, vol. 2 (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979), 226–28, as cited in Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 219. ↩
35 Jonathan L. Kvanvig, The Problem of Hell (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 90, as cited in Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 218. ↩
36 Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 125–26. ↩
37 Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 167. ↩
38 N.T. Wright, Surprised by Hope: Rethinking Heaven, the Resurrection, and the Mission of the Church (New York: HarperOne, 2008), 193, as cited in Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 226–27. ↩
39 Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 228. See also Chapter 26 of this volume for a full discussion of the evangelism objection. ↩
40 Jonathan, Grace beyond the Grave, chap. 5, "Missiological and Pastoral Evaluation." Jonathan notes that Gabriel Fackre, himself an advocate of posthumous salvation, insists that eschatological evangelization does not "cut the nerve of mission." ↩
41 Burnfield, Patristic Universalism, chap. 8, "Answering Objections," under "Objection 5: Minimizes Sin and God's Holiness." ↩
42 Beilby, Postmortem Opportunity, 197–98. Beilby notes that many early church objections to postmortem repentance were actually objections to the notion of a "second chance" for those who had already been evangelized, not objections to the idea that the unevangelized might receive their first chance after death. ↩
43 Clark H. Pinnock, A Wideness in God's Mercy: The Finality of Jesus Christ in a World of Religions (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992), 168–72. Pinnock argues that a person like Hitler would likely continue to resist God at the Judgment. ↩
44 Thomas Talbott, The Inescapable Love of God, 2nd ed. (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2014), chap. 12, "Some Modest Proposals." While Talbott argues that God's grace will ultimately prove irresistible, the postmortem opportunity thesis I defend does not require this stronger claim. ↩
45 Robin Parry [as Gregory MacDonald], The Evangelical Universalist, 2nd ed. (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2012), chap. 1, "Introduction." Parry's honest question—"What if I am wrong?"—is a model of theological humility that both universalists and non-universalists would do well to emulate. ↩
46 Jonathan, Grace beyond the Grave, chap. 6, "Conclusion." ↩
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