The debate between conditional immortality and biblical universalism draws on a rich vocabulary of biblical, theological, and philosophical terms. Many of these terms carry centuries of meaning, and some have been used in dramatically different ways by different traditions. This glossary provides clear, accessible definitions of the most important terms used throughout The Better Hope. Where a term is discussed at length in a particular chapter, the reader is directed to that chapter for a fuller treatment.
How to Use This Glossary: Terms are arranged alphabetically. Greek, Hebrew, and Latin terms are transliterated and, where helpful, the original script is provided in parentheses. Cross-references to chapters in the main text are included so the reader can explore each concept more deeply.
These are among the most important and contested words in the entire debate. The Greek noun aiōn means “age” or “eon”—a period of time, often of indefinite but not necessarily infinite duration. The adjective aiōnios, derived from aiōn, fundamentally means “pertaining to an age” or “age-long.” In the Septuagint (the Greek OT), aiōnios is used to describe things that clearly had or will have an end: the “everlasting” hills (Hab. 3:6), Jonah’s time in the fish “forever” (Jonah 2:6), and the Levitical priesthood. The Hebrew olam (עוֹלָם) carries a similar semantic range: it denotes a long or hidden duration whose endpoint is determined by context, not by the word itself. The CI position reads aiōnios when applied to punishment as meaning “permanent” or “irreversible”—the result of destruction is everlasting. The UR position argues that aiōnios describes the quality of the age to come and that its duration, when applied to punishment, is age-long but not necessarily unending. The meaning of this word is explored in detail in Chapter 6.
The belief that the unsaved will ultimately cease to exist—that God will destroy them completely and permanently so that they are no longer conscious or extant. Annihilationism is closely related to conditional immortality (see below) and is sometimes used interchangeably with it, though some scholars distinguish them: annihilationism emphasizes the act of destruction, while conditional immortality emphasizes that immortality is not inherent to the human soul but is a gift granted only to the redeemed. In either case, the final destiny of the wicked is nonexistence. This view was held in the early church by Arnobius of Sicca and has been defended in modern times by Edward Fudge, John Stott, Clark Pinnock, and others. See Chapters 1, 2, and 25.
The Greek verb most often translated “destroy” or “perish” in the New Testament. It is one of the most important words in the CI/UR debate because the CI case depends heavily on reading it as “annihilate” or “cause to cease to exist.” However, apollymi has a wide semantic range. In Luke 15, the lost sheep, lost coin, and lost son are all described with forms of apollymi—and in every case, what is “lost” is found and restored, not destroyed. In John 3:16, the word can be read as “lost” rather than “annihilated.” The UR case argues that the pattern of apollymi usage, combined with the OT judgment-then-restoration pattern, supports reading destruction language as describing ruin and loss that is reversible through God’s restorative action, not permanent obliteration. See Chapter 8.
Greek for “restoration of all things.” The term comes from Acts 3:21, where Peter speaks of “the time of universal restoration that God announced long ago through his holy prophets.” In early Christian theology, apokatastasis became the technical term for the doctrine that all rational creatures will ultimately be restored to right relationship with God through Christ. The doctrine was taught by Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory of Nazianzus, Maximus the Confessor, and others. The apokatastasis tradition insists that God’s redemptive purposes will not be permanently frustrated—that every prodigal will come home. Ilaria Ramelli’s landmark study, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis, traces this tradition in exhaustive detail. See Chapters 24 and 25.
A model of the atonement, classically articulated by Gustaf Aulén, which presents Christ’s death and resurrection as a cosmic victory over the powers of sin, death, and the devil. Rather than focusing primarily on the payment of a legal penalty (as in penal substitution), the Christus Victor model emphasizes that Christ has defeated the hostile forces that held humanity captive. The relevance to the CI/UR debate is significant: if Christ has genuinely triumphed over death and the powers of evil (Col. 2:15), how can death and the powers claim permanent victims? The UR position argues that a truly victorious Christ will ultimately liberate every captive. See Chapters 7 and 19.
The theological position that human beings are not inherently immortal. Immortality is a gift from God, bestowed only on those who are saved through faith in Christ. Those who reject God’s offer of salvation will, after judgment, cease to exist entirely. The soul’s continued existence after death depends on God’s sustaining will, and God will ultimately withdraw that sustaining power from the finally impenitent, resulting in their complete annihilation. This position is distinguished from eternal conscious torment (ECT) in that the unsaved do not suffer forever; they are destroyed. Major modern defenders include Edward Fudge (The Fire That Consumes), John Stott, Clark Pinnock, Chris Date (Rethinking Hell), and Glenn Peoples. In this book, the CI reader is the intended audience—someone who has already rejected ECT and takes Scripture seriously. See Chapter 1 for the shared ground and Chapter 2 for how CI differs from UR.
The view—shared by both CI and UR in this book—that the soul is conscious between physical death and the final resurrection. Believers go to paradise/heaven to be consciously with Christ (Luke 23:43; Phil. 1:21–23; 2 Cor. 5:1–8). Unbelievers go to Hades, a conscious waiting area that is NOT the Lake of Fire and NOT final punishment (Luke 16:19–31). This view is contrasted with soul sleep (the idea that the dead are unconscious until the resurrection). A conscious intermediate state is essential for both the CI and UR positions in this book, because both affirm that God provides a postmortem opportunity—which requires a conscious person to encounter God between death and resurrection. See Chapters 1 and 4.
Latin for “the descent into hell” (or more properly, “the descent to the underworld”). This phrase refers to the early Christian belief, enshrined in the Apostles’ Creed (“He descended into hell”), that between His death and resurrection, Christ descended to the realm of the dead. The primary biblical texts are 1 Peter 3:18–20 and 4:6, along with Ephesians 4:8–10 and Acts 2:24–31. On the postmortem opportunity reading, Christ’s descent was a salvific mission: He went to preach the gospel to the dead, offering them the opportunity to respond in faith. The CI advocate sees this as a genuine offer that some may still reject; the UR advocate sees it as the mechanism by which God’s saving purposes reach every person who ever lived. See Chapters 22 and 29.
A model of hell drawn from the Eastern Orthodox theological tradition, particularly the writings of Isaac of Nineveh and Alexandre Kalomiros. On this view, hell is not a place away from God but the experience of being in God’s full, unmediated presence while one’s heart is turned against Him. God’s love is like fire: for those who love God, it is experienced as warmth, light, and joy. For those who hate God, this same love is experienced as burning agony—not because God is creating special punishing fire, but because His very love is unbearable to those who have set themselves against everything He is. This is the view of hell shared by both CI and UR advocates in this book. Revelation 14:10–11 explicitly places the torment “in the presence of the Lamb,” supporting this model. The CI advocate holds that some will be consumed by this fire; the UR advocate holds that the fire will ultimately purify everyone it touches. See Chapters 1, 5, and 23.
The traditional Western view that the unsaved will suffer conscious torment in hell forever, without end or relief. ECT has been the dominant view in Latin/Western Christianity since at least Augustine (fifth century) and was affirmed by most of the major Protestant Reformers. Both the CI and UR positions in this book reject ECT—the CI reader has already moved past this view, and this book does not spend significant time arguing against it. ECT is mentioned only where directly relevant to the topic at hand. See Chapter 1.
The Greek term used by Jesus in His warnings about final punishment, derived from the Hebrew ge-hinnom (“Valley of Hinnom”)—a valley south of Jerusalem associated with the burning of refuse and, historically, with the horrifying practice of child sacrifice (2 Kings 23:10; Jer. 7:31). By Jesus’ time, Gehenna had become a metaphor for divine judgment. The CI advocate reads Jesus’ Gehenna warnings as describing the place where the wicked will be permanently destroyed. The UR advocate reads them as corrective warnings—prophetic “alarm bells” designed to provoke repentance, comparable to Jonah’s warning to Nineveh. The UR position does not deny that Gehenna is real and terrifying; it asks whether Gehenna is God’s last word. Gehenna is distinct from Hades (the intermediate state), Tartarus (the prison of fallen angels), and the Lake of Fire (the eschatological reality described in Revelation). See Chapter 12.
The Greek term for the realm of the dead in the New Testament, roughly equivalent to the Hebrew Sheol. In the NT, Hades is the intermediate state between death and the final resurrection—a holding place, not a place of final punishment. In the parable of the rich man and Lazarus (Luke 16:19–31), the rich man is conscious and tormented in Hades, but this is explicitly the intermediate state, not the final judgment. Crucially, Revelation 20:13–14 says that “death and Hades gave up the dead that were in them” and that “death and Hades were thrown into the lake of fire.” Hades is thus temporary; it will itself be destroyed. This has enormous implications for the debate: the rich man’s “great chasm” (Luke 16:26) is in Hades, which itself comes to an end. Hades is distinct from Gehenna, the Lake of Fire, and Tartarus. See Chapters 1, 13, and 23.
Latin for “the image of God.” The foundational biblical teaching, rooted in Genesis 1:26–27, that every human being is created in God’s image. In the UR argument, the imago Dei plays a critical role: if every person bears the image of God, however defaced by sin, that image is never completely eradicated. Genesis 9:6 grounds the prohibition against murder in the imago Dei even after the Fall; James 3:9 affirms that human beings are “made in God’s likeness.” The UR position argues that the divine image in every person means there is always something worth saving—the fire of God’s presence will always find gold to refine, never a person so corrupted that nothing remains. The CI objection (“What if there is nothing left to save?”) is met by the insistence that the imago Dei cannot be destroyed by sin. See Chapters 5 and 27.
Two Greek words for “punishment,” distinguished carefully by Aristotle and by several early church fathers. Kolasis (kolasin aiōnion, “eternal punishment,” in Matt. 25:46) is corrective punishment—punishment inflicted for the benefit of the one being punished. Timoria, by contrast, is retributive punishment—punishment inflicted to satisfy the demands of justice or the anger of the punisher. Aristotle made this distinction explicit in his Rhetoric (1.10.17): kolasis is for the sake of the sufferer; timoria is for the sake of the one inflicting it. The UR case argues that Jesus’ choice of kolasis rather than timoria in the climactic judgment passage (Matt. 25:46) is profoundly significant: if Jesus intended merely retributive punishment, the word timoria was available. He chose the word that denotes correction. Ilaria Ramelli has traced the patristic awareness of this distinction in extensive detail. See Chapter 14.
An image found exclusively in the book of Revelation (19:20; 20:10, 14–15; 21:8), describing the final eschatological reality into which the beast, the false prophet, the devil, death, Hades, and those not found in the book of life are cast. Revelation 20:14 explicitly identifies the Lake of Fire with the second death: “This is the second death, the lake of fire.” The CI position reads the Lake of Fire as the place of permanent destruction—the wicked are consumed and cease to exist. The UR position reads it as the final, most intense experience of God’s purifying presence. Strikingly, immediately after describing the Lake of Fire, Revelation introduces the New Jerusalem with gates that are never shut (21:25) and a tree whose leaves are for the healing of the nations (22:2)—inviting the question of whether the Lake of Fire is God’s final word. The Lake of Fire is distinct from Hades, Gehenna, and Tartarus. See Chapter 23.
A Greek noun meaning “ruin” or “destruction.” It appears in 2 Thessalonians 1:9 in the phrase olethros aiōnios, translated “everlasting destruction.” The CI position reads this as permanent annihilation. The UR position notes that olethros does not necessarily mean cessation of existence; it can mean devastation, ruin, or the loss of well-being. In 1 Corinthians 5:5, Paul uses olethros with an explicitly salvific purpose: handing a man over “for the destruction (olethros) of the flesh, so that his spirit may be saved.” The word’s use in a context where destruction SERVES salvation undermines the assumption that olethros always means final annihilation. See Chapters 6 and 8.
The view that a human being is entirely physical—that there is no separate, immaterial soul or spirit. On this view, when the body dies, the person ceases to exist entirely until God raises them at the resurrection. In recent decades, a growing number of CI scholars have adopted physicalism or non-reductive physicalism, arguing that the Bible teaches a holistic view of the person rather than a body-soul dualism. Proponents include Joel Green and Nancey Murphy. Both the CI and UR positions in this book reject physicalism: both affirm substance dualism and a conscious intermediate state. The author argues that physicalism undermines the postmortem opportunity that both positions affirm, since if there is no conscious soul between death and resurrection, there is no person to encounter God. Chapter 4 presents the comprehensive biblical and philosophical critique of physicalism.
The belief that those who die without a genuine opportunity to hear and respond to the gospel will receive that opportunity after death. This is a shared assumption between CI and UR in this book. The primary biblical support comes from 1 Peter 3:18–20 and 4:6, which describe Christ preaching to the dead; the descensus ad inferos clause of the Apostles’ Creed; and the theological logic that a just and loving God would not condemn those who never had an adequate opportunity to respond. The CI advocate holds that this postmortem encounter is genuine but that some will still reject God and be destroyed. The UR advocate holds that God’s love is so overwhelming and His patience so unrelenting that every person will ultimately be brought to willing faith—whether in this life or beyond it. James Beilby’s Postmortem Opportunity is the most rigorous modern defense of this position. See Chapters 1, 22, and 29.
The view that divine punishment is always purposeful—aimed at the correction and ultimate restoration of the one being punished, not merely at retribution or the satisfaction of abstract justice. The UR case builds heavily on this concept: if God disciplines those He loves “as sons” (Heb. 12:5–11), and if that discipline yields “the peaceful fruit of righteousness,” then the trajectory of divine punishment is always toward restoration, never toward annihilation. The analogy of a father disciplining a child is central: a father who destroys his child has not disciplined; he has failed. Similarly, a refiner who destroys the gold has failed as a refiner (Mal. 3:2–3). The CI advocate may acknowledge that some punishment is remedial but insists that for the finally impenitent, destruction is the just and merciful outcome. See Chapters 5, 21, and 22.
The central metaphor of a landmark essay by the Greek Orthodox theologian Alexandre Kalomiros, “The River of Fire” (1980). Drawing on the patristic tradition—especially Isaac of Nineveh (Isaac the Syrian), Basil the Great, and Maximus the Confessor—Kalomiros argues that the “river of fire” flowing from the throne of God (Daniel 7:10) is not a tool of retributive punishment but is God’s love itself. The same river is experienced by the saints as light, warmth, and life, and by the unrepentant as burning torment. Hell, on this view, is not a place away from God but the experience of being in God’s full presence while one’s heart is turned against Him. Kalomiros argues that the Western theological tradition distorted God’s nature by making Him the active cause of punishment, when the patristic fathers taught that God is unchanging love and that torment arises from the creature’s own resistance. This tradition is foundational to the shared CI/UR view of hell in this book. See Chapter 5.
A term found exclusively in the book of Revelation (2:11; 20:6, 14; 21:8) that describes the final fate of the wicked. Revelation 20:14 explicitly identifies the second death with the Lake of Fire: “Then Death and Hades were thrown into the lake of fire. This is the second death, the lake of fire.” The CI position reads the second death as the permanent cessation of existence—final, real death from which there is no return. The UR position asks a pointed question: if the “last enemy” to be destroyed is death itself (1 Cor. 15:26), and if death is truly and completely destroyed, can the second death claim permanent victims? If death is genuinely abolished, the second death is overcome. The debate over whether the second death is God’s final word or an intermediate reality that is itself swallowed up in victory is at the heart of the CI/UR disagreement. See Chapter 23.
The Hebrew term for the realm of the dead in the Old Testament. Sheol is depicted as a shadowy, underground abode where the dead go after physical death—both the righteous and the wicked. In early OT texts, Sheol is described in somewhat vague terms: a place of silence, darkness, and diminished existence (Ps. 88:10–12; Eccl. 9:10). Over time, a more developed understanding emerged, with hints that God’s power extends even into Sheol (Ps. 139:8), that God can redeem from Sheol (Ps. 49:15; Hos. 13:14), and that the dead will one day be raised (Isa. 26:19; Dan. 12:2). Sheol is roughly equivalent to the Greek Hades in the New Testament. It is distinct from Gehenna, Tartarus, and the Lake of Fire. See Chapter 9.
The view that the soul, after death, enters a state of unconscious “sleep” until the resurrection. On this view, there is no conscious intermediate state; the dead are unaware of the passage of time and simply “wake up” at the resurrection. Proponents appeal to biblical passages that describe death as “sleep” (Dan. 12:2; John 11:11; 1 Thess. 4:13–14). Both CI and UR in this book reject soul sleep, arguing that “sleep” in these passages is a metaphor for the appearance of the body in death, not a description of the soul’s condition. The same biblical authors who use sleep language also clearly affirm conscious existence after death (e.g., Paul in Phil. 1:21–23 and 2 Cor. 5:1–8; the souls under the altar in Rev. 6:9–11). A conscious intermediate state is essential for the postmortem opportunity thesis. See Chapter 4.
The philosophical and theological view that a human being is composed of two distinct kinds of substance: a material body and an immaterial soul (or spirit). These two substances are intimately united during earthly life but can exist apart—specifically, the soul can survive the death of the body and continue to function as a conscious, thinking, willing entity. This is NOT Platonic dualism, which teaches that the soul is inherently immortal. In the Christian version, the soul is created by God and depends entirely on God’s will for its continued existence. Jesus affirmed this: “Fear him who can destroy both soul and body in Gehenna” (Matt. 10:28). Substance dualism has been defended by J. P. Moreland, Richard Swinburne, John Cooper, and others. This book argues that substance dualism is both biblically grounded and theologically essential: if there is no immaterial soul that survives death, there is no conscious person to encounter God between death and resurrection—and the postmortem opportunity that both CI and UR affirm collapses. See Chapter 4.
An argument used in the debate over Matthew 25:46, which places “eternal punishment” (kolasin aiōnion) in parallel with “eternal life” (zōēn aiōnion). The argument holds that if aiōnios means “everlasting” when applied to life, it must mean the same when applied to punishment. Therefore, if eternal life lasts forever, eternal punishment must also last forever. The CI reader has already broken this symmetry: the CI position holds that “eternal punishment” does NOT mean conscious suffering for eternity but rather a permanent act of destruction with permanent results. The UR advocate points out that if the CI reader can break the symmetry (and they do), then the UR interpretation—that aiōnios kolasin means “age-long correction”—is at least as legitimate. Eternal life is grounded in God’s nature and promise, not in the word aiōnios alone. See Chapter 6 and especially Chapter 14.
A famous logical argument formulated by the philosopher Thomas Talbott in The Inescapable Love of God. The trilemma presents three propositions, any two of which imply the falsity of the third: (1) God wills the salvation of all human beings. (2) God accomplishes all that He wills. (3) Some human beings are not saved. Traditional Calvinism affirms (2) and (3) but denies (1)—God does not will the salvation of all. Traditional Arminianism affirms (1) and (3) but denies (2)—God’s saving will can be frustrated by human freedom. Universalism affirms (1) and (2) and denies (3)—all will ultimately be saved. Talbott argues that the universalist resolution is the most consistent with the full witness of Scripture regarding God’s character and sovereign purpose. See Chapters 3, 27, and 28.
A Greek term that appears only once in the New Testament, in 2 Peter 2:4: “God did not spare angels when they sinned, but cast them into hell [tartarōsas, ταρταρώσας] and committed them to chains of gloomy darkness to be kept until the judgment.” In Greek mythology, Tartarus was the deepest region of the underworld, reserved for the most wicked. Peter uses this term specifically for the imprisonment of fallen angels—not for human beings. Tartarus is thus distinct from Hades (the general realm of the dead), Gehenna (Jesus’ warnings about judgment), and the Lake of Fire (the eschatological reality in Revelation). Its inclusion in the biblical vocabulary illustrates the complexity of the biblical picture and the danger of treating all references to “hell” as though they describe the same place. See Chapter 22.
The belief that all human beings will ultimately be saved and reconciled to God through Jesus Christ. Conservative or evangelical universalism—the version defended in this book—must be sharply distinguished from liberal or pluralistic universalism, which denies biblical authority, downplays sin, and claims that all religions lead to God. Conservative universalism affirms without exception: the authority of Scripture, the reality and severity of sin, the necessity of faith in Christ for salvation, substitutionary atonement, the reality of hell as genuinely painful and terrifying, and the final judgment. What it adds is the conviction that God is powerful enough and patient enough to bring every person to genuine, willing faith—whether in this life or beyond it. The fire refines; it does not merely consume. Every prodigal comes home. Major proponents include Thomas Talbott, Robin Parry (writing as Gregory MacDonald), David Bentley Hart, Ilaria Ramelli, Jan Bonda, Brad Jersak, and, in the early church, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, and Maximus the Confessor. See Chapters 2, 24, and 30.
Additional Terms for Reference:
Beatific vision — The direct, face-to-face experience of God’s presence that the redeemed will enjoy eternally; the ultimate goal of human existence. On the divine presence model, this same presence is experienced as torment by those who resist God.
Creedal Christianity — Christian faith as defined by the early ecumenical creeds (Apostles’ Creed, Nicene Creed, Chalcedonian Definition), which establish the boundaries of orthodox belief regarding the Trinity, the person of Christ, and the fundamental shape of the gospel.
Eschatology — The branch of theology concerned with “last things”: death, the intermediate state, the return of Christ, the resurrection, the final judgment, heaven, hell, and the consummation of all things. The entire CI/UR debate is fundamentally an eschatological question.
General revelation — God’s self-disclosure through creation, conscience, and the moral order—available to all people everywhere—as distinguished from special revelation (Scripture and the incarnation of Christ). Relevant to the postmortem opportunity argument regarding the unevangelized.
Great White Throne Judgment — The final judgment described in Revelation 20:11–15, in which the dead are raised and judged according to what they have done. Both CI and UR affirm this as the climactic moment of judgment; they disagree on its ultimate outcome. See Chapter 23.
Nephesh (נֶפֶשׁ) — Hebrew term variously translated as “soul,” “life,” “self,” or “living being.” Its meaning is context-dependent. Physicalists argue nephesh refers to the whole person; dualists point to passages where nephesh departs at death (Gen. 35:18), suggesting a separable soul. See Chapter 4.
Panta en Pasin (πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν) — Greek for “all in all” (1 Cor. 15:28). Paul’s statement that God will ultimately be “all in all” is the UR advocate’s climactic Pauline text: for God to be panta en pasin, nothing can remain outside His loving rule. See Chapter 18.
Pneuma (πνεῦμα) — Greek for “spirit,” “breath,” or “wind.” When used of the human spirit, it often refers to the immaterial aspect of the person that survives death (Luke 23:46; Acts 7:59; Heb. 12:23). See Chapter 4.
Ruach (רוּחַ) — Hebrew term meaning “spirit,” “breath,” or “wind.” Ecclesiastes 12:7 says the ruach returns to God at death while the body returns to dust, supporting substance dualism. See Chapter 4.
Soteriology — The branch of theology concerned with salvation: its nature, its scope, its means, and its application. The CI/UR debate is fundamentally a soteriological question about the scope and finality of God’s saving work in Christ.
Theosis / Theōsis (θέωσις) — The Eastern Orthodox doctrine of “divinization” or “deification”—the process by which human beings are progressively transformed into the likeness of God through participation in His divine energies. Relevant to the UR case that the fire of God’s presence transforms rather than merely destroys.
Triduum Mortis — Latin for “the three days of death.” The period between Christ’s crucifixion and resurrection, during which, according to the descensus tradition, He descended to the realm of the dead and preached to the spirits there. See Chapters 22 and 29.
Note: This glossary is intended as a quick-reference guide for readers of The Better Hope: Why Biblical Universalism Answers What Conditional Immortality Cannot. For full scholarly treatments of each term, please consult the relevant chapters as indicated, as well as the works listed in the bibliography.