Walk into almost any church in the world, and what do you see? A cross. It might be a golden cross hanging high above the altar. It might be a simple wooden cross on the wall behind the pulpit. Step back outside and look at the building itself, and you might notice that even the floor plan is shaped like a cross—the long nave and the two side transepts forming the unmistakable shape. Look around at the people gathered for worship, and you will see crosses dangling from necklaces, pinned to lapels, stitched into clergy vestments. Listen to the hymns they sing, and you will hear about the cross over and over again. Watch them at the Lord’s Table, breaking bread and pouring wine, and you will see them remembering a death—not a birth, not a miracle, not even the resurrection by itself, but a death.
John Stott, one of the most important Christian writers of the twentieth century, painted a vivid picture of this reality in the opening chapter of his masterful book The Cross of Christ. He imagined a stranger visiting St. Paul’s Cathedral in London. The visitor, knowing almost nothing about Christianity, walks along Fleet Street and is immediately struck by the massive golden cross dominating the great dome of the cathedral. He steps inside and stands beneath the dome. Looking down, he notices the cruciform floor plan. He walks through the side chapels and sees a cross displayed prominently on every table. He goes down to the crypt and finds a cross engraved or embossed on every tomb. He comes back up and decides to stay for the service. The man next to him is wearing a small cross on his lapel. The woman on the other side has one on her necklace. The stained-glass windows contain crosses. A choir processes in behind someone carrying a large cross. And the hymns they sing are all about the cross.1
Stott’s imaginary visitor left the cathedral impressed but puzzled. Everywhere he turned, the cross was there. But why? What is it about this particular symbol—an instrument of Roman execution—that has captivated the hearts and minds of billions of people for two thousand years?
The choice of the cross as the central symbol of Christianity is, when you stop to think about it, astonishing. Stott himself pointed out that Christians could have chosen any number of other symbols. They could have chosen the manger or crib in which the baby Jesus was laid, pointing to the wonder of his birth. They could have chosen the carpenter’s bench, honoring his years of humble labor in Nazareth. The boat from which he taught the crowds in Galilee might have symbolized his teaching ministry. The basin and towel he used to wash the disciples’ feet could have spoken of his servant heart. The empty tomb would have proclaimed his resurrection. The throne could have symbolized his reign. The dove could have pointed to the gift of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost.2
Any of these symbols would have pointed to a real and important part of who Jesus is. But instead, the earliest Christians chose a cross—a Roman instrument of torture and execution. They chose to define their faith not by the manger, the teaching, the miracles, or even the empty tomb, but by the death of their Lord. Why?
The answer, Stott argued, is that the centrality of the cross originated in the mind of Jesus himself. From early in his public ministry, Jesus began to teach his followers that he had come to die. The Gospel of Mark records a turning point: “And he began to teach them that the Son of Man must suffer many things and be rejected by the elders and the chief priests and the scribes and be killed, and after three days rise again” (Mark 8:31, ESV). This was not a passing comment. Jesus repeated this teaching again and again. He told his disciples that he came “not to be served but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many” (Mark 10:45, ESV). At the Last Supper, he took bread and wine and said, “This is my body, which is given for you” and “This cup that is poured out for you is the new covenant in my blood” (Luke 22:19–20, ESV).3
Jesus understood his death as the very purpose for which he had come. As Stott put it, from Jesus’ youth, indeed even from his birth, the cross cast its shadow ahead of him, and his death was central to his mission.4 The early church simply followed Jesus’ own lead in placing the cross at the center.
Every religion and ideology has its visual symbol, Stott observed. Buddhism has the lotus flower. Judaism has the Star of David. Islam has the crescent. Marxism has the hammer and sickle. But Christianity chose an instrument of execution. The cross was not even the earliest Christian symbol—in the years of persecution, Christians used the fish (ichthys, ἰχθύς, in Greek), because the letters formed an acronym for “Jesus Christ, God’s Son, Savior.” But the fish eventually gave way to the cross, because the early Christians understood that the death of Jesus was not an unfortunate ending to an otherwise inspiring life. It was the climax—the very thing he had come to do.39
The apostles themselves were clear about this. When Peter stood up on the Day of Pentecost to preach the first Christian sermon, the heart of his message was the death and resurrection of Jesus: “This Jesus, delivered up according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God, you crucified and killed by the hands of lawless men. God raised him up” (Acts 2:23–24, ESV). Peter did not treat the cross as an accident or a tragedy that God then turned to good. He declared it was God’s “definite plan.” The cross was not Plan B. It was Plan A from before the foundation of the world.
But we need to go deeper than simply noting that the cross is central. We need to ask what it means. What actually happened when Jesus died on that Roman cross outside the walls of Jerusalem on that Friday afternoon? Why did he die? What did his death accomplish? And how does it apply to us today?
These are not minor questions tucked away in the footnotes of dusty theology textbooks. They are the most important questions any human being can ask. What we believe about why Jesus died shapes absolutely everything else in the Christian faith. It shapes how we understand God. Is God primarily a God of love, or of justice, or of wrath? Or is he somehow all of these at once, and if so, how do they fit together? What we believe about the cross shapes how we understand ourselves. Are we merely sick and in need of healing? Or are we guilty and in need of forgiveness? Or are we enslaved and in need of liberation? Or all of these? It shapes how we think about salvation—what we are saved from and what we are saved for. It shapes the Christian life, our worship, our ethics, and our hope for the future.
The technical word for the study of what Jesus accomplished on the cross is “atonement.” And this unusual English word itself tells us something important. Unlike most theological terms, which come from Greek or Latin, “atonement” comes from Middle English. It means “at-one-ment”—being brought into harmony, being made “at one” with someone. William Lane Craig, one of the most respected Christian philosophers alive today, points out that when William Tyndale produced his famous English translation of the New Testament in 1526, the meaning was transparent: the “ministry of reconciliation” was “the office to preach the atonement,” and being “reconciled to God” was being “at-one with God.”5
The doctrine of the atonement, then, is about how God and human beings are brought back together after sin drove a wedge between them. Think of it this way. The Bible tells a grand story that stretches from the first page to the last. God created human beings to live in a close, loving relationship with him. But we rebelled. We sinned. And that sin created a chasm between us and a holy God—a chasm that we are utterly powerless to bridge on our own. The whole of Scripture, from Genesis to Revelation, is about how God himself bridges that chasm. And the bridge, according to the New Testament, is the cross of Jesus Christ.
The apostle Paul put it as plainly as it can be put: “For I delivered to you as of first importance what I also received: that Christ died for our sins in accordance with the Scriptures, that he was buried, that he was raised on the third day in accordance with the Scriptures” (1 Cor. 15:3–4, ESV). Notice that phrase: “of first importance.” Paul was not saying that the death and resurrection of Jesus was one important topic among many. He was saying it is the most important thing—the absolute center of the Christian message. Scholars believe this brief creedal formula dates to within just a few years of the crucifixion itself, making it the oldest Christian confession we possess.6 And its very first line—“Christ died for our sins”—captures the heart of what the atonement is about. That little word “for” (hyper, ὑπέρ, in Greek) carries immense weight. Christ died for our sins. On our behalf. In our place. Because of our sins. To deal with our sins.
Key Point: The atonement is not an abstract theological puzzle for academics. It is the beating heart of the Christian gospel. “Christ died for our sins” (1 Cor. 15:3) is the earliest and most foundational Christian confession, and understanding why Jesus died and what his death accomplished is the most important theological task the church undertakes.
Paul was so captured by the centrality of the cross that he declared to the Corinthians: “For I decided to know nothing among you except Jesus Christ and him crucified” (1 Cor. 2:2, ESV). He told the Galatians that he would never boast “except in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ” (Gal. 6:14, ESV). “The cross” became a kind of shorthand for the entire gospel message. Paul even called the gospel “the word of the cross” (1 Cor. 1:18, ESV)—a phrase that would have sounded utterly bizarre in the ancient world, where the cross was a symbol of shame, horror, and degradation.7
The same emphasis runs through the rest of the New Testament. The four Gospels devote a strikingly large proportion of their narrative to the final week of Jesus’ life—his suffering, trial, and crucifixion. Scholars have sometimes described the Gospels as “passion narratives with extended introductions.” In the book of Revelation, when the apostle John was given a vision of the heavenly throne room, the figure at the very center of all worship was not a conquering warrior or a crowned king—it was “a Lamb standing, as though it had been slain” (Rev. 5:6, ESV). The redeemed in heaven sing: “Worthy are you to take the scroll and to open its seals, for you were slain, and by your blood you ransomed people for God from every tribe and language and people and nation” (Rev. 5:9, ESV). Even in the eternal glory of heaven, the cross is still at the center. The slain Lamb is the one on the throne. His wounds are still visible. His sacrifice is still celebrated.8
So the atonement is not a dry, dusty debate for seminary classrooms. It is the living heart of everything Christians believe, practice, celebrate, and hope for. Understanding the atonement is not optional for the Christian. It is essential.
Here we come to a distinction that will set the stage for everything in this book, and I want to draw it carefully. Craig makes the helpful point that we should distinguish between the doctrine of the atonement and a theory of the atonement. The doctrine is what the New Testament teaches directly and plainly: Christ died for our sins, and through his death, our reconciliation with God has been accomplished. That is the fact—the non-negotiable core of the Christian message. No ecumenical council, no creed, no confession of faith has ever been willing to set this aside.9
A theory of the atonement, on the other hand, goes further. It asks the deeper questions: How does the death of one man on a cross two thousand years ago deal with the sin problem of all humanity? Why was this death necessary? Could God have simply declared us forgiven without the cross? What exactly did Christ’s death accomplish, and how does it work? A theory of the atonement seeks to explain the mechanism, the inner logic, of how Christ’s death reconciles us to God.10
This is an important distinction because Christians have sometimes been tempted to play the fact and the theories against each other. Some people say, “All we need is the simple fact that Jesus died for us. We don’t need complicated theories.” I understand that impulse. And there is a grain of truth in it—a person can be saved by trusting in Christ without being able to articulate a sophisticated theory of the atonement. But I believe this impulse, taken too far, is dangerous.
William Hess, writing from an Eastern-influenced, Christus Victor perspective in his book Crushing the Great Serpent, is right to warn against the danger of formulating a theory first and then reading it back into the Bible rather than letting the text speak for itself.11 Craig echoes this concern powerfully. He observes that many contemporary Christian philosophers develop their atonement theories with almost no attention to what Scripture actually says. They build models based on how reconciliation typically works in human relationships, or on abstract philosophical principles, and then hunt for Bible verses to support the theory they have already constructed. Craig calls this approach “eisegesis, not exegesis”—reading meaning into the text rather than drawing meaning out of it. And he warns that this method runs the risk of producing a theory that, however philosophically elegant, simply is not a Christian theory of the atonement because it does not arise from the biblical data.12
I agree completely that the biblical data must come first. We must not build a theory in advance and then go hunting for proof texts. But I also believe—and here I agree with Craig once more—that we must not stop at simply reciting the biblical language without seeking to understand it. The great theologian P. T. Forsyth once said that the Bible is enough for our saving faith, but not enough for our scientific theology.13 We must ask the deeper questions. We must seek understanding. We must do the hard, careful work of explaining how Christ’s death saves us, using the best tools of biblical exegesis, historical theology, and philosophical reasoning.
If we refuse to ask these questions, we leave the field open to critics who will happily declare to the world that the Christian doctrine of the atonement is nonsense. The atheist philosopher A. J. Ayer once called the doctrines of original sin and vicarious atonement “intellectually contemptible and morally outrageous.” Craig observes, with some frustration, that a whole volume of essays defending the atonement was published in response—and not a single contributor even attempted to address Ayer’s philosophical challenge.14 That is not good enough. We need to show that the atonement is not only proclaimed by Scripture and celebrated by the church, but also that it is coherent, defensible, and morally beautiful.
Fact vs. Theory: The fact of the atonement is that Christ died for our sins and thereby achieved our reconciliation with God (1 Cor. 15:3). Theories of the atonement seek to explain how and why his death accomplishes this. Both matter. The fact without understanding leaves the gospel vulnerable to distortion and criticism. A theory without deep roots in the biblical text becomes mere speculation. In this book, I am committed to doing both—taking the biblical data with utmost seriousness and thinking carefully about what it all means.
Craig also notes something that sets the atonement apart from other great doctrines of the faith. Unlike the Trinity and the Incarnation, no ecumenical council ever issued a definitive ruling on the atonement. The Council of Nicaea (325) addressed the deity of Christ. The Council of Chalcedon (451) defined the two natures of Christ. But no council ever said, “This is the correct theory of the atonement.” That means competing theories must be assessed by two criteria: their faithfulness to the biblical data and their philosophical coherence.15 This book takes both criteria seriously.
Before I state the thesis of this book in full, I need to lay out a map of the major ways Christians have understood the cross over the past two thousand years. Theologians have proposed a number of different “models” or “theories” of the atonement. Each one highlights a different aspect of what Christ accomplished. Thinking of them as different windows on the same great landscape can be helpful—each window gives a genuine view, but no single window shows us the whole picture.
David Allen, in his comprehensive study of the atonement, observes that the variety of descriptions in Scripture arises partly because the human problem itself is described in so many different ways. Sin is pictured as breaking the law, as slavery that needs liberation, as a debt that needs payment, as uncleanness that needs cleansing, as a broken relationship that needs reconciliation, and as bondage to hostile powers that needs a military victory. Different biblical writers draw their imagery from the temple, the battlefield, the marketplace, and the courtroom. Each way of describing the problem naturally suggests a different way of describing the solution.16
Allen also draws on Oliver Crisp’s helpful work to distinguish between atonement “metaphors,” “models,” “doctrines,” and “theories.” A metaphor is a figure of speech (like “the blood of Christ”). A model is a more developed framework that organizes several metaphors into a coherent picture. A doctrine is a settled church teaching. And a theory is a full explanatory account of how the atonement actually works.17 These distinctions matter because not all atonement models operate at the same level. Some tell us what the result of the atonement is (victory, reconciliation, freedom) without explaining the mechanism—the “how.” Others, like penal substitution, dig into the mechanism itself.
Since the work of Gustaf Aulén in the 1930s, it has become common to group atonement theories into three big families: Christus Victor, Satisfaction/Penal Substitution, and Moral Influence. But as Crisp has pointed out, this tripartite classification is too simple. It flattens out the real differences between the various theories and mixes up different levels of theological explanation.18 The reality is richer and more complex than any three-part scheme can capture. Let me walk through the major models one by one.
This is one of the oldest ways of understanding the cross. It is often called Christus Victor, a Latin phrase meaning simply “Christ the Victor.” On this view, the primary thing that happened at the cross is that Jesus won a great victory over the powers of evil—sin, death, and the devil. Humanity was held captive by these dark forces, and Jesus, through his death and resurrection, defeated them and set us free.
The New Testament roots of this model are strong. Paul writes that on the cross, God “disarmed the rulers and authorities and put them to open shame, by triumphing over them in him” (Col. 2:15, ESV). The author of Hebrews says that Jesus, through his death, destroyed “the one who has the power of death, that is, the devil” (Heb. 2:14, ESV). First John 3:8 states plainly that “the reason the Son of God appeared was to destroy the works of the devil.” Jesus himself, in John 12:31, declared on the eve of his crucifixion: “Now is the judgment of this world; now will the ruler of this world be cast out.”
The early church fathers loved this imagery. Many of them described the cross as a great cosmic battle in which Christ engaged the forces of darkness and won a decisive victory. Some even used the vivid metaphor of the “fishhook”—Christ’s humanity was the bait on the hook, and when the devil swallowed the bait, he was caught on the hidden hook of Christ’s divinity. While that particular metaphor has its problems, the underlying conviction is profound: at the cross, something decisive happened in the spiritual realm. The powers that held humanity captive were broken.
In the twentieth century, the Swedish theologian Gustaf Aulén revived interest in this model with his enormously influential book Christus Victor (1931). Aulén argued that this “dramatic” or “classic” model was the dominant understanding of the atonement in the early church, and that it was only later displaced by the more “legalistic” satisfaction and penal models in the medieval and Reformation periods.19 Aulén’s thesis has been enormously influential, and it continues to shape the thinking of many theologians today. William Hess, in his recent book Crushing the Great Serpent, argues passionately that the classical Christus Victor model is more faithful to both Scripture and the early church than penal substitution.20
I want to say plainly: I believe the Christus Victor model captures something genuinely true and deeply important about what happened at the cross. Christ really did win a cosmic victory over sin, death, and the devil. That victory is real, glorious, and worth celebrating. But I also believe this model, taken by itself, is incomplete. It tells us that Jesus won, but it does not fully explain how he won. What was it about his death, specifically, that broke the power of evil? Why was a cross necessary for the victory? As we will see throughout this book, I believe penal substitution provides the mechanism by which the great victory was accomplished. The cross is a victory, but it is a victory won through the bearing of sin’s penalty (see Chapters 19, 21, and 24 for the full argument).
In the eleventh century, Anselm of Canterbury wrote one of the most famous and enduring books in Christian history: Cur Deus Homo—“Why Did God Become Man?” Anselm’s argument went something like this: Human sin is an offense against God’s infinite honor. Because God is infinitely great, even a seemingly small sin against him creates an immeasurably great debt. No mere human being could ever repay such a debt. So the debt either remains unpaid (which would dishonor God’s majesty) or someone must repay it who is capable of making satisfaction for an infinite offense. Only someone who is both fully God (and therefore of infinite worth) and fully human (and therefore able to act as humanity’s representative) can do this. This is why the incarnation was necessary: Christ, as the God-man, offered the gift of his perfect life and death as “satisfaction” for the debt humanity owed to God’s honor.21
Anselm’s contribution was immense. He brought intellectual rigor to atonement theology and raised questions that the church has been grappling with ever since. His core insight—that sin creates a debt before God that we cannot pay and that only God himself can provide the remedy—points in a profoundly right direction. But Anselm framed the problem primarily in terms of honor, reflecting the feudal culture of his time, rather than in terms of justice and penalty as the Bible itself most often does. The Protestant Reformers would later shift the focus from God’s honor to God’s justice, from satisfaction of honor to satisfaction of the law. That shift produced what we now call penal substitutionary atonement (see Chapters 16–17 for the full historical story).
Peter Abelard, a brilliant and controversial twelfth-century theologian, is often credited with proposing a radically different atonement theory. On this view, the primary purpose of the cross was not to satisfy God’s justice, repay a debt, or defeat the devil. Rather, the cross reveals God’s love so powerfully and dramatically that it melts our hard hearts and moves us to repent. The cross changes us. It is an act of supreme love designed to inspire a response of love in return. Christ’s death is essentially a moral demonstration, a divine example of self-giving love.
I should note that Abelard’s actual views were more nuanced than the label “moral influence” often implies. Allen observes that Abelard has been unfairly caricatured as the father of all purely subjective, non-objective atonement theories.22 Abelard himself likely affirmed more than mere moral influence. Still, the broad tradition that bears his name emphasizes the subjective, inward, transformative power of the cross, and many liberal theologians from the nineteenth century onward have embraced some version of this approach.
Is there truth here? Absolutely. The cross does reveal God’s love in breathtaking fashion. Paul himself makes this point: “God shows his love for us in that while we were still sinners, Christ died for us” (Rom. 5:8, ESV). And that revelation does transform us from the inside out. John himself wrote that “we love because he first loved us” (1 John 4:19, ESV), and it is often the vision of Christ crucified for us that first awakens love in the human heart.
But here is the critical question: if the cross is only a demonstration of love, what does it accomplish that could not have been accomplished some other way? If the sole purpose was to show us how much God loves us, why was a cross necessary? Could God not have demonstrated his love by some less horrific means? And here is an even deeper question: how does a demonstration of love deal with the real, objective problem of human guilt before a holy God? If I owe an enormous debt and a friend shows me how much he cares about me, that may warm my heart—but it does not pay the debt. The moral influence model, by itself, captures a genuine effect of the cross (the transformation of the human heart) but not the foundation of the cross (the actual dealing with sin and its penalty). It tells us something real about what the cross does in us but not enough about what the cross does before God.
This is the model that stands at the heart of this book, and I want to define it carefully. Penal substitutionary atonement (often abbreviated PSA) teaches that Jesus Christ died as our substitute—in our place, on our behalf—and that on the cross he bore the penalty, the just consequences, that our sins deserved. The word “penal” comes from the Latin poena, meaning “penalty” or “punishment.” The word “substitutionary” means “in someone else’s place.” Put them together and you have the basic idea: Jesus bore sin’s penalty in our place.
Steve Jeffery, Michael Ovey, and Andrew Sach provide a crisp and careful summary in the opening sentence of their important book Pierced for Our Transgressions: penal substitution is the doctrine that God gave himself in the person of his Son to suffer instead of us the death, punishment, and curse due to fallen humanity as the penalty for sin.23 Notice two things about this definition. First, God gave himself. The initiative is God’s. This is not a reluctant Father sacrificing an unwilling Son. It is God acting in love. Second, Christ suffered instead of us. The substitution is real. Christ took our place and bore what we should have borne.
The roots of this model run deep into Scripture—far deeper than many of its critics realize. We will trace those roots in careful detail throughout this book (Chapters 4–12). But the model was formulated most clearly and systematically during the Protestant Reformation, particularly in the writings of Martin Luther and John Calvin (see Chapter 17). Luther spoke powerfully of the “great exchange”—Christ taking our sin and giving us his righteousness. Calvin’s Institutes of the Christian Religion devoted sustained attention to how Christ’s death satisfied divine justice on our behalf. Since the Reformation, penal substitution has been the dominant understanding of the cross among evangelical and Reformed Christians, defended with great force by an impressive line of theologians: Francis Turretin in the seventeenth century, Jonathan Edwards in the eighteenth, Charles Hodge and B. B. Warfield in the nineteenth, and Leon Morris, J. I. Packer, and John Stott in the twentieth. In our own time, the torch has been carried by scholars like William Lane Craig, David Allen, Steve Jeffery, Michael Ovey, Andrew Sach, Thomas Schreiner, Simon Gathercole, and Henri Blocher, among many others.
The great Baptist preacher Charles Spurgeon, over a century ago, captured the vital importance of this doctrine with a warning that now reads almost prophetically: if the day ever comes when our pulpits are full of modern thought and the old doctrine of substitutionary sacrifice is abandoned, he said, then there will remain no word of comfort for the guilty and no hope for the despairing. A silent gospel will possess the world, and no voice of joy will break the silence of despair.42 That day has not arrived. But the pressure is real. And that is one reason this book exists.
Defining Penal Substitutionary Atonement: PSA is the teaching that God the Son, Jesus Christ, voluntarily took our place on the cross, bearing in himself the judicial consequences—the penalty—that our sins deserved, so that we could be forgiven and reconciled to God. Two elements are essential: substitution (Christ in our place) and penalty (bearing the just consequences of sin).
In the seventeenth century, the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius proposed a modification of penal substitution. On his view, Christ’s death was not the exact penalty that sinners deserved, literally transferred from them to him. Rather, it was a demonstration of what sin deserves. God, as the moral governor of the universe, needed to uphold his law and show that sin cannot be taken lightly. Christ’s suffering served as a public display of the seriousness of sin, enabling God to forgive without undermining the moral order of his creation.
The governmental theory has found a home among some Wesleyan and Arminian theologians. It shares certain features with penal substitution—both connect the cross to the problem of sin’s penalty—but differs on the crucial question of whether Christ actually bore the penalty or merely displayed it. One way to think about the difference: penal substitution says that Christ paid the debt itself; the governmental theory says that Christ demonstrated how serious the debt was, freeing God to forgive it out of mercy. I believe the governmental theory has genuine insights—the cross certainly does uphold God’s moral authority and demonstrate the seriousness of sin. But I also believe it stops short of the full biblical teaching. When Paul says that God “made him to be sin who knew no sin, so that in him we might become the righteousness of God” (2 Cor. 5:21, ESV), he is describing something more than a demonstration. He is describing a real exchange, a real bearing of sin and its consequences. When Isaiah says that “the LORD has laid on him the iniquity of us all” (Isa. 53:6, ESV), the language is not merely symbolic. Something happened on the cross that goes deeper than display (see Chapter 22 for a full discussion).
The second-century Church Father Irenaeus of Lyon proposed one of the earliest and most beautiful ways of understanding what Christ accomplished. His key concept was recapitulation—from the Latin recapitulatio and the Greek anakephalaiōsis (ἀνακεφαλαίωσις), meaning “to sum up again” or “to go over from the beginning.” Irenaeus taught that Christ, in his incarnation, life, death, and resurrection, “recapitulated” the entire human story, reversing at every point what Adam had done wrong. Where Adam disobeyed, Christ obeyed. Where Adam reached for the fruit of the tree in prideful grasping, Christ stretched out his arms on the wood of the cross in humble self-giving. Where Adam brought death, Christ brought life. By living a fully human life from birth to death and beyond, Christ healed and restored human nature from within.24
This model is especially beloved in Eastern Orthodox theology, where it connects closely with the doctrine of theosis (θέωσις)—the idea that through Christ, human beings are brought into participation in the divine life. Athanasius captured this with his famous saying: “He became man so that we might become god”—not meaning that we become God in essence, but that we share in God’s life and nature by grace. I believe Irenaeus’s recapitulation model captures a profound and beautiful truth. But once again, by itself it does not adequately explain how the cross deals with the specific problem of human guilt and the judicial consequences of sin (see Chapter 23 for a full treatment).
In recent decades, several new atonement proposals have emerged. Some scholars, shaped by liberation theology, have emphasized the cross as God’s identification with the oppressed and marginalized. Others, influenced by the cultural anthropology of René Girard, have interpreted Christ’s death as the exposure and dismantling of the scapegoat mechanism by which human societies channel their violence onto innocent victims.25 J. Denny Weaver has proposed a “nonviolent atonement” that removes any notion of divinely intended or required suffering. Feminist theologians like Rita Nakashima Brock and Rebecca Ann Parker have argued that traditional atonement theology glorifies suffering, legitimizes abuse, and reinforces patriarchal power structures.26
Hess, as noted above, has articulated a contemporary version of the classical Christus Victor model. He is particularly concerned that penal substitution distorts the character of God by portraying the Father as pouring out wrath on an innocent victim. Hess sees the cross not as the Father punishing the Son, but as Christ entering into the domain of death itself in order to defeat evil from within.27
These are serious voices making serious arguments, and this book will engage them with fairness and care (see Chapters 32–35). I want to hear their concerns, acknowledge what is true in their critiques, and then show where I believe they fall short of the full biblical and theological picture. Jeffery, Ovey, and Sach observe that the tide of criticism against PSA has been rising for over a century and a half. Beginning with the liberal theological movement of the mid-nineteenth century, penal substitution has been attacked from multiple angles—biblical, theological, philosophical, cultural, and ethical. In their words, after rumbling behind the closed doors of the liberal scholarly academy for generations, these criticisms have recently been voiced by influential evangelical theologians and church leaders, provoking real alarm within the Christian community.40 One of the goals of this book is to demonstrate that these criticisms, while sometimes raising legitimate concerns about careless or distorted formulations of PSA, ultimately fail to overturn the central doctrine itself.
With this background in place, let me now state clearly what I believe and what I will argue throughout the pages that follow.
I believe that penal substitutionary atonement, rightly understood within a Trinitarian framework of divine love, is the central and most important facet of the atonement. The cross is God’s self-substitution—the Triune God acting in unified, self-giving love to bear the judicial consequences of human sin. Other atonement models—Christus Victor, recapitulation, moral influence, satisfaction, and others—capture genuine and important dimensions of what Christ accomplished. But each of them, when taken by itself, is incomplete. Only when penal substitution stands at the center, with the other models arranged around it as complementary facets of a many-sided reality, does the full picture of the atonement emerge.
Let me unpack this thesis with several key affirmations.
First, substitution is essential. Jesus Christ died as our substitute—in our place, on our behalf. He took upon himself the consequences that were rightly due to us because of our sin. The New Testament language is unmistakable. Christ died “for us” (hyper hēmōn, ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν) and “for our sins” (hyper tōn hamartiōn hēmōn, ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν). Simon Gathercole, in his rigorous academic study Defending Substitution, demonstrates that the formula “Christ died for our sins” in 1 Corinthians 15:3 carries genuine substitutionary meaning. It cannot be explained away as mere representation or moral example. Christ stood where we should have stood. He bore what we should have borne.28
Second, the penal dimension is real. What Christ bore on the cross was not suffering in general—not simply the physical pain of crucifixion, nor merely the emotional anguish of rejection, nor only the spiritual darkness of feeling abandoned. It was the judicial consequence of human sin—the penalty of death and separation from God that we deserved. The Bible consistently teaches that sin has consequences, and that those consequences are not arbitrary but just. “The wages of sin is death” (Rom. 6:23, ESV). When Christ went to the cross, he bore those consequences in our place. Our sins are forgiven judicially—that is, in terms of the righteous judgment of God—because Jesus bore the judicial consequences in our stead. The penal element is not merely a metaphor drawn loosely from the courtroom. It is a genuine, objective dimension of what took place at Calvary. The cross satisfies the demands of divine justice, not by setting justice aside, but by fulfilling it completely through the willing self-sacrifice of the Son.
Third—and this is absolutely critical—the Trinity acted in unified love at the cross. One of the most common and most damaging objections to penal substitution is that it pits the Father against the Son. In this distorted picture, the Father is an angry deity pouring out his wrath on an innocent, unwilling victim, while a loving Jesus steps in to absorb the Father’s rage. Steve Chalke and Alan Mann infamously called this picture “a form of cosmic child abuse.”29 And I want to say plainly: if that is what penal substitution teaches, it should be rejected immediately. It would be a monstrous doctrine.
But that is a caricature, not the real thing. The Father did not pour out anger and wrath upon the Son as though the Son were an unwilling third party. God the Father loved Jesus throughout the entire crucifixion. The Father was never enraged at the Son. Rather, the Godhead acted in unified, self-giving love to absorb the consequences of human sin. The Son went to the cross voluntarily, in perfect obedience and perfect love. And the Father, far from sadistically inflicting punishment, was present with the Son in shared grief and shared purpose, even amid the unfathomable agony of the cross.
John Stott captured this truth better than perhaps any other modern writer. In what I believe is one of the most important chapters ever written on the atonement—Chapter 6 of The Cross of Christ, titled “The Self-Substitution of God”—Stott argued that the cross is not a transaction between an angry Father and an innocent victim. It is God himself, in the person of his Son, bearing the cost of our sin. The cross is God’s self-substitution. Stott wrote that God must be “completely and invariably himself in the fullness of his moral being.” The solution to the problem of sin must come from within God himself, satisfying both his holiness and his love simultaneously—not one at the expense of the other, but both together.30 The Father and the Son are not at odds. They are united in love. The initiative comes from the Father’s love, the execution comes through the Son’s willing obedience, and the power comes through the Holy Spirit. The cross is a Trinitarian act of self-giving love from beginning to end.
Critical Clarification: Penal substitutionary atonement does NOT teach that an angry God punished an unwilling victim. The “cosmic child abuse” caricature is a distortion of the real doctrine. Rightly understood, PSA teaches that the Triune God—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—acted in unified love at the cross. God himself, in the person of the Son, bore the consequences of our sin. The initiative came from the Father’s love. The Son went willingly. The cross is God’s self-substitution.
Fourth, the other atonement models capture genuine facets of the cross. I am not arguing that penal substitution is the only thing the cross accomplished. That would be reductionism, and it would not do justice to the richness of the biblical witness. Christus Victor is true: Christ won a genuine victory over sin, death, and the devil. Recapitulation is true: Christ reversed what Adam had done and healed human nature from within. The moral influence of the cross is real: the revelation of God’s love at Calvary genuinely transforms the human heart. Elements of Anselm’s satisfaction theory are valid. These are not rival theories to be rejected. They are complementary facets of a reality far richer than any single model can express. But each is insufficient on its own. Only when penal substitution stands at the center, providing the foundational mechanism by which the other accomplishments are achieved, does the complete picture emerge (see Chapter 24 for the full integration).
As Allen rightly observes, the cross is a victory (Christus Victor) by means of penal substitution.31 Jeremy Treat has argued compellingly that penal substitution has explanatory priority: it directly addresses the fundamental problem (sin and its penalty), while models like Christus Victor address the derivative problem (bondage to evil). The victory is real, but it is won through the bearing of sin’s judicial consequences.32
Fifth, the Eastern Orthodox tradition has valuable insights that Western Christians should take seriously. The Orthodox emphasis on theosis, recapitulation, and the cosmic scope of Christ’s victory enriches our understanding of the cross. However, the common claim made by some modern Orthodox polemicists that penal substitution is a purely Western invention with no patristic support is, I believe, demonstrably false. Fr. Joshua Schooping, an Eastern Orthodox priest, has shown in remarkable detail that penal substitutionary language is not foreign to the Orthodox tradition at all—it appears pervasively in Orthodox liturgical hymnography, in the writings of major Eastern Fathers like Cyril of Alexandria, John Chrysostom, Maximus the Confessor, and Gregory Palamas, and in the canonical sources of the Orthodox Church.33 Jeffery, Ovey, and Sach likewise survey an extensive range of patristic writers—both Eastern and Western—who use clearly substitutionary and penal language when describing the atonement.34 A fair reading of the primary sources, undistorted by polemical agendas, reveals that substitutionary and penal themes run throughout the patristic tradition, even if the systematic theological formulation of “penal substitutionary atonement” as a named doctrine came later.
Sixth, the atonement has universal scope. Christ died for all people without exception, not merely for the elect. The benefits of the atonement are available to every human being who has ever lived. The New Testament declares that God “desires all people to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth” (1 Tim. 2:4, ESV), that Christ is “the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only but also for the sins of the whole world” (1 John 2:2, ESV), and that Christ gave himself “as a ransom for all” (1 Tim. 2:6, ESV). Allen, in his comprehensive treatment, is especially strong on this point, making the case that both Scripture and the majority of the Christian tradition support unlimited atonement—the view that Christ’s death is sufficient and intended for all, even though only those who respond in faith receive its full salvific benefits.41 I reject the Calvinist doctrine of limited atonement (sometimes called “particular redemption”), and I will make the biblical case for the universal extent of Christ’s atoning work in Chapters 30–31.
How will we get from here to the conclusion of this argument? The book is divided into nine parts, and each builds on what comes before. Let me give you a brief roadmap.
We begin here, with this introduction. Chapter 2 will explore the rich biblical vocabulary of the atonement—words like propitiation (hilastērion, ἱλαστήριον), expiation, reconciliation (katallagē, καταλλαγή), redemption (apolytrōsis, ἀπολύτρωσις), and ransom (lytron, λύτρον). These are the building blocks of atonement theology, and understanding them clearly is essential before we dig into the texts themselves. Chapter 3 will examine the character of God—his love, his justice, his holiness, his wrath—because what we believe about the atonement depends at every turn on what we believe about the God who accomplished it. Stott was right: the problem of forgiveness is located not outside God but within his own being, in the tension between his holy love and the unholy lovelessness of humanity.35
The cross did not appear out of nowhere. Centuries of divine preparation laid the groundwork. Chapter 4 examines the Levitical sacrificial system—burnt offerings, sin offerings, guilt offerings, peace offerings—and asks what these ancient rituals reveal about how God deals with sin. Chapter 5 focuses on the Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur) described in Leviticus 16—the most solemn day in Israel’s calendar, when the high priest entered the Holy of Holies to make atonement for the sins of the entire nation. We will look closely at the two goats: one slain as a sin offering and one sent away into the wilderness bearing the people’s sins. Chapter 6 turns to Isaiah 52:13–53:12, the prophecy of the Suffering Servant—one of the most extraordinary passages in all of Scripture and the single most important Old Testament foundation for penal substitutionary atonement. There we read that the Servant was “pierced for our transgressions” and “crushed for our iniquities,” that “the LORD has laid on him the iniquity of us all,” and that he made himself “an offering for guilt” (asham, אָשָׁם) (Isa. 53:5–6, 10, ESV).
This is the heart of the biblical case. Chapter 7 examines how Jesus himself understood his death, drawing on his words in the Gospels—Mark 10:45, the Last Supper, Gethsemane. Chapter 8 provides a detailed study of Romans 3:21–26, with its teaching on propitiation, divine righteousness, and justification by faith. Chapter 9 covers the broader Pauline witness: 2 Corinthians 5:21 (“God made him to be sin who knew no sin”), Galatians 3:13 (“Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for us”), Colossians 2:13–15, Romans 5:6–11, Romans 8:3, and more. Chapter 10 explores the theology of Hebrews, with its vision of Christ as the once-for-all sacrifice in the heavenly sanctuary. Chapter 11 examines 1 Peter’s atonement theology and the cry of dereliction from the cross (Mark 15:34). Chapter 12 gathers the Johannine writings and remaining New Testament evidence.
What did the earliest post-apostolic Christians believe about the cross? Chapter 13 surveys the Apostolic Fathers and second-century atonement thought. Chapter 14 examines the major patristic figures of the third through fifth centuries. Chapter 15 is one of the most distinctive chapters in this book: it corrects the widely repeated claim that penal and substitutionary language is absent from the Church Fathers. Drawing on the groundbreaking research of Fr. Joshua Schooping and the extensive patristic survey in Jeffery, Ovey, and Sach, this chapter shows that the Fathers contain far more penal and substitutionary language than modern critics typically acknowledge.36 Chapters 16–18 carry the story through the medieval period, the Reformation, and the post-Reformation era to the present day.
With the biblical and historical foundations in place, we turn to the constructive theological work. Chapter 19 presents the full biblical and theological case for penal substitutionary atonement. Chapter 20 defends the Trinitarian character of the atonement and responds head-on to the “cosmic child abuse” accusation, showing that true PSA is grounded in the unified love of the Trinity. Chapters 21–23 give full, fair, and appreciative treatments of Christus Victor, the ransom/satisfaction/moral influence/governmental theories, and the Eastern Orthodox contribution through recapitulation and theosis. Chapter 24 then integrates all these threads, presenting the multi-faceted atonement model with PSA at the center.
Many of the sharpest criticisms of penal substitution are philosophical. Can punishment really be transferred from one person to another? Is it morally just for an innocent person to bear the penalty deserved by the guilty? How do representation, federal headship, and corporate solidarity work? These chapters engage these objections head-on, drawing especially on the careful philosophical work of Craig, whose multi-chapter defense of PSA’s coherence and moral justifiability is arguably the most rigorous treatment available in contemporary scholarship.37
Did Christ die for all people or only for the elect? Chapter 30 builds the positive biblical case for unlimited atonement. Chapter 31 responds to the arguments for limited atonement, or “particular redemption,” as articulated in the Reformed/Calvinist tradition.
We then systematically address the major objections raised against PSA: exegetical objections (Chapter 32), theological and moral objections (Chapter 33), the Eastern Orthodox critique (Chapter 34), and contemporary objections from violence studies, feminist theology, and liberation theology (Chapter 35). In every case, I commit to presenting the opposing arguments as fairly and forcefully as I can before responding. The goal is to steel-man the opposition, not to caricature it.
The atonement is not merely a doctrine to be debated. It is a reality to be lived. Chapters 36–37 explore how the atonement transforms every dimension of Christian experience—justification, reconciliation, redemption, worship, ethics, suffering, and daily faithfulness. Chapter 38 offers a final reflection on the inexhaustible richness of the cross.
Four appendices round out the volume: a comprehensive Scripture index, an annotated bibliography, a glossary of key terms, and a quick-reference guide to what the Church Fathers actually said about substitutionary and penal atonement.
I want to close this introduction with a word about tone, spirit, and the kind of book I am trying to write.
This book is making a strong argument. I believe the evidence—biblical, historical, philosophical—points clearly toward penal substitutionary atonement as the central facet of the cross. I will make that case with conviction. But I want to make it with humility, warmth, and genuine respect for those who see things differently. Many thoughtful, godly Christians hold different views on the atonement. I have learned from them. I have been stretched and challenged by them. Some of my deepest insights have come from engaging scholars whose conclusions I ultimately cannot accept—from Aulén’s vivid portrayal of Christ’s cosmic victory, from Hess’s passionate concern to protect the character of God from distortion, from the Orthodox tradition’s breathtaking vision of theosis and deification, from Stump’s sophisticated philosophical reflections on reconciliation.
I am also committed to engaging the strongest versions of the opposing arguments, not the weakest. In philosophy, this is called “steel-manning”—the opposite of setting up a straw man. When I present an objection to PSA, I will present it as forcefully and fairly as I can, as its most thoughtful defenders would want it presented. Only then will I offer my response. This approach takes more time and more pages, but I believe it produces a more honest and more compelling argument in the end. If PSA is true—and I believe it is—it has nothing to fear from the strongest objections. It can stand the test.
I should also say a word about what this book is not. This is not a devotional book, though I hope it will stir worship and gratitude in the reader’s heart. It is not a purely academic monograph, though I have tried to engage the best scholarship with care. It is written for the thoughtful Christian reader—the person who loves the Lord, who cares about theology, who wants to think deeply about the cross, but who may not have seminary training. I have done my best to write in plain language, to define technical terms clearly, and to make complex ideas accessible without dumbing them down. If a Greek or Hebrew word appears, I will explain what it means. If a philosophical concept comes up, I will unpack it in everyday terms. My goal is to combine scholarly substance with genuine accessibility. I want the reader to feel like a trusted friend is walking them through the argument, not like a distant professor is lecturing from a podium.
One more thing. Throughout this book, I will frequently use the first person—both “I” and “we.” When I say “I believe,” I am expressing my own conviction as the author, arrived at through years of study and reflection. When I say “we,” I am inviting you, the reader, to explore these questions alongside me. Theology is not a spectator sport. It is a journey we take together.
The cross is not a problem to be solved and filed away. It is a mystery to be explored, a love to be received, and a life to be lived. Even after thirty-eight chapters, four appendices, and hundreds of footnotes, we will only have scratched the surface. The cross is inexhaustible. Stott was right: the cross, far from being the embarrassing problem Christianity must explain away, is the glory at the very heart of the faith.38 The great hymn writer Isaac Watts captured something of this when he wrote that the cross is a “wondrous” cross—not a tragic one, not a merely useful one, but a wondrous one. The more we look at it, the more astonished we become.
I believe the cross of Jesus Christ is the most important event in the history of the world. I believe that understanding what happened there is the most important intellectual and spiritual task any human being can undertake. And I believe that penal substitutionary atonement, rightly understood within a Trinitarian framework of self-giving love, gives us the clearest, richest, and most complete window into the glory of what God accomplished on that dark Friday afternoon outside the walls of Jerusalem.
So let us begin. Let us look together at the cross. Let us examine the Scriptures with care. Let us listen to the voices of two thousand years of Christian reflection. Let us think hard about the objections and wrestle honestly with the difficulties. And let us see what we find there—at the foot of the cross, where God gave himself for us.
1 John R. W. Stott, The Cross of Christ (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2006), 23–25. Stott opens his book with a vivid narrative of a visitor exploring St. Paul’s Cathedral and encountering the cross at every turn—on the dome, in the stained glass, on tombs, on necklaces, in hymns, and in the sacraments. ↩
2 Stott, The Cross of Christ, 26–27. Stott surveys the range of symbols Christians might have chosen—the manger, the carpenter’s bench, the boat, the towel, the empty tomb, the throne, the dove—and notes that the cross prevailed because the early church understood Christ’s death as central. ↩
3 Stott, The Cross of Christ, 31–32. Stott traces how Jesus himself initiated the church’s focus on the cross through his passion predictions and Last Supper words. ↩
4 Stott, The Cross of Christ, 23. ↩
5 William Lane Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ: An Exegetical, Historical, and Philosophical Exploration (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2020), chap. 1, “Introduction,” under “The Meaning of ‘Atonement.’” Craig discusses Tyndale’s translation and the etymological sense of “at-one-ment.” ↩
6 Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, chap. 1, “Introduction,” under “Our Focus.” Craig notes that this pre-Pauline formula, dating to within five years of the crucifixion, was the message proclaimed by all the apostles (1 Cor. 15:11). See also Simon Gathercole, Defending Substitution: An Essay on Atonement in Paul (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2015), 68–80, for a detailed analysis of 1 Corinthians 15:3. ↩
7 Stott, The Cross of Christ, 41–44. Stott surveys the New Testament emphasis on the cross as the center of the gospel message, noting Paul’s references to “the word of the cross” (1 Cor. 1:18) and his determination to know nothing except “Christ crucified” (1 Cor. 2:2). ↩
8 Stott, The Cross of Christ, 43–45. Stott observes that in the book of Revelation, the center of the heavenly stage is occupied by the Lamb of God who was slain, and that the New Testament writers believed passionately in the centrality of the cross. ↩
9 Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, chap. 1, “Introduction,” under “Doctrine and Theory of the Atonement.” Craig draws a distinction between the doctrine (the biblical teaching that Christ died for our sins) and theories (explanations of how and why his death achieves reconciliation). ↩
10 Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, chap. 1, “Introduction,” under “Doctrine and Theory of the Atonement.” ↩
11 William L. Hess, Crushing the Great Serpent: Did God Punish Jesus? (2024), chap. 2, “What Is Penal Substitutionary Atonement?” Hess warns against formulating a theory first and then reading it back into the biblical text. ↩
12 Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, chap. 1, “Introduction,” under “Doctrine and Theory of the Atonement.” Craig criticizes contemporary philosophers for constructing atonement theories with minimal attention to biblical exegesis, calling this approach “eisegesis, not exegesis.” ↩
13 P. T. Forsyth, The Work of Christ (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1910), 4. Quoted in Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, chap. 1, “Introduction,” under “Doctrine and Theory of the Atonement.” ↩
14 Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, chap. 1, “Introduction,” under “Doctrine and Theory of the Atonement.” Craig recounts A. J. Ayer’s charge and notes that the contributors to The Glory of the Atonement failed to address Ayer’s philosophical challenge. ↩
15 Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, chap. 1, “Introduction,” under “Doctrine and Theory of the Atonement.” Craig notes that no ecumenical council has ruled on the doctrine of the atonement, leaving competing theories to be assessed by their biblical faithfulness and philosophical coherence. ↩
16 David L. Allen, The Atonement: A Biblical, Theological, and Historical Study of the Cross of Christ (Nashville: B&H Academic, 2019), 8–9. Allen lists the various domains from which biblical atonement imagery is drawn: temple (sacrifice), battlefield (victory), commerce (redemption), and law court (justification). ↩
17 Allen, The Atonement, 10–11, drawing on Oliver Crisp’s discussion of the distinction between atonement metaphors, models, doctrines, and theories. ↩
18 Allen, The Atonement, 12–13. Allen quotes Crisp’s observation that the standard tripartite classification “flattens out the differences between particular doctrines” and distorts the nature of the differences between historic approaches. ↩
19 Gustaf Aulén, Christus Victor: An Historical Study of the Three Main Types of the Idea of Atonement, trans. A. G. Hebert (New York: Macmillan, 1931). See also Allen, The Atonement, 12, for a discussion of Aulén’s influence and the limitations of his classification scheme. ↩
20 Hess, Crushing the Great Serpent, chap. 15, “Crushing the Great Serpent,” under “Christ the Victor.” Hess presents his constructive case for a classical Christus Victor understanding of the atonement. ↩
21 Anselm of Canterbury, Cur Deus Homo (c. 1098). For a helpful overview, see Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, chap. 7, “Medieval Theories.” ↩
22 Allen, The Atonement, 14. Allen observes that Abelard has been unfairly reduced to the father of all subjective theories, when his actual views were more nuanced. ↩
23 Steve Jeffery, Michael Ovey, and Andrew Sach, Pierced for Our Transgressions: Rediscovering the Glory of Penal Substitution (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2007), 21. ↩
24 Irenaeus of Lyon, Against Heresies, 3.18.7; 5.21.1–2. For a modern treatment, see Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, chap. 6, “Patristic Theories.” ↩
25 Allen, The Atonement, 13–14. Allen surveys the influence of Girard’s mimetic theory and the contributions of liberation, feminist, and postcolonial approaches to atonement theology. ↩
26 Rita Nakashima Brock and Rebecca Ann Parker, Proverbs of Ashes: Violence, Redemptive Suffering, and the Search for What Saves Us (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001). See also J. Denny Weaver, The Nonviolent Atonement, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011). ↩
27 Hess, Crushing the Great Serpent, chap. 2, “What Is Penal Substitutionary Atonement?” and chap. 15, “Crushing the Great Serpent,” under “A More Reasonable View.” ↩
28 Gathercole, Defending Substitution, 14–15, 68–80. Gathercole argues that 1 Corinthians 15:3 carries genuinely substitutionary significance, demonstrating that Christ stood in our place. ↩
29 Steve Chalke and Alan Mann, The Lost Message of Jesus (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2003), 182. See also Jeffery, Ovey, and Sach, Pierced for Our Transgressions, 25, for a discussion of the controversy. ↩
30 Stott, The Cross of Christ, 133–134. Stott insists that the atonement arises from within God himself: God must act “in absolute consistency with the perfection of his character,” satisfying both his holiness and his love simultaneously. Chapter 6, “The Self-Substitution of God,” develops this argument at length (pp. 133–163). ↩
31 Allen, The Atonement, 233. Allen states that the cross is a victory (Christus Victor) achieved by means of penal substitution, not as an alternative to it. ↩
32 Jeremy Treat, The Crucified King: Atonement and Kingdom in Biblical and Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2014), 178–182. See also Allen, The Atonement, 232–233, who engages Treat’s argument about the explanatory priority of penal substitution. ↩
33 Fr. Joshua Schooping, An Existential Soteriology: Penal Substitutionary Atonement in Light of the Mystical Theology of the Church Fathers (Olyphant, PA: St. Theophan the Recluse Press, 2020), chaps. 6–21. Schooping surveys penal substitutionary language in the writings of Cyril of Alexandria, John Chrysostom, John of Damascus, Maximus the Confessor, Gregory Palamas, Symeon the New Theologian, Philaret of Moscow, and in Orthodox liturgical hymnography. ↩
34 Jeffery, Ovey, and Sach, Pierced for Our Transgressions, 161–204. Chapter 5 surveys patristic support for substitutionary and penal atonement in Justin Martyr, Eusebius, Hilary of Poitiers, Athanasius, Gregory of Nazianzus, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Augustine, Cyril of Alexandria, and others. ↩
35 Stott, The Cross of Christ, 133. “We have located the problem of forgiveness in the gravity of sin and the majesty of God.... The problem is not outside God; it is within his own being.” ↩
36 Schooping, An Existential Soteriology, chaps. 6–21; Jeffery, Ovey, and Sach, Pierced for Our Transgressions, 161–204. ↩
37 Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, chaps. 9–14. Part III of Craig’s book is devoted entirely to philosophical reflections on the coherence, justification, and moral defensibility of penal substitution. ↩
38 Stott, The Cross of Christ, 44–45. ↩
39 Stott, The Cross of Christ, 25–27. Stott surveys the early Christian use of the fish symbol (ichthys) and other cryptic motifs in the catacombs before the cross eventually prevailed as Christianity’s universal emblem. ↩
40 Jeffery, Ovey, and Sach, Pierced for Our Transgressions, 25–26. The authors trace the trajectory of criticism from liberal theology through C. H. Dodd, Joel Green and Mark Baker, Steve Chalke, and others. ↩
41 Allen, The Atonement, 7. Allen affirms that Christ intended to die for the sins of all people in the world and builds a comprehensive case for unlimited atonement throughout his book. ↩
42 Charles H. Spurgeon, sermon “The Blood of Sprinkling” (No. 1888), delivered February 28, 1886. Quoted in Jeffery, Ovey, and Sach, Pierced for Our Transgressions, 21–22. ↩
Allen, David L. The Atonement: A Biblical, Theological, and Historical Study of the Cross of Christ. Nashville: B&H Academic, 2019.
Anselm of Canterbury. Cur Deus Homo. C. 1098.
Aulén, Gustaf. Christus Victor: An Historical Study of the Three Main Types of the Idea of Atonement. Translated by A. G. Hebert. New York: Macmillan, 1931.
Brock, Rita Nakashima, and Rebecca Ann Parker. Proverbs of Ashes: Violence, Redemptive Suffering, and the Search for What Saves Us. Boston: Beacon Press, 2001.
Chalke, Steve, and Alan Mann. The Lost Message of Jesus. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2003.
Craig, William Lane. Atonement and the Death of Christ: An Exegetical, Historical, and Philosophical Exploration. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2020.
Forsyth, P. T. The Work of Christ. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1910.
Gathercole, Simon. Defending Substitution: An Essay on Atonement in Paul. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2015.
Hess, William L. Crushing the Great Serpent: Did God Punish Jesus? 2024.
Irenaeus of Lyon. Against Heresies. C. 180.
Jeffery, Steve, Michael Ovey, and Andrew Sach. Pierced for Our Transgressions: Rediscovering the Glory of Penal Substitution. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2007.
Schooping, Fr. Joshua. An Existential Soteriology: Penal Substitutionary Atonement in Light of the Mystical Theology of the Church Fathers. Olyphant, PA: St. Theophan the Recluse Press, 2020.
Stott, John R. W. The Cross of Christ. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2006.
Treat, Jeremy. The Crucified King: Atonement and Kingdom in Biblical and Systematic Theology. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2014.
Weaver, J. Denny. The Nonviolent Atonement. 2nd ed. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011.