Chapter 10
In the last chapter, we gave eternal conscious torment its very best day in court. We laid out the strongest biblical texts, the most careful theological arguments, and the most respected defenders of the traditional view. We did this because fairness demands it. No one should reject a position they have not truly understood.
But understanding a view is not the same as accepting it. And now we must do what honest readers of Scripture must always do: we must hold the view up to the light and see where it cracks.
I want to be clear about something before we begin. Many of the finest Christians who have ever lived believed in eternal conscious torment. Augustine believed it. Aquinas believed it. Calvin and Edwards believed it. I have no doubt these were sincere, godly men who loved the Lord. I am not questioning their hearts. I am questioning their theology on this specific point—because I believe a better reading of Scripture exists, one that takes God’s love more seriously, one that makes better sense of the biblical language, and one that the earliest Greek-speaking Christians would have recognized far more readily than the version that came to dominate the Western church.
So here is what we will do in this chapter. We are going to examine five fatal problems with eternal conscious torment. I call them “fatal” not because I enjoy the word, but because I believe each one, on its own, is serious enough to call the traditional view into question—and taken together, they make it very hard to keep holding on to ECT with a clear conscience and a clear Bible.
The five problems are these: the moral problem, the biblical problem, the theological problem, the philosophical problem, and the historical problem. We will take them one by one.
I need to start with the hardest one, because it is the one that sits heaviest on the heart. And I think it should.
Eternal conscious torment teaches that God will keep billions of human beings alive—forever—for the sole purpose of tormenting them. Not for a year. Not for a thousand years. Not for a million years. Forever. Without pause. Without relief. Without hope. Without end.
Think about that for a moment. Really think about it.
The famous preacher Jonathan Edwards once described the experience of hell this way: the wicked “shall eternally feel the torment, not for one minute, nor for one day, nor for one year, nor for one age, nor for a hundred ages, nor for a million of ages, one after another, but for ever and ever; without any end, and never, never be delivered!”1 Fray Luis de Granada imagined sinners who “in cruel rage and despair turn their fury against God and themselves, gnawing their flesh with their mouth, breaking their teeth with gnashing, furiously tearing themselves with their nails, and everlastingly blaspheming against the judge.”2 Even John Wesley, who proclaimed the love of God with unmatched passion, wrote that the wicked will “gnaw their tongues for anguish and pain; they will curse God and look upwards. There the dogs of hell, pride, malice, revenge, rage, horror, despair, continually devour them.”3
Now here is the question that will not go away. What kind of God does this?
As Sharon Baker puts it: even in human courts, “juries, lawyers, and judges ostensibly work to fit the punishment to the crime.”4 We have built entire justice systems around the idea that the punishment must be proportional to the offense. A person who steals a candy bar does not get the death penalty. A person who runs a red light does not get life in prison. We recognize instinctively that a just punishment must fit the crime.
But ECT throws this principle into the garbage. Under ECT, a person who lived seventy years and sinned grievously receives the same punishment as a person who lived seventy years and sinned only mildly: both get infinite, unending, conscious torment. The Adolf Hitlers and the mildly selfish grandmothers all burn together, forever and ever, without distinction of severity and without hope of release. This is not justice. This is something else entirely.
Key Argument: The most basic principle of justice is that the punishment must fit the crime. But under ECT, finite sins committed during a short human lifetime are punished with literally infinite suffering. No matter how terrible a person’s sins may be, the amount of wrongdoing in a human life is still finite. Infinite punishment for finite sin is not justice. It is disproportion of the most extreme kind.
R. Zachary Manis makes this case with careful precision. The principle at stake is what he calls the proportionality principle: a punishment is just only if its severity is proportionate to the severity of the wrongdoing it punishes.5 This is not some modern liberal invention. It is one of the most basic moral intuitions human beings possess. And it is deeply embedded in Scripture itself. The Old Testament law of “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth” (Exod. 21:24) was not a license for cruelty. It was a limit on punishment—a command that the punishment must not exceed the offense.6
Manis offers a simple thought experiment to make the point clear. Imagine a young child caught stealing candy from a store. The store manager demands that the child’s hand be cut off as punishment. Everyone recognizes immediately that this is not justice, no matter how wrong the child’s action was. The punishment is wildly out of proportion to the offense.7
Now multiply that example by infinity. That is what ECT asks us to accept about God. Not just a punishment out of proportion to the crime, but an infinitely disproportionate punishment for a finite set of offenses. And not imposed by a flawed human judge, but by the God who is love.
No loving father would do this. No decent human judge would do this. And we are asked to believe that the God who said, “I take no pleasure in the death of the wicked” (Ezek. 33:11), the God who “so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son” (John 3:16), the God who commands us to love our enemies (Matt. 5:44)—this God will torture His enemies forever?
Baker’s student Brooke put it memorably: “Even the government considers torture a criminal action! How can we condone it just because God is doing it?”8 Brooke may not have said it like a theologian, but she said it like a person with a functioning moral compass. And that matters. Because our moral compasses are not defective. God made them. They are part of being created in His image.
Someone might respond that sins against an infinite God deserve infinite punishment. This is the argument that William Shedd and others have advanced: because God is infinite in dignity, any offense against Him incurs infinite guilt, and therefore infinite punishment is justified.9 Manis dismantles this argument with devastating clarity. If this logic were correct, then every single sin—no matter how small—would deserve infinite punishment. Jaywalking would incur the same infinite guilt as murder. A white lie told to spare someone’s feelings would merit the same unending torment as genocide. The very idea of proportional justice collapses completely.10 As Manis puts it, this is more sensibly taken as a reductio ad absurdum—a proof that the argument has gone terribly wrong.11
Even worse, Shedd’s argument actually destroys the concept of retributive justice that it is trying to defend. If all sins are equally infinite in guilt, then there is no difference in severity between stealing a cookie and committing mass murder. And if all punishments are equally infinite in duration, then punishment accomplishes nothing. Whether a sinner is punished or not, the infinite guilt remains unchanged. Shedd’s view makes justice meaningless.12
Baker also raises the deeply troubling point that our traditional views of hell create a God with a split personality. We try to relieve the tension between love and punishment “by appealing to God’s love and mercy on the one hand, and to God’s justice and wrath on the other, assigning split personalities to God, as if God were a character like Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde.”66 We tell ourselves that God loves sinners and yet tortures them forever. We say that God desires all to be saved, yet He has designed a system in which most are lost forever. We preach that God forgives unconditionally, yet He demands an eternity of suffering for sins committed over a handful of decades.
Something does not add up. And the reason it does not add up is not because we lack faith. It is because the picture is wrong.
Think of it this way. We are commanded to love our enemies (Matt. 5:44). We are told to forgive seventy times seven (Matt. 18:22). We are instructed to overcome evil with good (Rom. 12:21). And we are told to “be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect” (Matt. 5:48)—to imitate God in all these things. But if God Himself tortures His enemies forever, then He is not doing what He commands us to do. He is commanding a higher standard of love from us than He practices Himself. The teacher is less loving than the student. The Father falls short of what He demands of His children.67
This is a moral absurdity. And it is one that has not gone unnoticed by the watching world. How many thoughtful non-Christians have looked at the doctrine of ECT and concluded, quite reasonably, that a God who tortures people forever is not worth worshipping? How many have walked away from the faith not because they hate God, but because they cannot bring themselves to love a God who does such things?
Baker’s student Lisa put it this way: “If God loves even enemies, and desires reconciliation with each one, should this fact alone give us cause to think differently about hell? Shouldn’t justice look more like love?”68 Yes, Lisa. It should. And in the divine presence model, it does.
The moral argument against ECT is simple, but it is powerful. Infinite punishment for finite sin is not justice. It is vengeance without limit. And vengeance without limit is not a quality of the God revealed in Jesus Christ.
One of the most important discoveries I made in my study of hell was this: the key biblical phrases that are used to support ECT do not actually say what most English readers think they say. The problem is not with the Bible. The problem is with the translation.
We need to look at two Greek words very carefully: aionios (often translated “eternal” or “everlasting”) and kolasis (often translated “punishment”). Both words appear in what is probably the single most important verse in the entire ECT debate: Matthew 25:46, where Jesus says, “And these will go away into eternal punishment, but the righteous into eternal life.”
Every major English translation renders this verse in almost identical language.13 “Eternal punishment” sounds pretty clear, doesn’t it? But the Greek is considerably more complex than the English lets on.
The Greek word aionios comes from the root word aion, which means “age” or “era.” In the world of the New Testament, people thought in terms of two great ages: the present age and the age to come. Aionios, at its most basic level, means “pertaining to the age” or “of the age to come.”14 It is an adjective that describes the quality of something that belongs to God’s coming age. It does not automatically or necessarily mean “unending in duration.”
This matters enormously. When Jesus spoke of “eternal life” (zoe aionios), He defined it not as life that goes on forever (though it does), but as a quality of relationship: “And this is eternal life, that they may know You, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom You have sent” (John 17:3). Eternal life is life lived in the knowledge and love of God. It is life that belongs to the age to come. Its duration is secondary to its nature.15
Dr. Helena Keizer, in her doctoral dissertation on aion in Greek literature and philosophy, concluded: “Infinity is not an intrinsic or necessary connotation of aion, either in the Greek or in the Biblical usage.”16 David Konstan and Ilaria Ramelli, in their scholarly study Terms for Eternity, agree. They write that aionios, “when it is associated with life or punishment, in the Bible and in Christian authors who keep themselves close to the Biblical usage, denotes their belonging to the world to come.”17
To be fair, ECT defenders like Denny Burk point out that aionios is used sixty-six times in the New Testament, fifty-one of those referring to the happiness of the righteous, and that its use in Matthew 25:46 sets up a parallel between eternal life and eternal punishment. If the life is unending, they argue, then the punishment must be unending too.18 This is a real argument, and it deserves a fair response.
The response comes from recognizing that parallel language does not always mean identical duration. Eternal life is an end in itself—it is a quality of relationship with God that, by its very nature, has no end, because God Himself has no end. Eternal punishment, by contrast, could be punishment that belongs to the age to come, punishment that comes from God, punishment whose effects are permanent—without necessarily meaning that the act of punishing goes on forever.19 Thomas Talbott makes the point clearly: the fire that destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah is called “eternal fire” in Jude 7, but no one believes those cities are still burning today. The fire was eternal in the sense that it came from God and its results were permanent—not in the sense that it burned without end.20
Robin Parry, in Four Views on Hell, makes the same observation: it is significant that universalists among the early Church Fathers happily used the word aionios to describe eschatological punishment while still believing that punishment would eventually come to an end. They saw no contradiction in this, because they understood aionios to describe the quality of the punishment (it belongs to God’s age), not necessarily its duration.21
The second word is even more interesting. The Greek word kolasis, translated “punishment” in Matthew 25:46, has a very specific history. In classical Greek, it was distinguished from another word for punishment, timoria. The difference is important. Timoria refers to retributive, vindictive punishment—punishment for the sake of the one inflicting it. Kolasis, on the other hand, refers to corrective, remedial discipline—punishment aimed at improving the one who receives it.22
Aristotle himself drew this distinction clearly. He wrote that kolasis is inflicted in the interest of the sufferer, while timoria is inflicted in the interest of the one who inflicts it.23 The word kolasis comes from the verb kolazo, which originally meant “to prune”—as in pruning a tree to help it grow better.24 William Barclay, the world-renowned Greek scholar, stated bluntly that “in all Greek secular literature kolasis is never used of anything but remedial punishment.”25
Now, I must be fair here. ECT defenders push back hard on this point. Burk argues that kolasis in the New Testament and related literature does not carry the corrective meaning, and that the standard lexicon of New Testament Greek defines kolasis in Matthew 25:46 as “transcendent retribution.”26 Parry himself, though a universalist, concedes that by the time of the New Testament, kolasis could be used generically for punishment regardless of whether it was corrective.27 So I will not hang the entire case on this single word.
But here is what I will say: even if kolasis in Matthew 25:46 carries a generic meaning, it is deeply significant that Jesus chose this word rather than timoria. If Jesus had wanted to communicate vindictive, retributive punishment without any corrective element, the Greek language offered Him a perfectly clear way to do so. He did not use it. He chose the word whose classical meaning is pruning, correction, and discipline. At minimum, this should give us pause before we build the entire doctrine of eternal conscious torment on this single verse.28
A Note on Translation: The distinguished Greek scholar Richard Weymouth translated Matthew 25:46 as “these shall go away into the Punishment of the Ages, but the righteous into the Life of the Ages.” This translation captures the age-based meaning of aionios and avoids importing the assumption that “eternal” must mean “unending.” Interestingly, after Weymouth’s death, the publishers of his translation changed this rendering back to “everlasting punishment” in the fourth edition—an editorial decision made without the translator’s consent.29
The other major biblical pillar of ECT is the language of Revelation, particularly Revelation 14:11 (“the smoke of their torment rises forever and ever”) and Revelation 20:10 (“they will be tormented day and night forever and ever”). These verses sound clear and final in English. But we must remember what kind of literature we are reading.
Revelation is apocalyptic literature. That is a technical word for a style of writing that uses vivid, symbolic, often wildly exaggerated imagery to communicate spiritual truths. Apocalyptic writing is not meant to be read like a newspaper report. It is meant to be read like a political cartoon—with symbols and images that communicate a message through intensity and drama, not through literal correspondence to physical reality.30
Consider this: Revelation 19:3 uses the exact same “forever and ever” language about the smoke rising from the fallen city of Babylon. But no one believes that the ancient city of Babylon is still burning today. The language communicates totality and finality of destruction—not literally unending combustion.31
The same is true of Jude 7, which describes Sodom and Gomorrah as suffering “the punishment of eternal fire.” But as we read in Genesis 19, those cities were destroyed in a single catastrophic event. They are not still burning. The “eternal fire” refers to the finality and divine origin of the destruction, not to a fire that literally burns without ceasing.32 Second Peter 2:6 makes this even clearer, stating that God “condemned the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah by burning them to ashes, and made them an example of what is going to happen to the ungodly.” Ashes. Not an eternal bonfire. Ashes.33
John Stackhouse, in Four Views on Hell, makes a penetrating observation about Revelation’s imagery. The phrase “no rest day or night” in Revelation 14:11 does not necessarily mean that the wicked are conscious forever. In the Old Testament, “rest” carries the positive meaning of Sabbath rest—of enjoying God’s presence in the Promised Land. To say the condemned have “no rest” is to say they will never enter God’s Sabbath rest. They are shut out permanently. It is a statement about exclusion, not about ongoing consciousness.34
Similarly, Isaiah 66:24—the passage Jesus quotes in Mark 9:48 about the worm that does not die and the fire that is not quenched—describes corpses being consumed, not living people being tortured. The worms and fire are agents of destruction. The point is that nothing stops them from finishing their work. They consume everything. Eventually, nothing is left.35
Key Argument: The “forever and ever” language in Revelation is borrowed from Old Testament prophetic imagery, where it consistently communicates the totality and finality of God’s judgment—not its literal, unending duration. Sodom’s “eternal fire” is not still burning. Babylon’s smoke does not still rise. These are powerful symbols of complete and irreversible destruction, drawn from a long tradition of apocalyptic writing.
None of this means that the judgment described in these verses is not real or not serious. It is both. What it means is that the specific claim of ECT—that conscious torment continues without end—cannot be established from the apocalyptic imagery of Revelation without reading far more into the symbolism than the genre warrants.
One more biblical point deserves attention. ECT defenders frequently appeal to the parable of the rich man and Lazarus (Luke 16:19–31) as evidence of conscious suffering in the afterlife. And there is, indeed, conscious suffering in this parable. The rich man is in Hades, in torment, and he can see Lazarus in Abraham’s bosom. But notice two things. First, this parable takes place in Hades—the intermediate state between death and the final judgment—not in the lake of fire. As we discussed in Chapter 7, Hades and Gehenna are different realities. The rich man is awaiting judgment, not experiencing his final fate. Second, the parable says nothing about the duration of the rich man’s suffering. It does not say he will be there forever. It says there is a “great chasm” fixed between the two sides (Luke 16:26), which could refer to the finality of the division at that point in time. To build the entire doctrine of eternal conscious torment on a parable about the intermediate state is to build on a foundation that cannot bear the weight.69
A further consideration is the way Jesus used the word Gehenna (often translated “hell”). Gehenna refers to the Valley of Hinnom outside Jerusalem—a place associated with burning refuse and with the historical atrocity of child sacrifice. It was a place of destruction, not of ongoing torment. The fire there was not designed to keep things alive but to consume them. When Jesus warned people about Gehenna, His audience would have pictured a garbage dump where things are burned up and destroyed—not a place of eternal, conscious existence.70
Matthew 10:28 is especially significant: “Do not be afraid of those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul. Rather, be afraid of the One who can destroy both soul and body in Gehenna.” The word is “destroy” (apollymi), not “torment forever.” Jesus is warning about the destruction of the whole person, body and soul together. This is far more naturally read as a statement about final destruction than about eternal, conscious suffering.71
The cumulative weight of the biblical evidence is striking. When we pay careful attention to the Greek words, the literary genre of apocalyptic writing, the Old Testament background of the fire imagery, and Jesus’s own word choices, the case for ECT becomes much weaker than most English-speaking Christians have been led to believe. The Bible does teach judgment. It does teach fire. It does teach terrible consequences for rejecting God. But it does not clearly or unambiguously teach that these consequences involve unending, conscious suffering—and the key texts that are supposed to prove it are more naturally read as pointing to the finality and seriousness of divine judgment than to its infinite duration.
Here is a problem that I have rarely seen ECT defenders address adequately, and it is one of the most devastating.
If ECT is true, then God must actively sustain the wicked in existence forever. Think about what this means. On the traditional view, the wicked are not just left to suffer as a natural consequence of their choices. God must keep them alive—forever—so that they can continue to suffer. God must power the furnace, so to speak. God must provide the energy and the continued existence that makes unending torment possible.
This means that God becomes, for all eternity, the active sustainer of suffering. He is not merely allowing evil to run its course. He is maintaining evil, preserving evil, guaranteeing that evil and suffering will continue without end. Robin Parry puts the point sharply: on this view, “God ends up perpetuating sin and an evil world without end. It is true that he is forever balancing them out with the appropriate amount of punishment, but it remains the case that instead of removing sin from creation, God actively keeps unreconciled, sinful wills around forever in hell.”36
This is deeply troubling. Scripture teaches that God’s ultimate purpose is to make all things new, to wipe away every tear, to bring about a creation in which “there shall be no more death, nor sorrow, nor crying” (Rev. 21:4). But if billions of souls are screaming in agony in hell for all eternity, has God truly made all things new? Has He truly conquered evil? Or has He merely contained it, while guaranteeing that it will exist alongside His kingdom forever?
Baker sees this problem clearly. She writes that traditional theories of hell “not only keep evil in eternal existence; they also keep the cycle of violence in motion for all eternity. Through loving every enemy, through the life and resurrection of Jesus, God interrupts and, I believe, eventually ends the cycle of violence with that love. But not if we hold to our traditional views of hell.”37
There is also the agonizing question of what ECT does to the redeemed. Can the saints ever be truly happy in heaven if the people they loved on earth are writhing in torment forever? Parry asks this question with devastating emotional force: “In the resurrection, how could a mother ever find perfect joy if her beloved daughter is burning in hell?”38 The God-given love she has for her daughter makes her yearn for her child’s entry into divine life. But under ECT, this can never happen. Not in a million years. Not ever. So it is not only the daughter who has no hope. The mother has none either—at least, not for the wholeness of her joy.
The traditional answer to this problem has been deeply disturbing. Aquinas taught that the saints in heaven would delight in witnessing the torments of the damned, as this would demonstrate God’s justice.39 Tertullian suggested that the spectacle of the wicked in hell would be a source of entertainment for the blessed.40 And Burk suggests that eternal punishment “will ultimately become a source of joy and praise for the saints as they witness the infinite goodness and justice of God.”41
I find this vision morally repugnant. Parry is right to respond: “We will look upon the damned, which will include people we love deeply, and see them in desolate turmoil of soul, with absolutely no hope, and our hearts will overflow with happiness. No thanks.”42 If heaven requires us to become the kind of people who can watch our loved ones suffer without compassion, then heaven has made us less human, not more. And a God who demands this kind of emotional hardness from His children is not the God revealed in Jesus Christ, who wept at the tomb of Lazarus.
The theological problem is this: ECT does not resolve the problem of evil. It institutionalizes it. It makes God the eternal guarantor that evil, suffering, and unredeemed sinful wills will exist alongside His kingdom forever. It asks us to believe that the God whose stated purpose is “to reconcile to Himself all things” (Col. 1:20) will, in fact, leave vast portions of His creation permanently unreconciled. This is not a minor theological tension. It is a gaping wound in the heart of the traditional view.
Consider also the problem from the perspective of the cross. The New Testament teaches that Jesus died to destroy the works of the devil (1 John 3:8), to reconcile all things to God (Col. 1:20), and to bring about a new creation in which God is “all in all” (1 Cor. 15:28). But if ECT is true, then the works of the devil are never fully destroyed—they persist in the lives of the damned forever. All things are never truly reconciled—billions of souls remain alienated from God for eternity. And God is never truly “all in all”—for vast regions of His creation remain consumed by hatred, suffering, and rebellion that have no end. On this view, the cross does not achieve what Scripture says it achieves. Christ’s victory is, at best, a partial victory—glorious for some, but forever incomplete for the majority of human beings who have ever lived.
This should trouble us. It troubled Alexandre Kalomiros, the Orthodox theologian whose essay The River of Fire has influenced so many of us. Kalomiros warned that the Western tradition’s emphasis on retributive justice had distorted the very gospel. When God is presented primarily as a judge dispensing punishments rather than as a Father offering healing, the result is a Christianity that “does not seem to them to be true. And maybe it is really false—not Christianity itself, but the way in which it has been presented to them.”72 The problem is not with God. The problem is with a theology that has made God look less loving than He actually is.
Baker puts her finger on the central issue when she observes that if we continue to believe in traditional hell, “we also must accept a God who would create and require that kind of hell, a God whose anger, vengeance, and vindictiveness endure forever without hope of mercy.”73 But the God revealed in Jesus is not a God of endless vengeance. He is a God who says, “Come to Me, all who are weary and heavy-laden, and I will give you rest” (Matt. 11:28). He is a God who heals the sick, raises the dead, forgives sinners, and weeps over the city that will reject Him. He is a God who, hanging on the cross, prays for the forgiveness of the very men who put Him there. Is this the same God who will torture people forever? I do not see how it can be.
Manis’s most penetrating contribution to the debate is what he calls the problem of love—and he argues convincingly that it is even more serious than the problem of justice.43
The argument is simple. To love someone means to will their highest good, insofar as you are able. This is not just a nice idea—it is the core of the Christian understanding of agape love. If God is perfectly loving, then God wills the highest good of every person He has created. But ECT teaches that hell is a retributive punishment. It is not designed to improve the person being punished. It is not intended to reform, heal, or restore. It serves no redemptive purpose whatsoever. The person in hell is not being disciplined toward a better end. There is no “better end.” There is only suffering, forever, for the sake of suffering.44
A punishment that is not aimed at the good of the person being punished is, by definition, unloving. Even if it could somehow be shown to be just (which we have already questioned), it would still be unloving. And that is the key. Because any view of hell that makes God unloving toward even one of His creatures is a view that contradicts the most basic declaration of Scripture: “God is love” (1 John 4:8).45
ECT defenders have tried various responses. Some argue that hell is a way of respecting the dignity of the damned. To be a moral agent is to be held accountable for your choices, and if God simply let sin go unpunished, He would be treating sinners as less than fully human.46 Manis acknowledges the appeal of this argument but shows that it falls apart under scrutiny. Even if eternal retributive punishment were a way of respecting someone’s moral agency, love requires more than willing some good. It requires willing the person’s highest good. And eternal suffering in hell is not anyone’s highest good.47
Manis offers a powerful analogy. Imagine a recovering drug addict going through severe withdrawal. His wife, wanting to relieve his pain, gives him more of the drug. She knows it will eventually kill him, but she just wants to help with the immediate suffering. This woman loves her husband in a sense—she wills some limited good for him. But she is not willing his highest good. She is feeding the addiction that will destroy him. Her love is deficient because it stops short of what true love demands.48
The same logic applies to the claim that hell promotes the dignity of the damned. Even if it did promote some good (which is debatable), it falls infinitely short of promoting their highest good. And a God who fails to will the highest good of His creatures is not a God who loves maximally. He is not a God whose love is perfect.
Insight: The problem of love may be the most devastating critique of ECT, because it strikes at the very heart of who God is. The problem of justice asks, “Is God fair?” The problem of love asks, “Is God good?” Any view of hell in which God ceases to will the highest good of His creatures—even the worst of them—is a view in which God has stopped being love. And if God stops being love, God stops being God.
Manis also develops what he calls the doxastic problem of hell—a set of problems that arise not from the doctrine of hell itself but from believing the doctrine. Here the critique is startling. If ECT is true and people know it is true, then the threat of eternal torment functions as a kind of cosmic coercion. When someone is told, “Believe in God or burn forever,” how can their belief be a free act of love? It is more like handing your wallet to a mugger who holds a gun to your head. You may comply, but your compliance is not free. It is forced.49
This creates a devastating paradox. The very things God demands of us in order to avoid hell—repentance, love, trust, worship—are things that cannot be coerced. You cannot make someone repent, because repentance is by its very nature a free act. You cannot force someone to love, because forced love is not love at all. So the revelation of ECT, if truly internalized, actually makes it impossible to do what is required to avoid hell. The only people who can respond to God freely are those who do not truly believe the doctrine.50
This is not just a philosophical puzzle. It is a pastoral crisis. I have met Christians who are paralyzed by the fear of hell—not for themselves, but for their children, their parents, their friends. Marilyn Adams writes that “the disproportionate threat of hell produces despair that masquerades as skepticism, rebellion, and unbelief. If your father threatens to kill you if you disobey him, you may cower in terrorized submission, but you may also reasonably run away from home.”51 How many people have abandoned the Christian faith not because they found it intellectually implausible, but because they could not stomach the idea of worshipping a God who tortures people forever?
Furthermore, First John 4:18 teaches that “perfect love drives out fear.” But belief in ECT produces fear—fear that has to do with punishment. If this fear is incompatible with love, and love is necessary for genuine worship, then belief in ECT actually impedes worship. The very doctrine that is supposed to drive people to their knees before God ends up making genuine worship psychologically impossible.52
The philosophical case against ECT, then, is not just about abstract logic. It reaches into the practical life of faith. ECT does not just create a theological problem. It creates a spiritual one.
Perhaps the most common defense of ECT is an appeal to tradition. “The church has always believed this,” people say. “Who are we to question centuries of consensus?”
But this claim turns out to be historically inaccurate. The tradition is far more diverse than most Western Christians realize. And the closer we look at the earliest centuries—the centuries when the Church was closest to the apostles, when the New Testament was being read in the original Greek by native Greek speakers—the more diversity we find.
Manis puts it this way: “alternatives to traditionalism were prominent in the early church, and even dominant in the Eastern church for the first five centuries.” During this period, he notes, “there was no consensus or official doctrine of hell yet established, and within the writings of the early church fathers, support for traditionalism, annihilationism, and universalism can be found; in fact, support for more than one view often can be found within the writings of a single author.”53
Think about that. The earliest Christians—the ones who read Paul and John in the original Greek, the ones who studied under the apostles’ own disciples—did not agree on ECT. Some of the most important and influential Church Fathers were not ECT defenders at all.
Clement of Alexandria, one of the greatest scholars of the early church, taught that the fire of judgment is remedial—a process designed to bring fallen creatures back to God.54 Origen, the most brilliant biblical scholar of the early centuries, believed in the eventual restoration of all things—a view called apokatastasis (a Greek word meaning “restoration to the original state”).55 Gregory of Nyssa, one of the three Cappadocian Fathers who shaped the Nicene Creed we confess today, was a universalist who taught that God’s fire would eventually purify every soul.56
And Gregory of Nyssa is no marginal figure. He is one of the architects of orthodox Trinitarian theology. If ECT were truly the non-negotiable position of the early church, how could one of the chief framers of the Nicene Creed have rejected it?
Parry provides a longer list of early Christian thinkers who either held or were sympathetic to universalism. This list includes Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory of Nazianzus (who presided over the second ecumenical council), Basil of Caesarea, Isaac of Nineveh, Maximus the Confessor, Didymus the Blind, Diodore of Tarsus, Theodore of Mopsuestia, and others.57 Augustine himself, the great champion of ECT in the West, acknowledged in his own day that many Christians believed in eventual universal salvation. He did not treat them as heretics wandering in from outside the church. He treated them as fellow believers with whom he disagreed.58
Charles Pridgeon, president of the Pittsburgh Bible Institute, summarized the historical situation well: “In these early centuries those holding the doctrine of endless punishment were in the minority, and no one was counted unorthodox who believed in restitution and the ultimate and complete victory of Christ.”59
There is also the significant fact that the early ecumenical creeds—the Apostles’ Creed, the Nicene Creed, the Chalcedonian Definition—say nothing about eternal conscious torment. They affirm the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come. They do not define the mechanics of hell. If ECT were the essential, non-negotiable teaching that its defenders claim, why did the councils that defined orthodox Christianity say nothing about it?60
This silence is even more striking when we remember who sat on these councils. Gregory of Nazianzus, widely considered sympathetic to universalism, presided for a time over the second ecumenical council—the very council that finalized the Nicene Creed as we know it today. If ECT were the doctrinal litmus test its modern defenders claim it to be, how could a universalist-leaning bishop have led the most important creedal council in Christian history?76
Ethelbert Stauffer, the distinguished historian and scholar, summarized the situation powerfully: “The primitive church never gave up the hope that in His will to save, the ‘all-merciful’ and ‘all-powerful’ God would overcome even the final ‘no’ of the self-sufficient world.”77 This does not mean the early church was universalist. It means the early church was diverse, open, and honest about the difficulty of the question—and it did not excommunicate people for hoping that God’s love might ultimately prove victorious over every obstacle.
It is also worth noting, as Manis observes, that the presentation of the gospel in the book of Acts makes no explicit reference to hell. Neither do the Pauline epistles. Even Jesus placed the emphasis of His message not on the afterlife but on the kingdom of God coming to earth. The modern tendency to make hell the centerpiece of evangelistic appeals has no real precedent in the earliest Christian preaching.78
The historical argument matters because it removes the single most powerful rhetorical weapon that ECT defenders have: the claim that to question eternal conscious torment is to abandon the Christian tradition. It is not. It is, in fact, to recover a range of views that the earliest and most learned Christians held openly, debated freely, and never treated as heresy.
Common Objection: “But if the early church was so diverse, doesn’t that mean ECT is just as valid as the alternatives? Why not stick with tradition?” The answer is that I am not arguing that ECT should be rejected simply because the early church was diverse. I am arguing that the appeal to tradition does not settle the debate the way ECT defenders want it to. When they say, “The church has always taught ECT,” they are making a factual claim that is not true. The diversity of the early church means we must do the hard work of exegesis, theology, and philosophy to determine which view is best—and when we do that work, as we have done in this chapter, ECT comes up short.
One final point about history. It was Augustine, more than any other single figure, who established ECT as the dominant view in the Western church. Augustine was a giant of the faith, and I respect him deeply. But it is worth noting that Augustine himself admitted that his knowledge of Greek was limited. He wrote, “I have learned very little of the Greek language.”61 The man most responsible for cementing the doctrine of eternal punishment in the Western tradition was, by his own admission, not a skilled reader of the language in which the New Testament was written. This does not mean Augustine was wrong. But it does mean we should be careful about treating his interpretation of Greek texts as the final word.
So if ECT fails on moral, biblical, theological, philosophical, and historical grounds—what replaces it? We have been building toward an answer throughout this book, and in the chapters to come we will develop it fully. But even here, at the point of critique, it is important to see that the divine presence model offers a better way.
On the divine presence model, hell is real. Judgment is real. The fire is real. But the fire is not a torture chamber built by an angry God. The fire is God. It is the overwhelming, all-consuming, inescapable blaze of His love—a love that purifies the willing and torments the resistant. The difference between heaven and hell is not a difference in location or in what God does. The difference is in the human heart. The same divine love that fills the saints with joy scorches the souls of those who have hardened themselves against it. As Isaac the Syrian taught, those who find themselves in Gehenna “will be chastised with the scourge of love. How cruel and bitter this torment of love will be! For those who understand that they have sinned against love undergo greater sufferings than those produced by the most fearful tortures.”62
On this view, every one of the five problems we have identified in this chapter finds its resolution.
The moral problem dissolves because God is not torturing anyone. He is being Himself—love. It is the sinner’s own hatred, self-deception, and hardness of heart that transforms the experience of perfect love into torment. God does not change. The human heart determines how His love is received.
The biblical problem is resolved because the divine presence model fits the biblical language better than ECT. The fire of Scripture is God’s own fire (Heb. 12:29), and it purifies or consumes depending on what it touches—just as Malachi describes (Mal. 3:2–3) and just as Paul teaches (1 Cor. 3:12–15). Kolasis can carry its corrective meaning naturally within this framework. Aionios need not be pressed into the service of infinite duration. The apocalyptic imagery of Revelation finds its proper home in a model that takes the fire of God seriously without turning God into a torturer.
The theological problem of God sustaining eternal evil is addressed because, on the divine presence model, God is not keeping the wicked alive to suffer. He is revealing Himself fully—and the wicked either yield to that revelation or are consumed by it. Whether the final outcome is destruction (conditional immortality) or eventual restoration (universal reconciliation) is a question we will explore in later chapters. But either way, God does not become the eternal guarantor of unredeemed evil. Evil ends—either by the transformation of the sinner or by the destruction of the sin-hardened soul.
The philosophical problem of love is resolved because, on the divine presence model, God never stops willing the highest good of every person. His fire is always aimed at restoration. Even the suffering of hell has a purpose—not punishment for its own sake, but the natural consequence of a sin-hardened heart encountering the fullness of Love. And the doxastic problems are eased because the revelation of hell is no longer a cosmic threat designed to coerce compliance. It is a warning about what happens when we harden our hearts against the Love that made us. This is the difference between a mugger with a gun and a doctor with a diagnosis. The doctor’s warning may be terrifying, but it is given in love, and its purpose is to save you.63
The historical problem is addressed because the divine presence model is not a modern invention. It has deep roots in the Eastern Orthodox tradition, in the writings of the Greek-speaking Church Fathers, and in the theological insights of thinkers as diverse as Isaac the Syrian, Basil the Great, Gregory of Nyssa, and C. S. Lewis.64 As we will see in Chapter 15, this is the view that the earliest Greek-speaking Christians would have recognized—the view that the Western church lost when it adopted a juridical, retributive framework for understanding hell.
Baker captures the heart of the matter when she writes that an alternative view of hell is possible—one that “lines up with Scripture, that gives possible solutions to the troubles above, and that weaves hell into the fabric of a loving, compassionate God who never forsakes us—the human race, who never abandons us—all humanity, and who seeks to reconcile us with God now and for all eternity.”65
That is the view we are building in this book.
One more thing needs to be said about the divine presence model in relation to ECT. The divine presence model does not dismiss the seriousness of what ECT is trying to protect. ECT, at its best, is trying to say that sin matters, that judgment is real, that eternity is at stake, and that God is not to be trifled with. The divine presence model agrees with every one of those convictions. In fact, I would argue that the divine presence model takes sin more seriously than ECT does. On the traditional view, sin is a legal violation that is met with a legal penalty. On the divine presence model, sin is a sickness of the soul that corrupts a person’s capacity to receive love—and when that person stands before the God who is Love, the corruption becomes agony. Sin is not just breaking a rule. It is becoming the kind of person for whom Love itself is torment. That is far more terrifying than any medieval portrait of hellfire and pitchforks.74
The divine presence model also preserves the biblical language of fire, judgment, wrath, and destruction—language that the choice model, as we will see in the next chapter, struggles to accommodate. On the divine presence model, the fire is real—it is God’s love, burning with purifying intensity. The judgment is real—it is the moment when every heart is laid bare before perfect Love. The wrath is real—it is the natural reaction of holiness to sin, experienced by the sinner as overwhelming torment. And the destruction is real—for those who harden themselves against Love beyond the point of no return, the fire that was meant to purify instead consumes. The divine presence model does not soften judgment. It explains it.
Manis captures the balance beautifully. On the divine presence model, God’s aim is always toward restoration, and His intention is the salvation of every person. But the damned experience God’s culminating act of salvation—the revealing of Christ in glory—as a retributive punishment, because their hearts are not able to receive it as the gift it truly is.75 The punishment is real. The suffering is real. But the cause of the suffering is not a vindictive God inflicting pain. The cause is a love so fierce and so pure that it exposes everything false, everything selfish, everything hardened in the human heart. For the willing, this exposure brings healing. For the resistant, it brings destruction. The fire is the same. The difference is in us.
We have covered a lot of ground in this chapter. We have examined five serious problems with eternal conscious torment—the moral problem of disproportionate punishment, the biblical problem of misread Greek, the theological problem of God sustaining evil forever, the philosophical problem of a love that stops loving, and the historical problem of a tradition that is far more diverse than we were told.
Each of these problems, by itself, is serious enough to give a thoughtful Christian pause. Taken together, they form a case that I believe is overwhelming. ECT makes God a torturer of finite sinners. It rests on translations that obscure the meaning of the original Greek. It requires God to sustain an eternal empire of suffering alongside His kingdom. It violates the very definition of love. And it claims a historical consensus that never actually existed.
I do not say this with glee. I take no pleasure in dismantling a view that many sincere believers hold dear. But I believe truth matters more than comfort, and the truth is that ECT does not do justice to the God revealed in Scripture. It does not do justice to the cross of Christ. And it does not do justice to the moral intuitions that God Himself has planted in the human heart.
I want to close with something personal.
When I first began to question ECT, I was afraid. I thought I was questioning God. I thought I was losing my faith. But as I dug deeper into the Scripture, into the Greek, into the Church Fathers, into the careful philosophical work of scholars like Manis and the passionate theological reflections of Baker—I discovered something that changed my life.
I was not losing God. I was finding a better God. Not a different God—the same God. The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. The God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. The God who is love. But a God whose love is deeper, more relentless, more serious, and more fearsome than the ECT tradition ever imagined. A God whose fire is not a torture chamber but a refiner’s furnace. A God whose wrath is not vindictive rage but the fierce, white-hot intensity of a love that will not let us go.
The question is not whether God judges. He does. The question is not whether hell is real. It is. The question is whether the God revealed in Jesus Christ—the God who died for His enemies, the God who wept over Jerusalem, the God who asked the Father to forgive the very men who were hammering nails into His hands—whether that God would build a torture chamber and stock it with the people He created and loves.
I do not believe He would. I do not believe He did. And in the chapters ahead, we will see why.
The divine presence model does not lower the stakes of eternity. It raises our view of God. And when we see God rightly—as the consuming fire of love that He is—everything about hell makes more sense, more biblical sense, more theological sense, and more moral sense than the traditional view ever could.
We are not done yet. In the next chapter, we will turn to the choice model of hell—the view made famous by C. S. Lewis—and ask whether it does better than ECT. It does, in many ways. But it also leaves some questions unanswered. And when we have looked at all the options, I believe we will see that the divine presence model handles the full weight of the biblical, theological, and philosophical evidence better than any of its competitors.
For our God is a consuming fire. And His fire is love.
↑ 1. Jonathan Edwards, “Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God” (1741). Quoted also in Baker, Razing Hell, p. 7.
↑ 2. Fray Luis de Granada (1588), quoted in Baker, Razing Hell, p. 7.
↑ 3. John Wesley, Sermon 15, quoted in Baker, Razing Hell, p. 7.
↑ 4. Baker, Razing Hell, p. 20.
↑ 5. Manis, Thinking Through the Problem of Hell, “The standard version of the problem of justice.”
↑ 6. The lex talionis (“law of retaliation”) in Exodus 21:24 was widely understood in ancient Israel as a ceiling on punishment, not a floor. It established proportionality as a core principle of justice.
↑ 7. Manis, Thinking Through the Problem of Hell, “The standard version of the problem of justice.”
↑ 8. Baker, Razing Hell, p. 20.
↑ 9. William G. T. Shedd, The Doctrine of Endless Punishment (1886; repr., Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust, 1986), pp. 132–34, 153.
↑ 10. Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, p. 21.
↑ 11. Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, p. 21. Manis writes that Shedd’s analysis, “insofar as it implies that jaywalkers incur infinite guilt, is a deficient analysis.”
↑ 12. Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, pp. 21–22. Manis argues that Shedd’s understanding of retributive justice “is self-defeating, because it undercuts the very basis of punishment as an appropriate response to wrongdoing.”
↑ 13. Phillips, What If Hell Is God’s, Not the Devil’s?, “kolasis.” Phillips demonstrates the remarkable uniformity across major English translations of Matthew 25:46.
↑ 14. Even Denny Burk, a defender of ECT, acknowledges that aionios “is an adjective that means ‘pertaining to an age.’” See Burk, “Eternal Conscious Torment,” in Four Views on Hell.
↑ 15. John 17:3. This is a crucially important text for understanding the meaning of “eternal life” in the New Testament. Jesus defines it as a relational quality, not merely an unending duration.
↑ 16. Helena Keizer, Life, Time, Entirety—A Study of Aiōn in Greek Literature and Philosophy, the Septuagint and Philo (doctoral dissertation, Amsterdam University, 1999). Quoted in Beauchemin, Hope Beyond Hell, chap. 2.
↑ 17. Ilaria Ramelli and David Konstan, Terms for Eternity: Aiōnios and Aïdios in Classical and Christian Texts (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias, 2013), p. 238.
↑ 18. Burk, “Eternal Conscious Torment,” in Four Views on Hell. Burk cites Harry Buis on the statistical usage of aionios in the New Testament.
↑ 19. As Beauchemin notes, “eternal life is a quality of relationship with God (Jn. 17:3), and is an end in itself; while eternal punishment is God’s corrective discipline and a means to an end.” Beauchemin, Hope Beyond Hell, chap. 2.
↑ 20. Thomas Talbott, The Inescapable Love of God, as cited in Beauchemin, Hope Beyond Hell, chap. 2. Talbott writes that “the fire is not eternal in the sense that it burns forever without consuming anything…and neither is the punishment eternal in the sense that it continues forever without accomplishing its corrective purpose.”
↑ 21. Parry, “A Universalist View,” response to Burk, in Four Views on Hell. See also Ramelli and Konstan, Terms for Eternity, chs. 3–4.
↑ 22. Phillips, What If Hell Is God’s, Not the Devil’s?, “kolasis.” Phillips lists five Greek words for punishment and distinguishes their meanings: ekdikesis (vengeance), epitimia (judicial penalty), dike (execution of a sentence), timoria (vindictive punishment), and kolasis (remedial, corrective discipline).
↑ 23. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1369b13. See also Plato, Gorgias 476A–477A; Protagoras 323e. Cited in Beauchemin, Hope Beyond Hell, chap. 2, and in Parry’s discussion in Four Views on Hell.
↑ 24. The verb kolazo originally meant “to cut” or “to prune.” See Schneider in TDNT III, 814. Phillips traces this etymology in What If Hell Is God’s, Not the Devil’s?, “kolasis.”
↑ 25. William Barclay, quoted in Phillips, What If Hell Is God’s, Not the Devil’s?, “kolasis,” and in Beauchemin, Hope Beyond Hell, chap. 2.
↑ 26. Burk, “Eternal Conscious Torment,” in Four Views on Hell. Burk cites BDAG’s definition of kolasis in Matthew 25:46.
↑ 27. Parry, “A Universalist View,” in Four Views on Hell. Parry concedes that kolasis could be used generically in later Greek and in the LXX, but notes that this is not the classical meaning.
↑ 28. The significance of Jesus’s word choice is heightened by the fact that timoria (vindictive punishment) appears in the New Testament as well (Heb. 10:29), so the distinction between the two words was clearly available to the biblical authors.
↑ 29. Phillips, What If Hell Is God’s, Not the Devil’s?, “aion.” Phillips notes that Weymouth’s original rendering was changed after his death to conform to traditional expectations.
↑ 30. On the nature of apocalyptic literature and its conventions, see any standard introduction to biblical genres. The key point for our purposes is that apocalyptic imagery communicates through symbols, hyperbole, and dramatic visions, not through literal, reporter-style description.
↑ 31. Revelation 19:3. Stackhouse, “Terminal Punishment,” in Four Views on Hell. Stackhouse points out that “only a woodenly literal reading would press the details of these descriptions as to temporal sequence and extent.”
↑ 32. Jude 7. Parry observes that “the ‘eternal fire’ (puros aioniou) of Sodom’s punishment (Jude 7)…did not burn forever.” See Parry, response to Burk, in Four Views on Hell.
↑ 33. 2 Peter 2:6. Preston Sprinkle, “A Case for Cataclysmic Judgment,” in Four Views on Hell. Sprinkle argues that “the text clearly says that in ‘burning to ashes’ Sodom and Gomorrah are ‘an example of what is going to happen to the ungodly.’”
↑ 34. Stackhouse, “Terminal Punishment,” in Four Views on Hell. Stackhouse connects the lack of “rest” to the Old Testament Sabbath theme and the concept of entering God’s rest (Heb. 4:9).
↑ 35. Isaiah 66:24. Note that the text describes people looking at “corpses” (peger in Hebrew)—dead bodies, not living people. The worms and fire consume the dead. See also Stackhouse’s discussion in Four Views on Hell.
↑ 36. Parry, response to Burk, in Four Views on Hell.
↑ 37. Baker, Razing Hell, p. 16.
↑ 38. Parry, response to Burk, in Four Views on Hell.
↑ 39. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Supplement, Q. 94, a.1 and a.3. See also Baker, Razing Hell, p. 8, and Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, p. 102.
↑ 40. Tertullian, De Spectaculis, ch. 29. See Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, p. 102.
↑ 41. Burk, “Eternal Conscious Torment,” in Four Views on Hell.
↑ 42. Parry, response to Burk, in Four Views on Hell.
↑ 43. Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, pp. 39–40. Manis writes: “Despite the greater popularity of the problem of justice, the problem of love is at least as formidable an objection to retributive models of hell; in my judgment, it is the more formidable of the two standard objections.”
↑ 44. Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, pp. 39–40. The key distinction is that retributive punishment “is not aimed at the moral improvement—or more generally, the good—of the one punished.”
↑ 45. Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, pp. 7–8. Manis specifies that an adequate solution to the problem of hell must be “consonant with the tradition of perfect being theology, with its view of the divine nature as being comprised of all compossible great-making properties in their maximal forms.”
↑ 46. Manis, Thinking Through the Problem of Hell, “The problem of love.”
↑ 47. Manis, Thinking Through the Problem of Hell, “The problem of love.” Manis writes: “Love requires more than willing some good of the beloved; it requires willing the beloved’s highest good. But hell, understood as an eternal retributive punishment, in no way promotes the highest good of those consigned to it.”
↑ 48. Manis, Thinking Through the Problem of Hell, “The problem of love.”
↑ 49. Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, pp. 54–55. See also Manis, Thinking Through the Problem of Hell, “The threat of hell.”
↑ 50. Manis, Thinking Through the Problem of Hell, “The threat of hell.” Manis concludes that “the very revelation of hell, as traditionalists understand it, makes it impossible for those who truly believe the doctrine to do what’s demanded of them in order to avoid hell.”
↑ 51. Marilyn McCord Adams, “The Problem of Hell: A Problem of Evil for Christians,” p. 325. Quoted in Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, p. 66.
↑ 52. Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, pp. 60–61. Manis develops the problem of worship at length, arguing that belief in ECT produces a fear incompatible with the love required for genuine worship.
↑ 53. Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, p. 101.
↑ 54. Clement of Alexandria, Paedogogus 1.8; Protrepticus 9; Stromata 6.6. See the discussion in Four Views on Hell, Peterson’s historical essay.
↑ 55. Origen, De Principiis 1.6.2–4; Contra Celsum 5.15 and 6.25. Apokatastasis comes from the Greek word meaning “restoration to the original state.” The concept is rooted in Acts 3:21, which speaks of “the restoration of all things.”
↑ 56. Gregory of Nyssa, On the Soul and the Resurrection. Gregory was one of the three Cappadocian Fathers (along with Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nazianzus) whose theological work was instrumental in shaping the Nicene Creed. See Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, pp. 101–102, and Parry, “A Universalist View,” in Four Views on Hell.
↑ 57. Parry, “A Universalist View,” in Four Views on Hell. See also Beauchemin, Hope Beyond Hell, chap. 8 and Appendix IV.
↑ 58. Augustine, City of God, 21.17. Augustine acknowledged the existence of Christians he called misericordes (“the compassionate ones”) who believed in eventual universal salvation. See also Parry, “A Universalist View,” in Four Views on Hell.
↑ 59. Charles Pridgeon, Is Hell Eternal? or Will God’s Plan Fail? (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh Bible Institute, 1920). Quoted in Beauchemin, Hope Beyond Hell, chap. 8.
↑ 60. The Apostles’ Creed, the Nicene Creed (325/381 AD), and the Chalcedonian Definition (451 AD) affirm the resurrection of the dead, the life of the world to come, and Christ’s return in judgment. None of these creeds defines the nature, duration, or mechanics of hell.
↑ 61. Augustine, Confessions, 1.13.20. Quoted in Beauchemin, Hope Beyond Hell, chap. 8. Augustine’s limited Greek proficiency is well documented by patristics scholars.
↑ 62. Isaac the Syrian (Isaac of Nineveh), Homily 84. Quoted in Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, pp. 254–55, and in Kalomiros, The River of Fire, section XV. Available online at http://www.orthodoxinfo.com/general/kalomiros_river.aspx.
↑ 63. Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, pp. 291–92. Manis uses the analogy of a doctor’s diagnosis to distinguish between a threat (coercive) and a warning (edifying).
↑ 64. On the divine presence model in the Eastern Orthodox tradition, see Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, pp. 253–56, and Manis, Thinking Through the Problem of Hell, “Introducing the core idea.” See also C. S. Lewis, The Great Divorce (1946), which develops a similar insight in imaginative form.
↑ 65. Baker, Razing Hell, p. 18.
↑ 66. Baker, Razing Hell, p. 15. Baker develops this point at length, arguing that the traditional view forces us to assign “split personalities to God” in order to reconcile eternal love with eternal punishment.
↑ 67. Baker, Razing Hell, p. 16. Baker observes that “we are called to imitate this God, to ‘be perfect’ as God ‘is perfect’ (Matt. 5:48).” If God tortures His enemies eternally while commanding us to love ours, the moral standard God demands of us exceeds the standard He practices Himself.
↑ 68. Baker, Razing Hell, p. 15.
↑ 69. On the distinction between Hades (the intermediate state) and Gehenna/the lake of fire (the final state), see the discussion in Chapters 7 and 22 of this book. The rich man in Luke 16 is in Hades, which is emptied at the final judgment (Rev. 20:13–14). His situation is not the final state.
↑ 70. On the background of Gehenna as the Valley of Hinnom, see Parry, “A Universalist View,” in Four Views on Hell. Parry notes that “there is no mention of Gehenna as a place of postmortem judgment in the post-Jeremiah books of the Hebrew Bible, the Apocryphal books, the LXX, or the Dead Sea Scrolls.” See also the fuller discussion of Gehenna in Chapter 21 of this book.
↑ 71. Matthew 10:28. The Greek verb apollymi means “to destroy utterly, to bring to ruin, to cause to perish.” It is the same verb used in John 3:16 (“should not perish”) and in Matthew 2:13 (Herod wanting to “destroy” the child Jesus). In no instance does it mean “to keep alive in a state of conscious torment.” See the fuller discussion of this verse in Chapter 23.
↑ 72. Kalomiros, The River of Fire, section I. Available online at http://www.orthodoxinfo.com/general/kalomiros_river.aspx.
↑ 73. Baker, Razing Hell, p. 33.
↑ 74. This is one of the most counterintuitive but important insights of the divine presence model. The traditional view makes hell about what God does to the sinner. The divine presence model makes hell about what sin has done to the sinner’s capacity to receive Love. The latter is, in many ways, far more terrifying—because it locates the horror not in God’s actions but in the sinner’s own spiritual condition. See the fuller development of this theme in Chapters 14 and 18.
↑ 75. Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, p. 290. Manis writes that on the divine presence model, “God’s aim is always toward restoration, and His intention is the salvation of every person, but the damned experience the culminating act of God’s salvific work in history—the revealing of Christ in glory in the eschaton—as a retributive punishment, instead.”
↑ 76. On Gregory of Nazianzus’s sympathies with universal restoration, see John Wesley Hanson, Universalism: The Prevailing Doctrine of the Christian Church During Its First Five Hundred Years (Boston: Universalist Publishing, 1899), ch. 1. See also Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, p. 101, n. 15.
↑ 77. Ethelbert Stauffer, New Testament Theology, quoted in Beauchemin, Hope Beyond Hell, chap. 8.
↑ 78. Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, p. 101, n. 15. Manis notes that “the presentation of the gospel in the first-century church, as recorded in the book of Acts, makes no explicit reference to hell; likewise for the Pauline epistles. Even Jesus, touted by traditionalists as the main biblical proponent of hell, placed the emphasis of his message not on afterlife issues of final destiny, but on the kingdom of God having come to earth.”