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Chapter 13

Universalism — The Hope, the Tension, and the Question That Won’t Go Away

We have now examined three of the four standard options for thinking about hell. We have seen eternal conscious torment at its strongest and identified its fatal problems. We have explored the choice model and shown where it overestimates human freedom and underestimates self-deception. We have presented conditional immortality and argued that while it rightly takes the Bible’s destruction language seriously, it leaves a crucial question unanswered: what is the fire that destroys the wicked? The divine presence model, which we will build in full beginning in Chapter 14, supplies that missing piece.

But before we get there, we must deal honestly with the fourth standard option—and in many ways the most emotionally powerful one: universal reconciliation. The belief that God will eventually save every single person who has ever lived.

I want to be upfront with you. This is a hard chapter for me to write. Not because universalism is weak—it isn’t. It is because universalism is strong. The arguments for it are deeply rooted in Scripture, fiercely logical, and motivated by the very love of God that drives this entire book. When I sit down with the universalist texts in my Bible—Colossians 1:19–20, 1 Corinthians 15:22, 1 Timothy 2:4, Romans 5:18—I feel the pull. I understand the hope. I sometimes share it.

And yet I am not a universalist. I lean toward conditional immortality, as I explained in the last chapter. I take the Bible’s language about finality and destruction seriously. I take human freedom seriously. And I believe that the divine presence model works powerfully with either outcome—whether the final end is the destruction of the stubbornly unrepentant or the eventual restoration of all.

So what I am going to do in this chapter is something that I think is too rare in Christian theology: I am going to present universalism at its absolute strongest, acknowledge what it gets right, name the real tensions it creates, and then show how the divine presence model navigates those tensions better than any other framework. I am going to treat this view with the respect it deserves—because the people who hold it are, in many cases, among the most serious and thoughtful Christians I have encountered. And because the God we serve is big enough for honest questions.

A. The View Presented Fairly: Universalism at Its Strongest

What Is Universal Reconciliation?

We need to start by clearing away some confusion, because the word “universalism” means different things to different people. When most evangelicals hear the word, they think of something like religious pluralism—the idea that all roads lead to God and it doesn’t really matter what you believe. That is not what we are talking about here.

Michael Phillips, drawing on the legacy of George MacDonald, puts the problem with the word well. The term carries so many inaccurate connotations that it can hardly be used without confusion.1 Phillips prefers the phrase “universal reconciliation” to distinguish the Christian hope of eventual restoration from the lazy, anything-goes pluralism of liberal theology.2 Others have used terms like “the Larger Hope,” “universal restoration,” or the ancient Greek word apokatastasis (restoration of all things), which comes from Acts 3:21.3

The view we are evaluating in this chapter is specifically Christian universalism—sometimes called “universal reconciliation” or “evangelical universalism.” It can be defined as follows: through the atoning work of Jesus Christ, God will eventually reconcile every human being to Himself. Hell is real. Judgment is real. The suffering of the wicked is real. But it is not endless. God’s purifying fire eventually accomplishes its purpose in every heart. Every knee bows and every tongue confesses—not under coercion, but in genuine, willing surrender to the overwhelming love of God.

This view holds firmly to the uniqueness of Christ. Salvation comes through Jesus alone. The cross is the only means of reconciliation. There is no other way. The universalist simply insists that God’s saving work through Christ will ultimately be successful in every case—that the Good Shepherd will not rest until the last lost sheep is found.4

This is no modern invention. As Robin Parry (writing under the pen name Gregory MacDonald) has shown in The Evangelical Universalist, this view has deep roots in the earliest centuries of the church.5 It is not some new-fangled liberal theology cooked up to make people feel comfortable. It is an ancient Christian position that stood alongside annihilationism and eternal torment as a legitimate option in the early church.6

The Historical Roots: It’s Older Than You Think

One of the most important things to understand about universal reconciliation is that many of the greatest minds in the early church held some version of it. We are not talking about fringe figures. We are talking about some of the most revered theologians in church history.

The view is most closely associated with Origen (c. 184–254), one of the greatest biblical scholars of the ancient world. But precursors to his thought can be found even earlier—in Clement of Alexandria (c. 150–215) and Bardaisan of Edessa (154–222).7 After Origen, the view was arguably held by an impressive list of names: Gregory of Nyssa, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nazianzus, Athanasius, Maximus the Confessor, Isaac of Nineveh, and many others.8 Gregory of Nyssa, one of the three Cappadocian Fathers who shaped the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, taught a robust version of apokatastasis—the eventual restoration of all souls to God. He was never condemned for this view. In fact, the church honored him as one of its greatest teachers.

Even Augustine—the towering figure of Western theology who ultimately became the strongest champion of eternal punishment—seems to have endorsed universalism early in his Christian life. More tellingly, he acknowledged in his own time that universalism was very common in the churches.9 The great historian of the early church, J. W. Hanson, argued at length that universalism was actually the prevailing doctrine during the first five centuries of Christianity.10 Whether or not that claim is overstated, the point is clear: we are dealing with a view that has serious, ancient credentials.

Think about that for a moment. The people who actually spoke Greek—who read the New Testament in the language in which it was written—were far more open to universalism than the later Latin-speaking Western church would be. That fact alone should give us pause before dismissing the view out of hand.

The Biblical Case: God’s Desire and God’s Power

The most basic argument for universal reconciliation runs like this: God desires the salvation of every person, and God has the power to accomplish what He desires. Therefore, every person will be saved.

As the philosopher John Hick puts it, we must affirm that there will ultimately be no personal life that remains unperfected and no suffering that has not eventually become part of God’s good purpose. Only in this way can we believe both in the perfect goodness of God and in His unlimited power to carry out His will.11 Universalists argue that their opponents must deny one of two basic attributes of God: either His love (He doesn’t want to save all) or His sovereignty (He can’t save all).12

This is a simple argument. It is also devastatingly powerful. And anti-universalists are wrong to treat it lightly, as R. Zachary Manis rightly observes.13

The biblical case for God’s universal saving desire is formidable. Consider these texts:

1 Timothy 2:4 — God “desires all people to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth.” This is not a vague wish. The Greek word thelō (to will, to desire) is the same word used elsewhere of God’s sovereign purposes. God does not merely hope that all people will be saved. He actively wills it.14

Colossians 1:19–20 — “For God was pleased to have all his fullness dwell in him, and through him to reconcile to himself all things, whether things on earth or things in heaven, by making peace through his blood, shed on the cross.” The scope here is breathtaking. God’s reconciling work through the cross extends to all things. As Gerry Beauchemin points out, the word “things” here translates the Greek pas, which is used hundreds of times in the New Testament for “all,” “every,” “all people,” and “everyone.” The immediate context confirms this: “And you...He has reconciled” (Col. 1:21), showing that the “all things” includes persons.15

Romans 5:18 — “Therefore, as one trespass led to condemnation for all people, so one act of righteousness leads to justification and life for all people.” The parallelism here is striking. If “all” in the first half means every human being (and it does—all people are affected by Adam’s sin), then “all” in the second half should mean every human being too. The scope of Christ’s redemption is at least as wide as the scope of Adam’s fall.

1 Corinthians 15:22 — “For as in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive.” Again, the same word, the same scope. If death came to all through Adam, life comes to all through Christ.

1 Corinthians 15:28 — “When all things are subjected to him, then the Son himself will also be subjected to him who put all things in subjection under him, that God may be all in all.” This is the grand vision of the end: God being everything to everyone. How can God be “all in all” if some of His creatures remain forever alienated, forever suffering, forever lost?16

Philippians 2:10–11 — “At the name of Jesus every knee should bow, in heaven and on earth and under the earth, and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord.” Universalists argue that this is not a picture of forced submission. It is a picture of genuine, willing worship. Every tongue will confess—and in the New Testament, confession of Christ as Lord is always a saving act (Romans 10:9).17

Acts 3:21 — Heaven must receive Christ “until the time for restoring all the things about which God spoke by the mouth of his holy prophets long ago.” The Greek here is apokatastasis pantōn—the restoration of all things. This is the very word the church fathers used for universal reconciliation.18

When you lay all these texts side by side, the cumulative effect is powerful. The Bible seems to say, again and again, that God’s saving purpose extends to all people, that the scope of Christ’s atonement matches the scope of Adam’s fall, and that the final goal of history is God being “all in all.”

The Philosophical Case: Talbott, Hart, and the Logic of Love

The biblical case is reinforced by powerful philosophical arguments. Two of the most important contemporary philosophical advocates of universalism are Thomas Talbott and David Bentley Hart.19

Talbott develops a particularly striking argument about what he calls “the inclusive nature of love.” Love for one person, he argues, is inextricably tied to love for others. If I truly love my daughter with all my heart, then I simply cannot be fully happy knowing that she is suffering or lost forever—unless I can believe that in the end, all will be well for her. If I believe she has been lost forever, my own happiness can never be complete, no matter what joys I experience, because I will always know what could have been and will always experience that as a terrible and unacceptable loss.20

Now apply this to God and the saints in heaven. The saints, perfected in love, will love every person without exception. If any person remains forever lost, the saints’ love for that person will be a source of eternal grief. And God, who loves the saints, must therefore love everyone the saints love. So for God to love the saints, He must love everyone—and for the saints to be perfectly happy, everyone must eventually be saved.21

Talbott also develops a powerful argument about perfect justice. If sin is whatever separates us from God and from each other, then perfect justice requires reconciliation and restoration—not endless punishment. We want those responsible for evil not only to suffer for their wrongdoing, but to fully appreciate the horror of what they have done and to be genuinely sorry. Only someone on the road to redemption can fully appreciate that horror. Perfect justice, then, requires the eventual salvation of both victims and perpetrators.22

David Bentley Hart, the Eastern Orthodox theologian and philosopher, presses the argument even further. In That All Shall Be Saved, Hart argues that the traditional view of eternal damnation is not just wrong but logically incoherent. A God who creates beings He knows will be eternally lost cannot be called good in any meaningful sense of the word. Hart contends that the victory of God over evil must be total, or it is no victory at all.23

The Core Universalist Argument: If God is perfectly loving (He desires the salvation of all), and God is perfectly sovereign (He can accomplish what He desires), then all will eventually be saved. Universalists argue that their opponents must either limit God’s love or limit God’s power—and neither option is acceptable.

Gregory of Nyssa and the Vision of Restoration

The most important patristic voice for universal reconciliation is Gregory of Nyssa (c. 335–395). Gregory was no marginal figure. He was one of the three Cappadocian Fathers who defended the Nicene faith against Arianism and helped shape the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity. He was honored by the Council of Constantinople (553) as “father of fathers.” His orthodoxy on the central doctrines of the faith is beyond question.

In his work On the Soul and the Resurrection, Gregory lays out a vision of apokatastasis—the eventual restoration of all souls to God. His argument proceeds from God’s nature. Because God is infinite goodness, and because evil has no independent reality of its own but is merely the privation of good, evil cannot last forever. It must eventually be exhausted. Just as darkness cannot endure forever in the presence of light, sin cannot endure forever in the presence of God. The fire of God’s love will eventually purge every soul of every defect, and all will be restored to the goodness for which they were created.24

For Gregory, this is not wishful thinking. It follows necessarily from the nature of God as infinite good. If God’s goodness is truly infinite, then no finite evil can resist it forever. The outcome is certain—not because human freedom is overridden, but because God’s love is simply greater than any resistance a finite creature can mount.

Think of it like this. Imagine an ice cube sitting in the full blaze of the noonday sun. The ice has a kind of integrity—it is solid, it has shape, it resists the heat for a time. But the sun is infinitely more powerful than the ice. Given enough time, the ice will melt. It is not a question of whether but when. Gregory sees the relationship between God’s infinite goodness and finite evil in exactly this way. Evil is like ice in the presence of an eternal sun. It may resist for a time—perhaps even a very long time. But it cannot resist forever, because it has no independent existence. It is merely the absence of good, just as cold is merely the absence of heat. And the absence of something cannot ultimately withstand the presence of the thing itself.

What makes Gregory’s position so theologically significant is that he develops it not as a speculative philosopher but as a bishop and pastor who is deeply committed to the Nicene faith. He is not trying to water down the gospel. He is trying to take the implications of God’s nature to their logical end. If God is truly infinite in goodness, power, and love, then the final victory must belong to God—completely, without remainder. Anything less would mean that evil has achieved a permanent foothold in God’s creation, which Gregory finds unthinkable.

This is a point worth pausing over. Many Christians are surprised to learn that one of the greatest defenders of Trinitarian orthodoxy in the history of the church was also a committed universalist. Gregory did not see any tension between these positions. For him, universal restoration was not a departure from orthodoxy but a consequence of it. If the God revealed in the Nicene Creed is truly who the creed says He is—almighty, maker of all things visible and invisible, whose kingdom shall have no end—then the full and final victory of that God over every form of evil and death is not merely hoped for. It is guaranteed.

Beauchemin and the “Blessed Hope”

Gerry Beauchemin, in Hope Beyond Hell, represents a more popular, devotional version of the universalist case. Beauchemin catalogues the biblical texts that speak of God’s universal saving purpose and argues that the Bible’s testimony on this point is overwhelming. God is the Savior of all people, especially of those who believe (1 Tim. 4:10). Once God’s righteous judgments have run their course, death will be destroyed, all will be made alive, and all will be subjected to Christ. Then God will be all in all (1 Cor. 15:22–28).25

Beauchemin insists that this is no casual theology that dismisses the need for repentance or the reality of judgment. Those who hold this hope affirm the authority of Scripture and the supremacy of Christ. They believe that Jesus is the only way of salvation. They take sin with utmost seriousness. They simply believe that God is greater than most Christians think He is—that the blood of Christ is powerful enough to overcome every last stronghold of sin, even beyond the grave.26

For Beauchemin, hell is real and terrible. But it is not endless. It is remedial. It is God’s fierce and consuming love doing what this life could not do—breaking through the last barriers of sin and self-will until the lost soul finally surrenders to the love that has pursued it since before time began.

Phillips and MacDonald: Hell as God’s Workshop

Michael Phillips, drawing deeply on George MacDonald, frames the question in terms of hell’s purpose. Two possibilities present themselves, Phillips argues: either hell is punitive (an eternal life sentence of endless punishment) or hell is corrective (it serves a larger end, leading toward redemptive change and the final restoration of all things).27

MacDonald himself puts it bluntly: “Hell is God’s and not the devil’s. Hell is on the side of God and man, to free the child of God from the corruption of death.”28 On this view, hell becomes God’s final workshop—His refiner’s furnace for purging out sin and purifying His children to become His sons and daughters.

Phillips is careful to note that this is no “peaches-and-cream escape hatch.” The message of universal reconciliation, properly understood, carries a fierce urgency. The consuming fire of God’s love is the most terrifying reality in the universe for a soul entrenched in sin. MacDonald himself asks: “When we say that God is Love, do we teach men that their fear of him is groundless? No. For as much as they fear will come upon them, possibly far more.”29 The longer a person delays repentance, the more agonizing the purifying process will be. Hell is real. The fire is real. The pain is real. But the fire is aimed at restoration, not revenge.

MacDonald’s vision of hell is striking precisely because it is so demanding. In his view, we need to be saved not from hell but from sin—from the selfishness, pride, and rebellion that corrupt us from within. Hell is not a punishment inflicted by an angry deity. It is the process by which God burns the sin out of us—the furnace in which the dross is consumed and only the gold remains. MacDonald insists that no one is safe from hell until they are free from their sins. The sins themselves are the hell. The external fire is merely the outward reflection of the internal reality.57

Phillips also makes an important point about the “last farthing.” MacDonald occasionally refers to hell as God’s prison, from which no one will emerge until they have paid the last farthing of what is due. But this is not a debt of retribution. It is a debt of penitence—the debt we owe to become what God created us to be. The door out of that prison is always repentance. There may be a sentence, but it is not an everlasting one. There always remains, in MacDonald’s vision, an “out.”58

What is particularly powerful about the MacDonald-Phillips tradition is the way it reframes the whole discussion. The question is no longer “How can a loving God send people to hell?” The question becomes “What is the purpose of hell, and does it serve the character of the God revealed in Jesus Christ?” If hell is punitive—if its sole purpose is to make people pay for sin forever—then it is hard to reconcile with the God who tells us to forgive seventy times seven. But if hell is corrective—if it is the furnace where the Great Refiner does His most difficult and painful work—then it is entirely consistent with a God whose every act is aimed at the redemption of His creation.

B. Strengths Acknowledged: What Universalism Gets Right

I want to be honest here. Universalism gets a lot right. And I think those of us who do not hold the view need to say that clearly, rather than dismissing it with a wave of the hand.

First, universalism takes God’s love with radical seriousness. If God is love—not just as one attribute among many, but as the defining reality of who He is (1 John 4:8)—then the universalist draws what seems like the most natural conclusion. A God of infinite, relentless, unconditional love will not give up on any of His children. Ever. The universalist refuses to set limits on divine love. That instinct is profoundly right.

Second, universalism takes the universal scope texts of Scripture seriously. Too many evangelical treatments of hell simply ignore or explain away passages like Colossians 1:19–20 and 1 Corinthians 15:22, 28. The universalist forces us to reckon with these texts. They are in the Bible. They mean something. We cannot pretend they don’t exist.30

Third, universalism rightly insists that God’s justice is restorative, not merely retributive. As we saw in Chapter 6, the biblical concept of justice (tsedaka) is not about giving people what they deserve. It is about putting things right. The universalist recognizes that a “justice” that leaves creation permanently broken is no justice at all. Talbott’s argument about perfect justice requiring the restoration of perpetrators as well as victims is compelling.31

Fourth, universalism has genuine historical credentials. This is not some late modern invention. It was held by some of the greatest theologians in the early church—theologians whose orthodoxy on every other major doctrine is unquestioned. The fact that Gregory of Nyssa, one of the architects of Trinitarian orthodoxy, was a universalist should give every evangelical pause.32

Fifth, universalism provides a coherent account of how God can be “all in all.” The grand vision of 1 Corinthians 15:28—God being everything to everyone—is hard to square with the idea that some of God’s creatures remain forever alienated from Him. The universalist has a ready answer: God will be all in all because all will eventually be reconciled. The traditional position must explain how God can be all in all despite the damnation or destruction of many of His creatures. That is not easy to do.33

Sixth, universalism addresses the problem of heavenly happiness. Talbott’s argument here is powerful. How can the redeemed in heaven be perfectly happy if people they love are in eternal torment? The traditional response—that God will somehow erase the memory or concern for the lost—raises troubling questions about whether the redeemed are still fully human. The universalist cuts this knot cleanly: the redeemed are happy because all are eventually saved.34

Seventh, and perhaps most importantly for our purposes in this book, universalism is driven by exactly the right starting point. The universalist begins where we have argued every theology of hell must begin: with the character of God as revealed in Jesus Christ. The universalist looks at the cross and sees a God who goes to the most extreme lengths imaginable to rescue sinners. The universalist looks at the parables of the lost sheep, the lost coin, and the lost son and sees a God who does not rest until what is lost is found. The universalist looks at Romans 8:38–39—“neither death nor life, nor angels nor rulers, nor things present nor things to come, nor powers, nor height nor depth, nor anything else in all creation, will be able to separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord”—and asks: if nothing can separate us from God’s love, does that not include even our own rebellion? That question may not have a simple answer. But it is the right question to ask.

These are not trivial strengths. They represent deep and genuine theological insights. Anyone who evaluates universalism fairly must acknowledge them.

C. Problems Identified: Where Universalism Creates Tension

And yet, for all its strengths, universalism creates serious tensions—tensions that I do not believe it can fully resolve. I want to walk through these carefully, because they are the reasons I lean toward conditional immortality rather than universal reconciliation, even as I hold the universalist hope in my heart.

The Problem of Freedom

The deepest and most persistent objection to universalism is the problem of freedom. If God will eventually bring every person to willing surrender, does that mean He overrides human freedom? And if so, is the result really love?

Love, by its very nature, must be freely given and freely received. A love that is coerced is no love at all. This is something that both Scripture and common sense affirm. God created us with the capacity to say “yes” or “no” to His love, and He takes that capacity seriously. The parable of the prodigal son is powerful precisely because the father lets the son leave. He does not chain him to the estate. He waits. He watches. He hopes. But he does not override his son’s freedom.35

The universalist responds that God does not need to override freedom. He simply needs to keep offering love until the resistant heart gives way. Given enough time and enough divine persuasion, every person will eventually choose freely to accept God’s love. No coercion is required—only patience.

But this response raises a question Manis presses with considerable force. Even on the divine presence model, where God’s presence is fully unveiled at the final judgment, the self-deceived may experience that presence as torment rather than invitation. The unveiling of truth does not guarantee a positive response.36 Think of it this way. If you set a bright light in front of someone with healthy eyes, they see clearly. But if you set that same light in front of someone whose eyes are damaged, they don’t see better. They are blinded. The light hasn’t changed. But the response depends on the condition of the receiver.

Kvanvig makes a similar point in his critique of Talbott. Talbott assumes that if all sources of ignorance and self-deception are removed, a person will inevitably choose God. But Kvanvig argues that this assumption may be wrong. Some patterns of resistance to truth may be willful—not the result of ignorance but of a deep, chosen posture of the soul. If that is the case, removing ignorance does not guarantee a change of heart.37

The analogy of the addict is helpful here. The addict knows the drug is killing him. He has all the information he needs. His family begs him to stop. His doctor tells him the truth. He sees the evidence with his own eyes. And yet he cannot—or will not—change. Knowledge does not automatically produce transformation. The heart can be so entangled in its own choices that even the clearest light cannot penetrate it. Not because the light is insufficient, but because the heart has built walls against it.

Does this mean the universalist is definitely wrong? No. Perhaps God’s love truly is powerful enough to break through every last wall. Perhaps what the addict cannot do, God can. I do not rule this out. But I think we have to take seriously the possibility that some hearts may harden beyond recovery—not because God’s love fails, but because freedom is real and its consequences are real.

MacDonald and Phillips offer a fascinating counter to this concern. Phillips argues that God can apply a kind of “pressure” on the will—not coercion, but a deep, penetrating light that goes beneath the will and changes it from within. MacDonald writes of a light that goes deeper than the will, a light that “can change your will, can make it truly yours and not another’s.” It is, MacDonald insists, compulsion without coercion—the creating will pouring itself into the created will to redeem it.59 This is an intriguing idea, and I take it seriously. But I am not fully convinced it resolves the problem. If God can change the will from within without violating freedom, then why does He not do so now, in this life, for everyone? Why does anyone die without faith? The universalist has answers to these questions—God’s timing, the necessity of the process, the pedagogical value of suffering—but each answer raises further questions of its own.

The tension here is genuine, and I want to name it clearly. On one side stands the conviction that love must be free to be real. If God guarantees that every person will eventually surrender, then the surrender is, in some sense, inevitable—and inevitability sits uneasily with freedom. On the other side stands the conviction that infinite love must eventually overcome finite resistance. A love that can be permanently defeated by a creature’s stubbornness does not seem very infinite. Both convictions are rooted in deep theological truth. I do not think we can fully resolve the tension on this side of eternity.

The Freedom Problem: If universalism is true, can anyone genuinely say “no” to God? And if no one can ultimately say “no,” was the ability to say “no” ever real in the first place? The universalist must show that freedom is preserved even as universal salvation is guaranteed. This is the central challenge for any universalist position.

The Problem of Sovereignty and Molinism

Some universalists try to solve the freedom problem by appealing to divine sovereignty. If God is in control of all things, then surely He can bring about universal salvation without violating freedom. One popular way of doing this is through Molinism—the view that God uses His “middle knowledge” (His knowledge of what every possible person would freely choose in every possible situation) to select for creation a world in which all creatures eventually and freely choose to be reconciled to Him.38

This is an ingenious solution. On this view, God does not override freedom. He simply chooses, from all the possible worlds available to Him, a world in which freedom and universal salvation are both achieved. Everyone freely chooses God—but God ensures this outcome by His wise selection of which world to create.

The problem, as Manis shows, is that this solution raises as many questions as it answers. If God has middle knowledge and could have selected a universalist world but didn’t, then anti-universalists face the problem of why God chose a world in which some are lost. But if God must choose a universalist world (because only such a world is consistent with His nature), then we seem to be saying that a non-universalist world is impossible—which is a very strong claim.39

Furthermore, Manis argues that several of the most prominent anti-universalist philosophers are themselves Molinists, and this creates significant tensions. If Molinism can serve as a vehicle for universalism so effectively, the anti-universalist Molinist is in an awkward position: Why didn’t God use His middle knowledge to create a world in which all are saved?40 This is what Manis calls “the problem of sovereignty”: any view that affirms both God’s saving desire and God’s sovereign control over the world faces the uncomfortable question of why universal salvation has not already been achieved.41

In the end, Manis suggests that anti-universalists may need to accept some degree of mystery regarding divine foreknowledge and sovereignty—saying, as Calvinists say of divine justice and love, that these are “mysteries still waiting to be solved.”42 This is honest. It is also uncomfortable. The universalist presses this discomfort to its advantage.

The Problem of Biblical Finality

The strongest biblical objection to universalism comes from the texts that seem to speak of a final, irreversible judgment. Consider these passages:

Matthew 25:46 — “And these will go away into eternal punishment, but the righteous into eternal life.” The word aionios (eternal, age-long) is used for both the punishment and the life. Whatever “eternal” means for the life of the righteous, it seems to mean the same thing for the punishment of the wicked. If the life is truly unending, the punishment appears to be truly unending as well.43

Now, we discussed in Chapter 10 why aionios may not always mean “everlasting” in the strict sense. It often refers to the quality of the age to come rather than infinite duration. And the word for “punishment” here—kolasis—is a word associated with corrective discipline, not retributive torment. But the parallelism in the verse is still a challenge for universalism. The text creates a strong impression of two permanent, contrasting destinies.44

Revelation 20:10–15 — The vision of the lake of fire, where the devil, the beast, and the false prophet are “tormented day and night forever and ever,” and where anyone whose name is not found in the book of life is thrown. The language here is intense and final. The “second death” sounds like an ending, not a temporary setback.

2 Thessalonians 1:9 — The wicked “will suffer the punishment of eternal destruction, away from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of his might.” The word “destruction” (olethros) suggests an end, not an ongoing process of purification.

Universalists have responses to each of these texts. They point out that aionios need not mean “everlasting.” They read Revelation’s imagery as symbolic and apocalyptic. They note that “destruction” could refer to the destruction of the old sinful self rather than the annihilation of the whole person. These responses are not unreasonable. But cumulatively, the finality language in the New Testament creates real tension for the universalist position. The Bible speaks repeatedly of a point of no return—a final separation, a second death, a closing of the door. The universalist must explain all of this as ultimately temporary. That is possible. But it requires reading against the grain of what these texts seem to say on the surface.45

The Problem of Baker’s Two Endings

One of the most instructive moments in this debate comes from Sharon Baker’s own wrestling with the question. Baker, as we saw in Chapter 12, develops a powerful account of what happens when a wicked person encounters the fullness of God’s presence at the final judgment. Her character Otto encounters God’s blazing love, is purified by it, and accepts God’s offer of restoration. It reads like a universalist story.

But then Baker adds a crucial qualification. She says that the possibility exists that Otto does not accept God’s offer—that after the purifying fire has done its work, nothing remains of him. In order to preserve human freedom, which God gave us at creation, we must allow for the possibility that some people will still reject God.46

When one of her students, Brooke, accuses Baker’s model of sounding like universalism, Baker responds that she is not a universalist. She believes God respects the freedom He has given us. We can choose God during our lifetime or at the time of judgment, after going through the fire. But if someone stands in God’s fiery presence and still refuses, God will not force reconciliation. Forced reconciliation, Baker says, does not bode well for the success of a relationship.47

Manis, analyzing Baker’s position, notes that her view is best classified as a hybrid of the divine presence model and annihilationism. The fire does not eliminate the gift of human freedom. Those who say “no” to God’s “yes” end up in the lake of fire, which annihilates them.48

Baker also presents a second scenario in which Otto’s encounter with the purifying fire leaves nothing good remaining—the fire destroys every last vestige of his being, because there was nothing in him that could receive love. This is annihilation not as punishment but as the natural outcome of a soul so saturated in evil that the fire of love consumes it entirely.49

I find Baker’s wrestling here deeply instructive. She is drawn to the universalist hope. But she will not let go of freedom. And that instinct, I think, is right.

The Problem of Moral Urgency

A common objection to universalism—one I hear frequently from fellow evangelicals—is that it removes the urgency of the gospel. If everyone will be saved in the end, why bother with evangelism? Why take sin seriously? Why sacrifice for the faith?

I want to handle this objection carefully, because I think it is partly wrong and partly right.

It is partly wrong because the best universalists do not treat salvation casually. Phillips, drawing on MacDonald, makes this point forcefully. The message of universal reconciliation carries fierce urgency because the purifying fire is real and terrible. The longer a person delays repentance, the more agonizing the process of being made right will be. MacDonald himself asks whether the prospect of being cleaned by consuming fire can appear to the sinner as anything other than a process of torture.50 This is not cheap grace. This is the most demanding grace imaginable.

But the objection is partly right in this sense: if the final outcome is guaranteed regardless of what we do in this life, then the stakes of our present choices are genuinely diminished—even if hell is painful along the way. There is a difference between “choose Christ now or suffer terribly before you eventually choose Him anyway” and “choose Christ now or face the possibility of permanent, irreversible loss.” The second scenario carries a weight that the first, for all its seriousness, does not quite match.51

Whether this difference matters for the truth of universalism is debatable. We should not accept a theological position just because it makes better propaganda for evangelism. If universalism is true, it is true whether or not it makes our preaching more urgent. But the concern is worth noting.

The “All” Texts and Their Limits

One final tension worth noting concerns the universalist reading of the “all” texts. When Paul says God desires “all” people to be saved (1 Tim. 2:4), or that in Christ “all” will be made alive (1 Cor. 15:22), does “all” really mean every single individual without exception?

The universalist says yes. But the word “all” (pas) in Greek, like “all” in English, is often used in ways that are not strictly universal. “All Jerusalem went out to see John the Baptist” does not mean every last person. “All things are lawful for me” does not mean literally everything. Context determines scope.52

The universalist has good responses here. In several of the key texts—especially Romans 5:18 and 1 Corinthians 15:22—the parallel structure of the argument demands that “all” in the second clause have the same scope as “all” in the first. If all died in Adam (and they did), then all are made alive in Christ. The parallelism is hard to escape.

But “made alive in Christ” could mean “raised from the dead” rather than “saved.” All will be raised—the righteous and the wicked alike (John 5:28–29)—but the resurrection itself does not guarantee salvation. The universalist reading is possible, but it is not the only reading.53

D. The Divine Presence Alternative: How the Model Navigates the Tension

Here is where I want to bring the argument to its crucial point. The divine presence model of hell—the view we will develop in full in the coming chapters—has a remarkable property that no other model possesses: it works with either outcome. Whether the final result is conditional immortality or universal reconciliation, the divine presence model provides a coherent account of how it happens.

If Universalism Is True

If universal reconciliation is the final outcome, the divine presence model explains how it happens. God’s unveiled love—the consuming fire of His presence—is the instrument of restoration. The wicked encounter the fullness of divine love at the judgment. That love burns away everything in them that is false, selfish, and sinful. The process is agonizing—not because God is vindictive, but because sin cannot survive in the presence of perfect Love. The deeper the sin, the more painful the purification. But eventually, the fire does its work. The last walls of resistance crumble. The hardened heart softens. The prodigal finally comes home.

On this reading, hell is real but purgatorial. The suffering is genuine, not cosmetic. The fire is fierce, not gentle. But it is aimed at restoration. Every last person eventually passes through the fire and stands before God purified, free, and willing to receive the love that has been pursuing them since before they were born.

This is the vision of Gregory of Nyssa. It is the hope of MacDonald and Phillips. And it is a vision that, frankly, I find deeply beautiful.

If Conditional Immortality Is True

If conditional immortality is the final outcome, the divine presence model explains that too—and it does so without making God a torturer. The wicked encounter the same fire of divine love. For some, the fire purifies. They pass through judgment, are cleansed, and receive God’s offer of reconciliation with grateful, broken hearts. Baker’s Otto story, in its most hopeful version, illustrates this beautifully.

But for others, the fire consumes. Not because God wills their destruction, but because there is nothing left in them that can receive love. The soul so thoroughly given over to hatred, self-deception, and rebellion encounters perfect Love and simply cannot endure it. The fire that purifies gold also consumes wood. The difference is not in the fire. The difference is in what it touches.54

Baker presents the chilling second scenario: Otto stands in the fire. It burns away impurities. But if Otto has no good at all in him, the fire would burn all of him. It would completely destroy him. Nothing would remain. He would be annihilated.55

On this reading, the “second death” is real and final. But it is not a punishment arbitrarily imposed by an angry God. It is the natural consequence of a hardened heart encountering infinite Love. God does not torture. God does not take vengeance. God loves—and His love is so powerful that it either transforms or consumes everything it touches.

The Key Insight: The divine presence model is the only framework that works equally well with both conditional immortality and universal reconciliation. It provides the mechanism for either outcome: God’s consuming love either purifies or destroys, depending on the disposition of the heart. This is why the CI-vs.-UR question can remain open within the divine presence model without damaging the model itself.

Why This Matters: The Character of God Is the Real Issue

Whether universalism or conditional immortality turns out to be correct, the most important thing is not the final outcome but the character of God. This is the thread that runs through every chapter of this book. God is love. His fire is love. His judgment is love in action. He does not torture. He does not take sadistic pleasure in the suffering of the wicked. His “punishments” are aimed at restoration, not revenge.

If universalism is true, God’s love wins every heart. If conditional immortality is true, God’s love still wins—because it destroys evil, honors freedom, and brings about a final state in which every remaining creature is reconciled, every tear is wiped away, and God is all in all. The loss of those who are destroyed is tragic, heartbreaking, and real. But it is not the result of divine cruelty. It is the result of divine love encountering a heart that has made itself incapable of receiving it.

In either case, God is vindicated. In either case, love is the consuming fire. In either case, we can trust that the Judge of all the earth will do right (Gen. 18:25).

Why I Lean Toward CI—But Hold the Hope

I have laid my cards on the table throughout this book, so let me do so again here. I lean toward conditional immortality rather than universal reconciliation. Here is why.

I take human freedom seriously. I believe that God has created us with a genuine capacity to say “yes” or “no” to His love, and that He will not override that capacity. The possibility of final refusal seems to me to be intrinsic to what it means to be a free creature. If there is no possibility of saying a permanent “no,” then I am not sure the “yes” is truly free.

I take the Bible’s finality language seriously. For all the strength of the universalist case, I cannot shake the impression that the New Testament speaks of a point beyond which there is no return. The second death. The shutting of the door. The separation of sheep and goats. The language feels final, even when I acknowledge that much of it is metaphorical.

And I take the testimony of Baker seriously. Her instinct that freedom must be preserved even at the cost of some being lost strikes me as profoundly right. A God who respects our freedom enough to let us destroy ourselves is, paradoxically, more loving than a God who overrides our resistance—because the first God treats us as genuine persons, while the second treats us as projects to be completed.

I also believe firmly in a genuine postmortem opportunity for salvation—a real chance for those who never heard the gospel in this life to encounter Christ after death, at or before the final judgment. This conviction, which we discussed in Chapter 3 and will develop further in Chapters 27–29, is crucial to my position. I am not saying that death is the end of all hope. God’s mercy extends beyond the grave. But I believe that at some point—whether at or during the final judgment—the opportunity comes to its close. Those who still refuse, even in the full blaze of God’s revealed love, face a final and irrevocable consequence. On the conditional immortality view, that consequence is destruction. On the universalist view, it is further purification. I lean toward the former. But I do so with trembling, because I know I could be wrong.

Let me tell you what keeps me up at night about this. If I am wrong—if universalism is true and I have affirmed conditional immortality—then I have underestimated the power of God’s love. That is a mistake, to be sure, but it is the kind of mistake that errs on the side of caution about human freedom. I can live with that. But if the universalist is wrong—if some hearts truly do harden beyond recovery and are destroyed by the fire of divine love—then the universalist has given false hope. And that is a heavier burden to bear.

This is not a comfortable place to stand. I am holding two convictions in tension: the conviction that God’s love is infinite and relentless, and the conviction that human freedom is real and consequential. I do not know how to fully reconcile them. I do not think anyone does. What I know is that the divine presence model gives me a framework that honors both—a framework in which the fire of God’s love is always aimed at restoration, whether its final effect in a given soul is purification or consumption.

But I hold this position with open hands. I could be wrong. If, at the end of all things, God’s love proves more powerful than any human resistance—if the last lost soul finally surrenders and comes home—I will not be disappointed. I will rejoice. The triumph of God’s love over the last stronghold of sin would be the most glorious thing imaginable.

I lean toward CI. But I hope for UR. And I do not think that hope is unfaithful. I think it is one of the most Christian things a person can do—to hope that God is even bigger, even more relentless in His love, even more victorious over evil than we dared to imagine.

E. Conclusion: The Question That Won’t Go Away

We have now completed our survey of the four standard options for thinking about hell. Eternal conscious torment makes God a torturer. The choice model overestimates human freedom and underestimates self-deception. Conditional immortality tells us what happens (the wicked are destroyed) but not what destroys them. Universal reconciliation takes God’s love to its logical conclusion but creates unresolved tensions with freedom and biblical finality.

None of these four options, on its own, is sufficient. Each captures something important. Each misses something important. And that is precisely why we need a fifth option—one that can incorporate the best insights of each while avoiding their weaknesses.

That fifth option is the divine presence model of hell. It is the view that hell is not a place of separation from God, but the experience of God’s inescapable, all-consuming love by those who have hardened their hearts against Him. The same fire that purifies the willing consumes the resistant. The same love that is paradise for the saint is torment for the sinner. Not because God changes, but because the human heart determines how divine love is received.

I want to pause here and say something about intellectual honesty, because I think it matters deeply in a book like this. I have spent this chapter presenting universalism at its strongest because I believe that is what love and truth require. You cannot refute a view you have not first understood. And you should not dismiss a hope that is held by some of the finest Christian minds in history. Even if I ultimately lean toward conditional immortality, I refuse to caricature the universalist position or pretend that its arguments are weaker than they are. The church deserves better than that. You deserve better than that.

In the chapters ahead, we will build the divine presence model in full. We will trace it through the Church Fathers who first articulated it. We will walk through the philosophical framework that R. Zachary Manis has developed with such care. We will see how Sharon Baker has made it accessible and personal. We will dig into the biblical texts and show that this model fits the scriptural data better than any of its competitors.

But I want to close this chapter by saying something directly to those of you who came to this chapter hoping to find a knockdown argument against universalism, and to those of you who came hoping to find a knockdown argument for it.

You will not find either here. Because the truth, as I see it, is that this question may not have a knockdown answer this side of eternity. The universalist hope is real and grounded in Scripture. The case for finality is real and grounded in Scripture. The tension between them is genuine, and it is not going to go away just because we want it to.

What I can tell you is this: whatever the final outcome turns out to be, the character of God remains the same. He is love. His fire is love. His judgment is the action of love against everything that defaces and destroys His beloved creatures. He does not torture. He does not take revenge. He is not the monster that the worst versions of Western theology have made Him out to be.

The question of CI versus UR is genuinely important, and we will return to it in depth in Chapters 30 and 31. But it is not the most important question. The most important question is: What kind of God are we dealing with? And the answer to that question—a God of consuming, purifying, inescapable love—does not change regardless of which eschatological outcome you favor.56

We serve a God whose fire is aimed at restoration, not destruction. Whose justice is His saving love. Whose presence is the most glorious and the most fearful reality in the universe.

That is the foundation. And we are about to build on it.

Notes

1. Phillips, What If Hell Is God’s, Not the Devil’s?, “Dungeon or Workshop?” Phillips notes that the term “universalism” carries so many inaccurate connotations that fruitful discussion requires immediate clarification whenever the word is used.

2. Phillips, What If Hell Is God’s, Not the Devil’s?, “Dungeon or Workshop?” Phillips also notes his wife’s fondness for the phrase “universal opportunity,” emphasizing that God will never turn His back on any saint or sinner of His creation.

3. Beauchemin, Hope Beyond Hell, chap. 7, “Restoration of ‘All’ Things.” Beauchemin surveys the various terms used historically: “The Larger Hope,” “Universal Salvation,” “Apocatastasis,” “Universal Restoration,” “Final Restitution,” and others.

4. Beauchemin, Hope Beyond Hell, chap. 14, “Closing Thoughts.” Beauchemin argues that ninety-nine sheep out of a hundred is not enough for Christ (Luke 15:4) and that the Great Shepherd will not be satisfied until the last sheep is found.

5. Robin Parry, The Evangelical Universalist, 2nd ed. (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2012). Parry wrote the first edition under the pen name “Gregory MacDonald.”

6. Parry, “A Universalist View,” in Four Views on Hell. Parry writes that Christian universalism is an ancient Christian theological position that in the early church stood alongside annihilationism and eternal torment as a viable option.

7. Parry, “A Universalist View,” in Four Views on Hell.

8. The list is extensive and includes Theognostus, Pierius, Gregory the Wonderworker, Pamphilus, Methodius of Olympus, Eusebius, Athanasius, Didymus the Blind, Gregory of Nazianzus, Evagrius Ponticus, Diodore of Tarsus, Theodore of Mopsuestia, the younger Jerome, Rufinus, Dionysius the Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor, Isaac of Nineveh, and John Scotus Eriugena. For a detailed defense of these attributions, see Ilaria Ramelli, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena, VC 120 (Leiden: Brill, 2013). See also Parry, “A Universalist View,” in Four Views on Hell.

9. Augustine, Enchiridion, sec. 112. See also Parry, “A Universalist View,” in Four Views on Hell, who notes Augustine’s early endorsement and later rejection of universalism.

10. John Wesley Hanson, Universalism: The Prevailing Doctrine of the Christian Church During Its First Five Hundred Years (Boston: Universalist Publishing, 1899).

11. John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 340, as cited in Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, p. 107.

12. Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, p. 107. Manis summarizes the core universalist argument and notes that anti-universalists are “remiss to treat it lightly.”

13. Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, p. 107.

14. The phrase is hos pantas anthrōpous thelei sōthēnai, where thelō denotes a genuine desire and will. See Baker, Razing Hell, p. 145, where she also cites this text as central to the divine purpose.

15. Beauchemin, Hope Beyond Hell, chap. 7. Beauchemin argues that since “And you...He has reconciled” follows immediately, the “all things” reconciled through the blood clearly includes persons. See also Parry, “A Universalist View,” in Four Views on Hell.

16. Parry, “A Universalist View,” in Four Views on Hell. Parry argues that the traditionalist must claim God will be all in all despite the damnation or destruction of many creatures, whereas the universalist can affirm it straightforwardly.

17. See Baker, Razing Hell, p. 145, and Beauchemin, Hope Beyond Hell, chap. 2. Both argue that the confession of Philippians 2:10–11 is genuine worship, not forced capitulation.

18. Beauchemin, Hope Beyond Hell, chap. 7, “Restoration of ‘All’ Things.”

19. Thomas Talbott, The Inescapable Love of God, 2nd ed. (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2014); David Bentley Hart, That All Shall Be Saved: Heaven, Hell, and Universal Salvation (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2019). Manis engages both at length in Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, Parts III–IV.

20. Talbott, The Inescapable Love of God, as discussed in Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, p. 108. Talbott develops this under the theme of “the inclusive nature of love.”

21. Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, p. 108. Manis presents Talbott’s reasoning: for God to love the saints, who love all people without exception, God must love everyone. And for the saints to be perfectly happy, everyone they love must ultimately be well.

22. Talbott, The Inescapable Love of God, pp. 144–52, as discussed in Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, pp. 111–12. Talbott argues that we want perpetrators of evil not just to suffer, but to fully appreciate the horror of their actions. Only someone on the road to redemption can achieve this full appreciation.

23. David Bentley Hart, That All Shall Be Saved (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2019). Hart argues that a God who creates beings He foreknows will be eternally lost has no claim to goodness in any coherent sense.

24. Gregory of Nyssa, On the Soul and the Resurrection. Gregory’s argument for apokatastasis proceeds from the metaphysical principle that evil, being a privation of good, cannot have permanent existence. Since God is infinite goodness, all finite evil must eventually be overcome.

25. Beauchemin, Hope Beyond Hell, chap. 6, “God Is the Savior of All.” Beauchemin analyzes 1 Timothy 4:10 and the Greek word malista (“especially”), showing that it cannot mean “exclusively,” and therefore God’s role as Savior extends beyond believers.

26. Beauchemin, Hope Beyond Hell, chap. 14, “Closing Thoughts.”

27. Phillips, What If Hell Is God’s, Not the Devil’s?, “Dungeon or Workshop?”

28. George MacDonald, as quoted in Phillips, What If Hell Is God’s, Not the Devil’s?, “Dungeon or Workshop?”

29. George MacDonald, “The Consuming Fire,” as quoted in Phillips, What If Hell Is God’s, Not the Devil’s?, “Burn, Sinner, Burn!”

30. This is a point Parry makes repeatedly in his essay in Four Views on Hell: the debate on hell has too often gotten bogged down in proof-texting, with each side pointing to its favorite verses while ignoring the other side’s strongest texts.

31. Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, pp. 111–12.

32. On the question of whether universalism was ever officially declared heretical, see Gregory MacDonald, ed., “All Shall Be Well”: Explorations in Universal Salvation and Christian Theology, from Origen to Moltmann (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2011), 2–13. It was certain specific teachings of Origen that were condemned, not universalism as such. Gregory of Nyssa, who held a clear universalist position, was never condemned.

33. Parry, “A Universalist View,” in Four Views on Hell.

34. Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, p. 108.

35. See the discussion of freedom and the choice model in Chapter 11 of this volume. The parable of the prodigal son (Luke 15:11–32) is central to understanding God’s posture toward the lost: He waits, but He does not coerce.

36. Manis, Thinking Through the Problem of Hell, “Answering the universalist’s objection, part I.” Manis argues that the unveiling of God’s presence does not guarantee a positive response from those whose souls are deeply self-deceived.

37. Kvanvig, The Problem of Hell, chap. 4. Kvanvig argues that some patterns of resistance may be willful rather than merely ignorant, and that removing ignorance does not necessarily resolve such resistance. He questions whether Talbott is entitled to the assumption that God can remove every source of cognitive interference without disturbing the individual’s freedom.

38. Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, pp. 120–22. Manis provides a detailed discussion of how Molinism relates to the universalism debate.

39. Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, pp. 122–24. Manis distinguishes between “necessary universalism” (a world in which God creates a person who forever rejects Him is not genuinely possible) and “contingent universalism” (God happens to have selected a universalist world but could have selected otherwise).

40. Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, pp. 126–34. Manis argues that the most prominent Molinist anti-universalists (including William Lane Craig) face the problem of explaining why God did not use His middle knowledge to create a world in which all are saved. The “transworld damnation” defense, which holds that some possible persons would freely reject God in every possible world, is metaphysically dubious.

41. Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, p. 107. Manis calls this “the problem of sovereignty”: insofar as God genuinely desires the salvation of every person, anti-universalism implies that the end of history is one in which God’s purposes for creation are, to some degree, finally thwarted.

42. Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, p. 153.

43. For the evangelical universalist’s response to Matthew 25:46, see Parry, The Evangelical Universalist, and Phillips, What If Hell Is God’s, Not the Devil’s?, “Matthew 25:46.” For a detailed discussion of aionios, see Chapter 22 of this volume.

44. On the meaning of kolasis as corrective rather than retributive punishment, and its distinction from timoria (retributive punishment), see our discussion in Chapter 10. For aionios as “pertaining to the age to come” rather than strictly “everlasting,” see Chapter 22.

45. See the extended exegetical discussions in Chapters 22–26 of this volume, where we work through all the major judgment and fire passages in detail.

46. Baker, Razing Hell, pp. 117–18. Baker writes: “The possibility exists, however, that Otto does not accept God’s offer of restoration, or that after the testing by fire, nothing remains of him at all. Nothing. In order to preserve human freedom, which God gave to us at creation, we must allow for the possibility that some people will still reject God.”

47. Baker, Razing Hell, pp. 141–42.

48. Manis, Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, pp. 311–12. Manis notes that Baker’s view conflates at least two different possible types of hybrid model: a natural consequence version (Otto is annihilated by the experience of God’s presence) and a free will version (Otto exercises his freedom one last time to reject God, at which point he is annihilated).

49. Baker, Razing Hell, pp. 144–45. Baker presents this as one of two possible readings of the lake of fire: if the lake of fire is the same as God’s fiery presence, then the fire tests, purifies, and puts death and evil to death. If nothing good remains in a person, the fire consumes everything.

50. George MacDonald, “The Consuming Fire,” as quoted in Phillips, What If Hell Is God’s, Not the Devil’s?, “Burn, Sinner, Burn!”

51. This is a point that defenders of conditional immortality often press. See, for example, the discussion of moral urgency in Fudge, “The Case for Conditionalism,” in Two Views of Hell.

52. For a discussion of the semantic range of pas in Greek, see standard lexicons such as BDAG. The word is extremely flexible and context-dependent.

53. See John 5:28–29: “An hour is coming when all who are in the tombs will hear his voice and come out, those who have done good to the resurrection of life, and those who have done evil to the resurrection of judgment.” This text suggests a universal resurrection that divides into two outcomes, complicating the universalist reading of 1 Corinthians 15:22.

54. This image draws on Kalomiros, The River of Fire, sections XIV–XVII. Kalomiros develops the image of the river of fire that flows from God’s throne: the same river is experienced as paradise by the righteous and as hell by the wicked. See also our extended discussion in Chapter 8.

55. Baker, Razing Hell, pp. 144–45.

56. We will return to the CI-versus-UR question in depth in Chapter 30 (“Conditional Immortality or Universal Reconciliation?—The Open Question”) and Chapter 31 (“Can Anyone Choose Hell Forever?—The Problem of Eternal Rejection”). The present chapter has introduced the debate; those chapters will wrestle with it at a much deeper level.

57. George MacDonald, as discussed in Phillips, What If Hell Is God’s, Not the Devil’s?, “Burn, Sinner, Burn!” MacDonald insists that what we need to be saved from is not hell or the punishment of God against sin, but from sin itself—from the sin that resides within us. The mission of Jesus was to work alongside our punishment and to set us free from our sins.

58. Phillips, What If Hell Is God’s, Not the Devil’s?, “Dungeon or Workshop?” Phillips develops MacDonald’s image of hell as a prison with a door: the debts we owe are not debts against God’s holiness in a juridical sense, but debts against childness, against others, against ourselves. To pay the last farthing is to surrender the final vestige of self-will.

59. Phillips, What If Hell Is God’s, Not the Devil’s?, “Dungeon or Workshop?” Phillips quotes MacDonald from Lilith on the idea of a light that goes deeper than the will and can change it without coercion. Phillips describes this as “compulsion without coercion”—God’s eternal purposes operating in the realm of infinity where parallel lines meet and where love and wrath point toward a single objective.

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