Appendix C — Glossary of Key Terms

This glossary defines the key terms used throughout More Than Dust. It is designed for readers with no background in theology, philosophy, or biblical languages. Every Hebrew and Greek term is transliterated, translated, and explained in plain English. Philosophical and theological terms are defined at an accessible level while maintaining accuracy. Terms are organized into four categories: Biblical Language Terms, Anthropological and Philosophical Terms, Eschatological Terms, and Evidence and Argument Terms.

I. Biblical Language Terms

Hebrew. This is one of the most important words in the entire body-soul debate, and it is also one of the most misunderstood. Nephesh has a wide range of meaning in the Old Testament. It can mean “soul,” “life,” “person,” “self,” “living being,” “appetite,” or even “throat” (its most basic physical sense). The physicalist argument seizes on this range of meaning and says, “See? Nephesh just means ‘whole person’ or ‘life’—it never means an immaterial soul that can exist apart from the body.” But that claim goes too far. While nephesh certainly can mean “person” or “life” in many contexts, there are key passages where it clearly refers to something that departs from the body at death (Gen. 35:18), returns to the body at resuscitation (1 Kings 17:21–22), and exists in Sheol apart from the body (Ps. 16:10). The word’s range of meaning includes “immaterial soul”—and the narratives of Scripture confirm that this meaning is central, not peripheral. Fudge consistently flattened nephesh to mean only “person” or “life-force,” ignoring the passages where it plainly refers to a separable, immaterial self.¹

Hebrew. The Hebrew word for “spirit,” “breath,” or “wind.” Like nephesh, ruach has a range of meaning. It can refer to the wind blowing across the land, the breath in a person’s lungs, the animating spirit that gives life, or the immaterial spirit of a person that returns to God at death (Eccl. 12:7). Physicalists argue that ruach simply means “breath” or “life-force”—not an immaterial substance that can exist on its own. But the Old Testament describes ruach as something that God forms within a person (Zech. 12:1), that gives understanding (Job 32:8), that is distinct from flesh (Isa. 31:3), and that returns to God when the body returns to dust (Eccl. 12:7). The dualist argues that ruach, in its fullest biblical usage, refers to a real immaterial dimension of the person—the spirit that God creates, sustains, and receives at death.²

Hebrew. Often translated “breath” or “breath of life.” This is the word used in Genesis 2:7 when God breathes into Adam’s nostrils the “breath of life” (nishmat chayyim). It is also used in Proverbs 20:27, where the neshamah of a person is called “the lamp of the LORD, searching all the inner depths.” While neshamah is less common than nephesh or ruach, it carries deep theological significance: it is the divine breath that animates the human person, distinguishing us from mere dust. On the dualist reading, God’s breathing neshamah into Adam was the act that gave him not just biological life but an immaterial, spiritual dimension—a soul.³

Greek. The Greek word most commonly translated “soul” in the New Testament. Like its Hebrew counterpart nephesh, psyche has a range of meaning: “soul,” “life,” “self,” “person.” Physicalists make the same argument here as they do with nephesh: they claim psyche always means “life” or “person,” never an immaterial soul. But Jesus uses psyche in Matthew 10:28 in a way that requires it to mean something distinct from the body—something humans cannot kill even when they kill the body. Jesus also attributes specific experiences to His psyche (Matt. 26:38; John 12:27). In Revelation 6:9–11, John sees the psychai (plural of psyche) of the martyrs existing consciously under the altar after their bodies have been killed. The dualist argues that psyche, in these key texts, refers to the immaterial soul—a real entity that survives the death of the body.⁴

Greek. The Greek word for “spirit,” “breath,” or “wind”—the New Testament counterpart to the Hebrew ruach. Pneuma is used in the New Testament for the Holy Spirit, for the human spirit, and for disembodied spirits. At death, Jesus yielded up His pneuma (Matt. 27:50; John 19:30). Stephen committed his pneuma to the Lord Jesus (Acts 7:59). Paul speaks of being absent in body but present in pneuma (1 Cor. 5:3). The author of Hebrews describes the departed righteous as “the spirits (pneumata) of just men made perfect” (Heb. 12:23). James defines death as the body without the pneuma (James 2:26). Across these texts, pneuma refers to the immaterial dimension of the human person—the spirit that departs at death, that can exist apart from the body, and that is the seat of the person’s relationship with God.⁵

Greek. The Greek word for “body.” In the New Testament, soma refers to the physical, material body of a person. Paul describes the body as a “tent” (2 Cor. 5:1, 4) and a “temple” (1 Cor. 6:19). The body is the material dimension of the person—the part that can be seen, touched, killed, and buried. On the dualist view, the soma is one component of the whole person. It is good (God created it), it matters (God will resurrect it), but it is not the entirety of what a person is. The person also has a psyche and a pneuma. At death, the soma goes into the ground while the pneuma returns to God (Eccl. 12:7; James 2:26). At the resurrection, body and soul/spirit are reunited in a transformed, glorified state (1 Cor. 15:35–49).⁶

Greek. The Greek word for “flesh.” In the New Testament, sarx is used in two primary senses. First, it can mean physical flesh—the material substance of the body (Luke 24:39: “a spirit does not have flesh and bones”). Second, Paul frequently uses sarx to describe the fallen human nature—the sinful orientation of the person that wars against the Spirit (Gal. 5:17; Rom. 8:5–8). In this second sense, “flesh” is not identical with “body”—it is a moral and spiritual orientation, not merely a physical substance. The distinction between sarx (flesh) and pneuma (spirit) runs throughout the New Testament and presupposes that human beings have both material and immaterial dimensions that can be in tension with each other (Matt. 26:41: “the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak”).⁷

Greek. The Greek word for “heart.” In the New Testament, kardia almost never refers to the physical organ pumping blood. Instead, it refers to the inner core of the person—the seat of thought, will, desire, and moral deliberation. God searches the kardia (Rom. 8:27); faith resides in the kardia (Rom. 10:9–10); the kardia can be hardened (Heb. 3:8) or purified (1 Pet. 1:22). The “heart” in this biblical sense is part of the immaterial interior life of the person—closely related to the soul and spirit.⁸

Hebrew. Literally “living soul” or “living being.” This phrase appears in Genesis 2:7, where God breathes into Adam and he becomes a nephesh chayyah. Physicalists point out that the same phrase is used for animals in Genesis 1:20, 24—therefore, they argue, it cannot mean an immaterial soul. But the dualist responds: the phrase nephesh chayyah describes the result of God’s creative act—a living being. The question is not whether animals are also living beings (they are) but whether God’s specific act of breathing neshamah into Adam gave him something the animals did not receive: an immaterial soul created in God’s image. The rest of Scripture’s testimony about the human nephesh—its departure at death, its existence in Sheol, its eternal value—answers that question decisively.⁹

II. Anthropological and Philosophical Terms

The view that a human being is composed of two fundamentally different kinds of substance: a material body and an immaterial soul (or spirit). The word “substance” here is a philosophical term meaning “a thing that exists in its own right”—not a “stuff” like a chemical substance. On substance dualism, the soul is a real, existing thing—not just a function of the brain, not just a way of talking about the “whole person,” but an actual immaterial entity that God created and sustains. The soul can exist apart from the body (by God’s power) between death and resurrection, though full human flourishing requires the reunion of body and soul at the resurrection. Substance dualism is the position defended throughout More Than Dust. It is not Platonic dualism (which says the soul is inherently immortal and the body is a prison). It is a biblical and Christian form of dualism that affirms the goodness of the body, the reality of the soul, and the hope of bodily resurrection.¹⁰
See also: Platonic Dualism, Holistic Dualism, Christian Physicalism.

The view associated with the ancient Greek philosopher Plato (428–348 BC) that the soul is inherently immortal, pre-exists the body, and is trapped in the body as in a prison. On Plato’s view, death is the liberation of the soul from the body, and the body is an obstacle to the soul’s true life. This is not the view defended in More Than Dust. Biblical substance dualism differs from Platonic dualism in several critical ways: the soul is not inherently immortal (God can destroy it—Matt. 10:28); the body is not a prison but a good creation of God (Gen. 1:31); the goal of human existence is not escape from the body but the resurrection of the body (1 Cor. 15); and the soul does not pre-exist the body but is created by God. Physicalists sometimes accuse dualists of importing Platonic philosophy into the Bible. This accusation is historically inaccurate—substance dualism as taught in Scripture predates and differs significantly from Plato.¹¹

A form of substance dualism that emphasizes the deep unity and interdependence of body and soul while still affirming that they are ontologically distinct. Holistic dualism holds that the body and soul are designed to function together, that full human flourishing requires their union, and that the separation of body and soul at death is an abnormal and tragic state that will be remedied at the resurrection. John W. Cooper uses this term to describe the position he defends in Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting. It is essentially the same view defended in More Than Dust: the soul is real and separable, but the body-soul unity is God’s design for human existence.¹²
See also: Substance Dualism.

The view that human beings are entirely physical—there is no immaterial soul or spirit that exists as a separate substance. On Christian physicalism, the words “soul” and “spirit” in Scripture are understood as ways of describing the whole person, a person’s life, or certain capacities of the person (like thinking and feeling)—not as references to an immaterial substance. Christian physicalists believe that when the body dies, the person ceases to exist entirely until God raises them in a new body at the resurrection. The major forms of Christian physicalism include Nancey Murphy’s nonreductive physicalism, Joel Green’s neuro-hermeneutic approach, and Kevin Corcoran’s constitution view. Edward Fudge’s treatment of human nature in The Fire That Consumes is consistently physicalist, though he does not use the term. More Than Dust argues that Christian physicalism is both unbiblical and unnecessary for conditional immortality.¹³
See also: Nonreductive Physicalism, Holistic Monism.

A specific form of Christian physicalism associated primarily with philosopher Nancey Murphy. Nonreductive physicalism holds that humans are entirely physical beings, but it insists that the higher-level capacities of persons (consciousness, moral reasoning, spiritual experience, relationship with God) are “nonreducible”—meaning they cannot be fully explained by physics and chemistry alone even though they are entirely produced by physical processes. In other words, there is nothing immaterial about a person, but the physical person is more than the sum of its physical parts. Critics of nonreductive physicalism (including the argument of this book) contend that it cannot consistently maintain its “nonreductive” claim: if everything about a person is physical, then consciousness, free will, and moral responsibility ultimately reduce to brain chemistry and physics, whether or not the physicalist wants them to.¹⁴
See also: Christian Physicalism.

Another name for what this book calls “Christian physicalism.” The term “holistic” emphasizes the unity of the person; the term “monism” (from the Greek monos, “one”) means the person is composed of only one kind of substance—physical matter. Fudge’s anthropology is best described as holistic monism: he consistently treats the human person as a unified whole with no separable immaterial component. The term sounds more appealing than “physicalism” because it emphasizes “wholeness,” but it means the same thing in practice: there is no immaterial soul. This book uses “Christian physicalism” and “holistic monism” interchangeably, while noting that the former is more precise.¹⁵
See also: Christian Physicalism, Nonreductive Physicalism.

The philosophical question of what makes you you—and what makes the person who wakes up tomorrow the same person who went to sleep tonight. This question becomes critically important in the body-soul debate when we consider the resurrection. If a person’s body is destroyed at death and God creates a new body at the resurrection, what makes the resurrected person the same person who died? On substance dualism, the answer is clear: the soul provides the thread of continuity. The same soul that inhabited the original body now inhabits the resurrected body. On physicalism, the answer is far more difficult. If the person is entirely physical and their body is destroyed, there is no continuous “something” that connects the person who died to the person who rises. The physicalist must appeal to God’s memory, God’s power, or some other external guarantee—but none of these actually makes the resurrected person identical to the one who died, as opposed to being a very good copy.¹⁶

A philosophical argument for substance dualism based on what is possible (the word “modal” refers to modes of possibility and necessity). The argument goes like this: I can conceive of my mind (my thinking, experiencing self) existing without my body. I cannot conceive of my body existing without my body. Therefore, my mind and my body are not the same thing—because if they were the same thing, whatever is possible for one would be possible for the other. Think of it this way: if Clark Kent and Superman are the same person, then anything that is possible for Clark is also possible for Superman. But if you can imagine Clark existing without Superman, then they cannot be the same person. Similarly, if you can imagine your conscious self existing without your body (and many people report exactly this experience during NDEs), then your conscious self and your body are not identical. This argument was developed by philosophers including Saul Kripke and has been refined by J. P. Moreland and Brandon Rickabaugh.¹⁷

A philosophical term (plural of the Latin quale, meaning “of what kind”) for the subjective, felt qualities of conscious experience. The redness you see when you look at a tomato, the sharp sting of a paper cut, the sweetness of honey on your tongue, the sadness you feel when a friend moves away—these are all qualia. They are what it feels like to have a particular experience. Qualia are a major problem for physicalism because they cannot be explained in purely physical terms. You can describe every neuron firing in someone’s brain when they see red, but that description will never capture what it is like to see red. The existence of qualia is evidence that consciousness involves something beyond the physical—exactly what substance dualism predicts.¹⁸

A famous thought experiment by philosopher Frank Jackson that illustrates the problem qualia pose for physicalism. Imagine a brilliant scientist named Mary who has spent her entire life in a black-and-white room. She has studied everything there is to know about the physics of color, the neuroscience of vision, and the wavelengths of light. She knows every physical fact about what happens in the brain when someone sees the color red. Then one day, she steps outside and sees a red rose for the first time. Does she learn something new? If physicalism is true, she should not—she already knew every physical fact. But intuitively, she does learn something: she learns what it is like to see red. This suggests that there are facts about conscious experience that are not captured by physical facts alone—which means physicalism is incomplete.¹⁹

A form of Christian physicalism proposed by philosopher Kevin Corcoran. On this view, a human person is constituted by (made up of) a physical body, just as a statue is constituted by a lump of bronze. The person and the body are not strictly identical (just as the statue and the lump are not strictly identical), but the person is still entirely physical—there is no immaterial soul. Critics argue that this view still cannot solve the personal identity problem at the resurrection, because if the body that constitutes the person is destroyed, there is nothing left to constitute the person until God creates a new body.²⁰

III. Eschatological Terms

The view that immortality is not an inherent property of the human soul but a gift of God given only to those who are in Christ. On this view, the wicked will not live forever in conscious torment—they will be destroyed. They will cease to exist after the final judgment. The word “conditional” means that immortality comes with a condition: faith in Christ. Those who meet the condition receive eternal life; those who do not are ultimately destroyed (the “second death”). More Than Dust affirms conditional immortality as the correct reading of what Scripture teaches about the final fate of the wicked. The book’s central argument is that CI does not require physicalism and is actually stronger when built on a substance dualist foundation. Matthew 10:28—CI’s strongest proof text—actually requires substance dualism to make sense: “Fear Him who can destroy both soul and body in hell.”²¹
See also: Annihilationism, Second Death.

A term often used interchangeably with conditional immortality, though some scholars draw a distinction. Strictly speaking, “annihilationism” emphasizes the outcome (the wicked are annihilated—reduced to nothing), while “conditional immortality” emphasizes the condition (immortality is conditional on faith in Christ). In practice, both terms refer to the same basic position: the wicked will not suffer eternal conscious torment but will be permanently destroyed after the final judgment. Some CI advocates prefer “conditional immortality” because “annihilationism” can sound harsh or dismissive. More Than Dust uses both terms but generally prefers “conditional immortality” (CI).²²

The traditional view held by much of Western Christianity that the wicked will suffer conscious torment in hell forever—without end. On this view, the unsaved are immortal (whether by nature or by God’s decree) and will experience unending punishment after the final judgment. More Than Dust rejects ECT as neither the best reading of Scripture nor the dominant view of the earliest Greek-speaking church. The book argues that the biblical language of “destruction,” “perishing,” and “the second death” most naturally describes the permanent ending of existence, not endless suffering. However, More Than Dust acknowledges that ECT has been held by many faithful Christians throughout history and engages the position with respect.²³

The view that God will ultimately reconcile all persons to Himself—that no one will be permanently lost. On this view, the fires of judgment are real but purifying: they cleanse and transform rather than destroy. Eventually, every human being will turn from sin and receive God’s love. More Than Dust does not endorse UR, but it acknowledges that some thoughtful Christians hold this view and that it is compatible with substance dualism. The author notes that the question of whether CI or UR is the final answer is a separate issue from the body-soul question. Substance dualism is compatible with all three views of hell (ECT, CI, and UR), and the book’s argument does not depend on which of these is correct.²⁴

The state of persons between death and the final resurrection. What happens to you after you die but before God raises the dead at the end of the age? On substance dualism, the answer is clear: your soul continues to exist consciously. Believers are “with Christ” (Phil. 1:23; 2 Cor. 5:8), and unbelievers are in Hades—a conscious state of waiting (Luke 16:19–31). On physicalism, the intermediate state is a problem. If there is no soul, the person ceases to exist at death and does not exist again until the resurrection. Some physicalists speak of the dead as being held in God’s memory, or they appeal to the idea that the dead experience no passage of time. But these solutions are speculative and lack clear biblical support. The intermediate state is one of the strongest theological reasons to affirm substance dualism.²⁵
See also: Hades, Sheol.

Hebrew. The Old Testament term for the realm of the dead. Sheol is where people go when they die—both the righteous and the wicked. It is often translated “the grave” or “the pit” in older English translations. In some passages, Sheol appears to be simply a poetic name for the grave. But in other passages, it is depicted as a place where the dead exist in some form of conscious awareness (Isa. 14:9–11; Ps. 16:10; 1 Sam. 28:8–15). The dualist argues that the Old Testament understanding of Sheol presupposes that the dead are not simply gone—they are somewhere, awaiting God’s final action. The New Testament equivalent is Hades.²⁶
See also: Hades, Intermediate State.

Greek. The New Testament equivalent of the Hebrew Sheol—the realm of the dead. In Luke 16:19–31, the rich man is in Hades, conscious and in torment. In Acts 2:27, 31, Peter speaks of Christ’s soul not being left in Hades. In Revelation 20:13–14, death and Hades give up their dead for judgment, and then Hades itself is thrown into the lake of fire. Hades is not the same as hell (Gehenna) or the lake of fire. It is a temporary holding state between death and the final judgment. On the dualist view presented in More Than Dust, Hades is where the souls of the unsaved wait consciously until the final resurrection and judgment. After the judgment, Hades is emptied and destroyed.²⁷
See also: Sheol, Gehenna, Lake of Fire.

Greek, from Hebrew Ge-Hinnom. The Greek word usually translated “hell” in the New Testament. It comes from the name of the Valley of Hinnom (Hebrew: Ge-Hinnom) south of Jerusalem, where child sacrifices to the pagan god Molech were once offered (2 Kings 23:10; Jer. 7:31) and which later became associated with divine judgment and destruction. Jesus uses Gehenna as the place where God can “destroy both soul and body” (Matt. 10:28). In the conditionalist understanding, Gehenna represents final, irreversible destruction—not eternal torment. The wicked are cast into Gehenna after the final judgment, and there they are destroyed permanently. On the dualist-CI view of More Than Dust, Gehenna is where both the soul and the resurrected body of the finally unrepentant are destroyed by God.²⁸
See also: Lake of Fire, Second Death.

The final place of punishment described in Revelation 19:20; 20:10, 14–15; 21:8. Death, Hades, the beast, the false prophet, and all whose names are not found in the Book of Life are thrown into the lake of fire. Revelation 20:14 identifies the lake of fire as “the second death.” On the conditionalist reading, the lake of fire represents final, permanent destruction—not ongoing, eternal torment. Those cast into it cease to exist. On the ECT reading, the lake of fire is the place of eternal conscious suffering. More Than Dust holds the conditionalist reading: the lake of fire is where the irreversible destruction of the wicked takes place—the second death from which there is no return.²⁹
See also: Gehenna, Second Death.

A term used in Revelation (2:11; 20:6, 14; 21:8) for the final fate of the wicked. The “first death” is ordinary physical death—the separation of soul from body. The “second death” is the permanent, irreversible destruction that occurs after the final judgment, when the wicked are thrown into the lake of fire. On the conditionalist view, the second death is actual death—the cessation of existence, both body and soul. On the ECT view, the “second death” is metaphorical for eternal suffering, not literal death. More Than Dust argues that the most natural reading of “death” is death—and that the second death means the wicked truly die a second and final time, from which they never return. On the dualist-CI framework, the second death is the destruction of both soul and body, as Jesus warned in Matthew 10:28.³⁰

The view that God provides a genuine chance for salvation to those who did not have an adequate opportunity to respond to the gospel during their earthly lives. This is based on passages like 1 Peter 3:18–20 (Christ preaching to the spirits in prison), 1 Peter 4:6 (the gospel preached to the dead), and the Descensus clause of the Apostles’ Creed (“He descended into hell/the dead”). On this view, the last chance to receive Christ is at or during the final judgment. After that, the fate of the unrepentant is sealed. More Than Dust argues that substance dualism supports the postmortem opportunity by providing a framework in which the person exists consciously between death and resurrection and can therefore encounter God, hear the gospel, and respond. But the book is careful to note that substance dualism is not strictly necessary for a postmortem opportunity—even on a physicalist view, the resurrected person could encounter God at the final judgment.³¹

Latin. Literally, “the descent to those below”—commonly known as the “harrowing of hell” or Christ’s descent into the realm of the dead. This doctrine is reflected in the Apostles’ Creed (“He descended into hell”) and is grounded in 1 Peter 3:18–20. Between His death and resurrection, Christ descended to the realm of the dead and proclaimed His victory (and, on some readings, offered the possibility of salvation) to the spirits held there. The Descensus presupposes that the dead exist consciously and can receive a proclamation—a strong support for the conscious intermediate state and substance dualism.³²

IV. Evidence and Argument Terms

An experience reported by some people who have been clinically dead (or very close to death) and then revived. Common elements of NDEs include the sensation of leaving the body, traveling through a tunnel or toward a light, encountering deceased relatives or spiritual beings, experiencing a life review, and feeling profound peace or love. Millions of people across cultures and centuries have reported NDEs. While NDEs vary in their content, the phenomenon itself is well-documented in medical literature. More Than Dust (Chapter 30) presents NDE evidence as secondary, corroborating evidence for substance dualism—not as the primary argument. The biblical case in Chapters 5–18 carries the main weight. But NDEs are significant because they provide modern, empirically documented cases of what Scripture describes: consciousness existing apart from normal brain function.³³
See also: Veridical NDE.

A near-death experience in which the person reports details that can be objectively verified—details they could not have known through normal sensory means. For example, a patient who was clinically dead and later accurately described events happening in another room, objects placed in locations they could not have seen, or conversations that took place while their heart had stopped and their brain showed no measurable activity. These are the most evidentially significant NDEs because they rule out hallucination, oxygen deprivation, and other purely physical explanations. If a clinically dead patient accurately reports events they could not have perceived through any physical means, something non-physical may be at work. This is exactly what substance dualism predicts: the conscious soul can perceive and remember even when the body’s sensory systems have shut down. Key researchers in this field include Gary Habermas, Janice Miner Holden, Bruce Greyson, Pim van Lommel, Sam Parnia, Michael Sabom, and Jeffrey Long.³⁴

The cessation of heartbeat and breathing. A person in clinical death has no pulse, is not breathing, and (in cases of cardiac arrest) typically shows a flat EEG (no measurable brain electrical activity) within ten to twenty seconds. Clinical death is not the same as biological death (irreversible cellular breakdown). A clinically dead person can sometimes be revived through CPR, defibrillation, or other medical interventions. The significance for the NDE debate is this: many veridical NDEs occur during documented clinical death—meaning the person’s brain showed no measurable activity at the time they report having conscious experiences. If consciousness is entirely produced by brain activity (as physicalism claims), this should be impossible.³⁵

A method of argumentation that builds its conclusion not on a single decisive proof but on the combined weight of many lines of evidence pointing in the same direction. More Than Dust uses a cumulative case approach: no single passage, no single philosophical argument, and no single NDE case proves substance dualism beyond all doubt. But when you take the 72+ biblical passages together, add the philosophical arguments against physicalism, add the corroborating evidence from veridical NDEs, add the testimony of the Christian theological tradition, and add the theological problems that physicalism creates for the intermediate state, personal identity, and the postmortem opportunity—the cumulative weight is overwhelming. Each thread may be contested individually, but together they form a rope that physicalism cannot break.³⁶

The full range of meanings a word can carry in different contexts. For example, the English word “run” can mean to move quickly on foot, to operate a machine, to flow (as water), to manage a business, or to compete in an election. The semantic range of “run” includes all of these meanings. Which meaning is intended depends on the context. The concept of semantic range is critical in the body-soul debate because both nephesh and psyche have wide semantic ranges. Physicalists argue that because these words can mean “person” or “life,” they always mean that and never mean “immaterial soul.” But that is like arguing that because “run” can mean “to manage a business,” it never means “to move quickly on foot.” Context determines meaning—and in many contexts, nephesh and psyche clearly refer to the immaterial self.³⁷

The method of interpreting Scripture by paying careful attention to the grammar of the original language (Hebrew, Aramaic, Greek) and the historical context in which the text was written. This method asks: What did these words mean in their original language? What was the author communicating to the original audience? What was the historical and cultural setting? Grammatical-historical exegesis is the primary method used in More Than Dust. It avoids reading modern assumptions (whether physicalist or dualist) back into the text and instead lets the biblical authors speak for themselves in their own words, in their own context.³⁸

The claim—widely repeated in academic and popular theology—that the ancient Hebrews viewed human beings as undivided wholes with no distinction between body and soul, and that the idea of a separable soul was a later Greek import into Christian thinking. This narrative has been enormously influential. Fudge relies on it heavily in The Fire That Consumes. But as John W. Cooper has demonstrated at length in Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, the “Hebrew holism vs. Greek dualism” narrative is historically inaccurate. The Old Testament itself contains numerous passages that presuppose the soul’s separability from the body (Gen. 35:18; 1 Kings 17:21–22; Eccl. 12:7). The idea that dualism was imported from Greek philosophy and imposed onto the Bible does not survive careful examination of the biblical text itself.³⁹

Notes

↑ 1. For a thorough analysis of the semantic range of nephesh and its dualist implications, see John W. Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-Dualism Debate (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), chap. 2, “The Old Testament Evidence.” For Fudge’s treatment of nephesh, see Edward Fudge, The Fire That Consumes, 3rd ed. (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2011), pp. 25–27.

↑ 2. Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, chap. 2; J. P. Moreland, The Soul: How We Know It’s Real and Why It Matters (Chicago: Moody, 2014), chaps. 3–4.

↑ 3. See the detailed exposition of Genesis 2:7 in Chapter 5 of this book. On the significance of neshamah, see Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, chap. 2.

↑ 4. Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, chap. 5, “The New Testament Evidence”; see also the detailed treatments of Matthew 10:28 (Chapter 10) and Revelation 6:9–11 (Chapter 14) in this book.

↑ 5. Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, chaps. 5–6; see also Chapters 12, 13, and 15 of this book for detailed treatments of the New Testament pneuma passages.

↑ 6. For the relationship between soma and pneuma in Paul’s anthropology, see Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, chaps. 5–7; see also Chapter 18 of this book on 1 Corinthians 15:35–49.

↑ 7. On Paul’s use of sarx, see Gordon Fee, God’s Empowering Presence: The Holy Spirit in the Letters of Paul (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1994); see also Chapters 15–18 of this book.

↑ 8. On the biblical concept of the “heart” as the interior self, see Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, chap. 2; Moreland, The Soul, chap. 4.

↑ 9. See Chapter 5 for the full exposition of Genesis 2:7. The physicalist argument from nephesh chayyah is addressed in detail in Chapter 19.

↑ 10. For a comprehensive defense of substance dualism, see Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting; Moreland, The Soul; Brandon Rickabaugh and J. P. Moreland, The Substance of Consciousness: A Comprehensive Defense of Contemporary Substance Dualism (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2024); Richard Swinburne, Are We Bodies or Souls? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). See Chapter 3 of this book for a full definition and defense.

↑ 11. On the distinction between biblical substance dualism and Platonic dualism, see Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, chap. 1; Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro, A Brief History of the Soul (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011). See Chapter 3 of this book.

↑ 12. Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, especially chaps. 7–8 and the Postscript to the second edition. Cooper uses “functional holism” and “holistic dualism” to describe his position.

↑ 13. For the major statements of Christian physicalism, see Nancey Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Joel B. Green, Body, Soul, and Human Life: The Nature of Humanity in the Bible (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008); Kevin Corcoran, Rethinking Human Nature: A Christian Materialist Alternative to the Soul (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006). For the critique, see Cooper, “Absent from the Body … Present with the Lord,” in Christian Physicalism? Philosophical Theological Criticisms, ed. R. Keith Loftin and Joshua R. Farris (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2018), chap. 16. See Chapters 3 and 24 of this book.

↑ 14. Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?; for the critique, see Rickabaugh and Moreland, The Substance of Consciousness, chap. 2. See Chapter 24 of this book.

↑ 15. On the terminology of “holistic monism” and its relationship to physicalism, see Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, chap. 1; see Chapter 4 of this book for the documentation of Fudge’s holistic monism.

↑ 16. For the personal identity problem and its significance for the resurrection, see Moreland, The Soul, chap. 6; Rickabaugh and Moreland, The Substance of Consciousness, chap. 7; see Chapter 25 of this book.

↑ 17. Rickabaugh and Moreland, The Substance of Consciousness, chap. 3, “The Modal Argument”; Moreland, The Soul, chap. 5. The argument has its roots in René Descartes and was given rigorous modern formulation by Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980). See Chapter 25 of this book.

↑ 18. Rickabaugh and Moreland, The Substance of Consciousness, chap. 4; Moreland, The Soul, chap. 5. The concept of qualia was given its most influential philosophical treatment by Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?,” The Philosophical Review 83, no. 4 (October 1974): 435–50. See Chapter 25 of this book.

↑ 19. Frank Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” Philosophical Quarterly 32, no. 127 (April 1982): 127–36; see Rickabaugh and Moreland, The Substance of Consciousness, chap. 4. See Chapter 25 of this book.

↑ 20. Kevin Corcoran, Rethinking Human Nature; for the critique, see Cooper, “Absent from the Body,” in Christian Physicalism, chap. 16. See Chapter 24 of this book.

↑ 21. For the definitive modern defense of conditional immortality, see Edward Fudge, The Fire That Consumes, 3rd ed. For an accessible introduction, see the resources at Rethinking Hell (rethinkinghell.com). See Chapters 2 and 27 of this book.

↑ 22. On the distinction between “annihilationism” and “conditional immortality,” see Fudge, The Fire That Consumes, Introduction. Many CI advocates prefer the latter term because it foregrounds God’s gift of immortality rather than the negative outcome for the wicked.

↑ 23. For a representative defense of ECT, see Robert A. Peterson, Hell on Trial: The Case for Eternal Punishment (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1995). For the critique from a CI perspective, see Fudge, The Fire That Consumes, throughout.

↑ 24. For a thoughtful evangelical case for universal restoration, see Robin Parry (writing as Gregory MacDonald), The Evangelical Universalist, 2nd ed. (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2012). See Chapter 29 of this book for the relationship between the postmortem opportunity and the CI/UR question.

↑ 25. Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, chaps. 5–7; Cooper, “Absent from the Body,” in Christian Physicalism, chap. 16. See Chapter 13 of this book for the detailed exegetical case for the conscious intermediate state.

↑ 26. Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, chap. 3, “The Old Testament on the Afterlife”; see Chapter 7 of this book.

↑ 27. See Chapter 13 of this book for the detailed treatment of Luke 16:19–31 and the distinction between Hades and the lake of fire.

↑ 28. For the background of Gehenna, see Fudge, The Fire That Consumes, chap. 6; see also Chapter 10 of this book on Matthew 10:28.

↑ 29. Fudge, The Fire That Consumes, chaps. 19–21; see also the theological commitments section of the Master Prompt.

↑ 30. On the “second death” as final destruction, see Fudge, The Fire That Consumes, chap. 21. On how substance dualism grounds the second death (destruction of both soul and body), see Chapter 27 of this book.

↑ 31. For the case for a postmortem opportunity, see Chapter 29 of this book. On the relevant passages (1 Pet. 3:18–20; 4:6), see Chapter 14.

↑ 32. On the Descensus, see Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, chaps. 3–5; see also Chapter 14 of this book on 1 Peter 3:18–20.

↑ 33. For an overview of NDE research, see Janice Miner Holden, Bruce Greyson, and Debbie James, eds., The Handbook of Near-Death Experiences: Thirty Years of Investigation (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2009); Gary R. Habermas and J. P. Moreland, Beyond Death: Exploring the Evidence for Immortality (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 1998). See Chapter 30 of this book.

↑ 34. For veridical NDE cases, see Pim van Lommel, Consciousness Beyond Life: The Science of the Near-Death Experience (New York: HarperOne, 2010); Sam Parnia, Erasing Death: The Science That Is Rewriting the Boundaries Between Life and Death (New York: HarperOne, 2013); Michael B. Sabom, Light and Death: One Doctor’s Fascinating Account of Near-Death Experiences (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998); Jeffrey Long, Evidence of the Afterlife: The Science of Near-Death Experiences (New York: HarperOne, 2010). See Chapter 30 of this book.

↑ 35. On the medical definition of clinical death and its relevance to NDE research, see Parnia, Erasing Death; van Lommel, Consciousness Beyond Life, chaps. 1–3.

↑ 36. On cumulative case reasoning in theology, see Basil Mitchell, The Justification of Religious Belief (London: Macmillan, 1973). The cumulative case for substance dualism is summarized in Chapter 31 of this book.

↑ 37. On the semantic range of nephesh and the error of collapsing it, see Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, chap. 2; see Chapters 5 and 19 of this book.

↑ 38. For an introduction to grammatical-historical exegesis, see Walter C. Kaiser Jr. and Möisés Silva, Introduction to Biblical Hermeneutics: The Search for Meaning, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2007).

↑ 39. Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, chaps. 1–4. Cooper devotes significant attention to dismantling the “Hebrew holism vs. Greek dualism” narrative. See also Chapter 23 of this book.