Chapter 27
Imagine someone told you that because you had breakfast this morning, you must not believe in dinner. You would stare at them, baffled. Breakfast and dinner are not rivals. They happen at different times. One comes first. The other follows. Nobody has to choose between them.
That analogy may sound silly, but it captures something important about one of the most common theological objections to near-death experiences. The argument goes like this: NDEs suggest that the soul escapes the body at death and continues on in some conscious, disembodied state. But Christianity teaches bodily resurrection—the hope that God will raise us up in new, glorious, physical bodies. Therefore, NDEs undermine the Christian hope. They replace resurrection with "soul-escape." And soul-escape, we are told, is not the Christian gospel.
Michael Marsh makes this argument forcefully. So do others. And I want to take it seriously, because it touches on something I care about deeply: the integrity of the Christian hope. If NDEs really did undermine the doctrine of bodily resurrection, I would have a problem. I believe in resurrection. I confess the Apostles' Creed every Sunday. I affirm the Nicene Creed without reservation. I believe that Jesus rose bodily from the grave and that one day God will raise all of us in bodies transformed and glorified.
But here is my contention, and I want to state it plainly at the outset: the claim that NDEs undermine resurrection is built on a false dichotomy. It forces us to choose between two things that classical Christian theology has always held together. The historic Christian position—the position of the creeds, the church fathers, the Reformers, and the majority of Christian thinkers across two thousand years—is that the soul survives the death of the body and that the body will be raised. These are not competing claims. They are sequential stages of a single eschatological hope. NDEs, if they show us anything about the afterlife, show us the first stage: the conscious intermediate state. They do not claim to show us the final state. And confusing the two is the heart of this error.1
Marsh's argument appears primarily in chapter 10 of his monograph, where he addresses theological anthropology and eschatology. He does not merely raise a passing objection. He builds a sustained case that the NDE narrative—with its imagery of souls leaving bodies and traveling to otherworldly realms—is fundamentally at odds with what he considers authentic Christian hope.
His core claim is worth quoting in context. Marsh writes that running through NDE narratives is "the unquestioned assumption of an unbroken continuity of the person through death and into the afterlife." He then argues that this supposition "is inconsistent with current trends in thinking about the nature of the person."2 For Marsh, death is not a gentle transition. It is a radical rupture. He insists, following theologians like Paul Fiddes and Colin Gunton, that "we must take death seriously" and that what passes from the old creation to the new creation is "very likely to be minimal."3
This leads Marsh to a striking conclusion. He writes that "a transference of the person through death and directly into another incorporeal modality in the afterlife" is incompatible with "resurrectional theology." And that resurrectional theology, he says, "must be grounded in the resurrection of Jesus as conqueror of death, and on the hope that we shall all acquire a new 'spiritual' body when the New Creation dawns, as expressed and anticipated in the credal tradition."4
There are several threads in Marsh's argument that we need to untangle. First, he claims that "the idea of a divinely implanted soul that can evade death and represent the whole person in eternity is foreign to much current philosophical, psychological and neurophysiological thinking."5 We addressed this philosophical and scientific claim in Chapters 23–25 on physicalism and substance dualism, and in Chapter 26 on biblical anthropology. The short version: Marsh is conflating one school of thought with settled consensus. There is a robust tradition of substance dualism in both philosophy and theology, and the NDE evidence provides empirical support for it.
Second, Marsh argues that the NDE picture of an "unbroken continuity" between earthly life and the afterlife is theologically naive. For him, death represents a total discontinuity—so radical that the New Creation cannot be understood as a simple extension of our present existence. He leans heavily on N. T. Wright's emphasis on resurrection as God's re-creative act, and on Fiddes's insistence that "there will be no stoking of past embers."6
Third, and most directly relevant to this chapter, Marsh sets up resurrection and soul-survival as competing alternatives. You get one or the other. Either the soul escapes at death (the NDE picture), or the whole person is raised at the resurrection (the Christian picture). Since Christianity teaches resurrection, the NDE picture must be wrong. In his own words, credal definitions call for "resurrection of the dead and the life everlasting, not immortality vested in the receipt of eternal, immortal soul."7
Marsh is not alone in making this move. The broader trend in certain academic theology circles over the past several decades has been to pit resurrection against the intermediate state. N. T. Wright, while more nuanced than some of his followers, has contributed to this trend by emphasizing resurrection as the center of Christian hope and expressing discomfort with what he sees as an over-emphasis on "going to heaven when you die."8 Nancey Murphy, a Christian physicalist whom Marsh cites approvingly, goes further, arguing that the soul is not a separate substance at all but an emergent property of the body—and that resurrection is God's re-creation of the whole person, not the reunion of a surviving soul with a new body.9 Fischer and Mitchell-Yellin, writing from a secular philosophical perspective, also assume throughout their work that the physicalist framework is the more parsimonious one, and they treat any appeal to a surviving consciousness as an extraordinary claim requiring extraordinary evidence.10
So the argument can be summarized like this: NDEs imply soul-escape. Christianity teaches resurrection. Soul-escape and resurrection are incompatible. Therefore, NDEs conflict with Christianity.
It sounds clean. It sounds logical. And it is wrong.
The fundamental problem with Marsh's argument is that it rests on a false either/or. And once you see the false dichotomy, the entire theological objection crumbles.
Here is the core issue: Marsh presents soul-survival and bodily resurrection as though they are mutually exclusive alternatives. You can have one or the other, but not both. This is simply not what the Christian tradition has historically taught. The mainstream Christian position across the centuries has been that both are true—sequentially. The soul survives death and exists consciously in an intermediate state. Then, at the final resurrection, the soul is reunited with a glorified, resurrected body. Step one: the soul departs the body. Step two: the soul is clothed with a new body. These are not rival doctrines. They are two chapters of the same story.11
John W. Cooper has demonstrated this with painstaking historical and exegetical rigor in Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting—one of the most thorough treatments of biblical anthropology available. Cooper shows that the dominant Christian tradition, from the church fathers through the medieval period, through the Reformation, and into the modern era, has affirmed what he calls "holistic dualism": the view that human beings are body-soul unities in this life, that the soul can and does exist apart from the body after death, and that the final hope is the resurrection of the body and the reunion of soul and body in the new creation.12 This is not a fringe position. It is the historic mainstream.
Marsh acknowledges Cooper's work. He even cites Cooper on Matthew 10:28, where Jesus says, "Do not be afraid of those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul. Rather, be afraid of the One who can destroy both soul and body in hell."13 But Marsh then pivots to Wright's reading and dismisses the dualist interpretation too quickly. He sides with Wright's caution against "Platonistic readings" and takes this as sufficient warrant to reject the dualist implications of Jesus' own words.14 This is a serious misstep. Wright's concern about Platonism is legitimate—nobody should confuse biblical dualism with Plato's view that the soul is inherently immortal and the body is a prison. But the solution to that concern is not to deny the intermediate state. It is to affirm the intermediate state while also affirming that the soul's continued existence depends on God, not on its own nature. That is precisely what the Christian tradition has done.
Key Argument: The historic Christian position is not "resurrection instead of soul-survival." It is "soul-survival followed by resurrection." Marsh's argument assumes a dichotomy that the Christian creeds themselves reject. The Apostles' Creed confesses both the resurrection of the body and the life everlasting—a life that, for believers, begins at death with the Lord (Luke 23:43; Phil. 1:23).
A second weakness in Marsh's argument is his claim that the NDE picture presents an "unbroken continuity" through death. This needs some unpacking. What does Marsh mean by "unbroken continuity"? He seems to mean that NDE accounts portray death as a smooth transition—the person simply floats out of the body and continues on, with personal identity intact, as though death were no more dramatic than walking from one room to another.15
There is something to this observation. Many NDE accounts do describe the transition from bodily life to an out-of-body state as surprisingly gentle and natural. But Marsh's theological conclusion does not follow from this. Even if the soul's departure from the body is experienced as smooth, this does not mean that death is theologically trivial. Christianity can affirm that the soul survives death—that is, that God preserves the person's conscious existence through the event of death—while also affirming that death itself is a real and serious rupture. The body dies. The union of body and soul is broken. That is a genuine loss. The person exists, but not in the fullness of embodied life that God intends. This is why the intermediate state is precisely that—intermediate. It is not the final destination. It is the waiting room.16
A third weakness is Marsh's tendency to equate substance dualism with Platonic dualism. He repeatedly invokes "Platonic and Cartesian notions of soul as completely separable from corporeality" and insists they are "inconsistent with current neurophysiological opinion."17 But the substance dualism I am defending is not Platonic. In Plato's system, the soul is inherently immortal—it cannot die. The body is merely a temporary prison, and death is liberation. That is not the Christian view. The Christian view, as we established in Chapter 26, is that God created the soul, God sustains the soul, and God can destroy the soul (Matt. 10:28). The soul's survival of death is not an automatic property of its nature. It is an act of God's sustaining power.18 This distinction matters enormously, and Marsh blurs it.
Consider the practical difference. In Plato's framework, the soul does not need resurrection. If the soul is inherently immortal and the body is a prison, then death is the ultimate good—the soul is finally free. Resurrection would actually be a step backward, a return to the prison. The Christian framework is exactly the opposite. The soul is sustained by God through death, yes. But that is not the ideal. The ideal is embodied life. The body is not a prison. The body is a good gift of God, part of the creation that God declared "very good" (Gen. 1:31). The intermediate state, in which the soul exists without the body, is real and conscious, but it is incomplete. Something is missing. And what is missing is the body. That is why resurrection is necessary. That is why resurrection is the final hope. Not because the intermediate state is bad, but because embodied existence is better.
When Marsh attacks "soul-escape" as though all dualism is Platonic, he is attacking a straw man. Christian substance dualism does not celebrate the escape of the soul from the body. It acknowledges that the soul can exist apart from the body, by God's power, during the intermediate state. But it looks forward eagerly to the day when body and soul will be reunited in the resurrection. Far from undermining resurrection, this view of the soul actually requires it. If the soul's natural and complete state is embodied, then the intermediate state is a temporary condition that cries out for resolution. And the resolution is resurrection.
A fourth weakness is Marsh's use of the phrase "current trends" as though theological fashion settles theological truth. He says the idea of a separable soul is "foreign to much current philosophical, psychological and neurophysiological thinking." But "current trends" in theology have been wrong before. The trend in mid-twentieth-century biblical scholarship was to deny any dualist element in Scripture and to insist that Hebrew thought was "holistic" in a way that left no room for a separable soul. Cooper and others have shown that this scholarly consensus was built on an oversimplification of the biblical data.19 The fact that a position is fashionable does not make it correct. And when the empirical evidence from NDEs directly challenges the physicalist trend, perhaps the trend is what needs revising.
The strongest response to Marsh's argument begins with a clear statement of what the Christian tradition has actually taught. And what it has taught, across nearly all of its major branches, is a two-stage eschatology: first, the conscious intermediate state; then, the bodily resurrection.
Cooper calls this the "traditional dualist-interactionist" view, and he traces it through the entire history of Christian thought. The early church fathers—Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Tertullian, Origen, Augustine—all affirmed in various ways that the soul continues after death. They disagreed about details (Where does the soul go? Is the intermediate state fully conscious or more like a dreamy state?), but none of them denied that the soul exists between death and resurrection.20 The medieval tradition, shaped by Aquinas, held that the soul survives death as an incomplete substance that awaits the resurrection to be made whole again.21 The Reformers, though they sometimes emphasized resurrection more than the intermediate state, did not deny it. Calvin explicitly affirmed the conscious existence of the soul after death and before resurrection.22
Why does this matter? Because Marsh writes as though the "soul-escape" picture is a modern aberration introduced by NDE enthusiasts who are smuggling Greek philosophy into Christian theology. It is not. The idea that the soul survives death has been part of orthodox Christian teaching since the beginning. What Marsh calls "soul-escape" the church fathers called the intermediate state, and they saw it as perfectly compatible with—indeed, as a necessary precursor to—bodily resurrection.
Think of it this way. When a Christian dies, the body goes into the ground. The soul goes to be with the Lord. That is the intermediate state. It is real. It is conscious. It is good—Paul says it is "far better" to depart and be with Christ (Phil. 1:23). But it is not the end. At the final resurrection, God raises the body, transforms it, glorifies it, and reunites it with the soul. That is the final state. And that is the ultimate Christian hope.23
NDEs fit perfectly within the first stage. They do not claim to show us the resurrection. Nobody who has had an NDE has come back with a resurrected body. What they describe—if we take their reports at face value—is exactly what substance dualism predicts for the intermediate state: conscious existence apart from the body, awareness, perception, the experience of encountering a realm beyond the physical. This is breakfast. Resurrection is dinner. And you do not have to choose.
Marsh appeals to the creeds in support of his argument. He claims that the creeds teach resurrection, not soul-immortality, and that the NDE picture is inconsistent with "the credal tradition."24 But does the credal tradition really support his position?
The Apostles' Creed says: "I believe in the resurrection of the body and the life everlasting." The Nicene Creed says: "We look for the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come." These are affirmations of bodily resurrection. Absolutely. But notice what they do not say. They do not say, "I deny the intermediate state." They do not say, "The soul ceases to exist at death." They do not say, "There is no conscious existence between death and resurrection." The creeds affirm resurrection. They do not deny the intermediate state. And the vast majority of theologians who wrote, debated, and ratified these creeds believed in both.25
In fact, the Apostles' Creed includes a line that Marsh does not address with sufficient care: "He descended into hell" (or "He descended to the dead"). This clause presupposes that there is a realm where the dead exist between death and resurrection. Jesus went there. He was conscious. He was active. The creed takes for granted the intermediate state.26
The same is true of the broader theological tradition that produced the creeds. As Cooper demonstrates, the intertestamental Jewish literature that formed the background to early Christian thought was full of references to the intermediate state—Sheol, the bosom of Abraham, the conscious existence of the righteous and the wicked between death and the final judgment.27 Jesus himself drew on this tradition in the parable of the rich man and Lazarus (Luke 16:19–31), where both men are conscious and aware after death, long before any final resurrection.28
We addressed the biblical anthropology question in detail in Chapter 26, so I will not repeat the full exegetical case here. But several passages are so directly relevant to the resurrection-vs.-soul-survival debate that they deserve focused attention.
Start with Paul. In Philippians 1:21–24, Paul writes about his dilemma: "For to me, to live is Christ and to die is gain. If I am to go on living in the body, this will mean fruitful labor for me. Yet what shall I choose? I do not know! I am torn between the two: I desire to depart and be with Christ, which is better by far; but it is more necessary for you that I remain in the body." Notice the structure. Paul expects that when he dies, he will immediately be "with Christ." He does not say he will be unconscious. He does not say he will cease to exist. He says it will be "better by far." This is a conscious, positive experience that begins at death—before the resurrection. Paul knows about the resurrection. He wrote an entire chapter about it (1 Cor. 15). He did not see the intermediate state as a competitor to resurrection. He held both.29
Second Corinthians 5:1–10 makes the same point with even more precision. Paul describes the current body as an "earthly tent" that will be destroyed. He then speaks of a "building from God, an eternal house in heaven, not built by human hands." He groans, longing to be "clothed" with the heavenly dwelling. He says, "We are confident, I say, and would prefer to be away from the body and at home with the Lord" (v. 8). Again: Paul distinguishes between being "in the body" and being "away from the body." He expects the latter to involve being "at home with the Lord." This is the intermediate state, described by an apostle who also passionately affirmed the bodily resurrection.30
Revelation 6:9–11 depicts the souls of martyrs under the altar in heaven, crying out to God for justice. Marsh tries to read this as merely a reference to their spilled lifeblood, drawing on the Old Testament association between blood and life-force. But as Cooper points out, this reading strains the text beyond its natural meaning. These souls speak. They ask questions. They receive an answer. They are told to wait. They are given white robes. Whatever symbolic elements may be present, the passage clearly portrays conscious, personal existence after death and before the final resurrection.31
Insight: Luke 23:43 is perhaps the most direct evidence of all. On the cross, Jesus says to the thief, "Truly I tell you, today you will be with me in paradise." Not "at the resurrection." Not "when the New Creation dawns." Today. Jesus himself affirmed that conscious existence with him begins immediately at death. If anyone's words should settle the question of whether soul-survival and resurrection are compatible, it is the words of the One who conquered death.
J. Steve Miller, in Is Christianity Compatible With Deathbed and Near-Death Experiences?, builds a compelling case that these passages form a consistent and unmistakable pattern. Paul, Jesus, the writer of Hebrews, and John in Revelation all presuppose that persons exist consciously between death and resurrection. Miller notes that those who deny the separability of soul and body need to grapple seriously with this evidence, pointing to the long tradition of Reformed and evangelical theologians—Charles Hodge, Louis Berkhof, Geerhardus Vos—who have affirmed the intermediate state as a straightforward teaching of Scripture.32
Miller also highlights a particularly telling point about Paul's reasoning. In 2 Corinthians 12:2–4, Paul describes a man who was "caught up to the third heaven" and says, "Whether it was in the body or out of the body I do not know—God knows." Miller rightly observes that if the soul cannot exist apart from the body, Paul would have had no reason to wonder. The very fact that he entertains the possibility of being "out of the body" presupposes that he considers disembodied consciousness a real option.33 And we might add: what Paul describes sounds remarkably like what modern NDE accounts report.
This brings us to the critical point that Marsh's argument overlooks. No serious NDE researcher has ever claimed that near-death experiences depict the final, resurrected state. Van Lommel does not claim this. Greyson does not claim this. Parnia does not claim this. Long does not claim this. The NDE literature is about what happens when a person clinically dies and then returns. It is, by definition, about what occurs before the final state, not during it.34
If NDEs show us anything about the afterlife, they show us the first moments of the intermediate state. The soul leaves the body. It is conscious. It perceives. In many cases, it perceives things it could not have perceived by any normal physical means—these are the veridical cases that form the backbone of the evidential argument of this book. The soul then encounters what appears to be a transcendent reality: light, love, deceased relatives, sometimes a being of light, sometimes a boundary or barrier. And then the person is sent back or chooses to return.35
None of this conflicts with resurrection. The NDE is a glimpse of the waiting room, not a tour of the final destination. The intermediate state is temporary. The resurrection is permanent. The intermediate state is disembodied. The resurrection is embodied. The intermediate state, however wonderful it may be, is incomplete. Full human flourishing, in the Christian view, requires the union of soul and body—and that is what the resurrection will accomplish.36
Marsh himself seems to sense that his dichotomy is too sharp. In his chapter 10, he allows that there "might be a combination of the two"—immortality of the soul and resurrection. But he quickly dismisses this possibility without giving it the sustained engagement it deserves.37 Cooper, by contrast, devotes entire chapters to demonstrating that this combination is not just possible but is precisely what the biblical text and the Christian tradition have always taught.
I have said this before, and it bears repeating here because it is so central to Marsh's confusion. The kind of dualism that NDE evidence supports is not Platonic dualism. It is Christian substance dualism—a view that affirms the following:
The soul is a real, immaterial substance created by God. The soul can exist apart from the body, because God sustains it. But the soul is not inherently immortal. Only God is inherently immortal (1 Tim. 6:16). The soul's survival of death is entirely dependent on God's will and power. The soul in the intermediate state is in a real but incomplete condition—it is awaiting reunion with a resurrected body. And the ultimate hope is not escape from the body but transformation of the body.38
This is what J. P. Moreland and others call "Thomistic substance dualism" or "holistic dualism"—it affirms the soul's separability from the body without treating the body as unimportant or the soul as self-sustaining.39 And this is precisely the kind of dualism that NDE evidence supports. NDEs show consciousness existing when brain activity is absent. They do not show consciousness being self-sustaining forever. They show a temporary separation—which is exactly what happens in the intermediate state. The NDE experiencer's soul separates from the body, functions independently for a time, and then returns. The Christian framework says: yes, that is possible, because God sustains the soul. And eventually, the body will be raised too.
Marsh collapses all dualism into Platonic dualism and then rejects the whole package. But this is like rejecting all medicine because you disapprove of one particular drug. The responsible move is to distinguish between the versions and evaluate each on its own merits.
It is worth noting that even N. T. Wright—the scholar Marsh relies on most heavily for his resurrection-centered theology—affirms the reality of a conscious intermediate state. Wright is no dualist in the traditional sense. He is uncomfortable with talk of "immortal souls" and prefers to focus on resurrection as the central Christian hope. But even Wright acknowledges that the New Testament teaches a period between death and resurrection during which the person exists consciously with the Lord.40
In The Resurrection of the Son of God, Wright devotes careful attention to the Jewish and early Christian beliefs about what happens between death and resurrection. He shows that the earliest Christians expected both an intermediate state and a final resurrection. They did not see these as contradictory. They saw them as two parts of one story.41 Wright's quarrel is not with the intermediate state itself. His quarrel is with a theology that stops at the intermediate state and forgets about resurrection. That is a legitimate concern. But it is a concern about emphasis, not about reality. And it has nothing to do with whether NDEs provide evidence for a separable soul.
So when Marsh appeals to Wright to dismiss the NDE evidence, he is misusing Wright's work. Wright argues: do not make the intermediate state the final hope. Fair enough. But Marsh takes this to mean: deny the intermediate state altogether. That goes beyond anything Wright himself says.
There is one more dimension of this discussion that I want to address, because it connects to my own theological convictions. I hold to conditional immortality—the view that only those who are in Christ receive the gift of eternal life, and that the wicked are ultimately destroyed rather than tortured forever. Some people assume that conditional immortality requires physicalism. If the soul is not inherently immortal, they reason, then perhaps there is no soul at all.
But this reasoning is flawed. Conditional immortality does not require physicalism. It requires only the denial of inherent soul-immortality—the Platonic idea that the soul, by its very nature, cannot be destroyed. The Christian conditionalist says: the soul is real, but it exists by God's sustaining will. God can preserve the soul in the intermediate state, clothe it with a resurrection body, and grant it immortality through Christ. And God can also, if he chooses, destroy the soul (Matt. 10:28). The soul's continued existence is conditional on God's purpose, not guaranteed by its own nature.42
This means that the dualism supported by NDE evidence is entirely compatible with conditional immortality. NDEs show the soul functioning apart from the body. They do not show the soul being indestructible. The NDE experiencer's soul leaves the body, experiences a transcendent reality, and returns. This is consistent with a soul that is real, that is sustained by God, and that is not inherently eternal. Conditional immortality plus substance dualism is a coherent and powerful position. And it is the position I hold.43
Hank Hanegraaff, in AfterLife, provides a helpful summary of the biblical case against soul sleep—the idea that the soul is unconscious between death and resurrection. Soul sleep is one of the few positions that would genuinely be incompatible with the NDE picture, because it denies conscious existence between death and resurrection. But Hanegraaff shows, using the same passages we have examined (Luke 23:43, Phil. 1:23, 2 Cor. 5:8, Rev. 6:9–11), that soul sleep has no solid biblical basis. He notes that the Bible uses "sleep" as a metaphor for death, not as a description of the soul's condition. And he points out that the soul's conscious existence in the intermediate state is something we "may look forward to with eager anticipation."44
Hanegraaff also makes a point that bears directly on the NDE debate: "In the whole of Scripture there is nary a hint that we will receive a temporary body in the transitional heaven. Where the Bible does speak clearly the contrast is always between the mortal body in the present and the immortal body in the promise."45 In other words, the Bible presents exactly the two-stage picture that NDE evidence supports: first, a conscious disembodied existence; then, a glorious embodied resurrection. No third option is offered. No temporary body. No soul sleep. Just the soul with the Lord, awaiting the day when the body will be raised.
What makes the NDE argument so powerful in this context is not simply that people report leaving their bodies. That alone might be dismissed as hallucination. What makes the evidence so difficult to dismiss is the veridical element—the cases where patients accurately reported information they could not have known by any normal means. And these veridical cases are precisely what we would expect if the soul genuinely separates from the body and perceives the physical world from an external vantage point.
Consider the kinds of cases documented in The Self Does Not Die by Rivas, Dirven, and Smit. Patient after patient, in case after case, reports seeing and hearing things during clinical death that are later confirmed by medical staff, family members, or other witnesses. A man sees the nurse remove his dentures and place them in a specific drawer—information he reports upon regaining consciousness, to the nurse's astonishment (Case 2.1). A woman accurately describes a conversation that took place in another room of the hospital while she was in cardiac arrest. A child describes surgical instruments used during his operation that he had never seen before and could not have seen from his position on the operating table.58
These cases are not about tunnels and lights and feelings of love. Those features are important, but they are not the evidential backbone. The evidential backbone is the veridical perception—the accurate reporting of physical-world events during a period when the brain shows no measurable activity. And if the soul can perceive the physical world while separated from the body, then we have exactly the kind of evidence that the intermediate state would predict. The soul exists. It is conscious. It perceives. It is not the body.
Marsh, to his credit, acknowledges these cases. He discusses the Pam Reynolds case at some length and engages with several other veridical accounts.59 But he never reckons with the theological implications of the veridical evidence. If a patient's consciousness can accurately perceive events while the brain is flatlined, then the physicalist anthropology that undergirds Marsh's theological argument is in serious trouble. And if physicalism is in trouble, then the foundation of his "resurrection vs. soul-escape" dichotomy collapses.
We have already mentioned 2 Corinthians 12:2–4, but it deserves more attention. Paul describes a man—almost certainly himself—who was "caught up to the third heaven" and "heard inexpressible things, things that no one is permitted to tell." He says he does not know whether this happened "in the body or out of the body." The language is remarkable. Paul, the great apostle of the resurrection, the man who wrote 1 Corinthians 15, entertains the possibility that he experienced something out of the body. He does not dismiss it. He does not condemn it. He reports it as a genuine encounter with the heavenly realm.
What Paul describes sounds strikingly similar to an NDE. He was taken to a transcendent realm. He perceived things beyond ordinary human experience. He was uncertain about the relationship between his consciousness and his body during the event. And he returned to bodily existence afterward. If Paul had walked into a modern NDE researcher's office and reported this experience, it would have been catalogued as a classic near-death or out-of-body experience.60
And here is the point: Paul did not see this experience as incompatible with his belief in resurrection. He was the same Paul who wrote, "If there is no resurrection of the dead, then not even Christ has been raised" (1 Cor. 15:13). He held both. He affirmed the resurrection with passionate conviction, and he affirmed the possibility of conscious out-of-body experience with equal conviction. If Paul could hold both, so can we.
One more theological consideration strengthens the case. A basic principle of New Testament eschatology is the "already/not yet" tension. The kingdom of God is already here, but it is not yet fully here. Salvation is already accomplished, but it is not yet fully realized. We are already God's children, but we do not yet see the fullness of what we will become (1 John 3:2). This tension runs through virtually every aspect of New Testament theology.
The intermediate state fits perfectly within this framework. The soul's survival of death is the "already." The resurrection of the body is the "not yet." The NDE evidence, by corroborating the reality of the intermediate state, simply fills in the "already" side of the equation. It does not deny the "not yet." It does not claim that the intermediate state is the final destination. It witnesses to the first stage of a two-stage eschatological hope—the stage that has "already" begun for every person who has died.61
Marsh, by collapsing the intermediate state into the resurrection, effectively removes the "already" and leaves only the "not yet." That is not good eschatology. It flattens the rich, two-stage picture that the New Testament presents into a single event. And it forces Marsh into the awkward position of having to explain what happens to persons between death and resurrection—a question that his physicalist framework cannot answer without resorting to the very "mechanistic" models he claims to reject.
Here is the deep irony of Marsh's position. He argues that NDEs undermine resurrection theology. But in fact, the veridical evidence from NDEs actually supports the broader Christian framework better than his physicalist alternative does.
Think about it. The Christian framework says: (1) The soul is real. (2) The soul can exist apart from the body. (3) When a person dies, the soul continues to exist consciously. (4) The soul awaits the resurrection, when it will be reunited with a glorified body. What does the NDE evidence show? (1) Consciousness appears to function when the brain is clinically inactive. (2) Patients accurately report events they could not have perceived through bodily senses. (3) The experience is overwhelmingly characterized as "more real than real"—not the confused, fragmented content of a dying brain, but coherent, meaningful, and often transformative encounters. (4) The NDE experiencers return to their bodies, suggesting that the separation was temporary and that embodied existence continues to be the norm.46
Every one of these features is what we would expect if the Christian substance dualist picture is correct. The soul survives death. It is conscious. It perceives. But the separation is temporary. The soul returns to the body (in the case of NDEs) or awaits the resurrection (in the case of permanent death). NDEs do not undermine the Christian hope. They provide empirical corroboration for the first half of it.
Key Argument: Marsh argues that NDEs conflict with resurrection theology. But the opposite is true. NDEs demonstrate exactly what substance dualism predicts for the intermediate state: a real, conscious soul functioning apart from the body. This is what the Christian tradition has always said happens between death and resurrection. NDEs do not replace resurrection. They illuminate the intermediate state that precedes it.
Chris Carter makes a similar observation in Science and the Near-Death Experience, noting that the NDE evidence is deeply compatible with the religious and philosophical traditions that have affirmed the soul's survival of death while also anticipating a future transformation of the whole person. The evidence does not require us to abandon the idea of resurrection. It invites us to take seriously the idea that there is something about us that survives the body's death—something that is real, personal, and conscious. Whether you call it the soul, the self, or the person, the NDE evidence indicates that death does not end it.47
J. Steve Miller brings this discussion to a practical conclusion. After surveying the biblical evidence, the theological tradition, and the NDE research, he argues that Christians who believe the Scriptures but doubt that the soul can separate from the body should make sure they understand the evidence for the dominant traditional position. He cites Hodge, Berkhof, Vos, and other pillars of Reformed theology who have affirmed the intermediate state. And he notes that the claim of "unanimity" among biblical scholars against dualism is a significant exaggeration—one driven more by accommodation to physicalist assumptions in secular neuroscience than by careful exegesis of the text.48
Miller also responds directly to Adrian Thatcher's claim that "there appears to be a rare unanimity among biblical scholars that the biblical picture of the person is non-dualist." Miller replies that Paul uses Jesus' resurrection as an example of what will happen to us at the final resurrection, not during the intermediate period. And since terms like "spirit" and "soul" are defined by their use in each New Testament context, the verses we have examined make it clear that in the biblical view, the self, soul, or spirit can indeed separate from the body.49
The dominant Christian tradition has been right all along. Soul-survival and resurrection belong together. NDEs support the first half of that picture. The Bible affirms both halves. And the critic who tries to force a choice between them is creating a problem that does not exist.
A skeptic might respond: "You're downplaying Marsh's point about the radicality of death. He argues that death is such a total rupture that nothing of the person can simply carry over into the afterlife. The soul doesn't just float out. Death destroys everything."
This objection sounds dramatic, but it proves too much. If death truly destroys everything—body, soul, consciousness, personal identity—then what is left for God to raise? Resurrection requires some continuity of identity. The person who is raised must be, in some meaningful sense, the same person who died. If death is so radical that absolutely nothing survives, then the resurrected person is not the same person at all. She is a brand-new creation, a copy, a replica. That is not resurrection. That is replacement.50
Cooper addresses this brilliantly. He argues that the soul provides the necessary continuity of personal identity between death and resurrection. Without the soul, you face what philosophers call "the gap problem": how can there be identity between the person who died and the person who is raised, if there is no continuous entity bridging the gap? Physicalism has struggled mightily with this problem. The dualist answer is simple: the soul bridges the gap. It is the same soul, the same person, the same "I"—first in the body, then apart from the body, then reunited with a glorified body. Continuity of the soul provides continuity of the person.51
Marsh mentions "teletransportation" and "replica" models and dismisses them—rightly, in my view.52 But he does not seem to realize that his own physicalist anthropology makes these exotic models necessary. If the soul does not survive death, if nothing carries over, then the only way to get the same person back at the resurrection is through some kind of divine information-transfer or re-creation from scratch. These models are precisely the "intensely anthropomorphic, mechanistic" solutions Marsh says he wants to avoid. The substance dualist does not need them. The soul does the work.
Another objection: "If NDEs were compatible with Christianity, wouldn't we expect NDE experiencers to describe seeing resurrected bodies, heavenly thrones, the New Jerusalem? Instead, they describe floating out of their bodies, going through tunnels, seeing lights. That doesn't sound very Christian."
This objection confuses the intermediate state with the final state. NDErs do not describe the resurrection because they have not experienced the resurrection. They have experienced clinical death and a brief separation of consciousness from the body. What they describe—the departure from the body, the encounter with light, the meeting with deceased persons, the sense of overwhelming love—is consistent with the intermediate state as depicted in Scripture. The rich man and Lazarus are conscious. The souls under the altar cry out. Paul expects to "be with Christ" immediately at death. None of these passages describe the full splendor of the resurrection. They describe the waiting period before it.53
And we should not be surprised that NDEs do not describe the resurrection. The resurrection has not happened yet. NDErs are people who died and came back. They never reached the final destination. They got a glimpse of the intermediate state—the foyer, not the banquet hall. The fact that their descriptions are consistent with the intermediate state, rather than with the final state, is actually evidence that the NDE picture maps onto the Christian framework quite naturally.
Common Objection: "If NDEs support the intermediate state, don't they support every religion's version of the afterlife? Hindus have NDEs too. Muslims have NDEs. Atheists have NDEs. This isn't evidence for Christianity specifically."
This is a fair question, and I want to give a careful answer. NDEs are not, by themselves, evidence for the specific doctrines of any one religion. They are evidence for the broader proposition that consciousness can exist apart from the body. They are evidence that death is not the end. They are evidence for substance dualism. These are important conclusions, and they are conclusions that Christianity affirms.
The fact that people from different cultural and religious backgrounds have NDEs does not undermine the Christian case. It is exactly what we would expect if the soul is real and the intermediate state is real. People of all backgrounds have souls. People of all backgrounds will enter the intermediate state at death. What they experience there may be filtered through their cultural and cognitive frameworks—just as two people visiting the same country would describe it differently depending on their background and expectations—but the underlying reality is the same.54
Moreover, as Miller has documented, the content of NDEs is far more compatible with Christianity than critics have acknowledged. The "being of light" is frequently identified as Jesus, even by people who were not strongly Christian before their experience. Anti-Christian elements are strikingly rare. Reincarnation, though occasionally mentioned, is not a dominant theme. The overall pattern of the evidence does not promote one religion at the expense of others, but it is remarkably consistent with the broad contours of Christian eschatology: conscious existence after death, a realm beyond the physical, the presence of a loving being of light, a life review with moral dimensions, and a boundary or point of return.55
A final counter-objection: "What about Christians who hold to physicalism? Nancey Murphy, Joel Green, Kevin Corcoran—they are committed Christians who deny the existence of a separable soul. Are you saying they are not real Christians?"
Absolutely not. I have no interest in questioning anyone's faith. These are serious Christian thinkers who have wrestled with the evidence and come to different conclusions. I respect them even when I disagree with them. My argument is not that physicalist Christians are not Christians. My argument is that their anthropology cannot account for the NDE evidence, that it creates serious problems for the doctrine of the intermediate state, and that it is not as well supported by Scripture as the dualist alternative. The biblical evidence for a conscious intermediate state is strong. The NDE evidence for consciousness functioning apart from the brain is strong. Together, they form a powerful case for substance dualism. But one can be wrong about anthropology and still be a faithful follower of Christ.56
What I am saying is this: the physicalist move in Christian theology, however well-intentioned, has created a problem. By denying the soul, physicalist Christians have inadvertently given ammunition to skeptics like Marsh who use the same physicalist framework to dismiss the NDE evidence entirely. If even Christians deny the soul, the skeptic reasons, then why should we take seriously the possibility that consciousness survives bodily death? The NDE evidence challenges this reasoning head-on. And the traditional dualist position, held by the vast majority of Christians throughout history, makes the best sense of both the biblical data and the empirical evidence.
Let me take one more objection seriously, because I think it gets at the heart of Marsh's concern. Someone might say: "You're treating Marsh unfairly. His real worry isn't a technical point about the intermediate state. His worry is that NDE enthusiasm will replace the robust Christian hope of resurrection with a thin, vague, sentimental picture of floating souls and shining lights. He's trying to protect the gospel."
I appreciate that concern. Deeply. And in some ways, Marsh is right to raise it. Popular NDE culture has sometimes produced exactly the kind of theologically thin, sentimentalized picture of the afterlife that serious Christians should be wary of. When people start treating NDE accounts as though they are a fifth gospel—authoritative revelations that override Scripture—we have a problem. When popular NDE books replace the concrete hope of resurrection with a fuzzy notion of "going to the light," something important has been lost.62
But the solution to this problem is not to deny the intermediate state or to dismiss the NDE evidence. The solution is to put the NDE evidence in its proper theological context. NDEs give us empirical evidence that consciousness survives bodily death. Good. That is consistent with what Scripture teaches. But NDEs do not give us the fullness of the Christian hope. The fullness of the Christian hope includes the return of Christ, the resurrection of the dead, the renewal of all creation, the final judgment, and the eternal communion of the redeemed with God in glorified bodies. No NDE gives us all of that. And no serious NDE researcher claims otherwise.
The proper response to Marsh's concern is not to reject the NDE evidence. It is to say: "Yes, resurrection is the ultimate hope. And the intermediate state, which NDE evidence corroborates, is the penultimate hope. Both are real. Both are important. And both are taught in Scripture." That is the balanced, theologically responsible position. And it is the position of this book.
Marsh frequently invokes Paul's great resurrection chapter, 1 Corinthians 15, as though it settles the matter against the intermediate state. He emphasizes Paul's language about being "changed" and the radical newness of the resurrection body. And he reads this as supporting his view that death involves a total discontinuity—that what happens in the New Creation is so entirely new that there is no need for a soul carrying over from the old creation.
But 1 Corinthians 15 does not say what Marsh needs it to say. Paul's argument in that chapter is about the nature of the resurrection body, not about the intermediate state. Paul is answering the question, "With what kind of body will the dead be raised?" (v. 35). His answer is that the resurrection body will be radically different from the current body—imperishable, glorious, powerful, spiritual (vv. 42–44). He uses the analogy of a seed: what is sown bears little resemblance to what grows from it. But the seed and the plant are still the same organism. There is continuity through transformation.63
None of this contradicts the intermediate state. Paul's point is that the resurrection body will be gloriously different from our current body. He is not arguing that the soul ceases to exist between death and resurrection. In fact, in the very same letter, Paul says, "If the dead are not raised, let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die" (v. 32)—suggesting that without the resurrection, death would be the end. But he clearly does not think death is the end, because he also writes to the Philippians that to die is "gain" and that he will be "with Christ" (Phil. 1:21–23). The only way both of these statements make sense together is if Paul holds a two-stage eschatology: the soul goes to be with Christ at death (the intermediate state), and the body is raised in glory at the resurrection (the final state).
So Marsh's appeal to 1 Corinthians 15 actually supports the two-stage model rather than undermining it. Paul affirms a radical transformation of the body at the resurrection—and a conscious intermediate state between death and that resurrection. Both are Paul's teaching. Both are the teaching of the historic church. And both are consistent with the NDE evidence.
Marsh's argument that NDEs undermine resurrection theology fails because it rests on a dichotomy that the Christian tradition has never accepted. The historic Christian position affirms both the survival of the soul and the resurrection of the body. These are not rivals. They are stages. The soul survives death and enters a conscious intermediate state. At the final resurrection, the body is raised and reunited with the soul. NDEs, if they tell us anything about the afterlife, tell us about the first stage—the intermediate state—and what they describe is remarkably consistent with what Scripture teaches.
The creeds affirm resurrection. They do not deny the intermediate state. The Bible teaches both. The church fathers, the Reformers, and the vast majority of Christian theologians across two millennia have affirmed both. And the NDE evidence provides empirical corroboration for the reality of the intermediate state—the very reality that Marsh's physicalist anthropology forces him to deny.
I want to close this chapter on a personal note. One of the things that first drew me to this subject was a deep conviction that death is not the end. Not because I wished it to be so—though I certainly do wish it—but because the evidence pointed that way. The biblical evidence. The philosophical evidence. And, increasingly, the empirical evidence from near-death experiences. I believe in the resurrection of the body. I confess it in the creed. I look forward to it with hope. But I also believe, on the basis of both Scripture and evidence, that the soul does not wait in unconscious darkness until that great day. The soul goes to be with the Lord. That is the intermediate state. That is what NDE evidence appears to corroborate. And far from undermining my faith in the resurrection, it strengthens it. Because if the soul survives death, if consciousness continues when the brain stops, then the materialist objection to the afterlife collapses. And the resurrection becomes not an impossible miracle but a glorious completion of what God has already begun.
Resurrection and soul-survival are not enemies. They are partners. And the evidence—biblical, theological, and empirical—points unmistakably in their direction.57
↑ 1. The argument of this chapter draws extensively on John W. Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-Dualism Debate, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), especially chaps. 5–7, where Cooper demonstrates that the biblical and theological tradition has consistently affirmed both the intermediate state and bodily resurrection.
↑ 2. Michael N. Marsh, Out-of-Body and Near-Death Experiences: Brain-State Phenomena or Glimpses of Immortality? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. xxiv.
↑ 3. Marsh, Out-of-Body and Near-Death Experiences, p. 259. Marsh draws on Paul Fiddes, The Promised End: Eschatology in Theology and Literature (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), and Colin Gunton, The Christian Faith (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002).
↑ 4. Marsh, Out-of-Body and Near-Death Experiences, p. xxiv.
↑ 5. Marsh, Out-of-Body and Near-Death Experiences, p. xxiv.
↑ 6. Marsh, Out-of-Body and Near-Death Experiences, p. 209. The phrase "there will be no stoking of past embers" appears in Marsh's discussion of resurrection as radical newness.
↑ 7. Marsh, Out-of-Body and Near-Death Experiences, pp. 258–259.
↑ 8. N. T. Wright, Surprised by Hope: Rethinking Heaven, the Resurrection, and the Mission of the Church (New York: HarperOne, 2008), chaps. 1–3. Wright's concern is that popular Christianity has replaced the biblical hope of resurrection with a vague hope of "going to heaven." His emphasis is laudable, but it has been misused by some to deny the intermediate state entirely.
↑ 9. Nancey Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 39. Marsh cites Murphy approvingly; see Marsh, Out-of-Body and Near-Death Experiences, p. 212.
↑ 10. John Martin Fischer and Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin, Near-Death Experiences: Understanding Visions of the Afterlife (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), chap. 9.
↑ 11. Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, chaps. 6–7. Cooper calls this the "two-stage" eschatology and traces it through the history of Christian doctrine.
↑ 12. Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, chap. 7. Cooper uses the term "holistic dualism" to distinguish the biblical view from Platonic dualism. The biblical view affirms body-soul unity as the norm while also affirming the soul's ability to exist apart from the body by God's sustaining power.
↑ 13. Matthew 10:28 (NIV). Marsh discusses Cooper's reading of this passage in his chap. 10; see Marsh, Out-of-Body and Near-Death Experiences, p. 192.
↑ 14. Marsh, Out-of-Body and Near-Death Experiences, p. 192. Marsh cites Wright's caution against Platonistic readings but uses it to dismiss the entire dualist argument, which goes beyond what Wright himself intends.
↑ 15. Marsh, Out-of-Body and Near-Death Experiences, p. xxiv.
↑ 16. Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, chap. 6. Cooper describes the intermediate state as genuine but incomplete—the soul is with the Lord, which is good, but the full restoration requires the resurrection of the body.
↑ 17. Marsh, Out-of-Body and Near-Death Experiences, p. 212.
↑ 18. J. P. Moreland, The Soul: How We Know It's Real and Why It Matters (Chicago: Moody Publishers, 2014), chap. 2. Moreland carefully distinguishes Christian substance dualism from Platonic dualism on precisely this point: the soul's continued existence depends on God, not on an inherent property of the soul itself.
↑ 19. Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, chaps. 2–4. Cooper demonstrates that the "Hebrew thought is holistic" consensus was an oversimplification that ignored numerous Old Testament passages presupposing a separable soul, including Gen. 35:18, 1 Kings 17:21–22, and Eccl. 12:7.
↑ 20. Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, chap. 7. For a broader survey, see Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro, A Brief History of the Soul (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), chaps. 1–4.
↑ 21. Thomas Aquinas held that the separated soul after death is in an unnatural state—still existing, still conscious, but incomplete without the body. See Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (London: Routledge, 2003), chap. 6.
↑ 22. John Calvin, Psychopannychia (1542). Calvin wrote this treatise specifically to refute the doctrine of soul sleep and to affirm the conscious existence of the soul between death and resurrection.
↑ 23. Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, chap. 6. This two-stage framework is also affirmed in Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994), chaps. 41–42.
↑ 24. Marsh, Out-of-Body and Near-Death Experiences, p. xxiv.
↑ 25. J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds, 3rd ed. (London: Continuum, 2006). Kelly demonstrates that the framers of the creeds held a dualist anthropology that included both the intermediate state and bodily resurrection.
↑ 26. The descensus clause has been interpreted in various ways, but all major interpretations presuppose the existence of a realm where the dead are conscious. See Wayne Grudem, "He Did Not Descend into Hell: A Plea for Following Scripture Instead of the Apostles' Creed," Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 34, no. 1 (1991): 103–113.
↑ 27. Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, chap. 3. Cooper surveys the intertestamental literature, including 1 Enoch, 4 Ezra, and 2 Baruch, showing a well-developed expectation of a conscious intermediate state.
↑ 28. Luke 16:19–31. Whether this is a parable or a real account, the theological point is the same: Jesus portrays the dead as conscious and aware in the period between death and final judgment.
↑ 29. Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, chap. 5. Cooper provides an extensive exegetical analysis of Phil. 1:21–24, arguing that Paul clearly expected conscious personal existence with Christ immediately upon death.
↑ 30. Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, chap. 5. See also Murray J. Harris, Raised Immortal: Resurrection and Immortality in the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985), chap. 6.
↑ 31. Marsh, Out-of-Body and Near-Death Experiences, p. 192. Marsh tries to reduce the "souls" of Rev. 6:9 to a reference to shed lifeblood (cf. Deut. 12:23; Lev. 17:14). But the text describes personal agents who speak, ask questions, receive answers, and are given garments. This goes well beyond a metaphor for spilled blood. See Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, chap. 5.
↑ 32. J. Steve Miller, Is Christianity Compatible With Deathbed and Near-Death Experiences? The Surprising Presence of Jesus, Scarcity of Anti-Christian Elements, and Compatibility with Historic Christian Teachings (Wisdom Creek Press, 2021), chap. 4. Miller cites Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979), vol. III, 724–747; L. Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1941), 688ff.
↑ 33. Hank Hanegraaff, AfterLife: What You Need to Know about Heaven, the Hereafter, and Near-Death Experiences (Brentwood, TN: Worthy Publishing, 2013), chap. 5. Hanegraaff makes this observation about 2 Cor. 12:2–4, as does Miller in his treatment of the same passage.
↑ 34. Pim van Lommel, Consciousness Beyond Life: The Science of the Near-Death Experience (New York: HarperOne, 2010), chap. 16. Van Lommel is careful to distinguish between what NDEs tell us about consciousness surviving death and broader metaphysical or religious claims about the final state of the cosmos.
↑ 35. For a comprehensive catalogue of NDE features corroborated by veridical evidence, see Titus Rivas, Anny Dirven, and Rudolf Smit, The Self Does Not Die: Verified Paranormal Phenomena from Near-Death Experiences (Durham, NC: IANDS, 2016), passim.
↑ 36. Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, chap. 6. Cooper is clear that the intermediate state, while genuine and conscious, is not the fullness of human existence. Full humanity requires the union of body and soul, which will be realized in the resurrection.
↑ 37. Marsh, Out-of-Body and Near-Death Experiences, p. 201. In his section 10.3, Marsh mentions that continuity between earthly life and the afterlife "might be created anew in resurrection—or indeed there might be a combination of the two," but he does not explore this combination option seriously.
↑ 38. Moreland, The Soul, chap. 7. Moreland argues that Christian substance dualism differs from Platonic dualism in affirming that the soul is created by God and depends on God for its continued existence, that the body is good and essential to full human flourishing, and that the ultimate hope is bodily resurrection, not permanent disembodiment.
↑ 39. Brandon Rickabaugh and J. P. Moreland, The Substance of Consciousness: A Comprehensive Defense of Contemporary Substance Dualism (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2023), chaps. 1–3. See also Richard Swinburne, Are We Bodies or Souls? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).
↑ 40. N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003), 129–140, 204–206. Wright discusses early Jewish and Christian beliefs about the intermediate state and acknowledges that the earliest Christians expected some form of continued existence between death and resurrection.
↑ 41. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God, chap. 3. Wright surveys Jewish beliefs about Sheol, the "bosom of Abraham," and the varied expectations about what happens to the dead before the final resurrection.
↑ 42. Edward Fudge, The Fire That Consumes: A Biblical and Historical Study of the Doctrine of Final Punishment, 3rd ed. (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2011). Fudge argues for conditional immortality while affirming the conscious intermediate state. The two positions are entirely compatible, as the intermediate state is temporary and the final destruction of the wicked is a separate eschatological event.
↑ 43. For a defense of this combination, see also Chris Date and Glenn Peoples, eds., Rethinking Hell: Readings in Evangelical Conditionalism (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2014). Several contributors to this volume affirm substance dualism alongside conditional immortality.
↑ 44. Hanegraaff, AfterLife, chap. 5.
↑ 45. Hanegraaff, AfterLife, chap. 5.
↑ 46. For a comprehensive summary of these evidential features, see Jeffrey Long, Evidence of the Afterlife: The Science of Near-Death Experiences (New York: HarperOne, 2010), chaps. 1–9; Bruce Greyson, After: A Doctor Explores What Near-Death Experiences Reveal about Life and Beyond (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2021), chaps. 3–7.
↑ 47. Chris Carter, Science and the Near-Death Experience: How Consciousness Survives Death (Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions, 2010), chap. 16.
↑ 48. Miller, Is Christianity Compatible With Deathbed and Near-Death Experiences?, chap. 4.
↑ 49. Miller, Is Christianity Compatible With Deathbed and Near-Death Experiences?, chap. 4. Miller responds to the claim of Adrian Thatcher, quoted in Theodore Schick and Lewis Vaughn, How to Think about Weird Things: Critical Thinking for a New Age, 6th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2011), 254.
↑ 50. This is sometimes called the "gap problem" or the "reduplication problem" in philosophy of mind. See Dean Zimmerman, "The Compatibility of Materialism and Survival: The 'Falling Elevator' Model," Faith and Philosophy 16, no. 2 (1999): 194–212. Zimmerman attempts to solve this problem within a physicalist framework but acknowledges its difficulty.
↑ 51. Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, chap. 7. Cooper argues that the soul provides the metaphysical basis for personal identity across the gap between death and resurrection—a problem that physicalist accounts of the resurrection struggle to solve.
↑ 52. Marsh, Out-of-Body and Near-Death Experiences, p. 212. Marsh calls these models "intensely anthropomorphic, mechanistic, and entirely devoid of the corporate theme of resurrectional life within the Body of Christ and the Triune Godhead."
↑ 53. Gary R. Habermas, "Evidential Near-Death Experiences," in The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism, ed. Jonathan J. Loose, Angus J. L. Menuge, and J. P. Moreland (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2018), 227–246. Habermas argues that the evidential value of NDEs lies in their support for consciousness functioning apart from the body—exactly what the intermediate state requires.
↑ 54. Jeffrey Long, God and the Afterlife: The Groundbreaking New Evidence for God and Near-Death Experience (New York: HarperOne, 2016), chap. 3. Long discusses the cross-cultural consistency of core NDE features alongside the cultural variations in specific details.
↑ 55. Miller, Is Christianity Compatible With Deathbed and Near-Death Experiences?, chaps. 1–3. Miller found that NDE/DBE reports in the best studies rarely oppose Christianity or its major doctrines, and that the frequently heard claim that NDEs promote Eastern religions or universalism does not hold up under scrutiny.
↑ 56. For representative works by Christian physicalists, see Nancey Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?; Joel B. Green, Body, Soul, and Human Life: The Nature of Humanity in the Bible (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008); Kevin Corcoran, Rethinking Human Nature: A Christian Materialist Alternative to the Soul (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006).
↑ 57. The argument of this chapter connects forward to Chapter 28, which addresses the broader question of NDE compatibility with Christian theology, and back to Chapter 26, which treats the exegetical case for biblical dualism in full detail.
↑ 58. Rivas, Dirven, and Smit, The Self Does Not Die, chap. 2, Case 2.1 (the dentures man, originally reported in van Lommel's Lancet study). For additional veridical cases, see chap. 1, Cases 1.1–1.12, and chap. 3 for cases involving perception at a distance.
↑ 59. Marsh, Out-of-Body and Near-Death Experiences, chap. 1, where he discusses the Pam Reynolds case and other famous NDE accounts. His treatment of the veridical elements is thorough but his conclusions are, in our view, inadequate. See Chapters 4–6 of this book for a detailed response.
↑ 60. Michael Sabom, Light and Death: One Doctor's Fascinating Account of Near-Death Experiences (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998), 204–205. Sabom discusses the parallels between Paul's experience in 2 Cor. 12 and modern NDE reports. See also Miller, Is Christianity Compatible With Deathbed and Near-Death Experiences?, chap. 4.
↑ 61. For the "already/not yet" framework in New Testament eschatology, see George Eldon Ladd, A Theology of the New Testament, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), chaps. 3–4. The intermediate state represents the "already" of personal eschatology—the person is already with the Lord—while the resurrection represents the "not yet" of cosmic eschatology.
↑ 62. This concern is addressed more fully in Chapter 28, which distinguishes between the evidential value of NDE research and the theological interpretations offered by individual experiencers. The evidence is strong; the interpretations vary and must be evaluated against Scripture.
↑ 63. Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text, New International Greek Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 1259–1290. Thiselton's careful analysis of 1 Cor. 15:35–49 shows that Paul affirms both genuine continuity (same organism) and radical transformation (different kind of body) in the resurrection.