The debate between conditional immortality and biblical universalism draws on a rich vocabulary of biblical, theological, and philosophical terms. Many of these terms carry centuries of meaning, and some have been used in dramatically different ways by different traditions. This glossary provides clear, accessible definitions of the most important terms used throughout The Consuming Fire. Where a term is discussed at length in a particular chapter, the reader is directed to that chapter for a fuller treatment.
How to Use This Glossary: Terms are arranged alphabetically. Greek, Hebrew, and Latin terms are transliterated and, where helpful, the original script is provided in parentheses. Cross-references to chapters in the main text are included so the reader can explore each concept more deeply.
These are among the most important and contested words in the entire debate. The Greek noun aiōn means “age” or “eon”—a period of time, often of indefinite but not necessarily infinite duration. The adjective aiōnios, derived from aiōn, fundamentally means “pertaining to an age” or “age-long.” In the Septuagint (the Greek OT), aiōnios is used to describe things that clearly had or will have an end: the “everlasting” hills (Hab. 3:6), Jonah’s time in the fish “forever” (Jonah 2:6), and the Levitical priesthood. The Hebrew olam (עוֹלָם) carries a similar semantic range: it denotes a long or hidden duration whose endpoint is determined by context, not by the word itself. The CI position actually agrees with much of the UR word study here—this is an area of genuine common ground. CI does not need aiōnios to mean “everlasting torment” (as ECT requires). Instead, CI reads aiōnios when applied to punishment as meaning “permanent in result”—the destruction is aiōnios because it is irreversible and final, not because the process continues forever. The UR position argues that aiōnios describes age-long correction that eventually comes to an end. Neither reading requires the word to mean “everlasting” in the ECT sense. The meaning of this word is explored in detail in Chapter 6.
The belief that the unsaved will ultimately cease to exist—that God will destroy them completely and permanently so that they are no longer conscious or extant. Annihilationism is closely related to conditional immortality (see below) and is sometimes used interchangeably with it, though some scholars distinguish them: annihilationism emphasizes the act of destruction, while conditional immortality emphasizes that immortality is not inherent to the human soul but is a gift granted only to the redeemed. In either case, the final destiny of the wicked is nonexistence. This view was held in the early church by Arnobius of Sicca and Irenaeus (in certain readings) and has been defended in modern times by Edward Fudge, John Stott, Clark Pinnock, Chris Date, and others. See Chapters 1, 2, and 24.
The Greek verb most often translated “destroy” or “perish” in the New Testament. It is one of the most important words in the CI/UR debate because the CI case depends heavily on reading it as “destroy” or “cause to cease to exist” in contexts of final judgment. Apollymi has a wide semantic range. In Luke 15, the lost sheep, lost coin, and lost son are all described with forms of apollymi—and in every case, what is “lost” is found and restored. The UR advocate argues this pattern supports reading destruction language as reversible. The CI case responds that the Luke 15 usages describe things found through repentance in THIS life—not eschatological judgment. When the NT speaks of God’s judgment on the wicked, the context is consistently one of finality: “broad is the road that leads to destruction” (Matt. 7:13); “fear him who can destroy both soul and body in Gehenna” (Matt. 10:28). The context determines the meaning, and in judgment contexts, apollymi most naturally means permanent destruction. See Chapter 8.
Greek for “restoration of all things.” The term comes from Acts 3:21, where Peter speaks of “the time of universal restoration that God announced long ago through his holy prophets.” In early Christian theology, apokatastasis became the technical term for the doctrine that all rational creatures will ultimately be restored to right relationship with God through Christ. The doctrine was taught by Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, and others. The CI response notes that: (1) Origen was condemned, and while the details are disputed, the church did not embrace universalism as orthodox. (2) Not all alleged universalist fathers clearly held the position—some expressed hope rather than doctrine. (3) The conceptual resources for CI (destruction language, conditional immortality of the soul) were also present from the earliest period. Ilaria Ramelli’s landmark study, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis, traces the universalist tradition in exhaustive detail. See Chapters 24 and 25.
A model of the atonement, classically articulated by Gustaf Aulén, which presents Christ’s death and resurrection as a cosmic victory over the powers of sin, death, and the devil. Rather than focusing primarily on the payment of a legal penalty (as in penal substitution), the Christus Victor model emphasizes that Christ has defeated the hostile forces that held humanity captive. Both CI and UR affirm this model alongside substitutionary atonement. The UR position argues that a truly victorious Christ will ultimately liberate every captive. The CI response: Christ’s victory over death as a cosmic power is real and complete, but its personal application requires personal faith. Christ defeated death, making resurrection and eternal life AVAILABLE to all. The destruction of the finally impenitent does not represent a victory for death or evil; it represents the complete removal of all rebellion from the cosmos. See Chapters 7 and 19.
The theological position—defended throughout this book—that human beings are not inherently immortal. Immortality is a gift from God, bestowed only on those who are saved through faith in Christ (1 Tim. 6:16; 2 Tim. 1:10; Rom. 2:7). Those who reject God’s offer of salvation, even after the fullest possible opportunity including the postmortem encounter, will after judgment cease to exist entirely. The soul is real and survives physical death (substance dualism), but its continued existence beyond the final judgment is contingent on God’s decision to sustain it. God alone has immortality, and He gives it as a gift to those who receive eternal life through Christ. This position is distinguished from eternal conscious torment (ECT) in that the unsaved do not suffer forever; they are destroyed. Major modern defenders include Edward Fudge (The Fire That Consumes), John Stott, Clark Pinnock, Chris Date (Rethinking Hell), Glenn Peoples, and others. In this book, the UR reader is the intended audience—someone who has already rejected ECT and is open to being persuaded that CI is the more biblically faithful position. See Chapters 1 and 2 for shared ground and the definition of CI.
The view—shared by both CI and UR in this book—that the soul is conscious between physical death and the final resurrection. Believers go to paradise/heaven to be consciously with Christ (Luke 23:43; Phil. 1:21–23; 2 Cor. 5:1–8). Unbelievers go to Hades, a conscious waiting area that is NOT the Lake of Fire and NOT final punishment (Luke 16:19–31). This view is contrasted with soul sleep (the idea that the dead are unconscious until the resurrection). A conscious intermediate state is essential for both the CI and UR positions in this book, because both affirm that God provides a postmortem opportunity—which requires a conscious person to encounter God between death and resurrection. See Chapters 1 and 4.
Latin for “the descent into hell” (or more properly, “the descent to the underworld”). This phrase refers to the early Christian belief, enshrined in the Apostles’ Creed (“He descended into hell”), that between His death and resurrection, Christ descended to the realm of the dead. The primary biblical texts are 1 Peter 3:18–20 and 4:6, along with Ephesians 4:8–10 and Acts 2:24–31. On the postmortem opportunity reading (shared by both CI and UR in this book), Christ’s descent was a salvific mission: He went to proclaim the gospel to the dead, offering them the opportunity to respond in faith. The CI advocate sees this as a genuine offer that some may still reject; the UR advocate sees it as the mechanism by which God’s saving purposes ultimately reach every person. See Chapters 22 and 29.
A model of hell drawn from the Eastern Orthodox theological tradition, particularly the writings of Isaac of Nineveh and Alexandre Kalomiros. On this view, hell is not a place away from God but the experience of being in God’s full, unmediated presence while one’s heart is turned against Him. God’s love is like fire: for those who love God, it is experienced as warmth, light, and joy. For those who hate God, this same love is experienced as burning agony—not because God is creating special punishing fire, but because His very love is unbearable to those who have set themselves against everything He is. This is the view of hell shared by both CI and UR advocates in this book. Revelation 14:10–11 explicitly places the torment “in the presence of the Lamb,” supporting this model. The CI advocate, following Sharon Baker’s framework in Razing Hell, holds that those who stand in the fire of God’s holy presence freely choose whether to be purified by the fire and be redeemed, or, rejecting that option, to be consumed by it and cease to exist. The fire purifies those who submit and consumes those who refuse. See Chapters 1, 5, and 23.
The traditional Western view that the unsaved will suffer conscious torment in hell forever, without end or relief. ECT has been the dominant view in Latin/Western Christianity since at least Augustine (fifth century) and was affirmed by most of the major Protestant Reformers. Both the CI and UR positions in this book reject ECT—the reader has already moved past this view, and this book does not spend significant time arguing against it. ECT is mentioned only where directly relevant to the topic at hand. See Chapter 1.
The Greek term used by Jesus in His warnings about final punishment, derived from the Hebrew ge-hinnom (“Valley of Hinnom”)—a valley south of Jerusalem associated with the burning of refuse and, historically, with the horrifying practice of child sacrifice (2 Kings 23:10; Jer. 7:31). By Jesus’ time, Gehenna had become a metaphor for divine judgment. The CI advocate reads Jesus’ Gehenna warnings as genuine warnings about real, final destruction. Gehenna was a place where refuse was CONSUMED—the fire destroyed what was thrown into it. The worm and fire in Mark 9:48 (quoting Isa. 66:24) describe agents of decomposition and destruction that do not cease until their work is done. The UR advocate reads the Gehenna warnings as corrective warnings designed to provoke repentance, comparable to Jonah’s warning to Nineveh. Gehenna is distinct from Hades (the intermediate state), Tartarus (the prison of fallen angels), and the Lake of Fire (the eschatological reality in Revelation). See Chapter 12.
The Greek term for the realm of the dead in the New Testament, roughly equivalent to the Hebrew Sheol. In the NT, Hades is the intermediate state between death and the final resurrection—a holding place, not a place of final punishment. In the parable of the rich man and Lazarus (Luke 16:19–31), the rich man is conscious and tormented in Hades, but this is explicitly the intermediate state, not the final judgment. Crucially, Revelation 20:13–14 says that “death and Hades gave up the dead that were in them” and that “death and Hades were thrown into the lake of fire.” Hades is thus temporary; it will itself be destroyed. Both CI and UR agree that Hades is not the final state. For CI, the inhabitants of Hades face the final judgment, where the postmortem opportunity culminates and the final separation occurs. Hades is distinct from Gehenna, the Lake of Fire, and Tartarus. See Chapters 1, 13, and 23.
Latin for “the image of God.” The foundational biblical teaching, rooted in Genesis 1:26–27, that every human being is created in God’s image. Genesis 9:6 grounds the prohibition against murder in the imago Dei even after the Fall; James 3:9 affirms that human beings are “made in God’s likeness.” The UR position argues that the divine image in every person means there is always something worth saving—the fire of God’s presence will always find gold to refine. The CI response: yes, every person bears God’s image, but these texts affirm the image’s existence, not its indestructibility. The image persists after the Fall, giving every person inherent dignity. But if a person has spent the fullest possible opportunity (including the postmortem encounter) rejecting God, the CI advocate asks: can that image be so thoroughly corrupted by persistent rebellion that, in the final analysis, there is nothing left to restore? God’s destruction of the finally impenitent does not deny the imago Dei; it is the tragic consequence of a creature made in God’s image freely choosing to reject the source of its existence. See Chapters 5 and 27.
Two Greek words for “punishment,” distinguished carefully by Aristotle and by several early church fathers. Kolasis (kolasin aiōnion, “eternal punishment,” in Matt. 25:46) is corrective punishment—punishment inflicted for the benefit of the one being punished. Timoria, by contrast, is retributive punishment—punishment inflicted to satisfy the demands of justice. Aristotle made this distinction explicit in his Rhetoric (1.10.17). The UR case argues that Jesus’ choice of kolasis rather than timoria is profoundly significant. The CI response: (1) the kolasis/timoria distinction is real in classical Greek, but by the first century, kolasis had largely lost its distinctively corrective meaning and was used as a general term for punishment; (2) even granting a corrective nuance, the text says nothing about what happens AFTER the correction; CI can say the correction IS the fire of God’s presence, which purifies those who submit and consumes those who do not (Baker’s framework); (3) CI does not need kolasis to mean purely retributive because CI agrees the punishment has an end—it ends when the person is destroyed. See Chapter 14.
An image found exclusively in the book of Revelation (19:20; 20:10, 14–15; 21:8), describing the final eschatological reality into which the beast, the false prophet, the devil, death, Hades, and those not found in the book of life are cast. Revelation 20:14 explicitly identifies the Lake of Fire with the second death: “This is the second death, the lake of fire.” The CI position reads the Lake of Fire as the place of permanent destruction—the wicked are consumed and cease to exist. On the divine presence model shared by both CI and UR, the Lake of Fire IS God’s unmediated presence, and those thrown into it face the choice: be purified or be consumed. For those who refuse purification, the fire consumes (Baker’s framework). The UR position reads the Lake of Fire as the final, most intense experience of God’s purifying presence. The Lake of Fire is distinct from Hades, Gehenna, and Tartarus. See Chapter 23.
A Greek noun meaning “ruin” or “destruction.” It appears in 2 Thessalonians 1:9 in the phrase olethros aiōnios, translated “everlasting destruction.” The CI position reads this as permanent annihilation—the destruction is “everlasting” because its result is irreversible. The UR position notes that olethros does not necessarily mean cessation of existence; in 1 Corinthians 5:5, Paul uses olethros with an explicitly salvific purpose: handing a man over “for the destruction (olethros) of the flesh, so that his spirit may be saved.” The CI response: (1) the 1 Corinthians 5:5 usage describes church discipline within this life, not eschatological judgment; (2) context determines meaning, and the context of 2 Thessalonians 1:9 is final judgment, not remedial discipline; (3) in the same letter where Peter affirms God’s patience (2 Pet. 3:9), he uses the language of “destruction of the ungodly” (2 Pet. 3:7). See Chapters 6 and 8.
The view that a human being is entirely physical—that there is no separate, immaterial soul or spirit. On this view, when the body dies, the person ceases to exist entirely until God raises them at the resurrection. In recent decades, a growing number of CI scholars have adopted physicalism or non-reductive physicalism. Proponents include Joel Green and Nancey Murphy. Both the CI and UR positions in this book reject physicalism: both affirm substance dualism and a conscious intermediate state. This book argues that physicalism undermines the postmortem opportunity that both positions affirm, since if there is no conscious soul between death and resurrection, there is no person to encounter God. Physicalism also weakens the CI case at its strongest point: Matt. 10:28, where Jesus distinguishes between body and soul and warns that God can destroy BOTH in Gehenna. If there is no soul, Jesus’ distinction is meaningless. Chapters 30 and 31 present the comprehensive biblical and philosophical critique of physicalism within the CI movement.
The belief that those who die without a genuine opportunity to hear and respond to the gospel will receive that opportunity after death. This is a shared assumption between CI and UR in this book. The primary biblical support comes from 1 Peter 3:18–20 and 4:6, which describe Christ preaching to the dead; the descensus ad inferos clause of the Apostles’ Creed; and the theological logic that a just and loving God would not condemn those who never had an adequate opportunity to respond. God gives each individual the absolute best opportunity they personally need. Time may work differently in the afterlife—an encounter with God could encompass what feels like a months-long interaction. The CI advocate holds that this postmortem encounter is genuine but that some will still reject God and be destroyed—that permanent rejection is genuinely possible. The last possible chance to receive Christ is at or during the final judgment itself. After that, the choice is final. The UR advocate holds that God’s love is so overwhelming that every person will ultimately be brought to willing faith. James Beilby’s Postmortem Opportunity is the most rigorous modern defense of this position. See Chapters 1, 22, and 29.
The view that divine punishment is always purposeful—aimed at the correction and ultimate restoration of the one being punished. The UR case builds heavily on this concept: if God disciplines those He loves “as sons” (Heb. 12:5–11), the trajectory of divine punishment is always toward restoration. The CI response: (1) the discipline passages in Hebrews describe God’s treatment of His CHILDREN (believers), not the finally impenitent; God disciplines His sons for their good, but He does not discipline His enemies into submission; (2) CI acknowledges that some punishment is remedial—the fire of God’s presence in the postmortem encounter IS purifying for those who submit; (3) but for those who persist in rejection even after the fullest possible opportunity, destruction is the just and merciful final outcome; (4) the analogy of a father disciplining a child breaks down at a critical point: CI argues that at some stage, persistent refusal of correction makes further correction indistinguishable from coercion. See Chapters 5, 21, and 28.
The central metaphor of a landmark essay by the Greek Orthodox theologian Alexandre Kalomiros, “The River of Fire” (1980). Drawing on the patristic tradition—especially Isaac of Nineveh (Isaac the Syrian), Basil the Great, and Maximus the Confessor—Kalomiros argues that the “river of fire” flowing from the throne of God (Daniel 7:10) is not a tool of retributive punishment but is God’s love itself. The same river is experienced by the saints as light, warmth, and life, and by the unrepentant as burning torment. Hell, on this view, is not a place away from God but the experience of being in God’s full presence while one’s heart is turned against Him. This tradition is foundational to the shared CI/UR view of hell in this book. For the CI advocate, the river of fire both purifies and consumes: those who surrender are refined; those who refuse are consumed. See Chapter 5.
A term found exclusively in the book of Revelation (2:11; 20:6, 14; 21:8) that describes the final fate of the wicked. Revelation 20:14 explicitly identifies the second death with the Lake of Fire: “Then Death and Hades were thrown into the lake of fire. This is the second death, the lake of fire.” The CI position reads the second death as the permanent cessation of existence—final, real death from which there is no return. With substance dualism, the second death is something different and more final than physical death: it is the end of the soul itself. This gives the second death the gravity the text seems to demand. Physical death separates soul from body; the second death is the end of both. The UR position asks whether death can claim permanent victims if “the last enemy to be destroyed is death itself” (1 Cor. 15:26). The CI response: death IS destroyed—its power is ended permanently. For the saved, this means resurrection to eternal life. The second death is the final act of death’s destruction—even death dies. See Chapter 23.
The Hebrew term for the realm of the dead in the Old Testament. Sheol is depicted as a shadowy, underground abode where the dead go after physical death—both the righteous and the wicked. In early OT texts, Sheol is described in somewhat vague terms: a place of silence, darkness, and diminished existence (Ps. 88:10–12; Eccl. 9:10). Over time, a more developed understanding emerged, with hints that God’s power extends even into Sheol (Ps. 139:8), that God can redeem from Sheol (Ps. 49:15; Hos. 13:14), and that the dead will one day be raised (Isa. 26:19; Dan. 12:2). Sheol is roughly equivalent to the Greek Hades in the New Testament. It is distinct from Gehenna, Tartarus, and the Lake of Fire. See Chapter 9.
The view that the soul, after death, enters a state of unconscious “sleep” until the resurrection. On this view, there is no conscious intermediate state; the dead are unaware of the passage of time and simply “wake up” at the resurrection. Proponents appeal to biblical passages that describe death as “sleep” (Dan. 12:2; John 11:11; 1 Thess. 4:13–14). Both CI and UR in this book reject soul sleep, arguing that “sleep” in these passages is a metaphor for the appearance of the body in death, not a description of the soul’s condition. The same biblical authors who use sleep language also clearly affirm conscious existence after death (e.g., Paul in Phil. 1:21–23 and 2 Cor. 5:1–8; the souls under the altar in Rev. 6:9–11). A conscious intermediate state is essential for the postmortem opportunity thesis. See Chapter 4.
The philosophical and theological view that a human being is composed of two distinct kinds of substance: a material body and an immaterial soul (or spirit). These two substances are intimately united during earthly life but can exist apart—specifically, the soul can survive the death of the body and continue to function as a conscious, thinking, willing entity. This is NOT Platonic dualism, which teaches that the soul is inherently immortal. In the Christian version defended in this book, the soul is created by God and depends entirely on God’s will for its continued existence. Jesus affirmed this: “Fear him who can destroy both soul and body in Gehenna” (Matt. 10:28). The soul is real but not inherently immortal—this is the heart of conditional immortality. God can withdraw His sustaining power from the soul of the finally impenitent, resulting in their complete destruction. Substance dualism has been defended by J. P. Moreland, Richard Swinburne, John Cooper, and others. This book argues that substance dualism is both biblically grounded and theologically essential: if there is no immaterial soul that survives death, there is no conscious person to encounter God between death and resurrection—and the postmortem opportunity that both CI and UR affirm collapses. Moreover, substance dualism makes Matt. 10:28 the strongest possible CI proof text: Jesus warns about something beyond physical death—the destruction of the whole person, soul and body, in Gehenna. See Chapters 4, 30, and 31.
An argument used in the debate over Matthew 25:46, which places “eternal punishment” (kolasin aiōnion) in parallel with “eternal life” (zōēn aiōnion). The argument holds that if aiōnios means “everlasting” when applied to life, it must mean the same when applied to punishment. Therefore, if eternal life lasts forever, eternal punishment must also last forever. The CI advocate has broken this symmetry in one direction: “eternal punishment” does NOT mean conscious suffering for eternity but rather a permanent act of destruction with permanent results. The CI position maintains that the RESULT is as permanent as eternal life—the punishment is irreversible. The UR advocate argues that if CI can break the symmetry, the UR interpretation—that aiōnios kolasin means “age-long correction”—is at least as legitimate. The CI response: the UR advocate must break the symmetry further by making the punishment temporary in result as well, which goes against the natural reading of the parallel structure. See Chapter 6 and especially Chapter 14.
A famous logical argument formulated by the philosopher Thomas Talbott in The Inescapable Love of God. The trilemma presents three propositions, any two of which imply the falsity of the third: (1) God wills the salvation of all human beings. (2) God accomplishes all that He wills. (3) Some human beings are not saved. Traditional Calvinism affirms (2) and (3) but denies (1). Traditional Arminianism affirms (1) and (3) but denies (2). Universalism affirms (1) and (2) and denies (3). The CI response: the CI advocate rejects premise (2) as stated, arguing that God’s sovereign will includes His decision to create genuinely free beings. God’s DESIRE for all to be saved (premise 1) is genuine, but God’s sovereignty includes His sovereign choice not to override creaturely freedom. This is not a limitation on God’s power; it is an expression of God’s character. God COULD override freedom but CHOOSES not to—just as He allows evil in the present age rather than preventing it. See Chapters 3, 27, and 28.
A Greek term that appears only once in the New Testament, in 2 Peter 2:4: “God did not spare angels when they sinned, but cast them into hell [tartarōsas, ταρταρώσας] and committed them to chains of gloomy darkness to be kept until the judgment.” In Greek mythology, Tartarus was the deepest region of the underworld, reserved for the most wicked. Peter uses this term specifically for the imprisonment of fallen angels—not for human beings. Tartarus is thus distinct from Hades (the general realm of the dead), Gehenna (Jesus’ warnings about judgment), and the Lake of Fire (the eschatological reality in Revelation). Its inclusion in the biblical vocabulary illustrates the complexity of the biblical picture and the danger of treating all references to “hell” as though they describe the same place. See Chapter 22.
The belief that all human beings will ultimately be saved and reconciled to God through Jesus Christ. Conservative or evangelical universalism—the position this book respectfully but firmly engages as a dialogue partner—must be sharply distinguished from liberal or pluralistic universalism, which denies biblical authority, downplays sin, and claims that all religions lead to God. Conservative universalism affirms without exception: the authority of Scripture, the reality and severity of sin, the necessity of faith in Christ for salvation, substitutionary atonement, the reality of hell as genuinely painful and terrifying, and the final judgment. What it adds is the conviction that God is powerful enough and patient enough to bring every person to genuine, willing faith—whether in this life or beyond it. Major proponents include Thomas Talbott, Robin Parry (writing as Gregory MacDonald), David Bentley Hart, Ilaria Ramelli, and, in the early church, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Gregory of Nyssa. This book argues that while the UR vision is beautiful and its appeal is real, the cumulative weight of Scripture’s destruction language, the logic of genuine freedom, and the natural reading of final judgment passages point more strongly toward conditional immortality. See Chapters 2, 24, and 25.
Additional Terms for Reference:
Beatific vision — The direct, face-to-face experience of God’s presence that the redeemed will enjoy eternally; the ultimate goal of human existence. On the divine presence model, this same presence is experienced as tormenting fire by those who resist God—and ultimately consumes those who refuse to be purified.
Creedal Christianity — Christian faith as defined by the early ecumenical creeds (Apostles’ Creed, Nicene Creed, Chalcedonian Definition), which establish the boundaries of orthodox belief regarding the Trinity, the person of Christ, and the fundamental shape of the gospel.
Eschatology — The branch of theology concerned with “last things”: death, the intermediate state, the return of Christ, the resurrection, the final judgment, heaven, hell, and the consummation of all things. The entire CI/UR debate is fundamentally an eschatological question.
General revelation — God’s self-disclosure through creation, conscience, and the moral order—available to all people everywhere—as distinguished from special revelation (Scripture and the incarnation of Christ). Relevant to the postmortem opportunity argument regarding the unevangelized.
Great White Throne Judgment — The final judgment described in Revelation 20:11–15, in which the dead are raised and judged according to what they have done. Both CI and UR affirm this as the climactic moment of judgment; they disagree on its ultimate outcome. For CI, this is where the last possible chance to receive Christ occurs. See Chapter 23.
Nephesh (נֶפֶשׁ) — Hebrew term variously translated as “soul,” “life,” “self,” or “living being.” Its meaning is context-dependent. Physicalists argue nephesh refers to the whole person and does not imply a separable soul. The CI dualist responds that while nephesh has a range of meanings, passages where nephesh departs at death (Gen. 35:18) or returns to the body (1 Kings 17:21–22) clearly indicate a separable entity. See Chapter 4.
Panta en Pasin (πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν) — Greek for “all in all” (1 Cor. 15:28). Paul’s statement that God will ultimately be “all in all” is one of the strongest UR texts. CI reads this as God being all in all that exists after the wicked have been destroyed—the new creation entirely under God’s loving sovereignty, with no pocket of rebellion, no unrepentant sinner suffering endlessly, no evil marring the cosmos. See Chapter 18.
Pneuma (πνεῦμα) — Greek for “spirit,” “breath,” or “wind.” When used of the human spirit, it often refers to the immaterial aspect of the person that survives death (Luke 23:46; Acts 7:59; Heb. 12:23). See Chapter 4.
Ruach (רוּחַ) — Hebrew term meaning “spirit,” “breath,” or “wind.” Ecclesiastes 12:7 says the ruach returns to God at death while the body returns to dust, supporting substance dualism. See Chapter 4.
Soteriology — The branch of theology concerned with salvation: its nature, its scope, its means, and its application. The CI/UR debate is fundamentally a soteriological question about the scope and finality of God’s saving work in Christ.
Theosis / Theōsis (θέωσις) — The Eastern Orthodox doctrine of “divinization” or “deification”—the process by which human beings are progressively transformed into the likeness of God through participation in His divine energies. Relevant to the UR case that the fire of God’s presence transforms rather than merely destroys.
Triduum Mortis — Latin for “the three days of death.” The period between Christ’s crucifixion and resurrection, during which, according to the descensus tradition, He descended to the realm of the dead and preached to the spirits there. See Chapters 22 and 29.
Note: This glossary is intended as a quick-reference guide for readers of The Consuming Fire: Why Conditional Immortality Answers What Universalism Cannot. For full scholarly treatments of each term, please consult the relevant chapters as indicated, as well as the works listed in the bibliography.