This is the second of a series on the authorship of sin that came about as a result of discussions and observations on this post. Part 1 and the first section of this post address Calvinist claims that Arminians “also make God the author of sin.”

Conflating Origins

When discussing authorship implying the origination of sin, the argument inevitably arises, “but if sin originates in people, people still originate from God, therefore sin originates from God as well!” Not quite. Beings capable of sin originated from within God, it doesn’t follow that their rebellion itself came from within Him.

For counter-example, my children originated from within me. If my daughter goes off and does something of her own imagining that I didn’t teach or tell her to do, then can it rightly be called my idea? Would it be fair to state, “your daughter’s action came from her, she came from you, therefore her action originated in you!”? Not at all. There’s a independent volitional separator between myself and my daughter’s choices and actions, namely, my daughter herself, who is a free agent and makes choices that proceed from within herself independent of my causing them. To assert that all of her choices come from me or are somehow my idea is the utmost folly since she has some degree of independence from me in her choices. Now if I were somehow controlling her so that she couldn’t think or do anything but exactly what I commanded, then such an accusation would be fair, but thankfully for all involved, that isn’t the case!

So likewise, God is the originator of all creation, but it’s fallacious to think that He’s the originator of everything His creation does if He’s granted them some degree of independence. Or to put it plainly, if God created agents with wills that can function in some ways external to Himself, then those agents are capable of concepts and choices that don’t arise from within God.

Was that really necessary?

One Calvinist objection to the middle-knowledge view is that if God knows what you will do given situation X, then puts you in situation X, that your reaction to X is then necessary. They then may argue that God can therefore be called the author of sin if middle knowledge is employed, since He’s made sin necessary by putting His creations in situations in which He knows they will sin.

The error in logic here is equating “necessary given what you will do” with “divinely necessary.” If what I will do if put in situation X is determined by me rather than God, then my reaction can’t be divinely necessary, as this would essentially be saying that what was divinely necessary was contingent upon a created being’s independent will -a contradiction. God knowing what I will do in situation X and putting me in situation X makes the reaction certain, but if it in any way depends upon my independent agency, then it can’t be called divinely necessary.

In a similar vein, it’s also argued that our agency doesn’t really constitute free will if the outcome is made certain by God placing us in a situation. I mean, you don’t really have power to choose if your choice is certain, do you? Logically speaking, you actually do. ‘Certainty’ doesn’t imply constraint, it implies factuality, including that which is occurs apart from necessity. An ‘acid test’ to tell if an agent is free in the libertarian sense is the question, “For any given choice and the situation in which it occurs, could the choice be different based solely on the agency of the creature, with no factors changed or differing action on God’s part?” If the answer is “yes,” then this reply indisputably implies libertarian agency, regardless of objections that it “doesn’t sound like free will.”

The following section deals with arguments often employed by Calvinists in defending their theodicy.

“It’s good when God decrees it happen, bad when it actually happens…”

This is how Calvinists have classically tried to evade the problem of God authoring sin. It’s declared to be somehow righteous and holy in God decreeing it, but it’s just somehow bad when people commit it. Augustus Toplady (as quoted by Randolph Foster) verbalizes this well,

Though he [God] may be said to be author of all the actions done by the wicked, yet he is not the author of them, in a moral, compound sense, as they are sinful, but physically simply, and sensu diviso, as they are mere actions, abstractly from all consideration of the goodness or badness of them.

Hence, we see that God does not immediately and per se infuse iniquity into the wicked, but powerfully excites them to action, and withholds those gracious influences of his Spirit, without which every action is necessarily evil.

Every action, as such, is undoubtedly good, it being an actual exertion of those operative powers given us by God for that very end. God may, therefore, be the author of all actions, and yet not be the author of evil.

Foster responds to this with the obvious question and inevitable conclusion:

But, then, a question arises right here. Was not the sinner’s intention decreed, also, as well as the act? If you answer, “No,” then here is something which comes to pass in time which was not decreed before time. If you answer, “Yes,” and the sin was in the intention, then God, who was the author of the intention, was the author of the sin; for the sin and the intention are the same.

Again: did not God decree that certain acts, if committed with certain intentions, should be sinful? But did he not also decree that those very acts and intentions should exist? If so, is he not the author of the sin, both with respect to the act and intention? If not, is not here something coming to pass in time which was not decreed before time? (Foster, R.; Objections to Calvinism as it is)

Obviously, if nothing happens apart from God’s decree, then this would include not only one’s actions, but his thoughts and intents as well. So truly exhaustive determinism would necessarily have God authoring not only the act, but that which makes the act itself evil. Beyond being mere “lack of good,” wicked thoughts and intents are themselves an abominable thing to God.

“The thoughts of the wicked are an abomination to the Lord, but gracious words are pure.” (Proverbs 15:26)

The book of Proverbs goes to further state that those who devise evil things are also abominable to Him.

“There are six things the Lord hates, seven that are detestable to him: haughty eyes, a lying tongue, hands that shed innocent blood, a heart that devises wicked schemes, feet that are quick to rush into evil, a false witness who pours out lies and a man who stirs up dissension among brothers.” (Proverbs 6:16-19)

At least some actions can be in and of themselves morally neutral, with the thought behind it determining whether it’s good or evil. Thoughts and intentions are a different matter, evil thoughts being inherently contrary to the Holiness of the absolutely Holy God, and utterly abominable to Him along with the heart that devises them. The horrid ramification of exhaustive determinism, as seen above, is that all of these things that God finds abominable wind up originating in Him. Further, if the wickedness of the wicked isn’t ultimately from themselves, but rather produced for them from within God, then the heart that devises their evil schemes wouldn’t truly be their own, but God’s!

Secondary causes?

Many Calvinists appeal to “secondary causes” to mitigate the concept of God being the author of sin. Besides being a rather lame defense (employing secondary causes didn’t get David off the hook -see 2 Samuel 11:14-12:9), especially when all the causes are also exhaustively determined by God, what means are used to bring the sin about change nothing about where it originates. To say that God’s decree brings about the sin that He has unconditionally willed men to commit through secondary causes is in fact a tacit admission that God authored their sin in the first place.

Mystery

The usual last resort to try and reconcile exhaustive determinism with God not being the author of sin is appeal to mystery. Now mystery certainly has a place in theology: From God’s ex nihilo creation of the universe, to His eternal self-existence, to His Triune Being, some things simply defy comprehensive understanding by finite human beings. While these are sound doctrines, for lack of complete explanation, some of their details must be relegated to the realm of mystery and/or speculation.

What mystery is useless for is attempting to resolve logical contradiction. If someone says that he affirms Christ’s physical resurrection and that He’s alive forever more, and yet at the same time claims that His body is still dead in the ground, then no amount of “mystery” or “tension” can salvage such a belief, because it’s making contradictory truth claims.

The same goes for the segments of the Roman Catholic church that hold Mary to be “co-mediatrix” alongside Christ (the One Mediator -1 Tim 2:5) between God and man. There cannot be “only one mediator,” and in the same time/sense “more than one mediator.” Mystery cannot mitigate the contradiction.

Which brings us to the claims of many Calvinists who hold to exhaustive determinism: God by Himself exhaustively, immutably and unconditionally predetermines [which plainly implies authorship] all that occurs (actions, thoughts, intentions, etc. in toto), yet at the same time doesn’t author sin. Now if sin does occur (and all parties agree that it does), then sin falls in the category of “all that occurs.” So God authoring all that occurs entails God authoring sin, which directly contradicts the latter claim that He doesn’t author sin. Appeal to mystery at this juncture is futile. The contradiction is further attested to by the Calvinist denial of libertarian freedom, since this rules out all possibilities except for God. As I pointed out in reply to Mr. Maxwell concerning my first post on the subject:

The logic is pretty inescapable really; appeals to mystery can’t solve outright contradictions. You don’t have to explicitly say something to unmistakably imply it. You don’t need to say “one” if you say “a positive integer that’s less than two,” because the longer statement rules out all possibilities other than one.

A creature that has no independent agency can’t truly ‘author’ anything of its own, all of its thoughts etc. are externally predetermined or authored for it. So if we state that no created being has free agency, then we’ve ruled out the idea of sin being authored by them. So if to the question of sin’s authorship/origin we categorically exclude all created beings, then the only alternative left is an uncreated being, the only one of which is God.

In short, if we as God’s creations have no libertarian freedom, then we determine nothing for ourselves, then we author nothing for ourselves, which then leaves our Creator as the only possible author for sin. The necessitarians have thus effectively resolved any “mystery” concerning the authorship of sin in their view by process of elimination.

In our next and tentatively final part, we’ll examine at least one more general defense of exhaustive determinism and some of its underlying scriptural problems.

A few weeks ago I wrote on a fallacy common to Calvinist apologetics, namely, that they often claim that while they teach exhaustive determinism, they still claim that God isn’t the author of sin. It garnered substantially more responses than I expected. To clarify things and answer some common questions/objections, I’m putting together a synopsis of the relevant arguments (this is part 1).

Moral problems?

I often see Calvinists attempting to establish that the Arminian view of God isn’t superior to their “God decreeing all sin” doctrine by implying that the former also has ‘moral problems.’ The argument in a nutshell essentially says that, “God knew when He created man that His creation would fall into wickedness, He also has power to prevent it from occurring, yet instead allows it to happen, therefore God is morally responsible for not preventing said evil.” Paul Helm expresses this objection in a response to Peter Byrne,

“…is God’s end not sullied and dirtied by Him permitting and upholding evildoers? …. Is not God flawed by the most terrible deception because He could not tell Himself that He did not allow the death camps as an evil but only as part of an outweighing good? …. In my view, Byrne’s deployment of the principle of double effect has failed to show that God’s responsibility for sin and evil is significantly morally different in the case of libertarian theism than it is in that of compatibilist theism.” (Helm, P. “God, compatibilism, and the authorship of sin:Theodicy,” par. 9)

The problem with Helm’s logic is that there isn’t anything in the scriptures or logical analysis of the facts indicating that God is somehow responsible for preventing people from committing evil of their own accord.

Exhaustive determinists will sometimes intuitively appeal to the fact that people have some extent of moral obligation to prevent wickedness when possible. While this is often true, it has to do with one’s level of obligation to stop the act from occurring, so would naturally not apply where no such obligations exist. For instance, a common parenting technique for stubborn young children who don’t take correction is to sometimes let them have what they think they want (e.g. eating too many cookies) with the inevitable unpleasant result of their disobeying mommy and daddy following. For such situations, parents aren’t obligated to stop their kids from disobeying them. They have the responsibility from God to teach their children to do right (which often entails discipline), but can’t be called morally responsible for not preventing the act of disobedience to begin with. So preventing evil from occurring isn’t an absolute moral imperative.

To get around this, some Calvinists raise dramatic counter-examples about a man not actually committing, but allowing (for example) a mass-murder to take place while not preventing it when he has power to. Indeed this would generally be wrong for people, but this ultimately tells us nothing about God. We as people aren’t God, we don’t hold the absolute power of life and death, therefore it’s generally not our place to decide who dies even by way of passivity, and thus we’re under general obligation to save human life if we can, except in cases such as just execution by higher authorities. God, on the other hand, has absolute power over life and death from the littlest babe to the mightiest warrior to the loftiest king to the oldest sage. He’s not required to prevent death, harm, pain or destruction without authorization by some higher authority, because He is the final Authority. I do believe that God’s attribute of justice does compel Him to settle the accounting of sin, but there’s no evidence of any principle of obligation making Him morally responsible to prevent us from harming each other or ourselves.

On a personal level, this strikes me as among the most ridiculous of assertions. Trying to hold another (God, no less) responsible for one’s own self-induced stupidity is the pinnacle of absurdity. Your own wrongdoing really is your choice, God didn’t make you do it, didn’t tempt you to do it, and isn’t subject to some immutable law that says He has to stop you from doing it. The one responsible is you. This Calvinist attempt to highlight ‘moral problems’ in Arminian theodicy is nothing more than a smokescreen and lame excuse for their own unsalvageable theodicy. It’s more or less a “your theology is kind of like mine” defense that relies upon taking the concept of God allowing people to commit sin for a period prior to their judgment, and trying to morally equate it with God masterminding all their sin!

Such a defense is little more than trying to apply an arbitrary standard to God to justify the ridiculous notion of Him being the author of everything He finds abominable. Despite their attempts to confuse the issue, it boils down to the options of God leaving men to their own wicked devices (a good method of discipline and/or justice) versus God Himself producing their wicked devices for them (to quote Dordt, “a blasphemous thought”), and there simply is no comparison. Logically, it can only be concluded then that there is no moral problem with God allowing libertarian agents to commit evil of their own accord.

“Authorship” through prior knowledge?

A related assertion is that God in the Arminian view still is the de facto author of sin, because He created the world as it is [set the initial conditions] knowing that there would be evil in it due to peoples’ choices. Essentially stating that God knew the results of His creating the world, and is therefore still the author of evil in some sense. For starters, the sinful thoughts, intentions etc aren’t generated by God; their existence (and hence God’s knowledge of them as well) are from within and are entirely contingent upon His creations, hence God can’t rightly be called the author of what doesn’t proceed from within Himself.

But God still knew the outcome of creating this world, wouldn’t that make Him the author in some sense? Not at all. Prior knowledge of some agent authoring a thing doesn’t constitute authorship by the one who knew it. Consider the example of a chess master who can (by whatever means) perfectly anticipate an opponent’s move. He sets up a gambit knowing the counter-move his opponent will make as a result. Did the chess master ‘author’ his opponent’s move by virtue of knowing it and setting a condition by which it would occur? Hardly. The opponent’s own move is still his own move; neither the chess master’s knowledge nor his own moves are relevant to who actually authored his opponent’s moves. To declare that God in framing the world (analogous to His ‘initial move’ with respect to us) somehow makes Him the author of what He knew would be our resulting free choices would be falls into this same trap of illogicality and equivocation. Even if I know with absolute infallibility that the next Twilight novel will be sophomoric and shallow, this doesn’t imply that I’m somehow making Stephenie Meyer develop one-dimensional cliche characters and idiot plots.

To reiterate the definition, the author of a thing is the one in whom a concept originates; one who is the sole determiner of a thing can be none other than its author. Salvation for instance, was God’s idea, hence God is the author of the faith of Christ and salvation through Him (Heb 5:9, 12:2), but not the author of sin. Amusingly, in response to my article, more than one Calvinist cited the preceding verses to prove that the definition of author ‘backfires’ against my view of conditional election, because, you know, like,

sole-determiner -> author
clearly means that,
author -> sole-determiner

(Discerning the obvious fundamental flaw in the above logic is left as an exercise to the reader.)

A relevant counter-example

This is a slightly modified example I gave in the combox to demonstrate the inoperability of the exhaustive determinist arguments to real situations:

Suppose programmer P works for the FBI and is (with the bureau’s approval) laying a trap for a cyber-terrorist suspect S. Let’s say he’s deduced from the suspect’s postings on a message board that the suspect wishes to destroy government databases and would do so once he finds opportunity. Let’s also say he writes database maintenance utility T, and on that message board offers it to S, anticipating that he’ll use the utility to break into one of their databases and wreak havoc. P, anticipating an attack, securely backs up the system so he can restore it in case of failure, and (again with authorization) leaves the database unsecured and vulnerable to attack. In spite of numerous built-in clear warning messages and safeguards within the utility, S misuses T and writes a script that destroys the unsecured database (effect E), but is caught red-handed in the process by P (who is monitoring the situation as it occurs). The location of S is pinpointed, and agents sent to arrest him shortly afterward. P restores the database, good guys win, all is well. Are there any viable objections to P’s actions or anything to implicate him as the actual author of E?

Did the programmer allow the attack? Yes.
Is the programmer breaking the law in allowing this to occur? No, he is authorized to do so in this example.
Did he provide the suspect with the means to break the law? Yes.
Could the attack have occurred without the programmer making his utility? S doesn’t have the know-how by himself; assume ‘no’ for sake of argument.
Did he know the suspect would use it for that purpose? Given S’s postings, we can assume ‘yes’ for sake of argument; note also that P watched the crime occur.
Was the criminal act inherent or necessary to the design of the programmer’s utility? No.
Who misused the utility for an evil purpose? The suspect.
Is the programmer then responsible for the suspect’s misuse of his utility? No.
Can the programmer then truly be called the “author of the suspect’s crime?” Not at all.

P could have been somewhat morally responsible (undue endangerment of government property) for the results if he didn’t have authority to leave the database vulnerable; but since he did, then he can’t be culpable for the crime in any sense. Why is P not responsible for suspect S’s crimes? E did come about because P created T, right? Doesn’t matter. Crime E wasn’t inherent to P’s design of T; committing E or refraining from doing so was strictly up to S -P’s correctly anticipating his move beforehand doesn’t change that fact.

By the same logic:
Did God allow sin to occur? Yes.
Is God committing some moral wrong by allowing sin to occur? No, God is free to allow anything He wishes (take it up with Him if you disagree).
Did God give men and angels power to rebel? Yes.
Could we have rebelled if God had not chosen to create us? No.
Did God know sin would come about due to free agents’ choices? Yes.
Was their rebellion inherent/necessary to His design? No.
Who misused free will for an evil purpose? Satan, the angels who joined him, and later Adam & Eve.
Is God then culpable for our misuse of free agency? No.
Can God then truly be called the “author of sin” in a free will theodicy? Not at all.

This analogy was similar in nature to my ‘who authored the crime’ post. Also of note is the fact that if the misdeed in the analogy above had been somehow inherent or necessary to the design of the programmer’s utility, then the programmer himself could in fact be rightly charged with authoring the crime.

Bottom Line:

* There’s no evidence of God having any obligation to stop us from sinning (and incurring its consequences).

* One being’s prior knowledge of another being authoring a thing doesn’t constitute the knower being the author.

Steve Hays attempts to respond to my pointing out a rather obvious fallacy in his reasoning; namely, he tries to make the case that God is being cruel if He lets a believer fall away. While his reply is little more than posturing, we’ll clear up a few misconceptions he attempts to sow.

JCT: If the Arminian view is that God didn’t want the children of Israel to fall, but the Calvinist view is that their fall was His perfect will, who then is framing God as setting them up for their demise?

Hays: …He responds by trying to create a parallel with Calvinism! How does that rebut my argument?
…
JCT: If the Arminian view is that God didn’t want the children of Israel to fall, but the Calvinist view is that their fall was His perfect will, who then is framing God as setting them up for their demise?

Hays: …I drew an analogy between Arminianism and what Arminians find so odious in Calvinism. He responds by trying to create a parallel with Calvinism! How does that rebut my argument?

For anyone who bothers to read, notice that I first show how charges of cruelty don’t fit the Arminian view in that God isn’t making anyone fall; Hays’ shallow rhetoric fitting his own view to a tee is just icing on the cake.

Hays attempts to save his position by putting up a few more assertions and questions. The main ideas are:

Why did God create people that He knew would fall?

This is of course a red herring. I never claimed to be able to reveal God’s purposes behind everything He does or allows; but the issue is whether God is cruel, not why He would create certain people. To claim it was a set-up‘ when speaking in terms of those who hate God doesn’t constitute much of an objection.

If God knew they would fall, He intended the outcome of destroying them.

God does intend to destroy anyone who turns from Him, that doesn’t change the fact that who specifically turns from Him hinges upon the free agents themselves, not God’s decree. Such an execution of justice therefore neither implies necessitation of their damnation by God’s decree, nor gives God pleasure in destroying them, and wouldn’t constitute cruelty for letting them have the results of their own choices.

How is is loving or merciful for God to save people only to damn them later, leaving them in a worse state than before?

and,

God isn’t acting in the apostate’s best interest.

Of course God doesn’t act in the best interests of those who turn against Him. God is often conditionally merciful. Just as He conditionally saved many among the tribes of Israel from their enemies when they followed Him, yet later condemned many of them to die in the wilderness when they rebelled, so it is with the apostate. God is more than loving and fair in giving one genuine opportunity to be saved at all, He can’t be rightly called cruel for expelling those who despise Him.

Other Oddities

A few of Hays’ other quotes are simply bizarre, and border on incoherent.

How is “allowing” evil ipso facto exculpatory? Aren’t there many situations in which allowing evil is culpable?

Not if the one who allows it isn’t under obligation to prevent it… which God isn’t….

Introducing libertarian freewill into the discussion is a diversionary tactic. For it makes no difference to my argument. I wasn’t arguing on Calvinist assumptions. I was arguing on Arminian assumptions.

If Steve is arguing from my assumptions then how is it ‘diversionary’ to cite the assumptions he’s supposedly arguing from? Then again, if the charge is that I’m ‘diverting’ people away from falling for his sloppy caricatures by my providing context, then I plead guilty.

…how does Arminianism extricate its God from the charge that he is merely toying with the lost?

If by ‘toying’ Hays is implying that God shows goodness and mercy to those who love Him, but will show wrath to those who later turn from Him,

“Therefore the Lord, the God of Israel, declares: ‘I promised that your house and your father’s house would minister before me forever.’ But now the Lord declares: ‘Far be it from me! Those who honor me I will honor, but those who despise me will be disdained.” (1 Sam 2:30)

Then all the term amounts to is a subjectively rhetorical smear against God’s mercy and justice as revealed in the Bible.

…I took Arminian assumptions for granted for the sake of argument, then constructed a morally analogous situation in Arminianism.

If one reads the ‘morally analogous situation’ Hays came up with, he’ll find that Steve excludes the idea of apostasy itself so he can paint the Almighty as ‘cruel’ for letting the traitor perish. Morally analogous indeed, except of course for the whole moral reason for destroying the apostate to begin with. Hays conveniently ignores the apostate actually turning from God and independently incurring His wrath, all so he can erroneously frame God as being like a “serial killer who orchestrates the death of his victim.”

JCT: “So who then is portraying God as orchestrating the downfall of the people He had saved?”

Hays: …Thibo is equivocating over the term “saved.” There’s a basic difference between “salvation” in the sense of delivering the Israelites from Egypt, and “salvation” in the sense of delivering somebody from a hellish fate.

Again invoking his wild imagination, Hays tries to refute imaginary meaning he’s assigned to my words (which is consistent with Hays’ methodology). I didn’t say “saved from hell.” From the context, it’s quite clear to anyone who grasps the basics of reading comprehension that I was speaking of their being physically saved from Pharaoh, which is analogous to our salvation in Christ. The case could be made however that the passage implies that many of those with whom God was ultimately displeased were in a saving covenant with Him at one point, since the scriptures cited tell us,

“They all ate the same spiritual food and drank the same spiritual drink; for they drank from the spiritual rock that accompanied them, and that rock was Christ. Nevertheless, God was not pleased with most of them; their bodies were scattered over the desert.” (1 Cor 10:3-5)

A defended fallacy is still a fallacy

Hays will doubtless toss up more red herrings and excuses, though he’s really got nothing left to defend his fallacious reasoning with. Through all of his hem-hawing, demands to know God’s motives, contrived standards, and distractions the point still stands unmitigated: the same twisted logic he employs that would condemn God as cruel for redeeming a sinner and later cutting him off for rebellion would necessarily have to condemn God as cruel for saving many of the Israelites and later cutting them off for rebellion.

Omake

Lee Shelton IV from Contemporary Calvinist also weighs in concerning my commentary on Israel’s fall in the wilderness,

Shelton: “Of course, this completely ignores the fact that while the people of Israel did “fall away” and were disciplined, they were still God’s chosen people and the covenant made with Abraham remained intact.”

Not at all. The body of God’s chosen people does remain in covenant with Him; this, just as in the case of Israel, wouldn’t preclude specific individuals from being cut off from it.

Related Fallacies:
Red Herring
Equivocation

“All I have tried to do here is show how clearly, succinctly and simply that Calvinism does NOT charge God with the authorship of sin and so (to employ the somewhat aggressive language of Scripture) to shut the mouths of the gainsayers. If any have a case against Calvinism, then let it be based on truth and not on falsehood and slander.” – Colin Maxwell, Do Calvinists believe and teach that God is the Author of Sin?

Colin Maxwell put up the page linked to above showing various quotes from prominent Calvinist sources indicating that they do not believe or teach that God is the author of sin. His point apparently, judging from the content and page’s title, is to stop non-Calvinists from ‘slandering’ them by claiming they teach such a thing.

Problems with this logic

This is something of a red herring, as it’s not widely claimed that Calvinists (apart from some exceptions) directly teach or are willing to connect the dots of their own doctrine to conclude that God is the author of sin. That’s probably the biggest hole in high Calvinism, why would they admit to it -much less openly teach it? Whether they’re willing to accept the ramifications of their beliefs is quite beside the point. The real problem is that making God out to be the author of sin is what their exhaustive determinist doctrine inescapably amounts to.

What is meant by ‘author of sin?’

The term ‘author‘ as employed by Arminians/Synergists in this case, is used in an originative sense to describe where the evil ultimately arose from. If we can identify, “whose idea was this?“, then we’ve found the author. Calvinists will often equivocate and say that it means “actually committing the sin,” or some such, but the ‘author’ of an action doesn’t necessarily describe someone directly committing that action, rather it denotes the one who came up with the action to begin with. A reasonable summary of how decree and authorship are related might be worded:

If a decree is made and its intentions carried out as a result, then the author of the decree is the author of the decree’s fulfilled intentions.

Looking at an example from scripture, this concept stands up quite well.

“So Pharaoh commanded all his people, saying, “Every son who is born [to the Hebrews] you shall cast into the river, and every daughter you shall save alive.” (Exodus 1:22)

As a result, Pharaoh’s men went and carried out his cruel order. To be sure, such a devilish scheme was an inexcusable crime against the people of God; our question then is who authored this crime?

Let’s assume for sake of argument that Pharaoh didn’t actually do any of the dirty work himself. So who authored this crime? The Hebrews? Hardly. The soldiers carried it out. Was it then his soldiers’ idea? Whether they did so willingly or unwillingly under threat of death doesn’t make a difference; they weren’t the ones that came up with the order, Pharaoh was. His subordinates’ level of willingness is irrelevant. His not lifting a finger in helping them perform it is irrelevant. Pharaoh was the one who made the decree, and it was Pharaoh’s intent that was carried out as a result. Pharaoh was the one who ultimately masterminded the act. Pharaoh authored the crime.

High Calvinist Theodicy

It can be fairly said then that whoever makes a decree that is carried out is the author of its intended action. Without fear of being charged with oversimplification then, high Calvinist theodicy can be easily broken with the questions:

Did God author sin?
Did God decree sin?
Did God not author His own decrees?

It’s as simple as that. If God specifically decreed that people sin, then God is the one who came up with the idea and is therefore its author (and the de facto mastermind behind it). Trying to deny the problem by redefining ‘author’ amounts to nothing more than playing word games. One need not ‘charge’ God with being the author of sin to give just such an implication from one’s doctrine. Hence Maxwell’s attempts to put down supposed slander are wholly misaimed and inconsequential, since what he and other Calvinists aren’t directly teaching doesn’t change what they’re effectively teaching.

What About Arminian Theodicy?

The Calvinist might try to confuse the issue by claiming that God decreed that man have free will, which man then turns to sin; therefore for the Arminian, sin is also a result of God’s decree. The answer to this charge is simple. Sin did indeed result from God’s endowing man with free will, but that result hinged upon the creatures’ independent wills, not by necessity of divine decree. In other words, God created good but somewhat independent agents who add their own independent choices to the mix, so that some parts of the outcome (e.g. their sin) are not what God decreed specifically. Or to put it more simply, creatures independently choosing to rebel doesn’t make God the author of their rebellion by virtue of His giving them free will.

For a hypothetical example similar to that cited in Exodus, what if Pharaoh had instead ordered his men, “Make sure the Hebrews don’t start a rebellion,” yet one of the officers assumed he could then commit infanticide and so misused his power? Would Pharaoh have then been the author of the crime? No, had it happened that way, the author would have been the subordinate officer who misused his authority in giving the order. In the same way, God has given us free will, but not necessitated that we misuse it in rebellion against Him.

Didn’t God intend Christ’s death?

Yes He did. God fully intended to offer up His only begotten Son as a sacrifice for sin. This doesn’t imply that He authored every evil intent used to obtain that result. If for the sake of others, one were to deliver his child into the hands of wicked men to do with as they please (even knowing their murderous intent), this would only imply that he was the author of offering up his child, the authors of the wicked schemes carried out are the evil men themselves. And as all sides would agree, God can turn the results of mens’ self-authored wicked intentions to accomplish His own purposes.

Another Red Herring

Calvinists will often try to dismiss the problem by saying that sin is something man does of his own will and motivations. For instance, Maxwell on this page cites a quote by Calvin:

every evil proceeds from no other fountain other than the wicked lusts of man

This sort of defense by an exhaustive determinist is a subtle attempt to draw attention away from where they believe man’s choices and motivations arise: What they’re not telling you is that they also believe that every choice, motivation, ‘wicked lust,’ vice, and evil imagination is specifically and immutably decreed by God. If you want to know where they think the sin actually originated, just pose the question,

“Has any creature who has ever sinned (unbelievers, believers, Adam, Eve, Satan, the fallen angels etc.) ever made that choice with some degree of independence so that it could have chosen differently, or have they always chosen exactly as God irresistibly and immutably decreed they choose?”

Unless you’re talking to one of the very rare free will Calvinists (such as Greg Koukl), the answer will always be the latter (or “I don’t know / it’s a mystery” if they’re feeling squeamish). It always ends up being unconditionally due to God’s decree. Clearly, all the rhetoric about sin proceeding from man’s evil motives is simply an evasion of the real issue, since to the high Calvinist, even the evil motives themselves don’t come from man’s abuse of his independent will, but irresistibly arise from God’s decree.

Conclusion

Given this determinist dogma, Calvinists simply denying that they believe God is the author of sin is hardly relevant. That’s akin to someone claiming that he doesn’t deny the physical resurrection of Christ while at the same time claiming that Christ’s body is still dead and buried. The two claims are mutually exclusive, thus to make them simultaneously is self-contradictory.

The Bible doesn’t directly state that “God isn’t the author of sin;” but the fact that the wickedness that exists in our world didn’t originate from within Him barely even needs be stated.

“This is the message which we have heard from Him and declare to you, that God is light and in Him is no darkness at all.” (1 John 1:5)

If one claims that God exhaustively and unconditionally predetermines every motive and thought, this is equivalent to saying that God is the originator every motive and thought, which inescapably includes God being the originator of every evil motive and thought. “A heart that devises wicked imaginations” is an abomination to God (Prov. 6:18), yet if high Calvinist dogma is to be believed, we’d have to conclude that God devised all of their depraved imaginations for them! Far better to believe the scriptures that testify both of God’s absolute Holiness as well as the choices that He in His sovereignty allows men to freely make, rather than Calvinism’s incoherent train wreck of a doctrine that (wittingly or no) makes Him into the mastermind behind every evil scheme.

Related Fallacies:
Special Pleading (Double Standard)
Equivocation
Straw man

“Of course, this raises the question, why does their God save a person to damn him? Why not simply leave him in his unsaved state?” – Steve Hays, ‘Tender Mercies‘

To get a better view of this fallacy, let’s examine the author’s argument more fully from the analogy he gives:

Suppose there’s a new student in high school. His family moved into the area a few weeks ago. Because he’s feeling lonely and out of place, suppose I appear to befriend him by inviting him to take a fishing trip with me and two of my high school buddies. He’s overjoyed to make some new friends. On the first day out, he falls into the water. Unfortunately, he can’t swim. Fortunately, I jump in to save him. He hugs me and thanks me profusely for saving his life. He tells us how much he’s looking forward to the life ahead of him. I nod and smile. The next day he falls into the water again. Only this time I don’t rescue him. I let him drown. What is more, I had premonition that this would happen before I ever invited him to join us on the fishing trip. I knew that when I saved him the day before, I’d let him die the day after. I knew all along, as he was hugging me and thanking me for saving his life, that I’d let him die the very next day. Why rescue him in the first place, only to let him drown a day later? Isn’t that cruel? …

Problems with this logic

This critical failure at critical thinking can be easily answered with a simple scriptural example:

“Moreover, brethren, I do not want you to be unaware that all our fathers were under the cloud, all passed through the sea, all were baptized into Moses in the cloud and in the sea, all ate the same spiritual food, and all drank the same spiritual drink. For they drank of that spiritual Rock that followed them, and that Rock was Christ. But with most of them God was not well pleased, for their bodies were scattered in the wilderness.” (1 Corinthians 10:1-5)

How each systematic theology interprets the events of Israel’s fall in the wilderness reveals much.

These answers are particularly ironic when the rest of the spiel is considered:

I know something he doesn’t. I know that he is doomed. But I allow him to entertain a tremendous sense of relief after his brush with death, even though, unbeknownst to him, that’s a temporary reprieve which is just a set-up for his untimely demise. How is that so very different than a serial killer who orchestrates the death of his victim by befriending the victim to gain his trust, so that he can toy with the victim before he delivers the coup de grâce?

“A set-up for his untimely demise”? Per the table above, if the Arminian view is that God didn’t want the children of Israel to fall, but the Calvinist view is that their fall was His perfect will, who then is framing God as setting them up for their demise?

“A serial killer who orchestrates the death of his victim…[toys] with the victim before he delivers the coup de grâce”? From where did their rebellious downfall ultimately originate? Note again that in the Arminian view, this was the Israelites’ own doing and not necessitated by the will of God; in the Calvinist view their rebellion was necessary due to God’s decree. So who then is portraying God as orchestrating the downfall of the people He had saved?

Who then portrays God acting cruelly?

Is it cruel of God to save people from destruction and give them a genuine opportunity to obtain the promise, even though He knows they will ultimately die in a self-started rebellion?

Or is it cruel for God to save people from destruction only to lead them out into the desert to die in a rebellion that He Himself inescapably decreed they commit?

The fact that God shows His continued kindness to men on a conditional basis is well-established in scripture (e.g. 2 Chronicles 16:6-9). So the logic of this argument then breaks down to the ridiculous position of condemning God as ‘cruel’ if He saves someone, but later lets him suffer the destructive consequences of his own free choices; and at the same time lauding Him as good and just if He saves someone, then later destroys him for choices that God decreed he make! That’s special pleading at its most absurd. Further, the author confuses and equivocates God merely allowing the evil to occur (the Arminian view) with God ‘setting up’ and ‘orchestrating’ the event (which better reflects his own exhaustively deterministic views). The comparison of God to a serial killer in that He’s eager to deliver the death blow is also a complete mischaracterization, since He doesn’t take pleasure in the death of the wicked (or their wickedness for that matter).

The missing piece

Back to the question of apostasy. Just as Israel fell in the wilderness after being saved from the wrath of Pharaoh, so the scriptures warn us against likewise incurring God’s judgment after He has shown us His goodness.

“See that you do not refuse Him who speaks. For if they did not escape who refused Him who spoke on earth, much more shall we not escape if we turn away from Him who speaks from heaven…” (Hebrews 12:25)

“Let us therefore be diligent to enter that rest, lest anyone fall according to the same example of disobedience.” (Hebrews 4:11)

“Therefore consider the goodness and severity of God: on those who fell, severity; but toward you, goodness, if you continue in His goodness. Otherwise you also will be cut off.” (Romans 11:22)

God wouldn’t be any more cruel for punishing such an apostate than He was for punishing the Israelites for their rebellion. Missing from the weak and badly misplaced ‘fishing trip’ analogy is any reference to the factor of willful rebellion against the Savior. Apostasy isn’t something that people suddenly just fall into by accident and without warning. The apostate isn’t some poor kid flailing in the water and crying for help to an uncaring and indifferent God. He’s the one who walked once, but is now an enemy of the cross (Philippians 3:18). He’s the false teacher who knew Christ, but turned away (2 Peter 2:20). He’s the servant who repays his king’s forgiveness with cruelty to his fellow servants (Matthew 18:23-35), and before the just Judge of all the earth, his sentence is the same as all who do not love our Lord Jesus Christ.

James G. McCarthy’s John Calvin Goes to Berkeley is an enjoyable book that deals with an important contemporary issue: the growth of Calvinism, especially among young people.  The setting is the famed University of California where some Calvinist members of a campus ministry are starting to make their presence known by putting pressure on the group leader to do things their way and to teach the Calvinistic view of predestination.  This development is very troubling to the leader and many of the group members who do not know a great deal about Calvinism, but know enough to be very uncomfortable with the idea of pushing Calvinism onto the other members of “University Christian Fellowship”.  Inevitable problems and conflicts ensue leading several members to embark on a quest to better understand the Biblical teaching on predestination.  The main Calvinist group member is dealing with pressures of his own since his pastor that he is counting on for a recommendation to a Reformed College is not at all happy with his membership in a group that is largely non-Calvinist.

The book has a few unexpected twists and plenty of sub plots that keep the story interesting even for those who don’t care much about the theological themes. The eventual solution to the predestination problem is intriguing and unexpected as well.  It will especially appeal to anyone who is involved with campus ministry or anyone who is interested in the Arminian and Calvinist debate.  I read the book very quickly due to my interest in both of the main themes and had a hard time putting the book down.  It leaves you anxious to find out what will happen next, especially regarding the student’s personal investigations regarding what the Bible has to say on the topic of predestination, and the interpersonal dynamics of the conflicts that result.

A concept that’s gained some popularity among Determinists is that God’s foreknowledge is incompatible with libertarian free will. One proponent of this idea is Dr. Linda Zagzebski, who has published works arguing this concept based upon the ‘Transfer of Necessity Principle’ (TNP)

Necessarily Non-Transferrable
The basic argument can be understood from a determinist dilemma by Diodorus Cronus, which I provide {translation} for where appropriate.

Let S = the proposition that there will be a sea battle tomorrow.

(1L) Yesterday it was true that S. [assumption]
(2L) If some proposition was true in the past, it is now-necessary that it was true then. [Form of the Necessity of the Past]
{we can’t change the fact that ‘S will happen tomorrow tomorrow’ was true in the past}
(3L) That yesterday it was true that S is now-necessary. [1, 2]
{we can’t now change that S happening tomorrow was true in the past}
(4L) Necessarily, if yesterday it was true that S, then now it is true that S. [omnitemporality of truth]
{if the proposition of a sea battle happening tomorrow was true yesterday, then it’s also true today}
(5L) If p is now-necessary, and necessarily (if p then q), then q is now-necessary. [Transfer of Necessity Principle]
(6L) Therefore, that it is true that S is now-necessary. [3L, 4L, 5L]
{there’s nothing we can do about the sea battle occurring tomorrow}
(7L) If its being true that S is now-necessary, no alternative to the truth of S is now-possible. [definition of “necessary”]
{it’s not possible now to prevent the sea battle tomorrow}
(8L) So no alternative to the truth of S is now-possible [6L, 7L]
(9L) If no alternative to the truth of a proposition about the future is now-possible, then what the proposition is about will not be brought about by free human choice. [Version of Principle of Alternate Possibilities]
(10L) Hence, the sea battle tomorrow will not be brought about by free human choice. [8L, 9L]

Simplifying this argument, it basically states,

P1 We have no power to change our past now. [necessity of the past]
P2 Propositions about what will happen in the future were true in our past.
C1 Therefore we can’t now change the truth about the propositions concerning the future that were true in the past, which implies we can’t do anything to affect the future. [transferring necessity of the past to the present]

The inoperability of this sort of logic can be demonstrated with little difficulty. It’s akin to the hypothetical example a man who is speeding at 90 mph in a 35 zone. A patrol officer pulls him over to ticket him, but the man protests that he couldn’t have done differently because of his speedometer’s reading:

“Yesterday, it was true that the speedometer was going to hit 90 mph in this zone today. The speedometer functions perfectly, so its indication of the car’s speed is accurate. I obviously can’t ever change what’s in the past, so I couldn’t change what the speedometer was going to say, therefore I couldn’t help how fast the car was going to travel because of my speedometer’s reading.”

Try that one on a traffic cop some time and see how it works. This is of course an absurd statement; the question is ‘why?’

Temporal Dependence of Omnitemporal Truth

The flaw in this argument is failure to distinguish between events in the past and propositional truth values in the past. What’s the difference? One word: dependence. Events from the past are completely independent (and thus aren’t affectable) by events after that point in the past. I drove to work yesterday. This is a fact from the past, and nothing after that point in the past can affect it. What if I yesterday put forth the proposition that the stock market would fall 5 points today? Is the truthfulness of that proposition likewise completely independent of anything that happens today? Certainly not; its truthfulness rather depends on what happens today.

Propositions about events within time aren’t true in and of themselves, they’re true based upon the events they reference actually occurring within time. The problem with the syllogism arises with the premises,

(2L) If some proposition was true in the past, it is now-necessary that it was true then. [Form of the Necessity of the Past]
(3L) That yesterday it was true that S is now-necessary. [1, 2]
4L) Necessarily, if yesterday it was true that S, then now it is true that S. [omnitemporality of truth]

But if S being true depends upon the event that it references actually occurring on the prescribed date, then S being true isn’t ‘now necessary,’ it’s rather contingent upon that future event, and doesn’t really prove anything about S being necessarily true between yesterday and when that event is to occur. Thus the argument for necessity by transfer of necessity principle being applied to truth values is invalidated with the arguments:

P1 For phenomenon P to be non-affectable by anything at point in time B, it must be independent of anything at B.
P2 Events at point in time A (which is prior to B) are independent of anything at B.
C1 Past events are independent of, and therefore aren’t affectable by any events subsequent to the point of time in which they occur.

P3 Per C1, past events are independent of & not affectable by subsequent events.
P4 Let Pr be a proposition about an event at point in time C (C is subsequent points A and B). Whether Pr is true or false at point in time A is completely dependent upon events in point in time C.
C2 Therefore the future-independent events at point A not being affectable by anything subsequent to A, tells us nothing about future-dependent truth values at point A not being affectable by anything subsequent to A.

Clearly, if it can’t be shown that “event X isn’t affectable at point A,” then it can’t rightly be said, “event X is necessary at point A.”

How can we now establish or falsify the truth value of propositions in the past? If someone made a proposition in the past that I would write on philosophy at this moment in time, then that proposition’s truthfulness wasn’t completely settled by a past event, it’s unarguably settled by my choice now; it indeed had a truth value in the past, but was still entirely dependent upon this moment. Truth being omnitemporal (thus spanning all time, not merely localized) can contain true propositions about future events that have dependencies on those future events as the basis of their truth values.

Some may argue that this is ‘retro-causation,’ but retro-causation involves time-bound phenomena (making what comes after in time cause what comes before in time). The omnitemporal truth can be point-in-time dependent, but isn’t time-bound (truth isn’t an ‘event’), and therefore the sequence is logical, not chronological. The implication,

“There will be a sea battle tomorrow -> therefore the proposition made yesterday that there will be a sea battle tomorrow is true”

is then perfectly sound. Therefore, it’s quite valid to say that whether previously made propositions about future events are true or not depends upon those events – not vice-versa. The line of argumentation some Determinists propose appears to rely upon events being subject to the truth values of certain propositions (the logical effect of the events) rather than recognizing that the truthfulness of propositions that reference events in time are dependent upon those events at that point in time, and thus are not very different from the above “the speedometer made me do it” argument. With this in mind, we address Zagzebski’s dilemma of foreknowledge.

Dilemma of Foreknowledge and Modal Temporal Asymmetry

I’ll again provide {translation} where appropriate. Zagzebski writes,

…let T = the proposition that you will answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am.

(1f) There is (and was before now) an essentially omniscient foreknower (EOF) [Assumption for dilemma]
{God knows what will happen}
(1f) and the Principle of the Necessity of the Past tells us that
(2f) Either it is now-necessary that the EOF believed T before now or it is now-necessary that the EOF believed not T before now.
{you can’t now-affect whether God has believed you’d answer the phone}
From (1f) and the definition of an EOF it follows that
(3f) Necessarily (The EOF believed before now that T -> T), and necessarily (The EOF believed before now that not T -> not T).
{the event has to happens as God believes it will}
By the Transfer of Necessity Principle (TNP), (2f) and (3f) entail
(4f) Either it is now-necessary that T or it is now-necessary that not T.
(4f) is logically equivalent to
(5f) Either it is not now-possible that T or it is not now-possible that not T.
{if you will or won’t answer the telephone, there is nothing you can do now to affect it}
From the Principle of the Contingency of the Future we get
(6f) It is now-possible that T and it is now-possible that not T.
{if you really have free will, you can now affect whether you’ll answer the phone or not}
But (6f) contradicts (5f).
{to say “you can affect it” and “you can’t affect it” is a contradiction}

Same mistake, different words. All that’s been done is replacing truth-values with God’s knowledge. I do firmly believe that God exhaustively knows the future, but it doesn’t follow that men have no power of choice. I’ve expressed my belief that God is both transcendent and immanent; His knowledge transcending time, and thus not being constrained therein (implying that He doesn’t need to ‘wait’ for the future to happen to know what will unfold). I’ve also speculated that His knowledge of individuals’ choices may be derived from integral factors of self-determination abstracted from space-time (but manifest in time as our choices), which constitutes a sort of transcendent middle-knowledge. Both have the commonality that God’s knowledge of individual human choices is to some degree dependent upon the individuals’ independent self-determination.

As such, God’s “knowledge in the past” that concerns our choices in the future, just as propositional truth values in the past concerning the future, wouldn’t be independent of what it’s derived from. Thus Zagzebski’s premises:

(1f) and the Principle of the Necessity of the Past tells us that
(2f) Either it is now-necessary that the EOF believed T before now or it is now-necessary that the EOF believed not T before now.,

are incorrect: Assuming the omniscient God has allowed T to be decided by the agent’s self-determination, whether He has believed/not-believed T about our future isn’t now-necessary (i.e. out of the agent’s control), because it’s not independent of what the agent wills. If God infallibly knows something about the future based upon agent causation, then that event isn’t necessary, but certain due to that contingency. Zagzebski’s argument, assuming that God can know the future without causing it and substituting ‘certainty’ for ‘necessity,’ would come out as,

Assuming for sake of argument, K = that God foreknows one’s free choices based upon his independent self-determination

(1) Yesterday God infallibly knew T rather than ~T. [Supposition of infallible divine knowledge]
(2) If E was in the past, it is now-certain that E was then. [Principle of the Fixity of the Past]
(3) It is now-certain that yesterday God knew T. [1, 2]
(4) Certainly, if yesterday God knew T, then T. [Definition of “infallibility”]
(5) If p is now-certain, and certainly (p -> q), then q is now-certain.
(6) So it is now-certain that T. [3,4,5]
(7) If it is now-certain that T, then you won’t do other than answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am. [Definition of “certain”]
(8) Since certainty doesn’t imply necessity, then certainty of T doesn’t negate the fact that T comes about by your independent self-determination. [K, Distinction of certainty from necessity]
(9) Because the truth value of T is independently decided by the agent, and the decision wasn’t necessary, the truth value of ~T was also decided upon by the agent -> ~T was an available option. [K, 8]
(10) Therefore, despite the available option to not answer the telephone, you will choose to answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am. [6, 7, 9]
(11) If you can do otherwise (have other options available) when you act, you are acting freely. [10, Principle of Contrary Choice]
(12) Therefore, when you answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am, despite God’s certain and infallible knowledge of T, you are doing it freely. [1, 8, 11]

Do We “Change What God Knows?” – Arguments Against Transcendent Foreknowledge

The transcendence argument has been proposed before, and Zagzebski makes a move to counter it:

I have argued (Zagzebski 1991, chap. 2) that the timelessness move does not avoid the problem of theological fatalism since an argument structurally parallel to the basic argument can be formulated for timeless knowledge. If God is not in time, the key issue would not be the necessity of the past, but the necessity of the timeless realm. So the first three steps of the argument would be reformulated as follows:

(1t) God timelessly knows T.
(2t) If E is in the timeless realm, then it is now-necessary that E.
(3t) It is now-necessary that T.

Perhaps it is inappropriate to say that timeless events such as God’s timeless knowing are now-necessary, yet we have no more reason to think we can do anything about God’s timeless knowing than about God’s past knowing.

The author of that statement misses the obvious here: what’s in the “timeless realm,” assuming God is transcendent and not merely divorced from time, necessarily encompasses what’s in the temporal. Since God’s perspective would encompass all associated with what we know as space-time (much as an exhaustive printed timeline would be to us), this would necessarily include our independent self-determination. Thus, the choices we make in what is our ‘now’ must be reflected in what God perceives as ‘all time,’ which would account for God’s knowledge of libertarian decisions. When you make a choice among possible options now, you aren’t “changing what God knows,” but your choices/self-determination are rather what constitute what He perceives (and therefore knows).

This is quite akin to the philosophical misconception about truth values discussed above. Actions and events today don’t change what was true yesterday, they establish which propositions about today are true at all times. Likewise, what we choose doesn’t change what God knows about our choices, it is what God knows about our choices.

Conclusion

The Transfer of Necessity as applied by Cronus to propositional truth values and Zagzebski to divine foreknowledge raises numerous problems and absurdities, as well failing to adequately address the resolution of epistemological certainty based upon non-temporally-limited perception.

Of course, if Determinists want to try to limit God’s knowledge by time in arguing He can’t now know the future unless He exhaustively predetermined it beforehand, the same kind of flawed logic present in the above TNP arguments they propound can be just as easily turned around:

P1 God elected some men unto salvation.
P2 The truth of the names and number of all the elect was also true prior to God electing them.
C Applying transfer of necessity of the past, the identities of the elect were then necessary at the point when God elected them -> Therefore God couldn’t have chosen who to save any differently than He did, and He didn’t freely choose who to save.

Cleaning up the mess TNP makes by applying the distinction between events and truth values of propositions (as well as certainty versus necessity), the ridiculous argument for God having no freedom in election becomes:

P1a God elected some men unto salvation.
P2a The truth of the names and number of all the elect was also true logically prior to God electing them, but was directly dependent upon His choice.
Ca Therefore God conceivably could have chosen differently than He did, and thus was free in His choosing.

So the truth of who the elect are and how many they are is dependent upon God’s free choice; His choosing isn’t subject to some higher-than-God immutable truth value that compels Him to choose specific people. And our patrol officer retorts:

“Yesterday, it was true that the speedometer was going to hit 90 mph in this zone today. The speedometer functions perfectly, so its indication of the car’s speed is accurate; and yes, you obviously can’t ever change what’s in the past. But your actions today were what made that proposition in the past a true one, so that proposition being true was irrelevant in determining your choice today, therefore the speed it registered doesn’t mean you couldn’t have done differently, therefore you’re still gettin’ your ticket wiseguy.”